[TRINPsite, 58.40.7-62.03.1, mvvm.net/En/MNI/BoS1-6.txt                    ]
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MODEL OF NEUTRAL-INCLUSIVITY by Vinsent Nandi, 41-62 aSWW



BOOK OF SYMBOLS [all chapters]



1  THE REPRESENTATION OF NEUTRAL-INCLUSIVITY


1.1  INSTRUMENTALISM, FUNDAMENTALISM AND SYMBOLISM


The ideological approach of this Model is predominantly instrumentalistic in 
the Book of Instruments, predominantly fundamentalistic in the Book of 
Fundamentals and predominantly symbolistic in the Book of Symbols.

By instrumentalism we then understand the doctrine that certain ideas and 
theories are instruments of action --also of further theorizing-- and that 
their usefulness determines their truth, or their theoretical value. The 
Model of Neutral-Inclusivity is by no means instrumentalistic in that it 
would consider true what would be ultimately useful or satisfying to 
believe: it does not espouse such a 'pragmatic' theory of truth. It is only 
instrumentalistic with respect to the instruments which are useful to arrive 
at the ideological foundation laid in the Book of Fundamentals. These 
instruments are concepts and theories which do not have to be entirely 
adequate and true, or the sole feasible ones. What is important is that they 
are (believed to be) the most helpful instruments to explain the source and 
scope of the theories and objectives put forward in the Book of 
Fundamentals. Obviously, none of the instrumental theories or ideas ought to 
be false in the sense of being contrary to established fact, or of being 
incoherent, or more incoherent (and implausible) than any alternative theory 
or idea. The Book of Fundamentals determines our ultimate denominational 
objectives, and whatever reasonable theoretical means are best to attain 
these have been adopted in the Book of Instruments, or may be adopted 
instead. The theories and ideas in that book have no independent value. The 
importance of the Book of Instruments is therefore mostly relative in that 
there may be other, better or more correct means to arrive at the Model's 
central destination.

By fundamentalism (in a normist sense) we shall understand the doctrine that 
certain theories and ideas must be interpreted literally and that they are 
true or correct and/or useful by themselves. The Model of Neutral- 
Inclusivity is fundamentalistic with regard to the catenical interpretation 
of nonpropositional reality and the veridicalist interpretation of the 
principle of truth, and with regard to the norm of neutrality and the norm 
of inclusivity. The catenical theory may be looked at in an instrumentalist 
way tho insofar as a different theoretical approach would not affect the 
substance of neutralism or neutral-inclusivism. This substance is to be 
found in the Book of Fundamentals, the heart of the Model. It is in this 
book that our body of disciplinary thought is established as a paradigm or 
paradigm-to- be. The Book of Fundamentals supplies the minimum constituents 
without which the DNI would not be a neutral-inclusivist denominational 
doctrine and part of the Ananorm.

By symbolism we shall understand the use of symbols, particularly when 
expressing the invisible or intangible by means of visible or tangible or 
different linguistic representations. From the theoretical denominational 
point of view these symbols are neither instrumental nor fundamental to the 
development of the doctrine, however great their import may be from the 
artistic or practical standpoint. The Model is symbolistic with regard to 
the generation and use of symbols, precisely because it does not consider 
symbols instrumentally necessary or fundamental. Whereas in religious, 
theocentrist ideologies 'fundamentalism' is characterized by a strict and 
obligatory, unrelenting adherence to, and literal interpretation of, 
denominational systems of symbols --as non-supernaturalists would call it--, 
in the DNI fundamentalism stands for what is fundamental to the doctrine as 
distinct from what is ('merely') symbolic. Such does not mean that neutral-
inclusivist fundamentalism would be antisymbolic or literalistic: the 
symbolism of the DNI itself could then never have come into being. Our 
doctrine as a whole is presentationally inclusive. That is, it allows the 
expression of neutral- inclusive thoughts and feelings thru symbols, but it 
does not command so. While the present book will supply some generative 
principles of the DNI's symbolism, such symbolism is not required for the 
individual adherent to be able to live under the neutral-inclusive Norm. 
Yet, it is required for the doctrine itself in order to be, and to function 
as, a denominational doctrine.

It was argued in section 2.2.1 of the Book of Fundamentals that both literal
communication and communication by means of nonliteral or nonlinguistic
symbols should be treated in their own right. But it was also argued there
that denominational symbols can only acquire a proper meaning in combination
with a more or less literal system of communication. That is why symbolism
with respect to the DNI or the Ananorm is not a choice for Ananormative
symbols instead of what is fundamental to the doctrine but in addition to
what is fundamental to it.

When denominational practises are not only symbolic (or supernaturalistic)
but also formalized, people speak of "rituals" and "ritual symbolism". This
formalization is a matter of concern, for in the ritual symbolism of
religious ideologies processes of disintegration and degeneration have not
been uncommon in which the nonsymbolic and the symbolic components of the
denominational system in question developed into two separate systems. The
reason for this was that the ritual and other symbols did not reflect the
same values as those of the nonsymbolic original anymore. The adherents of
such ideologies did thus in the course of history become more and more
sidetracked into a completely meaningless observance of a dotty and dusty
ritualism formulated by the priests (instead of by the author(s) or early
teacher(s) of the doctrine). The influence of those priests and the caste,
religious organization or temple society they belonged to led to decay
several times. New denominational doctrines were developed in the past for
the sole purpose of restoring the original norms and values with which an
antiquated ritualism and a fusty religious hierarchy had lost all contact.

There is no or little danger that the symbols to be presented in this book 
will be similarly responsible for an alienation from the fundamental values 
of neutral and inclusive thought. There would be such a risk in the use of 
ritual symbols, if they were part of obligatory ceremonial acts. Those 
giving themselves up to the formalized observance of such rituals would then 
probably start losing sight of the essentials of the weltanschauung. In the 
DNI such obligatory ritualism is not only nonexistent, in this veridicalist 
doctrine rituals or other forms of symbolism cannot be substituted for 
fundamental thought and action or nonaction in the first place.

Just as activating neutralism must include everything of nonactivating 
neutralism but not (necessarily) the other way round, so symbolist 
neutralism must include everything of fundamentalist neutralism altho not 
(necessarily) the other way round. When considering both the distinction 
between fundamentalist and symbolist neutralism, and between nonactivating 
and activating neutralism, the activating-symbolist variant is clearly the 
'strongest' or most far-reaching one of the DNI, whereas the nonactivating- 
fundamentalist variant is the 'weakest' or least exacting one. The 
activating- fundamentalist and nonactivating-symbolist variants lie 
somewhere in between.



1.2  THE NEED AND SIGNIFICANCE OF SYMBOLS


1.2.1  THE PRESENTATIVE VERSUS THE REPRESENTATIVE


1.2.1.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE   SYMBOL   OF   SYMBOLS

The highest symbol,
the symbol of symbols,
of the neutral-inclusive Norm
is the all-neutral supreme being.

No-one shall honor or dishonor
those who recognize the symbol of symbols,
and no-one shall dishonor or honor
those who do not recognize the symbol of symbols.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------


The psychological and sociological need of a universal, cosmic frame of 
reference can be satisfied in a direct, 'presentative', way or in an 
indirect, 'representative' or symbolic, way. A presentative system relates 
things and events directly to one another and to certain combinations of 
existing or fictitious matters as they are or are believed to be in 
themselves. In a representative system things are not so much important for 
what they are (believed to be), but for what they represent. In such a 
system things and events are related to one or more symbols which reflect 
the same ideas and values as the presentative system. Because the underlying 
ideas and values are the same, a representative system is not irrational and 
counterargumentative but rather nonrational and nonargumentative. The 
addition of symbolic entities or different forms of symbolism to the 
fundamental frame of reference may not satisfy the intellectual component of 
the human need of a (veridicalist) worldview in the way direct presentation 
does, it will provide a basis for the satisfaction of human feelings without 
having to yield to metaphysical or theoretical put-offs and exclusivist
inconsistences.

The satisfaction of the need of a descriptive or factual-modal, presentative 
frame of reference is what could be called "the informative function of 
denominationalism" (or "of ideology" in general); the satisfaction of the 
need of a normative, presentative system is then its 'imperative function'; 
and the satisfaction of the need of a symbolic, representative system, its 
'emotive function'. (These functions have already been discussed in 
I.6.1.2.) To deny the need and significance of the direct presentation of 
not only factual and modal conditions but also of norms, would be irrational 
and testify to abnegational literalism or aggrandizemental symbolic 
exclusivism. On the other hand, it would testify as much to presentational 
exism if the need and significance of the re-presentation of factual, modal 
and normative conditions thru symbols were denied. In our case this is the 
need not only of the presentation of neutral-inclusivity as set out in the 
Book of Fundamentals but also the need of the representation of neutral-
inclusivity.

If a human denominational doctrine or ideology is devoid of any meaningful 
symbolism and confines itself to what is considered fundamental or rational, 
it is human individuals who are bound to become themselves the idolized 
symbols of such a denominational doctrine or ideology. Those human 
individuals may be, for example, the originator of the doctrine in question, 
the founder(s) of the first or largest organization of that doctrine or a 
latter-day adherent who is believed or claimed to have been much more 
intelligent, artistic or virtuous than the average one. Because of the lack 
of nonpersonal or person-neutral symbols an ideology without a symbol- 
generating faculty, but with a considerable number of adherents 
nevertheless, will tend to degenerate more and more into a cult of 
individual exclusivism. Even an egalitarian doctrine can thus give rise to 
the idolization, if not deification, of a human being. It is not hard to 
find examples of ideologies, poor in meaningful symbols, of which the 
exponents have named one building or prize after the other for a particular 
person or member of a small, exclusive group of persons --or should we say 
"men"? Such onomastic exclusivism proves that the need of symbols (also 
nonlinguistic ones) does exist, and that our own doctrine must be capable of 
providing the deductive, heuristic, creative and other means to satisfy this 
need in an inclusivist manner.



1.2.2  SYMBOLS AND THE MENTAL OR SPIRITUAL


The popular distinction between what is termed "mental", "spiritual" or
"psych(olog)ical" on the one hand and "physical" or "material" on the other
is a metaphysical concoction of a number of clearly, or at least more
clearly, definable distinctions, such as:

  mental or personal vs bodily (or physical)
  abstract (non-spatiotemporal) vs concrete (spatiotemporal)
  propositional vs nonpropositional
  cultural vs natural
  visual (and auditory) vs tactual (gustatory and olfactory)
  symbolic (representative) vs nonsymbolic (presentative)

It is remarkable that human symbolism in ideology and in art is mainly, and 
often only, visual and auditory so far as the five senses are concerned. 
Traditionally human beings seem to more closely connect the visual, or 
visual and auditory, with what is or can be of symbolic significance than 
they do with respect to the other senses. There is no need for this, 
however, since symbols can in principle also use the sense of touch, of 
taste or of smell.

The above list of antitheses illustrates how the symbolic and the visual 
together are drawn into the sphere of the mental and of culture, whereas the 
presentative and the tactual stay in the sphere of the physical and of 
nature. At the same time the presentative is associated with the concrete 
ground-world; and the representative with abstract, propositional reality. 
Yet, in actual fact, a visual symbol is as 'concrete' as a tactual symbol. 
Concrete symbols are, perhaps, not propositional, but abstract symbols can 
be either propositional or nonpropositional.

Preferably symbols should not only adequately represent a certain idea or 
discipline, but have beauty as well. Beauty itself is a concept which is 
often put on the side of the visual(-auditory), culture (or art), the 
abstract and the propositional (or literature) with the symbolic. It is 
traditionally restricted to what is pleasing to the eye or the ear or to 
what pleasurably exalts the mind or spirit. Esthetics, which is 
etymologically supposed to deal with all sense perception, tends to deal 
exclusively or predominantly with the visual. It could be said that the 
beautiful and esthetic refer to the visual or visual-auditory by definition, 
but then similar kinds of concept and theory can be developed with regard to 
the senses of touch, taste and smell. Of course, there are words like nice, 
fine and delicious which can denote that something is pleasing to one or 
more of the three other senses. But they are either employed for all senses 
or associated with what pleasurably exalts the body in particular. For sure, 
this is not wrong. What is wrong is to suggest that beauty in the visual 
field would be less physical or spatiotemporal than the experience of a nice 
feeling in the tactual, or one of the other nonvisual, fields. Such an 
attitude is not warrantable: if a visual symbol or other thing should look 
good or be nice to look at, a tactual symbol or other thing should feel good 
or be nice to touch. Neither symbol or thing is more spiritual or more 
physical than the other. (Let alone more sexual in that intentionally 
touching a nice human body would be plain eroticism, whereas intentionally 
looking at such a body would be pure esthetics.)

Maybe something is 'beautiful' when it pleases the sense of sight or 
hearing. To be attractive, however, it does not only have to please the eyes 
or the ears, but also to represent something valuable. Beauty covers the 
presentative aspect of something, but there is also an (often not less) 
important representational aspect. (If beauty is said to cover both aspects, 
then being beautiful is not solely a question of pleasing the senses.) The 
representational aspect becomes most noticeable when the beautiful is 
expressed by artistic means, for the use of symbols (in the widest sense of 
the word) is essential to art in particular. Evidently, what applies to 
beauty and to the senses of sight and hearing, applies to the senses in 
general, even tho ordinary language may have no analogs of beauty and 
attractiveness for all five senses. If one does make the distinction between 
beauty and its analogs on the one hand, and attractiveness and its analogs 
on the other, and if one wants to associate this with the distinction 
mental/physical, it is attractiveness and its analogs which have both a 
physical and a mental or spiritual dimension, regardless of the kind of 
sense concerned.



1.3  WAYS OF CLASSIFYING SYMBOLS


1.3.1  ON THE BASIS OF MEDIUM, DEDUCTIBILITY AND FUNCTION


As said in the previous division there is a tendency in traditional thought 
to associate the symbolic with the visual-auditory and the spiritual, 
whereas in actual fact the symbolic need not be visual or auditory, and is 
not less 'spiritual' when it is not. Now, when speaking of 'visual', 
'auditory' and other symbols, we classify them on the basis of medium. But 
this is merely one way of classifying symbols (or modes of generative 
symbolism); there are at least four different criterions on the basis of 
which they can be subdivided, namely:

  the medium of representation
  the deductibility of the symbol
  the symbol's primary function
  the symbol's ideological acceptability

Granted that human beings have usually five senses, the classification on 
the basis of the medium of representation involved yields five types of 
symbol. They are, with the corresponding sensory modalities:

  1.  visual: the sense of sight
  2.  auditory: the sense of hearing
  3.  olfactory: the sense of smell
  4.  tactual: the sense of touch
  5.  gustatory: the sense of taste

Examples of ancient symbols which are not visual-auditory are the burning of
incense and the kissing of something which is believed to be holy or sacred.
The former symbol is olfactory, the latter one tactual. (Tactual is to be
preferred to tactile because of the analogy with visual. Compare also
visualize with tactualize.)

For all five mediums it must in principle be possible to find or create 
symbols which can represent neutral-inclusivity in general, or neutrality 
proper and neutral-directedness in particular. For example, pure water as a 
neutral liquid which is neither acid nor basic can be used as an ideal 
gustatory symbol representing neutrality proper or neutral-inclusivity in 
general. Insofar as the neutrality of water is, or can be, connected with 
the notion of inclusivity, it is etymologically justifiable to look at and 
experience water as a 'holy' substance. This must then be understood in a 
symbolic fashion. To unconditionally believe that water would literally 
always have a purifying or healing effect is supernaturalism.

Water may be suitable as a chemical symbol of neutrality, it does not follow 
from the norm of neutrality that it should be. Likewise, a symmetrical 
design, for instance, may very appropriately represent neutrality too, but 
it cannot be proved in any way that neutrality proper must per se be 
represented by symmetry even tho it is certain that neutrality proper cannot 
be represented by asymmetry. The choice of water and something which is 
symmetrical as neutralist symbols can be defended because of their inherent 
qualities. Perfect neutrality does indeed appear as symmetry of the purest 
water. Yet, the choice of water and symmetry as symbols is not an 
automatical result of the choice of neutrality as a normative value. In 
other words, the symbolic significance of such elements cannot be deduced 
from the perfective value of neutrality. Altho it never can in a way, there 
are considerable gradual differences nevertheless.

Some entities (the supreme being in particular) stand on the borderline of 
the presentative and the symbolic. They have practically the same 
significance whether viewed from a presentative or from a representative 
angle. Other entities or elements, like water, only become significant in a 
symbolist sense because of what they represent, and not so much for what 
they are. A being like the supreme being is in its representative capacity a 
fundamental symbol. The deductibility of such a fundamental symbol is 
maximal. That is why the distinction between fundamental and nonfundamental 
symbols can be said to be one on the basis of the deductibility of these 
symbols. In the third chapter it will be discussed in more detail why the 
supreme being is indeed a fundamental symbol of neutralism.

Nonfundamental symbols can be subdivided on the basis of their primary
function. At least three types of symbol can be distinguished in this way.
They are, with the phenomena or activities with respect to which they play a
role:

  linguistic: the choice and use of words and names
  emotional: expressions like celebration and mourning
  ritual: formal acts or series of acts

We will treat of linguistic symbolism in the next chapter, and of emotional 
and ritual symbolism in Chapter Five. The first reason to discuss the 
linguistic symbols (in Chapter Two) before the fundamental ones (in Chaper 
Three) is that even fundamental thought has to make use of linguistic 
symbols for its communication. The second reason is that the different types 
of symbolism do, of course, occur in combination too, and by treating 
linguistic symbolism first it is possible to immediately apply this form of 
symbolism --of generative symbolism in the case of the Ananorm-- to a number 
of nonlinguistic symbols to be presented in the later chapters. Before doing 
this tho, we should consider a fourth way of categorizing symbols.



1.3.2  ON THE BASIS OF ACCEPTABILITY


It needs no explanation that a symbol typical of the DNI which represents 
neutral-inclusivity, or the neutral-inclusivistic interpretation of truth 
and relevance, is for us an acceptable symbol. But, conversely, an 
acceptable symbol need not per se be a symbol typical of the DNI; it may 
also be a non- or interdenominational symbol or a symbol which originated in 
another ideology. Symbols of other ideologies than the DNI are not 
necessarily incompatible with Ananormative concepts and principles. 
Partially the symbolism of a different doctrine may more or less 
accidentally even coincide with one or more aspects of the neutral-inclusive 
symbolism. Or, the use of a symbol may be acceptable but not the traditional 
interpretation as taught by such a doctrine.

On the basis of acceptability four types of symbol can be distinguished. 
They are:

  1.  typical symbols: symbols typical of the DNI or the Ananorm
  2.  compatible symbols: acceptable symbols which are not typical of the
      Ananorm
  3.  antisymbols: unacceptable symbols which are somehow imposed on
      adherents of the Ananorm
  4.  nonimposed incompatible symbols: unacceptable symbols which are in no
      way imposed on adherents of the Ananorm

To every symbol to which a positive value is assigned by one ideological 
group (the in-group) a negative value can be assigned by another ideological 
group (the out-group). If a symbol is supposed to represent a positive value 
but is in some way forced upon a person or group for which it has a negative 
value, then it is an antisymbol for that person or group. Hence, it is the 
combination of incompatibility and importunity, even when merely 
psychological, which makes the symbol of another ideology into an 
antisymbol. A symbol with which we are not unnecessarily and involuntarily 
confronted need not be experienced as an antisymbol, however much what it 
stands for may deviate from our own denominational convictions.

People for whom a certain symbol represents a positive value, and people who 
do not care in this respect, cannot judge very well whether this same symbol 
represents a negative value or not for a person or group adhering to an 
ideology with another system of symbols. Especially when such a symbol is in 
some way foisted onto nonadherents, it may, because of the injustice 
involved, even have a much stronger negative meaning for those upon whom it 
is imposed than a positive meaning for those who accept the symbolism it 
forms part of. State religionists, for instance, and people without a 
denominational belief, often claim that symbols are not important when the 
matter of the imposition of certain symbols by the state is raised. Yet, 
they only dare claim this so long as those symbols represent their own or 
the traditional paradigm. Similarly, they may speak of "the need of empathy 
in morality" so long as this does not refer to the ability to understand 
veridicalistic or other nonreligious feelings towards imposed religious 
symbols.

In those countries which do not respect denominational or ideological 
inclusivity, such as the complete separation of state and religion, it is 
easy to find examples of antisymbols in the law, the state rituals, the 
flag, the so-called 'national' anthem, the official days of observance, the 
money issued, the names given to public buildings and streets, and so on and 
so forth. In religionist states it is the symbols of one particular religion 
or set of religions (such as the monotheist ones) which have been adopted by 
the governmental apparatus itself. By the manner of presenting and 
perpetuating them officially, those symbols are imposed upon all citizens 
regardless of the denominational doctrine or ideology these citizens 
personally sympathize with. In such states all citizens are legally and/or 
socially forced to directly or indirectly pay respect to the symbolism of 
one privileged religion or set of religions. The symbol, system of symbols 
or form of symbolism in question may (and should) therefore acquire a 
definitely negative connotation: it becomes a symbol of denominational 
discrimination or exclusivism; perhaps of general, ideological exclusivism; 
perhaps of nonphysical or general, subanthropic exclusivism; and perhaps 
even of exclusivism in general, particularly for members of the 
relevantistic community.

In countries or regions where there is a complete, fundamental and symbolic, 
separation of state and religion or comprehensive ideology in general, the 
adherents of the neutral-inclusive Norm will be able to live in peaceful 
coexistence with other citizens and without antisymbols. No denominational 
symbol, not even a neutralistic one, will then be forced upon them. In all 
those countries or regions of the world where the adherents of the Ananorm 
are confronted with antisymbols, they shall take those symbols at least as 
seriously as the people who flout the right to personhood or the principle 
of ideological inclusivity. But instead of propagating those symbols, they 
shall oppose them with arguments and all other suitable means; or, so long 
as ideological or denominational equality is not respected by the exponents 
of the counterideology in question, they shall replace or juxtapose those 
antisymbols with the intrinsic symbols of neutralism-inclusivism, if 
necessary even in an interideological context.

The right to personhood and the principle of denominational inclusivity 
require the total, fundamental and symbolic, separation of state and 
comprehensive ideology, whether theocentristic or normistic, religious or 
nonreligious, theodemonistic or nontheodemonistic, and whether recognizing a 
principal being or not recognizing such a being. Since a person's world-
outlook is a private affair (if, and to the extent that not everyone's world-
outlook is the same), 'e must not in any way, alone or with others, use 
public institutions to impose the particular, doctrinal values and/or 
symbols of 'er ideology on other citizens who do not believe in those values 
or symbols.

Even for those living in a time in which countless forms of interideological 
exclusivism afflict the whole world, once the moment must come that in all 
countries of this same world, or in the only country as the case may be, all 
forms of denominational exclusivity and exclusion will be eradicated both in 
the fundamental and in the symbolic field. Humankind should be able to 
celebrate the dawning of this age of worldwide denominational freedom and 
equality in the year 1.

Those who naively claim that the year 1 passed already hundreds or thousands 
of years ago have merely been deceived, or have merely deceived themselves, 
into believing that the system of chronological notation of their own part 
of the world, or of the denominational paradigm of their own time, would 
have universal validity. But a year numbered according to a supernaturalist 
or exclusivist system of chronological notation can never mark the beginning 
of an era of respect for people, regardless of their denominational 
convictions; at the most it will mark the end of the era of the old 
paradigm's symbol imposition, and hopefully of all supernaturalism and 
exclusivism with it. Moreover, the year EI 1 (that is, of the era of 
denominational or ideological inclusivity) does not and must not in any way 
indicate the official adoption by the state of one or more symbols typical 
of the DNI either, as this itself would be ideologically exclusivistic.

The age-old, irrelevantist systems of chronological notation are the last 
antisymbols to be officially abolished when all other vestiges of state 
religionism or totalitarianism have already been wiped out. The abolition of 
these last official antisymbols should therefore take place in the year BI 
1, that is, before (the era of denominational or ideological) inclusivity.

Only the future can tell those people who lived in the times of state 
religionism and other brands of ideological totalitarianism what year they 
really lived in or 'will have lived in': was it something like BI 100? BI 
200? BI 400? The early readers of this Model, or all the people who were 
born before the year 1, should not only hope that the exclusivist era will 
not last much longer, they should personally contribute to (the hastening 
of) its actual arrest. The least they can do, then, is not to voluntarily 
perpetuate its unacceptable symbolism.



2  THE CHOICE OF WORDS AND NAMES


2.1  THE USE AND NONUSE OF LINGUISTIC SYMBOLS


2.1.1  LITERAL, METONYMICAL AND VERBAL SYMBOLISM
       [not available]



2.1.2  THE NEUTRAL-INCLUSIVIST CHOICE OF LINGUISTIC SYMBOLS


Everyone's use and nonuse of words, as ordinary linguistic symbols, is, in
the first place, dependent on the language of communication. However, within
the framework of such a language, the vocabulary of the neutral-inclusivist
will or may differ from other vocabularies in the following respects:

  in the use of catenical terms
  in the use of 'paraneutral' verbal symbols
  in the nonuse of lingually exclusivistic terms and of terminological
   distinctions which are irrelevant in the context concerned
  in the explicitly inclusivistic use of terms which are traditionally
   lingually exclusivistic
  in the rejection of infralinguistic exclusivism
  in the nonuse of (typically) theodemonist or supernaturalist terms
  in the explicitly inclusivistic and veridicalistic use of terms which are
   traditionally theodemonistic or supernaturalistic.

Much of what applies to the neutral-inclusivist choice of words also applies 
to the choice of names. But characteristic of the inclusivist choice of 
names is of course the rejection of all forms of onomastic exclusivism, 
whether as an operational manifestation of individual exclusivism or of any 
other integral exclusivism.

The employment of catenical terms as literal, denotative symbols is inherent 
in the catenical fundament of neutral thought. Neutralism is unthinkable 
without some kind of catenical vocabulary. The potential use of catenical 
terms in names is practically unlimited because of the indefinite number of 
catenas and because of the many different types of predicate one can refer 
to in a name. Examples are: ... of the (Three) Catenated Predicates, ... of 
(Neutral) Catenality, ... of (Catenated) Neutrality and ... of (Happiness 
and) Nanhappiness. Dependent on the language of communication, on the choice 
of words and on personal taste, these and similar expressions may sound more 
or less poetic and be suitable as proper names.

The Ananorm's verbal symbolism comprises the n-a series of neutralist 
morphemes. But while symbols like nan and ana may be almost ideal, 
'paraneutral', verbal symbols, they are not the only ones. Also sound or 
character combinations which are merely symmetrical, for instance, can 
function as verbal symbols in our denominational doctrine.

The n-a series is not onomatopoeic in that the spoken terms would be vocal 
imitations of sounds associated with them (like cuckoo or hiss). But it is 
partially onomatopoeic in a sense in that the sound of each word (and its 
written image) does suggest its neutral or neutrality-related meaning. (How 
and why, we shall discuss in the last division of this chapter.) 
Presentatively speaking, a word like ananorm is a mere synonym of norm of 
neutrality and as such only a literal, purely denotative symbol. But 
representatively speaking, the prefix ana- relates the norm of neutrality to 
all neutral thought, feeling and conduct. It is in this representative 
sphere that ana- becomes a verbal symbol and acquires a neutralist quality 
which reaches far beyond the literal meaning it has in connection with the 
base-word. This is not only the case for a neologism like ananorm but also 
for some old words which are acceptable as part of the neutralist vocabulary 
because they have a prefix such as ana- and because of (one of) their 
appropriate conventional meaning(s). Thus the word anabasis can very well be 
used to denote the advance of the neutral-inclusive movement, for advance 
has always been one of its lexical meanings. Such a word can be made part of 
the doctrine's vocabulary without having been specifically neutralistic 
before. It goes without saying that the paraneutral prefixes do not have any 
fundamental significance in that every word which happened to start with 
such a prefix would have to be adopted by us with its traditional meaning.

The verbal symbols of the n-a series may be employed to form names in a 
presentative way; they may also emerge in such names when objects are named 
after a neutral-inclusivist thing or notion. Also the potential use of the 
names of these things or notions is great. Examples are: ... of the Ananorm, 
... of Nanhonore (such as The Way of Nanhonore) and The Anabatic Stream. For 
other names (or initials) it may be their symmetry which symbolizes 
neutrality or neutral-inclusivity.

The nonuse of lingually exclusivistic terms and of terminological 
distinctions which are irrelevant in the context concerned needs hardly any 
further explanation. Such nonuse may even go unnoticed when there is a 
suitable alternative within the framework of the official or standard 
language. This will probably be the case when we do not use derogatory words 
to refer to members of certain groups, or when we use sincere rather than 
honest. But there may also be a suitable alternative within the framework of 
the total language which is traditionally not always usual. This could be 
said of the use of it instead of she to refer to a country, ship or car. The 
nonuse of irrelevantist terms does become more noticeable in such a case. 
When a language does not offer any suitable alternative, one is forced to 
choose new words, new sets of words or new meanings for old words. It is 
then that the neutral-inclusivist speaker will most markedly deviate from 
the traditional speaker. An example is our gender-transcending use of 'e and 
'er, since the time-honored variant of the present language does not have 
any third person pronoun (only a male pronoun and a female pronoun).

Lingual inclusivity can be rendered explicit not just by using the neuter 
gender where a nonneuter gender has been normal before but also by 
purposefully breaking thru the exclusivist connotation of words which by 
themselves do not denote exclusivists or their notions, attitudes or 
actions. We can do this by using terms which are traditionally exclusivistic 
in an explicitly inclusivistic way. This can be illustrated for the facet of 
physical laterality-neutral inclusivity (with writing-related handedness-
neutral inclusivity as discussed in F.2.3.4). In a laterality-neutral 
terminology the words sinister and gauche will have no unfavorable 
connotation as in abnegational sinistral exclusivism; and the word dexter 
will have no favorable connotation as in aggrandizemental dextral 
exclusivism. Sinister and dexter are then purely synonymous to left and 
right, and neither pair of words indicates anything else than the side which 
is used or on which something is located. So long as the use of left and 
right is free and unbiased too, calling the left side of a building, for 
instance, "the sinister side" and the right side "the dexter side" will 
symbolically underline the laterality-neutral facet of our inclusivist 
doctrine.

The rejection of infralinguistic exclusivism --the fifth point on our list-- 
is more in the nature of a fundamental than of a symbolic issue. Moreover, 
infralinguistic inclusivity does not lead to a uniform, written or spoken, 
vocabulary. On the contrary, it makes diversity in the neutral-inclusivist 
vocabulary possible. One of the two or more variants may even be equal to a 
(more) traditional variant which is not typically neutral-inclusivistic. 
Infralinguistic inclusivity is not something that characterizes one speaker 
or writer in one work. That is the difference between infralinguistic 
inclusivity and inconsistence. Infralinguistic inclusivity is something that 
characterizes a group of language users, or one language user under 
different circumstances. Whether the neutral-inclusivist vocabulary will 
actually show the diversity infralinguistic inclusivity allows for, cannot 
be foreseen. Whatever may occur, such diversity is not something to strive 
for in itself.

Naturally, our disbelief in the ultimate authority of exclusivist gods and 
demons and our disbelief in supernatural constructs implies the nonuse of 
theodemonist and supernaturalist terms, except when referring to 
theodemonist or supernaturalist beliefs or believers themselves. This also 
means that the practising adherent of the DNI shall not curse by employing 
theodemonist or supernaturalist names or words for emphasis. Any person 
doing so in spite of these considerations will, while flying in the face of 
the Norm, only show a damnable weakness of character.

It is not always easy to determine whether a word or name is inherently 
theodemonistic or supernaturalistic, or whether it merely happens to be used 
by theodemonists or supernaturalists. Some notions, like god and sacred, 
clearly belong to the former category, whereas other notions, like being and 
supreme, clearly belong to the latter. Between these two epistemic 
categories there is a third class of notions for which the choice to make is 
completely or largely stipulative. An example is holy or holiness. Is holy 
an inherently supernaturalistic notion? From the etymological standpoint it 
can be argued that it is a 'holist' notion and therefore suitable for 
inclusivistic usage. Yet, it might be argued instead that holiness is so 
tainted by its historical connection with supernaturalist superstition and 
idolatry, that it is better to 'wholly' dissociate oneself from this term as 
much as possible.

Perhaps, some will argue the same with regard to the notion of 'dharma'. 
This concept is historically not just connected with a custom or law 
regarded as a duty but with a particular set of customs and laws with a 
highly supernaturalistic and extremely exclusivistic content. But such a 
content is also here not inherent in the etymology of dharma which derives 
from dharayati meaning (h)e holds and akin to firm. Nor is that content 
inherent in dharma when it is defined as basic principles of cosmic or 
individual existence or nature in a sense which is more normative than 
descriptive. (Also the content of what was customarily called "morality" has 
been very exclusivistic, especially sexualistic. Yet, that is no reason 
either not to use the word moral at all anymore, altho it is a reason to use 
it much more sparingly than before.) Therefore it is very well possible to 
call the set of basic principles of the DNI "the dharma" too. The Dharma is 
then the literary reference to the entire Norm itself. Since the use of 
terms like holy and dharma or Dharma may be controversial, it should be made 
clear, if they are used, that they have an explicitly inclusivistic and 
veridicalistic content in the case of the DNI.

We use an upper case instead of a lower case letter to show that a 
linguistic symbol is a name and not a literal word symbol. The Norm, for 
instance, is no norm, because the Norm itself is not a single interpreted 
principle. Conversely, when a linguistic symbol literally presents a certain 
thing or notion, there is no need to always capitalize it, at least not if 
there is only one such thing or notion. That is why we spell "supreme 
being", for the supreme being is indeed the sole being that is supreme, that 
is, of a supreme normative value. On the neutral-inclusivist model a Supreme 
Being is no supreme being.



2.2  SPEAKING TO OR ABOUT SIBS AND OTHER PEOPLE


2.2.1  SIBS AND SIBLINGS


Sexual irrelevantists have no 'sibs' but only 'sisters' and/or 'brothers'. 
Even when the gender of the body of a person who has the same parent(s) has 
no bearing on the subject of the conversation whatsoever, they will still 
speak of "their sisters" and of "their brothers". Fortunately, the present 
language --unlike the traditional variants of many other languages-- does 
have a word for somebody or someone who has the same parent(s), namely the 
word sib. Etymologically this term is akin to suus meaning nothing else than 
one's own. (It is only a coincidence that sib starts with the si of sister 
and ends with the b of brother.) An awkward way of defining sib is brother 
or sister (considered) irrespective of sex. In such a definition the 
language user is supposed to take a sib's gender into account without taking 
it into account. But purely truth-conditionally it must be admitted that a 
sib is a brother or sister, and that sibs are a brother or brothers and or 
or a sister or sisters.

Elsewhere sib and sibling may be treated as synonyms, but we shall reserve 
the latter term for persons who are members of the same group, particularly 
for persons who have the same ideals. The equivalents in sexualist 
subcultures are brother for male sibling and sister for female sibling. 
Exclusivist trade unions, professional organizations and religious orders 
are favorite places of such brothers and sisters: "We must fight for our 
rights, brothers!" and "Beloved brethren, we are gathered together to pray 
for our sisters who have taken a vow of silence". Both outlaws and legal 
specialists have formed brotherhoods in the past, and the old law of the 
land may thus force even antisexualist persons and groups to use the 
services of such a brotherhood. In 'titles', or when used as a form of 
address, brother and sister are capitalized as in Lord Exequall used to be 
Brother Wye or in If she gets her way, Sister Exex will revolutionize the 
whole ward.

Sibs have a biologic relationship with each other, but no such relationship 
is required for siblings, altho their emotional ties may be as strong as, or 
stronger than, those of sibs who grew up together. Neither biologic-
materialist nor maritally exclusivistic considerations play a role in our 
common adherence to the Ananorm or in the establishment of a neutral-
inclusive society. Gender is, likewise, not relevant either in this respect. 
We may be male or female when our interest is an erotic one, or when we want 
to beget or bear a child, in general we are people with neutral-
inclusivistic convictions. Hence, unless the context is erotic or related to 
procreation, we and our sibling adherents shall not call each other 
"brother" or "sister". For our ideal is a 'sibling culture' that truly and 
relevantly transcends all sister- and all brotherhood.



2.2.2  FORMS OF ADDRESS


Just as sexualists use Brother and Sister, and also Father and Mother, as 
'titles', so inclusivists can use Sibling as a 'title', that is, as a 
'title' for everyone without any exclusivist content. Sibling may, then, 
also be a form of address: Sibling Lee, Sibling Nan, Sibling Ronnie, and so 
on.

Religiogenic, bourgeois or proletarian titles like Mr, Mrs, Miss, Ms and 
Tovarish (if used for young men but not for young women) are obviously 
unsuitable for inclusivist reproduction. (Not to mention religious or 
theodemonical excrescences such as The Right Reverend Father in God, Lord 
Bishop by Divine Providence.) They make use of sexual, marital and etatic 
distinctions which do not have the universal and permanent relevance which 
is implicitly suggested (altho in the subcultures concerned the influence of 
the belief in the relevance of these distinctions may be very pervasive 
indeed).

An appropriate alternative for bourgeois and other exclusivist forms of 
address is Person, for that is what we are addressing ourselves to: to 
persons, not to bodies or small children. Instead of Mr Burgher and Mrs, 
Miss or Ms Labour, Person Burgher and Person Labour will do as well as the 
Sibling variant. Comrade and an equivalent like Tovarish (or Tovarich) may 
also be acceptable, provided that no distinction is drawn between males and 
females, and provided that this does not lead to confusion between the DNI 
and incompatible ideologies.

Should 'titles' like Sibling, Person and Comrade seem too short or not 
polite enough, one can always add (my) dear or respected. (In that case 
respect denotes concern and sympathy.) The Resp(ected) P(erson)s Burgher and 
Labour or Labour and Burgher should thus replace Mr and Mrs Burgher. This 
nonsexualist form of address shows respect for Sibling Labour in particular, 
when compared with the archaic and bourgeois Mrs Burgher or --even worse-- 
Mrs John Burgher. When Labour and Burgher are not only two different persons 
but also partners, and are addressed as a couple, "(the respected) partners 
(Person) Labour and (Person) Burgher" (or "Burgher and (Person) Labour") may 
be used, or "(the respected) Person Labour and partner" (if Burgher's 
surname is not known) or "(the respected) Person Burgher and partner" (if 
Labour's surname is not known). When Dear Siblings is used to address a 
group of people, it does not only transcend the irrelevantism of a 
monosexual expression like Beloved Brethren but also of a bisexual 
expression like Ladies and Gentlemen (except, maybe, when the speaker is 
allocating toilets to female and male, adult humans respectively). And -- 
again-- Dear Siblings is not obligatory. For those who have an open mind 
there are enough imaginative alternatives to the antiquated sexually, 
maritally and otherwise exclusivistic titles or forms of address.

In a relevantist environment it need not be explained that, and why, one 
does not consider a person's sex, marital status or age when speaking to or 
about 'im. In a mixed environment, however, it may clarify one's position, 
when emphasizing that one does not believe a person's sex, marital status or 
age to be to the point in the context concerned. This can be done by adding 
some sort of 'irrelevancy phrase' such as without irrelevance, free from 
(irrelevant) distinction(s), free from irrelevance or without (irrelevant) 
distinction(s). Especially in situations where sexual, marital and/or etatic 
exclusivism are still going strong, the connection with these exisms can be 
shown by adding of sex, marital status, age (or otherwise). For example, one 
may start a lecture with Dear listeners, please accept my respects free from 
distinctions of sex and age; or a letter with Dear Persons, please accept 
our greetings free from irrelevant distinctions.

Official titles may be regarded as relevant, if someone holds a certain
office, and when the communication refers to official business. Examples are
Dear Professor, My Dear Ambassador and The President.

In addressing, referring to or saluting a person the first time, someone may
want to employ a longer or more formal expression, while using a shorter or
more informal one later on. Thus 'e could write the first time "My Dear
Person Councilor Onoma, please accept my respects free from irrelevant
distinctions" (Onoma being another, fictitious surname). When 'e has known
the addressee for some time already, 'e could simply write "Dear Person
Onoma" or "Dear Onoma", if not using 'er forename or call name instead.



2.3  THE N-A SERIES OF NEUTRALIST MORPHEMES


2.3.1  THE TWO HALVES OF LINGUISTIC SYMBOLISM REUNITED


One of the basic assumptions of latter-day linguists is that literal, 
linguistic symbols are essentially arbitrary, that is, that there is no 
connection whatsoever between the sound of a word (the signal) and the thing 
it denotes or connotes (the message). Only a small number of onomatopoeic 
words are recognized by them as exceptions. On their 'conventionalist' view 
the names of things are due purely to convention and have no deeper 
appropriateness. Linguistic conventionalists once had to fight the so-called 
'naturalist' doctrine that there would be a correct name for everything by 
nature. According to this doctrine words denoting movement, for instance, 
would actually and necessarily contain an r or l (two sounds which are 
acoustically similar and may be allophones of the same phoneme, albeit not 
in the present language). Nowadays it is said that naturalism was 'inluenced 
by a primitive belief in the magic properties of names'; or that in 
'primitive societies' a thing was believed to be its name.

Conventionalists may conveniently have assumed that they settled the issue 
forever, and yet the rejection of supernaturalist 'naturalism' by no means 
forces us to adopt an entirely arbitrary conventionalism with respect to new 
words or the introduction of new morphemes, and with respect to a selective 
use of old ones. There may be no necessary link between the sound of a word 
and the thing it refers to, such does not mean that a certain linguistic 
symbol could not be connected with a certain thing in a fashion which is not 
arbitrary. It is only then that the sound of a word does not refer to a 
particular thing, but symbolizes it in the most appropriate way. Thus, given 
that certain phonemes are more stable than other ones, it is a 
straightforward case of analogy that --if possible, and if wanted-- words 
denoting or connoting stability or things which are stable, or which belong 
to the same associative field, should contain one or more stable phonemes 
(like n or m) rather than unstable ones (like s or h). Making use of such 
analogies is quite something else than arguing that existing words do 
actually contain these phonemes in a particular language as linguistic 
naturalists were once so audacious to profess. We shall call this new 
position "the symbolist position". Altho not incompatible with 
conventionalism, it treats the language user not merely as a consumer of 
conventional products but also as a creator of new products and as a 
selective user of old ones.

Names may not have magic properties, they do have properties, that is, whole-
properties and part-properties. In the spoken language a whole-property is, 
for example, the place of the primary stress. The part-properties are, then, 
those of the individual sounds making up the name. In the present language 
at least one of these sounds is always a vowel, and it may also be possible 
to link one or more of the properties of such a vowel to certain things in 
the reality the total word is about. Usually the thing will not have the 
same property, yet it may have an attribute with the same conceptual 
position, or a similar attribute in a different respect.

The word symbol itself derives from symballein meaning (to) throw together. 
This throwing together refers to an ancient custom of breaking a coin or 
ring in two when friends would part for a long time or forever. Would one of 
them, or one of their other friends or relatives, return after many years, 
the two parts of the coin or ring could be compared with each other. This 
would give the possessor a token of identity and a right to the other 
person's hospitality. Now, the two halves which our own linguistic symbolism 
reunites are, on the one hand, the view that the names of things are due to 
convention, and on the other, the view that the names of things need not be 
completely arbitrary combinations of sounds or characters. It is in their 
separated conditions, when broken away from each other, that these views 
existed, or still exist, as conventionalism and naturalism respectively.



2.3.2  THE CHOICE OF VOWEL(S) AND CONSONANT(S)


To express neutral and inclusive thought we have to make use of an existing 
script and language in our communication with others. The present script is 
(at least for the early readers of this Model) the most applied script in 
the world, and the present tongue is (similarly) the most widely used one of 
those which apply the present script. When considering individual linguistic 
systems (or groups of related systems), the most widely used system does not 
belong to the same family as the present one, but other widely used systems 
(with the present one among them) all belong to the same linguistic family. 
Many words in these linguistic systems have been and still are derived from 
three languages in particular, that is, three ancient languages which are 
now dead. Altho these three languages represent the largest family of 
languages in the world, they have no linguistic universality, and we have 
therefore no reason to derive our vocabulary exclusively from them. However 
important the cultures in question may have been in the evolution of human 
civilization, many other cultures have existed, exist now, and will emerge 
on the planet Earth, which must not be regarded as less important. Yet, 
while our new morphemes should be based on the most general linguistic 
principles, this does not mean that we would not remain confined by most of 
the traditional rules of the particular language we communicate in.

In phonetics cardinal vowels are often plotted on a diagram with the sound ï 
(pronounced as in technique), or a similar but shorter one, at the extreme 
left. (Phonetics is not interested in spelling and does not use the phonetic 
symbols of this Model. As already noted in F.3.3.1 we ourselves make use of 
an overlay system in which each diacritic indicates for one written letter a 
particular way of pronouncing that letter. The phoneme ï is therefore 
identical to the e in be.) The sound ü (as in rule), or a similar but 
shorter sound, is plotted at the extreme right of the diagram; and ä (as in 
art), or a similar but shorter sound, near the center of the left/right 
scale. Between ï and ä one finds e (as in bet) and a (the ash as in bat) or 
a closely related vowel; between ä and ü one finds o (as in dog), or a 
similar shorter sound, and u (as in put) or a closely related vowel. This 
yields roughly the following series of vowels with ä closer to the middle 
than any of the other vowels:
  ï , e , a , ä , o , u , ü .

The vowels on the left of the nearly central vowel ä are so-called 'front 
vowels'; those on the right 'back vowels'. Front vowels are pronounced with 
the front, central vowels with the middle part and back vowels with the back 
of the tongue raised. This subdivision is based on the horizontal movement 
of the tongue. (The ä is then 'between center and back, slightly more 
center'.) As regards the vertical movement of the tongue phoneticians 
distinguish open, half-open, half-close and close vowels. On the basis of 
this subdivision the ä is a fully open vowel with the tongue almost flat in 
the mouth. Moreover, the lips are said to be 'neutral' when pronouncing the 
ä.

We could call the ä "a neutral vowel between front vowels on the one hand, 
and back vowels on the other". But what traditionally has been called "the 
neutral vowel" is the schwa (as in abut) because this is a central vowel 
produced with the tongue in the position it has when at rest and with the 
lips 'neutral' or spread. Rest is also a neutral notion, and in this respect 
the choice of the schwa as the vowel of a neutralist morpheme is about as 
legitimate as the choice of the ä. The unstressed schwa (pronounced as the 
first vowel in abut) and the similarly articulated stressed vowel (the 
second in abut) can, just like the ä, be plotted in the middle of a cardinal 
vowel diagram with the unstressed schwa half-open to half-close and its 
stressed equivalent open to half-open. (This latter vowel may be represented 
by a schwa symbol too.) Altho they are not cardinal themselves, they are 
also relatively pure and unchanging. Yet, unlike the ä, many languages do 
not have the schwa as a phoneme, and therefore the schwa (or its stressed 
equivalent) is not to be considered a universal vowel.

That the ä is not only a universal vowel but also of a neutral nature 
clearly shows in the (main dialect of the) most widely spoken language 
(which does not belong to the same family as the present language). The 
speech sounds of this tongue can be divided into 'shengs' (the first letter 
if a consonant) and 'yuns' (the rest of the speech sound made up of one or 
more vowels, sometimes followed by n, ng or a sound written as r). Not all 
shengs and yuns can be combined. Especially the shengs y (pronounced as in 
yes) and w exclude each other in this respect. The remarkable thing is that 
a yun goes together with both these approximants if its vowel is the neutral 
ä. Does the yun contain a back or front vowel, then it cannot always be 
combined with the palatal y or the bilabial velar w. Thus the morphemes ye 
and yi exist but not yo. On the other hand, wo and wu exist but not we and 
wi. However, both ya and wa exist as morphemes.

Now, when considering (human) languages in general again, it does not matter 
whether the ä and the schwa are described as neutral or as central vowels. 
Neutrality is a concept in the same associative field as centrality, because 
it is the central predicate of the catena which is neutral --'central', that 
is, between negative predicates on the one hand (represented, let us say, by 
ï, e and a) and positive ones on the other (o, u and ü). So far as vowels 
are concerned we conclude therefore that on the symbolist view words 
denoting and/or connoting centrality or neutrality, central or neutral 
things, or things in the same associative field, should have ä as a vowel, 
or as the most important or central vowel. In tongues like the present one, 
in which both the ä and the schwa exist as phonemes, the schwa may replace 
the ä when there is a special reason for doing so.

But what about the consonants? The situation here is less clear, for while 
the neutral ä is a central vowel between front and back vowels, there is no 
consonant in a similar position as a limit element between two opposite sets 
of consonants. This is not to say that there does not exist a central 
consonant in any respect. If one takes the difference between compactness 
and diffuseness on the grounds of which the centrality of the ä can 
phonetically be demonstrated, one will find that the k may be considered a 
central letter too among consonants and on the same grounds. But the 
'opposite' sets of letters are not clearly distinguished here. And there is 
another reason why the plosive obstruent k does not fulfil our requirements: 
it cannot appear at all positions in the words of certain languages. The 
consonant we are looking for has, just like the vowel, to be 'universal' in 
that it exists in all languages (or in as many languages as possible) and in 
that it can appear at any place in the morphemes of those languages.

In the most widely used language not belonging to the same linguistic family 
as the present one, the velar plosive k cannot close off a word; the only 
consonants which can, are the n, ng and a sound spelled as r (among others). 
The velar nasal ng is not a 'neutral' consonant in that it can solely appear 
at the end of a yun --it cannot appear at the beginning of a syllable in the 
present language either--; and the r in the language concerned is not the 
same consonant as the r in this language. Therefore only the alveolar nasal 
n remains as a 'universal' consonant, at least so far as the two linguistic 
families in question are concerned. For the family of the present language 
there is the added advantage that the n is already to be found in neutral 
and its paronyms (neutrality, neutralize, neutron, neuter) and in non- which 
can be associated with the negation of positivity, negativity and polarity 
in general.

The n is a stable sound which can adequately represent stability, something 
it has in common with the m. Neutrality is a concept in the same field as 
stability, because stability is rest, steady motion or equilibrium, that is, 
a neutral state between negative and positive movement or change. Since the 
n also occurs in (nearly?) all human languages, it can be associated both 
with stability and neutrality, and with anthropic inclusivity or inclusivity 
in general (or the smallest possible degree of exclusivity). This is what it 
has in common with the neutral a, except that the first association is there 
with centrality rather than with stability.

The m and n are both stable, nasal consonants and thus the alveolar n could 
be replaced by the bilabial m. Since the m is not such a good representative 
of inclusivity as the n, the reason for doing so should be a compelling one.



2.3.3  SIX MORPHEMES, OF WHICH ONE INEFFABLE


The n (or m) is a suitable letter for symbolizing stability and consequently 
neutrality; the ä (or schwa) for symbolizing centrality and consequently 
also neutrality. In addition, both the n and the ä are suitable letters for 
symbolizing universality and consequently inclusivity. Together morphemes 
constituted of n and the neutral a as in schwa can therefore very well 
represent the notion and ideal of neutral-inclusivity. Starting with n the 
potential morphemes are na, nan, nana and so on; starting with a they are 
an, ana, anan and so on. More complex morphemes like naan (with twice a) and 
anna (with twice n) will not be considered here, because the spoken language 
does not allow such a doubling of sounds, or because in the written language 
such a doubling of letters has a different meaning. (This is not to say that 
Naan and Anna could not be nice, neutral-inclusivist proper names.) The 
simple morphemes listed above can be pronounced fluently in all languages -- 
one would expect. But the shortest ones of them, namely na and an, have 
already acquired a meaning in the present and/or other languages, either as 
an independent word or as an affix. Since they are not even symmetrical, we 
shall begin our collection of morphemes with nan and ana. Figure S.2.3.3.1 
shows the elements of the n-a series with their regular and irregular, 
potential pronunciations. The regular pronunciations given are those with ä 
and varying stress positions. The irregular ones are those with a schwa, an 
a [ash] or an â [pronounced as the stressed indefinite article], which may 
be acceptable from a different point of view.

Nan, nana, ana and anan are very suitable as prefixes or as roots of words 
in the language we are communicating in at the moment. Nan is the only one 
that, on its own, does not have asymmetrical primary stress. It is 
symmetrical both from the angle of stress and from the angle of its letter 
composition. This is what makes nan in itself representative of neutrality. 
Nan has therefore been chosen as a prefix with which the name of a 
neutrality can be derived from that of a positivity or a bipolarity. It has 
thus the function of limiting the original subset of attributes. (Also a 
positivity usually consists of more than one attribute.) Its meaning is 
being the neutral, external limit element of. This meaning does not 
correspond with the meaning of the 'un- prefixes' (un-, a-, dis-, il-, im-, 
in- and ir-), but it is in principle compatible with the meaning of non- and 
not, albeit much more specific. For example, nanhappy is not merely not 
happy but also not unhappy and not uncatenal; it pertains to everything that 
has the neutral attribute of the happiness catena. Similarly, nanhonorable 
does not merely mean not honorable but neither honorable nor dishonorable, 
while solely pertaining to things which could be honorable or dishonorable.

Because our principles are centered in neutrality, a symbol for neutral is 
very helpful where it designates elements of the neutralist doctrine, rather 
than catenated predicates. The norm of neutrality, for instance, can, 
strictly speaking, not be called "a neutral norm" since norms are not 
catenated primary predicates. (But for the sake of convenience we do also 
use neutral in the sense of neutrally catenal.) Therefore the sound 
combination ana, which is symmetrical apart from stress, has been selected 
to indicate the presence of neutrality without altering the meaning of the 
base-word. While nan- refers to what is neutrally catenal, whether 
perfective or not, ana- refers to what is perfection-related but not 
perfective in itself.

Nana and anan are primarily used as roots of the adjectives and nouns with -
ic and -icity as suffixes. Hence: nanaic, nanaicity and ananic, ananicity. 
(The morphemes -ic and -icity are, of course, only meant as suffixes for the 
present language.) In addition nana- functions as a prefix in nanapolar and 
nanapolarity. Whereas nana is a morpheme of corrective neutralism, anan is a 
morpheme of perfective neutralism. Nana stands for what is aimed at, or 
furthers, what is ananormatively superior; and anan for having a predicate 
which is ananormatively superior. The condition of having a perfective, 
neutral predicate is ananicity and the condition of having a corrective, 
nanapolar predicate is nanaicity. The opposite of nanaicity is 
'unnanaicity'; its neutral limit element is 'nannanaicity'. Nanaicity is the 
general term for having a predicate which is nanapolar, unnanaicity for 
having one which is 'unnanapolar', and nannanaicity for having one which is 
'nan-nanapolar'.

The fourth term in the series starting with na is nanan. This morpheme will 
be regarded as a noun in itself and should designate a thing which is 
nanaic. Due to the location of the primary stress (on the first syllable), 
nanan is asymmetrical in pronunciation, but this is compatible with the 
unneutral character of nanaicity. For the same reason there is little 
against pronouncing the a as a or a schwa in a word like nanan, or as â in 
word like nanaic. Whereas ananaic would not be suitable as a perfective-
neutralist symbol, nanaic is indeed suitable as a corrective-neutralist one.

Finally, there is one term we have not discussed yet: it is the fourth term 
in the series starting with an. Like nanan also this term can be treated as 
a noun. A remarkable feature of it is that it is symmetrical both in 
spelling and in pronunciation if the stress is put on the central syllable 
(and if letters are viewed as wholes). This unique noun is a perfect, 
neutral sound and character combination and as such the symbolic verbal 
epitome of neutral thought. However, as the name of the supreme being itself 
it is ineffable.


2.3.3.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE NAME OF THE SUPREME BEING

The name of the supreme is fundamentally ineffable,
for the supposition that the supreme being exists
only re-presents the end of ananicity.
To serve the end of ananicity
we need not adopt the symbolism of the doctrine.
Where everyone is together,
using this symbol is itself not even inclusive anymore.
It is by not uttering the name of the supreme being
that we realize this.

The name of the supreme is symbolically ineffable,
for the supposition that the supreme being exists
epitomizes ananicity in the end.
To serve ananicity in the end
we need not utter the name of the supreme being.
Where everything is perfected,
serving this purpose is itself not even all-neutral anymore.
It is by not uttering the name of the supreme being
that we realize this.

The name of the supreme may be easy to pronounce,
it is ineffable in the Norm.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------



3  THE SUPREME AND THE NANAIC


3.1  THE ALL-ANANIC


3.1.1  THE CONCEPT OF (THE) SUPREME BEING


According to the principle of catenated neutrality, the neutral predicate of 
a catena extensionality has, in the first instance, the highest normative 
value. Let us assume that ci is the catena value for catena I, and that ni 
is the normative value. The principle of neutrality does not tell how ni 
relates to ci, but one possibility is that ni = 1 / ( |ci| + 1). In that 
case ci = 0 and ni = 1 for neutrality (the highest normative value), and ci 
/= 0 and ni < 1 for unneutrality (the same for equally unneutral, negative 
and positive catena values). Now, let us also assume that vj is the overall 
normative value of a primary thing J, or of a combined state of being J, 
based on the normative value of the catenated predicates of the thing or 
state of being in question. We do not know how vj relates to the values ni,j 
(that is ni for J), but here too the function has to fulfil a number of 
requirements. One function which does fulfil these requirements is vj = P 
ni,j (that is, vj = n1,j * n2,j * n3,j ... ). According to this function the 
thing or things with the highest or supreme value are those with value 1 
(the same normative value as for one single form of ananicity). A state of 
being with the normative value 1 is then the highest, or supreme, state of 
being.

In the Book of Fundamentals (F.3.1.6) it was pointed out that there is no 
empirically given 'neutral' longitude, latitude or altitude in a three-
dimensional spatial universe, altho the norm of neutrality does apply to the 
corresponding catenas. Even the hypothesis of mean-neutrality does not give 
us an empirical clue in this respect. Yet, there is one thing we can tell 
from the applicability of the norm of neutrality to the basic spatial 
catenas, and that is that, so far as spatiotemporal things are concerned, 
there can only be one thing that is neutral in this respect; at least if we 
agree that there can only be one object or spatiotemporal thing at a place 
at a time. (The adjective spatiotemporal is, strictly speaking, superfluous 
because non-spatiotemporal things cannot be at any place.) There may not be 
a fixed 'tri-neutral' point in the universe, any supreme spatiotemporal 
being, that is, any being that is (also) supreme in the spatiotemporal 
respect, must be located at the tri-neutral point, whether this point is 
fixed or flexible. This means that there can only be one such supreme 
spatiotemporal being, because its value vj < 1, if it is not neutral with 
respect to one of the three spatial catenas. It does not mean that there 
must be such a thing. The symbolic importance of this deduction is that one 
can rightfully speak of "the supreme being", for if a supreme being is an 
object, there is only one of it, that is, one supreme object. If it is not 
an object (whether or not in addition to a supreme being which is), there is 
no need to use the plural. In that case it is more appropriate to speak of 
"a supreme state of being" or of "supreme being".

The unique primary thing located at the theoretically tri-neutral point in 
the three-dimensional spatial universe is, or would be, the supreme being if 
it also is, or was, neutral in all other ananormative respects in which it 
is catenal. Only then is its total, combined normative value 1. Should it be 
noncatenal in a number of respects, its combined value is still 1. All we 
can say is that the supreme being is and/or should not be unneutrally 
catenal in any ananormative respect, and not whether it is neutral instead 
of noncatenal. However, since the supreme being is and/or should be neutral 
or ananic for all catenical aspects where it is catenal, it may be called 
"the all-neutral or all-ananic being". (This is not a proper name but a 
definite description.) Of the two terms all-neutral and all-ananic the 
latter one is much more accurate for two reasons: firstly, the supreme is, 
strictly speaking, not 'neutral' but neutrally catenal; and secondly, the 
supreme is not neutrally catenal with respect to all catenas but (if catenal 
at all) only with respect to catenas to which the principle of catenated 
neutrality actually applies. The 'all-neutral' supreme being is not neutral 
with respect to modulus, and other factitiously derived, catenas, for 
instance.

Since the supreme is neutral with respect to basic catenas (granted that it 
is catenal with respect to those catenas), bicatenal bivariant difference-
catenality is not applicable to it in a factual sense, even tho bicatenal 
bivariant equality is ananormatively superior. It can be argued that the 
supreme should be equal to every primary thing, because every primary thing 
that is catenal in the same respect should be equal to the supreme. But it 
cannot be argued that the supreme actually is equal to every other primary 
thing, whether that thing is neutral or not, and therefore perhaps 
nonsupreme, in the basic respect. Equality may be superior to inequality, it 
is better that the supreme is not equal to an inferior being than that it is 
equal to it. By speaking of "the supreme" we are not simply referring to any 
being, as the concept of bicatenal bivariant difference-catenality implies. 
The supreme has then already been defined in terms of the basic catena. 
Altho this definition does not seem to be of any real significance in the 
spatiotemporal field (for there is no neutral-directed force aimed at some 
absolute tri-neutral point, so far as we know) it must be taken into account 
if our symbolism is to be (as) consistent (as possible). This is not to say 
that gravitation, as the relative nanaic force in the spatiotemporal field, 
would not be expressive of what furthers ananormative supremeness. It is 
only that the relationship between the concept of supremeness (which also 
applies to systems of primary things) and the concept of a supreme being 
(which is only one primary thing), or between normative and factual 
conditions, is more complicated in the case of bicatenal bivariant 
difference-catenality.

We have not proved that the supreme exists; and we have not proved, and will 
not prove, that the supreme being is literally neutral or ananic in every 
respect, or in every ananormative respect. What is symbolically important --
and that was the purpose of this section-- is that the concept of a supreme 
being, or of supreme being, can be deduced in our neutralistic catenical 
model.



3.1.2  ITS QUALITIES, IF CATENAL


When speaking of "the supreme being" it is first necessary to discuss some 
spatiotemporal aspects of this being. In the last resort, this is the way to 
distinguish a spatiotemporal primary thing which is supreme from other 
primary things. Maybe, some will argue that the supreme being, even if it is 
spatiotemporal, need not be at one place, but could be omnipresent or 
immanent in the whole of reality. If such a contention is to make sense at 
all, then those who argue this must confuse the notion of being supreme with 
the notion of supreme being. Any primary thing in the world that is ananic 
in a certain respect is supreme in that respect, and thus partakes of 
supremeness. But this having of a primary predicate which is neutral is 
quite something else than being a part of something that is neutrally 
catenal. Moreover, a neutral predicate (whether or not supreme) is not 
something spatiotemporal, nor does having a neutral predicate make something 
spatiotemporal. We had therefore better forget about an omnipresent or 
immanent, supreme being. It is only the norm of neutrality itself, the 
supremeness of ananicity and non-spatiotemporal supreme being which may be 
said to be 'omnipresent' in a more or less literary sense.

The principle of catenated neutrality does not apply to the predicates of 
temporal auxiliary series. (See F.3.1.5.) Therefore it is not the case that 
the supreme being would only exist at one supposedly 'neutral' moment in 
time. Yet, if we would like to treat time as space, we could say that the 
present moment is the neutral moment, and that the supreme being only exists 
'now'. Altho the supreme being does, then, have no past and no future, it 
will in practise exist always (if existing at all), for the catenization 
concerned shifts as time proceeds.

If we say that the supreme exists only one moment, it simply cannot move. 
But even if we say that it exists always, it does not move either, for the 
all-ananic remains at the tri-neutral point forever. Rest is neutrality, and 
motion as unneutrality is alien to the supreme being. Nonetheless, motion is 
relative in practise and the all-ananic may actually change position with 
respect to a nonuniversal system of reference, that is, with respect to any 
other system. This is the case for example, if the tri-neutral point is 
flexible and only based on the location of the supreme being itself. 
(Compare the neutral present point which would only be based on the flexible 
moment of supreme existence.) Since the all-neutral being is at rest with 
regard to the theoretical, universal frame of reference, it could be called 
"extremely slow". This extremely positive form of catenality is that of the 
slowness catena, however, and the ananorm does not assign the highest 
normative value to the neutralities of catenas such as the slowness catena.

While the principle of neutrality does not apply to temporal series of 
auxiliary predicates, it does not apply to normative series of auxiliary 
predicates either. Insofar as goodness and badness are purely normative or 
evaluative concepts, the supreme being is all-good (or maximally good) by 
definition. It is then the norm of neutrality which determines that all-good 
stands for all-ananic, for (all-)goodness in itself is still devoid of any 
substance. But good can also be used in the factual sense of beneficent and 
bad in the sense of maleficent. Goodness is, then, the quality of giving 
rise to the increase of a happiness-catenary value, and badness the quality 
of giving rise to the decrease of that value. In that case the all-ananic is 
neither good nor bad, because the supreme being makes other beings neither 
happier nor unhappier. Both change and causing change are unneutral and the 
supreme being does not cause change, neither for the worse nor for the 
better. Hence, the all-ananic has no destructive or creative powers. It did 
not even create life, for instance --not even in a symbolic fashion--, 
because the creation of life, where no life has been terminated or 
terminates in the same period, would signify an increase in the number of 
living beings. (This is not to say that the coming into being of life could 
not be nanaic for reasons not related to the number of living beings.) The 
all-ananic did never destroy life either, because the destruction of life 
would signify suffering and a decrease in the number of living beings or the 
destruction of a natural balance. These are positive and negative predicates 
the supreme being does not have, and does not cause to have. So far as life 
is concerned, the supreme being symbolizes the maintenance of the neutrally 
good life and of the balance of life.

Every honor and dishonor is alien to the nature of the all-ananic: it does 
not honor, nor dishonor; and it is not honored, nor dishonored. If the all-
ananic would assign a cultural or social value at all to other things, then 
only the limit value which is neither low nor high. Similarly, the supreme 
being itself can only be treated in accordance with the assignment of a 
value which is neither low nor high. We have clearly to distinguish the fact 
that it has the highest ananormative value from the fact that it would be 
treated in an exclusive way as a being with the highest cultural or social 
status, that is, from the fact that it would be honored. Since the supreme 
being can solely be treated in a neutral way, it can neither be honored nor 
dishonored. Also if the supreme being exists, there is no person in the 
universe who honors or dishonors 'im or it. Every purported veneration or 
worshiping of the supreme being is really the veneration or worshiping of an 
inferior being, for example, of an image of the supreme being, or of 
material attributes, living beings, people or institutions associated with 
that image.

What applies to honor and dishonor, applies to love and hatred. No-one loves 
or hates the supreme being; it is the image of the supreme being, or another 
inferior thing, which is loved or hated. Conversely, the supreme being 
'imself or itself loves or hates no-one and nothing either. If catenal in 
this respect, it is ananic with regard to all of us, and with regard to all 
others.



3.1.3  THE QUESTION OF ITS CATENALITY


Since the all-ananic is the principal being of neutrality, it is, for every 
primary thing that is catenal for a certain aspect, connected with the 
neutrality of that aspect, even if it is noncatenal for that particular 
aspect. Not knowing whether the supreme being is catenal or not in a certain 
respect, each person will tend to project 'er own catenality, or that of a 
primary thing under consideration, onto the all-ananic, so that the neutral 
catenality involved is indeed represented by this supreme being. Such a 
projection can in no way be compared, however, to the false representation 
in which someone apotheosizes 'er own image by projecting it onto the 
supreme being, such as the image of 'er own sex or race, of 'er own species, 
or of that of the living beings of 'er own planet. We could not develop such 
a deceptive image of the all-ananic, because we know that if it were catenal 
in a certain respect, it would be neutral in a universal sense. The 
catenization would then include all things in the universe that are catenal 
for the aspect in question, and not just our own sex or race, our own 
species, our own planet or any other exclusive system.

When we project our own catenality, that is, the fact that we are catenal in 
a certain respect, onto the all-ananic, we do not suggest that one of our 
own predicates is that of the supreme being --we may be positively or 
negatively catenal ourselves--, but we initiate a comparison with the 
supreme being or with being supreme. This may, then, turn out to be far 
different from ourselves. Moreover, the supreme being could indeed be 
catenal for the aspect in question. A person definitely would not be 
justified in considering the supreme catenal in a certain respect, when 
informed of the contrary.

The tendency to project specific catenalities onto the all-ananic may be 
acceptable so long as one realizes that these catenalities are conditional: 
they only hold true for certain things and not for others. If it is claimed, 
say, that the all-ananic does not honor and does not dishonor, this is an 
absolute truth. But if it is believed that the all-ananic is a figure which 
could honor or dishonor, while having the predicate of nanhonor(ing), this 
is only true for honor-catenals. For things having no culture in which 
different or equal social status values are assigned to certain things, the 
all-ananic cannot honor or dishonor and has the predicate of honor-
noncatenality.

The quality of neutrality or noncatenality which the all-ananic is assumed 
to have, when a thing projects its own catenality or noncatenality onto it, 
is a conditional one. The key-word for having such a proper or improper 
predicate is the preposition for. The use of for indicates that the all-
ananic only has the predicate mentioned symbolically, when a specific class 
of things (catenals or noncatenals) is the frame of reference. Thus, if life 
is defined as (the period of) happiness-catenality, referring to the 
capacity to experience happiness and unhappiness, and death as happiness-
noncatenality, then the supreme is nanhappy for living beings and it is no 
living being for the dead or inanimate. For the living it is (nanhappy) 
life; for the dead it is death. In this way the supreme being is --again-- 
not only a symbol of neutrality but of inclusivity as well.



3.1.4  THE TRUTH AND RELEVANCY OF ITS EXISTENCE


To a certain extent the existence, or possible existence, of the supreme 
being can be compared to the existence of a number. The concept of a number 
does always exist, certainly when speaking about it --even tho some may call 
it "the incomplete referent of a predicate"-- but whether there 'really' is 
something that corresponds to such a number, depends on what sets there 
'really' are in the universe (so that the question whether there exists a 
set with exactly that number of elements can be answered). Likewise, the 
concept of the supreme being cannot be rejected in a coherent normative 
system, but it is another matter altogether whether there really is an 
entity that can be individuated and identified, and that is (so far as 
possible) neutrally catenal in all respects in which it is catenal. Thus 
there may be a tri-neutral point and an object which occupies it; and yet 
such does not mean that this object could not be unneutrally catenal in 
respect of one or more nonspatial catenas.

The question which precedes that of the truth of the supreme being's 
existence is whether its existence or nonexistence is relevant. The answer 
is, as we have seen in the division on the antithesis between normism and 
theocentrism in the Book of Fundamentals (F.6.4), that the true existence of 
the supreme being is not relevant from a fundamentalist, normistic 
perspective. But also from the symbolist point of view, it is only important 
to recognize the significance of the supreme being or its image as a symbol 
which has the same supreme value as ananicity and which is its supreme 
representation in the world of primary things.

On the absolute definition of supreme being we have employed, the supreme 
being indicates, by the place it is to occupy, the direction of all 
normative striving, of all attempts to improve the world. (The difference 
between the absolute and the relative definitions has been explained in 
I.6.2.4.) The question whether there is (already) an object at a certain 
point in a certain space of a certain number of dimensions does not affect 
the direction of the path we go, or have to go, in any way. On a relative 
definition of supreme being the supreme is a thing which did, does or will 
come closer to all-neutrality than any other thing which did, does or will 
exist. The supreme being is then the existent with the highest normative 
value whether this value is 1 or smaller than 1. (If there are two or more 
things which are equally superior, then the set of those things may be 
conceived of as 'the supreme being' altho such a set itself does, strictly 
speaking, not exist.)

Those who opt for the relative definition of supreme being can be sure that 
the supreme being truly exists, but --as demonstrated already in the Book of 
Instruments-- the price of this truth is irrelevance. The 'empirical' 
knowledge that there is a particular existent which comes closest to the 
ideal of a doctrine does not add anything to one's normative insight, for 
this insight itself is a prerequisite to determining which existent deserves 
to be called "supreme".

Tho it may not exist, the all-ananic represents normative superiority in 
every field. In contrast with this, a relatively defined 'supreme existent' 
could still be normatively inferior in any field, the sole requirement being 
that it has the highest actual value on the whole. (Note that for divine 
prophets the absolute and the relative definitions are often conveniently 
mixed up. On a relative definition such a prophet is an existent, that is, a 
historical figure; but this may mean that 'e has one or more inferior, 
perhaps extremely inferior, attributes. On an absolute definition such a 
prophet would solely have superior attributes, but then no-one may actually 
ever have lived up to this ideal.)

The adherent of the Ananorm need not believe in or deny the true existence 
of the all-ananic supreme being. Whether or not it exists, the all-ananic 
represents perfective values like neutral well-being, nondiscrimination, 
interpersonal equality and the absence of all suffering. Recognizing this 
representation may make it easier or more meaningful for the individual 
adherent to conform to the dharma of neutrality and inclusivity. And this is 
what counts towards the realization of supremeness both in oneself and in 
others.



3.1.5  ANANIC INSTEAD OF IN(S)ANE


Some might wonder whether the neutralistic conception of the supreme being 
is not relatively empty when compared with traditional conceptions of a 
'Supreme Being' who is claimed to be all-good, all-powerful and 'Love 
Himself', for instance. Naturally, such people are confused. The reason may, 
first of all, be that they are not capable of distinguishing neutrality from 
noncatenality. A noncatenal thing may be empty when compared with a thing 
which is catenal, but a neutrally catenal thing is not emptier than an 
unneutrally catenal thing. Thus symmetry is not in any way 'emptier' than 
asymmetry. And if it cannot be guaranteed that the supreme being is catenal 
in every respect, we may symbolically assume that it is catenal in a 
particular respect for those things which, or those who, are catenal 
themselves in that respect.

But, perhaps, the people who would prefer something like an all-good and all-
powerful Cosmocrator do not so much mean that the all-ananic possesses fewer 
predicates, but rather that those it possesses do not have the 'fulness' of 
such predicates like goodness and powerfulness. Presumably, fulness is then 
nothing else than unneutrality or even extremity. So far as goodness is 
concerned: this term is used in different senses, and if good is purely 
normative, the all-ananic being is also an all-good being, for it is then 
ananicity which is good or a form of goodness. However, if good means 
beneficent, the all-ananic is as little beneficent as it is powerful (albeit 
not maleficent or weak either).

Why does the supreme being not have 'full' predicates such as beneficence 
and powerfulness? The answer is simply that the supreme being has only 
catenated predicates which are supreme, or that the supreme being as a 
symbol represents supremeness. That is: ananicity, and not nanaicity or 
other corrective-instrumental values. Hence, what the neutralist refuses, is 
to jumble up the ultimate and the instrumental, or the perfective and the 
corrective, and to create one mixed supreme-inferior being. It is the 
ultimate or perfective which belongs to the supreme, not the instrumental or 
corrective, however 'full' it may appear to be.

Those familiar with the monotheist 'problem of evil' know that we have every 
reason to believe that one and the same being could never be omnipotent, 
omniscient and all-good (in the sense of beneficent) at the same time. But 
even if we forgot, for the sake of argument, our veridicalistic convictions 
for a moment, would, then, the real existence of an all-powerful, all-
knowing, all-good being (or 'Being') make any particular form of monotheist 
godthink any more plausible? To see whether it would, we should look at the 
so-called 'great-making characteristics' such a being is supposed to have, 
namely omnipotence, omniscience and being all-good (or wholly beneficent or 
wholly just).

The first characteristic, omnipotence, may be 'great-making', but it is just 
not a perfective, let alone an ultimate, value. If it is believed to be one, 
then a most fiendish, extremist doxastic value. The belief in power or 
omnipotence as something ultimate in itself is perverse in that it takes
means for ends, or corrective-instrumental values for perfective ones. Power
may be useful to serve the supreme, it is not supreme in itself.

Omniscience (or knowledge in general) cannot be conceived of as a perfective 
value either --as has already been demonstrated in the Book of Instruments 
(I.7.3.3). If omniscience and omnipotence are to make any sense at all (even 
on the extremist account), they must be instrumental values. But 
instrumental with regard to which perfective value or values defined in 
purely denotative or factual terms?

If the good in all-good is purely evaluative or normative (like, or almost 
like, just), then it is entirely devoid of any (factual) denotation. A 
notion such as being all-good or just in no way touches upon the question of 
which kind of being or acting would be good, just or superior. In short, 
even the belief in a really existing omnipotent, omniscient and all-good 
being would have no (respectable) ultimate or perfective value whatsoever. 
The 'fulness' of such a being is either the foolish result of the insane 
belief that extremist values like the-most-power would be ultimate, or of 
the inane belief that values such as goodness or justice per se --not to 
mention "love"-- would have normative substance in themselves.

Even when the supreme is believed to be all-good in the substantive sense of 
beneficent, the condition that also beneficence in itself cannot be a 
perfective value remains. And besides that, such an all-beneficent supreme 
being --Love perhaps?-- would only symbolize utilitarianism, if no ultimate 
or perfective value other than beneficence or utility (or love?) could be 
assigned to it at the same time.

We conclude that if the ananic supreme being is 'empty' in any sense, then 
only so because it does not have the 'fulness' of supernatural and 
theodemonical conceptions. Once more the core of the normative turns out to 
lie on a higher plane than that of the extremist and/or inane belief in one 
being that would be omnipotent and omniscient and all-good at the same time 
and forever. This certainly does not mean, however, that we are not at all 
interested in beneficent beings that are powerful and knowledgeable as well -
-on the contrary. Nonetheless, their beneficence is not what makes them 
supreme; their beneficence is what makes them nanaic.


3.1.5.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

FOR THE SAKE OF THE SUPREMELY NORMATIVE

It is not for love of a man that a man is dear
but for the sake of the normative.
It is not for love of a woman that a woman is dear
but for the sake of the normative.
It is not for love of a child that a child is dear
but for the sake of the normative.
It is not for love of a parent that a parent is dear
but for the sake of the normative.
It is not for love of wealth that wealth is dear
but for the sake of the normative.
It is not for love of power that power is dear
but for the sake of the normative.
It is not for love of happiness that happiness is dear
but for the sake of the normative.
It is not for love of love that love is dear
but for the sake of the normative.
Ultimately it is neither for love of itself,
nor for love of a god, that anything is dear.
The ultimate it is which should always be borne in mind
for the sake of the normative.
Only thus can mortal beings realize what they wish for,
and what is dear as well.
Not because it is loved
but for the sake of the supremely normative.


  [This canonical prose poem was inspired by a passage in a
   philosophic-religious conversation which reportedly took
   place more than two-and-a-half thousand years earlier.]

----------------------------------------------------------------------------



3.2  THE ALL-NANAIC


A primary thing which aims at, or furthers, what is ananormatively superior 
is a nanaic being or 'nanan'. The set of all nanaic beings in the universe 
of the past, present and future may be called "the all-nanaic" or "all-
nanan". As a mere set of primary things the all-nanaic does in a strict 
ontological sense not exist as a primary thing itself, just as humankind as 
the set of all individual human beings does not exist either in this sense. 
Yet, so long as there is one nanaic thing in the universe, the all-nanaic 
'exists' in the same sense as humankind 'exists'. The existence of the all-
nanaic is therefore as incontestable as the existence of humankind.

The all-nanaic is not a 'being' in the sense of a primary thing such as the 
supreme being or a human being. But, if being is also taken in a wider sense 
which includes sets of beings, the all-nanaic is not merely a being but the 
second principal being of the neutralist denominational doctrine. Altho the 
term all-nanan suggests that this principal being would be a single, primary 
thing, this suggestion must be interpreted symbolically, for literally the 
all-nanan is not a (primary) thing. The expression all-nanaic is more 
appropriate in this respect since we could read "all nanaic beings" instead 
of "all-nanaic being". In both cases the function of all in all-nanaic is 
different from that of all in all-ananic. The all-nanaic consists of all 
primary things that are nanaic in at least one respect, whereas the all-
ananic is a single primary thing that is ananic in all (original) respects 
in which it is catenal.

The all-ananic is the end of the all-nanaic in that it determines as an 
ideal the direction in which each thing has to aim in order to be nanaic. 
The all-ananic is also the end of the all-nanaic in that no nanaicity would 
be required, and would even be possible anymore, if the state of complete or 
maximum ananicity were permanently attained. This would result in the end of 
the existence of the all-nanaic, since no primary thing were then, and could 
then be, nanaic anymore.

While the all-ananic is the principal being which represents neutrality 
proper, the all-nanaic is the principal (set of) being(s) which represents 
the forces contributing to the establishment or maintenance of neutrality, 
and of neutral-inclusivity. While the all-ananic is the supreme being, the 
all-nanaic is an inferior being (or a collection of inferior beings). The 
all-ananic supreme being is 'all-good' if good is a purely evaluative and 
perfective term; it is neither good nor bad in the sense of beneficent or 
maleficent; and it has no creative or destructive powers. The all-nanan, on 
the other hand, is not good in the purely evaluative, perfective sense of 
good, but it is good in the sense of beneficent when this enhances a 
sentient being's neutral well-being. Moreover, in its striving for ananicity 
the all-nanan has great creative power as well.

Altho no reasonable person can take the moldy creationist belief seriously 
which fancies "a creator of the universe" in terms of one personal being or 
other primary thing, we must recognize the creative force or forces of 
nature which have shaped the world and the things in it as they are (or as 
they used to be before their destruction). As regards the material, 
nonbiological aspect of the world: this is controlled by gravitation and 
other nanaic physical forces. As regards life systems on Earth and possibly 
other planets: order and evolution in these systems portray a maintenance of 
neutrality (balance, equilibrium, symmetry, equality) and a search for this 
state (adaptation, acclimatization) which are characteristic of nanaicity. 
The physical, chemical and biological forces concerned are all determined by 
the same 'nanapolar li'. Therefore, the creative force or 'creator' behind 
the meaningful development of our world as an orderly system forms part of 
the all-nanaic. The universal nanaicity exhibited by this 'creator' is not 
different from the relatively small-scale, ananormative striving for 
neutrality we are urged to ourselves. It is precisely by being nanaic in 
some respect that we, as persons, become part of this creative principal 
being ourselves.

A particular thing can be creative or nanaic in many different respects and 
with regard to many different other things. That is why the all-nanan has 
countless appearances. It is the nanaic substance of the universe as a 
whole, and the nanaic substance in every separate field. If neutrality in 
that field corresponds to nondiscrimination and inclusivity, then the all-
nanaic has at least as many appearances as there are facets of inclusivity. 
Thus one could speak of "the nanan of races", "of sexes", "of nations", "of 
languages", and so on. The nanan then designates the nanaic or a being that 
symbolically represents all primary things that are nanaic in the field 
concerned. The so-called 'nanan of races' includes everything that furthers 
racial nondiscrimination, everything that maintains racial inclusivity and 
everyone who fights racism.

The nanapolar field in question may also be a geographic one. Such a 
geographic field is, for example, that of a general natural or cultural 
feature, or that of one particular place or area. Thus the 'nanan of the 
mountains' represents everything that is nanaic in any high, mountainous 
area, while the 'nanan of the polders' represents everything that is nanaic 
in any low area reclaimed from the sea or other body of water. If 
Loandhiland is the (fictitious) proper name of a country, the 'Nanan of 
Loandhiland' represents the nanaicity in, or of, Loandhiland. (Compare the 
Nanan of the Bleen Sea and the Nanan of the Yellored Desert.)

Finally, the nanapolar field in question may be defined, too, in terms of a 
more specific, corrective value of neutralism. All beings that are nanaic 
because they are beneficent, for instance, are thus 'nanans of beneficence', 
or are symbolically part of one 'nanan of beneficence'. When good is not 
only used in a perfective, but also in a corrective, evaluative sense, the 
all-nanaic is, as it were, a 'pannanaon' of many different, good beings; 
that is, a 'pannanaon' of beings that are beneficent, of beings that promote 
interpersonal equality, of beings that combat exclusivism, and of beings 
that are nanaically good in any other respect.



3.3  BOTH TOGETHER


3.3.1  TWO FUNDAMENTAL SYMBOLS


From a purely presentative point of view the supreme being is a primary 
thing among primary things with only neutral catenated predicates which may 
or may not exist in reality. From a symbolic point of view the all-ananic 
(if it exists) or the image of the all-ananic (if the all-ananic itself does 
not exist) represents the highest of highest, that is, normative 
supremeness. Logically speaking, we do not need the image of an all-neutral 
being to represent the system of values based on the ananorm. Yet, the 
distinction between what the supreme being is and what it represents is so 
small, and the relationship between the thing proper and the matter 
symbolized so direct, that the all-ananic cannot be considered a kind of 
symbol like all other kinds of symbol. It is a fundamental symbol which can 
be straightforwardly deduced, given our basic neutral-inclusive premises. It 
forms part of a fundamental symbolism and as such also contributes to the 
intelligibility of the presentative system of neutral-inclusive values.

When comparing its presentative with its representative significance, the 
position of the all-nanaic is not in every respect the same as that of the 
all-ananic. Unlike the all-ananic, the all-nanaic unites countless (nanaic) 
primary things that did, do and will exist in reality. Among them are human 
beings and other primary things which are as concrete as human beings 
themselves. For the rest, however, the all-nanaic's position is the same. 
Its image is, logically speaking, not necessary either, but also here the 
distinction between what it is and what it represents is so small, and the 
relationship so direct, that the all-nanaic has to be regarded as a 
fundamental symbol of neutral and inclusive thought as well.

On the fundamental model the two principal beings are reasoned combinations 
of primary or secondary things with a unique, inherent significance; on the 
symbolic model these principal beings derive their significance from their 
representation of neutrality proper and neutral-directedness respectively. 
It is in this way that the all-ananic as the supreme symbol of perfect 
neutrality and the all-nanaic as the universal symbol of neutral-
directedness make it possible to bridge the gap between fundamental and 
symbolic neutralism.



3.3.2  WHETHER TO ADDRESS ONESELF TO A PRINCIPAL BEING


The chance of getting rain does not increase by praying for rain. From a 
purely physical angle praying is a senseless activity. And yet, it would not 
testify to our inclusive stance, if we did not recognize that there is more 
to an act like addressing oneself to a principal being, whether it is called 
"praying" or something else. Moreover, from the same physical angle there is 
no essential difference between praying and such an act as wishing someone a 
good time, for example, a good night or a happy New Year. Both praying and 
wishing involve some sort of request (even when only thanking a god this 
time). In neither case the chance of fulfilment of what is prayed for, or of 
what is wished for, (also in the future when now only expressing gratitude) 
is, physically speaking, increased by the expression of such a request.

Altho praying to a god may be a theocentrist practise based on the 
supernaturalist belief that prayers will have a positive effect in an 
immediate sense (but not necessarily at the time of praying), addressing 
themselves to a principal being can for certain people under certain 
circumstances have a profound symbolic and psychosocial significance. It can 
have such a symbolic significance in that it emphasizes the special 
relationship with the principal being concerned and the ideals it 
represents. Those who formally express their hope, wish or thanks thus try 
to symbolically come closer to an eminent being which has, perhaps, 
ostensibly remained at too great a distance.

The act of addressing oneself to a mightier being than oneself can have a 
psychological significance in that it may be a way to express, and possibly 
relieve, one's feelings of helplessness. Furthermore, the act of formally 
expressing a wish together with other people, while everyone is addressing 
'imself to the same principal being may have an important social function 
which must not be underestimated. (This can precisely be the strategic power 
of a common proper name such as God for the very dissimilar principal beings 
believed in by people of different religious persuasions.) Even the most 
austere, positivist rationalist cannot deny that those who address 
themselves to the same principal being (or name) unite themselves, that is, 
unite themselves under the same ideals (or under the same inane concepts) 
symbolized by, or in, the image of that principal being (or name). Maybe, 
the act of addressing oneself to a principal being does not really create a 
relationship with that principal being, but it does create a more intense 
relationship with all others living under the same denomination. Our 
veridicalism only requires here that we do not take literally what must be 
understood symbolically. The symbolic itself may, then, be said to have a 
psychosocial meaning.

It is not neutral to be prayed to, or otherwise addressed. And it does not 
make sense to specially ask something from a being that does not have a more 
than average power, or to specially thank it for something it cannot have 
done, or cannot have done better than the average other person or object. 
Therefore the supreme should not be prayed to or otherwise addressed, even 
if it exists or existed. Anyone purporting to address the supreme being does 
in fact address an inferior being. Not only should the supreme being not be 
prayed to or addressed, since it has no creative or nanaic power, it could 
not even be suggested in a prayer or formal wish that the all-neutral being 
aid those who have fallen victims to unananicity or unnanaicity. The all-
neutral being and its image are not only superior to prayers but also to the 
possible, nontheocentrist, non-supernaturalist analogs of prayers. In our 
relationship with the supreme being we ourselves should, similarly, be 
superior to every cult of requesting and thanking.

Whereas the all-ananic is too high in a normative respect to address oneself 
to, the all-nanaic is a mighty entity which in principle can help mortal 
humans and others when they need its assistance. The vigor of the all-
nanaic, or of a particular nanan, may thus stimulate the desire in certain 
individuals to more or less formally address themselves to this Ananormative 
principal being. Such an act or practise should be considered purely 
symbolic. And never should anyone address 'imself in a denominational 
context to a nanan that can or could address 'imself to others too as this 
is bound to degenerate into honor exism.

Tho it may theoretically be possible to address oneself to oneself, 
addressing oneself to something creates in the first place a distance 
between oneself and that other being. This is even more apparent when the 
other being is something to be religiously honored or loved. The distance 
between the adherent of the DNI and the two principal beings will not be 
enlarged because of some requirement that they should be honored; and, so 
far as the all-ananic is concerned, not because of some requirement that it 
should be prayed to or loved. However, so far as the all-nanaic is concerned 
the act or practise of addressing oneself to, or perhaps 'loving', the all-
nanaic or a particular nanan, could be responsible for a greater distance 
between the all-nanaic and the individual adherent. Such an effect would be 
very regrettable indeed. For unlike the principal beings of theocentrist 
denominations, the principal beings of the Norm are not there to be honored, 
loved or prayed to. On the contrary, they are there to share their qualities 
and to become part of.



3.3.3  THE DUAL CHARACTER OF THE DNI'S PRINCIPAL SYMBOLISM


The adoption of the ananorm has led us in two different directions: firstly, 
to the province of neutrality proper or ananicity; and secondly, to the 
province of neutral-directedness or nanaicity. As the fields of neutrality 
proper and neutral-directedness do not overlap, there is a basic difference 
in character between these fields. This dual character of both fundamental 
and symbolic, neutral thought shows best when comparing the all-ananic with 
the all-nanaic for a number of facets. (The last three in the following list
will be dealt with in Chapter Five.)


  THE ALL-ANANIC                        THE ALL-NANAIC
  (the supreme being)                   (the all-nanan)
  ------------------------------------  ------------------------------------
  normative supremeness                 normative inferiority
                                         (nonsupremeness)
  neutrality (ananicity)                unneutrality,
                                         both positive and negative
  nan-nanapolarity                      nanapolarity, positivity (nanaicity)
  passiveness                           activeness
  preservation                          creation, improvement
  rest                                  motion, movement
  situational goodness                  ethical goodness, beneficence
  centricity                            direction
  confinement to one location           universal presence
  one primary thing:                    indefinite number of primary things:
   singularity, individuality            plurality
  either personal or nonpersonal        both personal and nonpersonal
  possible existence                    indisputable existence
  idealism                              realism
  must not be addressed or prayed to    can be addressed
  contemplation, meditation             celebration
  end of summer or winter               beginning of summer or winter
  beginning of spring or fall           end of spring or fall


The above juxtaposition demonstrates that the neutral and the neutral-
directed together include almost every possible quality or state of affairs 
in the fields they cover. Even negativity is included under nanapolar 
negativity; and positivity under nanapolar positivity and under nanaicity, 
which is a positive predicate. There is, of course, one important exception. 
It is that neither principal being represents non-nanapolar unneutrality. 
And with the exclusion of non-nanapolar unneutrality neither fundamental 
symbol represents situational or ethical badness or evil. In other words, 
neither symbol represents situational deterioration and destruction.

Since it has been a well-considered choice in the doctrine of neutral-
inclusivity to assign a special status to the neutrality of the catena 
rather than to the, or a, negativity or positivity, the exclusion of non-
nanapolar unneutrality, which is indirectly the result of it, cannot be 
regarded as arbitrary. The fact that nonneutral, non-nanapolar predicates 
are secondary things is even more significant. For it means that the DNI 
does nowhere symbolically exclude a system of primary attributes and 
relations, that is, a primary thing, whether personal like ourselves or not. 
Even tho the DNI must make a choice in order to be a normative doctrine at 
all, it does not arbitrarily endow any nonpredicative thing (such as a human 
being) with highness, while referring other nonpredicative things (human 
beings) to a lower class. (This Model nowhere states --like a venom-spouting 
monotheist sacred book-- that certain groups of human beings are the supreme 
being's abomination and should be exterminated.)

The dual character of neutralism follows from the condition that neutrality 
needs a certain type of unneutrality, namely the nanaicity to maintain, to 
establish or to reestablish neutrality. If the DNI exclusively permitted 
neutrality, unneutral conditions would remain unneutral forever, which could 
result in the end of all neutrality. At the same time this dual character 
which renders fundamental neutral thought inclusivistic also gives an 
inclusive appearance to the DNI's principal symbolism. The inclusive, dual 
character of this symbolism represents in itself the inseparability of 
neutral and inclusive thought.



3.3.4  A COMPARISON WITH THEODEMONIST PRINCIPAL BEINGS


3.3.4.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE SUPREME AND THE IMAGES OF GODS AND DEMONS

We shall not enter the theodemonical arena
in which polytheists, monotheists and atheists
compete for the irrelevances of the true faith.

So far as the all-neutral supreme being is concerned
we recognize its value and significance as a symbol, but
we do not need to know
whether it exists
in the actual world.

So far as gods and demons are concerned
we do not maintain that there is no god or demon, but
we reject gods and demons or their images
for what they represent
in the province of norms.

We do not worship any particular god or demon
because the worship of a god or demon is
the recognition and perpetuation of exclusivist ideology.

We do not worship the supreme being
because every purported worship of the supreme being is
the worship of an inferior being.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------


Typical of theodemonist ideologies is, firstly, that the 'positive' 
principal beings (namely gods) are worshiped or said to be loved, and 
secondly, that the adherents are expected to unconditionally believe in the 
eternal existence of those principal beings. The latter may also apply to 
the 'negative' principal beings (or demons). If there is believed to be only 
one, or a highest, 'positive' principal being, it plays the role of a 
supreme being and is named "God" in this language. The belief in the true 
existence of such a supreme being is in general an absolute prerequisite for 
genuinely adhering to monotheist denominationalism. Not believing in the 
existence of such a god is not believing in the monotheist doctrine itself. 
That is why the leaders of such ideologies cannot very well tolerate any 
doubt about Mono's existence. Since they preach the primacy of the 
authoritative it is their own, earthly authority which has been doxastically 
derived from that of the 'Supreme Being', and which therefore depends on it.

Throughout this Model many reasons have been given why the all-neutral 
supreme being is no god as conceived in theist systems of thought. Unlike 
the god of monotheism in particular, the all-neutral supreme being is not 
necessarily concrete or abstract, not necessarily human or superhuman, not 
necessarily a person and not necessarily male. Unlike the god of monotheism 
in particular, the all-neutral supreme being did even as a person never 
consider, and does even as a person not consider, one people, land or town 
as 'er special own, or as a people, land or town which would be 'more equal' 
than all others. Unlike the god of monotheism in particular, the all-neutral 
supreme being did even as a person never demand, and does even as a person 
not demand, the extermination of nonadherents or other human beings that 'e 
would hate too much. And unlike the god of monotheism in particular, the all-
neutral supreme being did not have, and does not have, an exclusive 
relationship with the male members of the ruling class of a certain kind of 
human society as reflected in terms such as King and Lord.

While the existence of the all-ananic is disputable but irrelevant, the 
existence of the all-nanaic is as indisputable for us as that of a god for a 
fervent theist. Yet, the important difference with theist ideology is now 
that the existence of the all-nanaic is not automatically assumed to be 
eternal. As its continued existence is only needed until the state of all-
neutrality, or the least unneutral state possible, has been attained, the 
eventual neutralist ideal is the non-existence of the all-nanaic. Such 
cannot be said of any god! Theodemonists also want the nonexistence of the 
devil or demons, to be sure, but with respect to those principal beings they 
want their immediate nonexistence, because they are not even believed to 
have a function for the time being.

If the creator denotes the whole of all creative beings or forces, then this 
'creator' is part of the all-nanaic (if it is not to be a destroyer). But 
the 'creator' is not a supreme being that would be higher than the average 
human being. The nanaicity of the 'creator' is basically the same as the 
nanaicity human beings can display themselves, for the all-nanaic embraces, 
or can embrace, both the 'creator' and mortal human beings. Such a concept 
of the creation of our world cannot be found in theodemonist creeds.

The all-ananic is not a god, among other things, because it may not really 
exist (or because we are allowed to believe that it may or does not really 
exist). The all-nanaic is not a god, among other things, because it may not 
eternally exist, tho it does exist at present. Another important reason why 
neither the supreme nor the inferior, principal being is a god, is that 
neither one can or must be worshiped. We know that the all-ananic can not be 
worshiped, and we also know that the all-nanaic should not be worshiped, 
since we should not honor (nor dishonor) according to the norm of nanhonore. 
Unlike theists who erect temples --whatever they may be called-- to worship 
their 'Supreme Being' --whatever he may be called-- or other gods, 
neutralists are not allowed to build a place of worship for the all-ananic 
or the all-nanaic, for honor and dishonor are alien to the all-neutral 
supreme being itself or 'imself. What they are allowed to, is to assign loci 
of denominational representation; that is, to dedicate certain places to the 
symbols of ananicity and other places to the symbols of nanaicity.

It is one thing to say what qualities, attitudes or actions are, or would 
be, supreme, good or right; it is another thing to claim that one and the 
same primary thing would be involved in all of them. But too often the 
supreme being is, or has been, equipped with an artificial and gaudy 
collection of attributes, some of which might go together and some of which 
could never belong to one and the same outfit. Especially monotheist 
religions love combining the supreme being and the creator in one divine 
being. But a primary thing with such a concoction of attributes does not 
exist in the light of our veridicalist model. On this model there does not 
even exist one primary thing that comprises everything that is nanaic in the 
universe, let alone one primary thing that comprises both everything that is 
nanaic and everything that is supreme.

What comes, perhaps, nearest to the traditional concept of a god in the 
fundamental symbolism of neutral thought is the notion of a nanan. A nanan 
does not only exist, it may be highly beneficent and very powerful. Its 
existence does matter too in that its nanaicity is relevant to a particular 
form of neutrality or to neutrality in general. A nanan can also have a 
special relationship with a particular people, region or place, just as it 
can have a special relationship with a particular mode of neutrality or 
facet of inclusivity. But such a nanan is always one of a multitude of 
nanans. The 'pannanaon' of 'gods' acting in favor of neutral-inclusivity is 
practically inexhaustible. To take one of its members and to regard it as a 
god, because it has been/is/will be so extraordinarily good in a particular 
respect, or for a particular class of sentient beings, is in itself no 
deadly sin. It is when such a god (or group of gods) is claimed to be the 
sole one, and when the attributes of such a god (or group of gods) are said 
to be perfect in themselves, that theism degenerates into a system of 
reverence for the exclusive and the extreme, a system of reference for the 
exclusive and the extreme.



4  OBJECTS OF NONFUNDAMENTAL SYMBOLISM


4.1  NEUTRALISTIC AND COMPATIBLE SIGNS


4.1.1  THE NANAPOLARITY CATENA


Neutral-inclusive thought is characterized by three critical steps. When 
taking the neutralist starting point (rather than the relevantist one, as we 
have done in the Book of Fundamentals), the first step is that of assigning 
the highest normative value to the neutral predicate, and lower values to 
unneutral predicates. The second step is the realization that there are two 
sides to the neutral ideal: neutrality proper and the striving for 
neutrality, which is not neutral in itself. And the third step is the 
recognition of the inseparability of neutral and inclusive thought. It is on 
the grounds of this model that every symbol which is, strictly speaking, 
only neutralistic does represent the ideal of inclusivity as well.

The distinction between neutrality proper and the striving for neutrality 
corresponds to the distinction between an original catena and its neutral-
directedness catena. While neutrality proper (ananicity) is the central 
predicate of an original catena, the striving for this neutrality is the 
positivity of the neutral-directedness catena of such an original catena. 
(Its neutrality is nan-neutral-directedness, and its negativity un-neutral-
directedness.) This neutral-directed (nanapolar) striving is purely 
directional and can therefore be represented by an arrow. In a one-
dimensional space in which neutralness is represented by a point, the 
striving for neutralness has two directions: one from the one extreme to the 
center, and the other from the opposite extreme to the center. Since the 
catena is analogous to a one-dimensional space (that is, a line), a line 
with a distinct point in the center can be considered representing a catena 
(of which the neutrality corresponds to the distinct point). The positivity 
of the neutral-directedness or nanaicity catena can be superimposed on this 
image of the original catena by adding an arrow which represents the 
striving for neutrality thru positivity (increase) and an arrow which 
represents the striving for neutrality thru negativity (decrease). The two 
arrows will meet in the one point representing the neutrality of the 
original catena. The central sign which emerges in this figure looks like a 
multiplication sign (X), and the image has now become two-dimensional. Altho 
the total figure consisting of the straight line and the central sign
( ---X--- ) is still rather primitive, it does already symbolize both
aspects of neutral thought, namely the recognition of the special status of
(ananormative) neutrality and the significance of all (ananormative) 
striving for neutrality.

The simple figure formed by two arrows meeting in the middle is a visual 
and/or tactual symbol of neutrality, nanapolarity and the positivity and 
negativity of the original catena thru which neutrality can be achieved. It 
represents the whole basic or other original catena and the nanapolar 
predicate related to this catena. We shall call this concrete symbol "the 
(Nanapolarity) Catena" or "nanacatena" for short. (Since the symbol itself, 
or a concrete object, is not a catena, (Nanapolarity) Catena is a name to be 
capitalized.) Where the nanacatena is present, this is a nonfundamental sign 
of the belief in ananicity and nanaicity. (Nonfundamental in that it cannot 
be compared to the two fundamental symbols of the DNI.) The nanacatena is 
not the symbol of a nanaicity or neutral-directedness catena, because such a 
symbol would not only represent neutral-directedness but also nan- and un-
neutral-directedness.

The center of the Nanapolarity Catena symbolizes neutrality; the left of it 
positivity --the further to the left the more positive-- and the right 
negativity --the further to the right the more negative--, or vice versa. To 
indicate the degree of negativeness and positiveness we can make the 'line' 
thicker and thicker as we move from the neutral point. The degree of 
unneutralness is now also visualized or tactualized (that is, made tactual 
or tangible). Negative unneutrality and positive unneutrality must not be 
differentiated in a nanacatena, for they have exactly the same value 
according to the ananorm. Suffice it that one is on the sinister, the other 
on the dexter side of the center.

The original left and right lines which have become surfaces may be bordered 
by a straight line or by a (part of a) curve such as a circle. When these 
surfaces are bordered by straight lines, the nanacatena consists of two 
equicrural, but not equilateral, triangles of which the top angles meet in a 
point marked by the central sign of the nanacatena (the X sign which emerges 
when an arrow is mirrored). The central sign can only stand out when the 
base of the identical triangles is made considerably shorter than the sides. 
Also when the surfaces are bordered by curves, or parts of curves, this