[TRINPsite, 58.48.1-58.48.5, mvvm.net/En/MNI/BoF1-3.txt ] [Plain text file of section files at www.trinp.org/MNI/BoF/1/(*/)*.HTM to 3/(*/)*.HTM. Additions and revisions in the original *.HTM files have been incorporated until 58.48.5. This file is not part of the digital Model, as it may not be up to date and does not contain special symbols and fonts.] MODEL OF NEUTRAL-INCLUSIVITY by Vinsent Nandi, 41 aSWW BOOK OF FUNDAMENTALS, PART I [chapters 1-3] 1 THE NORM OF INCLUSIVITY 1.1 BASICS 1.1.1 FORMULA OF THE NORM The norm of inclusivity is the ground-norm obtained by taking the universal version of the non-metadoctrinal, nonpropositional principle of discriminational, nondoxastic relevance and by interpreting it in a catenically neutralistic way. In short: it is the neutralistic interpretation of the principle of relevance. 1.1.2 WHY A NON-METADOCTRINAL, NONPROPOSITIONAL PRINCIPLE? The norms of our denominational doctrine are not 'norms' in some (sub-)cultural or 'social' sense; they are norms in an independent ontological sense. They can be obtained by interpreting a certain principle or a certain version of a certain principle. This is why we also call them "interpreted principles". The principles themselves are, again, independent of the cultural or social circumstances of a special time or place. If they are said to be eternal, then because they apply to all times or all eras; if they are said to be nontemporal, then because their significance does not depend on any time or era in particular. If they are said to be omnipresent then because they apply everywhere, that is, in all places and communities; if they are said to be nonspatial, noncultural or nonsocial, then because their significance does not depend on any place or community in particular. The first two 'eternal', 'omnipresent' principles which every normative doctrine must recognize, explicitly or implicitly, are --as we have ascertained in the Book of Instruments-- the principle of truth and the principle of relevance. Neither principle, however, is metadoctrinal in that it inherently belongs to a second-order normative doctrine dealing with the relationship between persons and first-order normative doctrines. Both principles are (non-meta-) doctrinal in that they can, and ought to be, part of every first-order normative doctrine itself, altho this does not preclude them from being part of every normative doctrine of a higher order as well. Insofar as a metadoctrinal principle is concerned, our own ideology is in the first instance a first-order normative doctrine with (non-metadoctrinal) doctrinal principles. Later, after having discussed these doctrinal principles and the interpretations which we shall give to them, we will turn to the one metadoctrinal principle to be recognized in addition to those doctrinal ones. It is the principle which underlies the right to personhood. The prime concern of every ideology is the ground-world and, more particularly, the way the ground-world should be. Being comprehensive, a denominational doctrine will also cherish ideas about the relationships between people`s utterances or theories and the ground-world and, perhaps, about the formal aspects of thoughts about the ground-world. Nonetheless, the ideas about these relationships and formal aspects are subsidiary to ground-world questions. Even if they were not, they would not add as much interest to the doctrine as ground-world ideas and principles, for in general all people pay lip-service to non-ground-world principles like truth (which governs the relationship between utterances and the ground-world) and consistence or coherence (as a formal aspect of theorizing). It is nonpropositional principles or, if interpreted, nonpropositional norms which characterize a normative doctrine more than any propositional principle or principle of correspondence. It may now be rejoined that everyone will also say that `e is in favor of relevance, when asked whether `e is. No-one is likely to admit that `e aims at irrelevance or that `e does not care about relevance at all. This, however, is precisely the reason why the recognition of a principle of relevance does not mean much (if anything), that it is the interpretation of such a principle which counts, and the version adhered to. Altho this holds for truth, or a principle of truth, as well, the essential difference is that truth concerns at most a correspondence between nonpropositional and propositional reality, whereas (discriminational) relevancy concerns actions and attitudes in the ground-world itself. But then, we must admit too that the role of relevancy is only of fundamental significance for us in the ground-world. Consequently, it is the role of a nonpropositional principle of relevance which is of fundamental significance in a denominational doctrine like ours. 1.1.3 WHY DISCRIMINATIONAL, NONDOXASTIC RELEVANCE? Strictly speaking, 'doxastic relevance' is no relevance, and amongst ourselves it is, indeed, superfluous to speak of "nondoxastic relevance". Yet, in a wider or introductory context this addition stresses our ontological and epistemological position that something is not relevant merely because it is believed to be relevant. We have seen in the Book of Instruments how the use of the notion of relevance (especially the phenomenological one) sometimes tends to be excessive and doxastic, and we rather take a certainty for an uncertainty. This is not to suggest, of course, that we ourselves can be sure about what is relevant; actually no-one can. It does mean tho that we think it very important to apply at least the criterion of inconsistence, which does away with partial relevancy, the criterion of the fake focus, which does away with fake focuses of relevancy and the criterion of mere correlation, which does away with pseudofactual relevancy. Even if we, or other people, believe something to be relevant, it is not relevant if, for example, the focus of relevance is fake. The doxastic relevance is, then, irrelevance all the same. Nondoxastic relevance and irrelevance, however, are there, whether believed in or not. The question of why the nondoxastic relevance we are concerned about must be discriminational relevance, has only to be answered for the role of relevance in the ground-world as our principle of relevance is a nonpropositional one. Hence, it need not be explained why relevance-relatedness or semantic relevance are not interesting here. The fact that we are dealing with a principle of relevance which, when interpreted, yields a norm, makes it definitely impossible, too, that the relevance concerned is statistical or causal, for statistical and causal relevance are modal conditions, not factual ones. If something ever should be statistically or causally relevant, then only as a means to something else. The relevance is, then, merely instrumental, not a perfective (or perfectively instrumental) value, which it is supposed to be on the normative principle of relevance. The relevance of a nonpropositional principle of relevance must be value-dependent relevance, and must be classified on the basis of the type of fundament involved. To classify it on the basis of the type of terminus involved would either leave the principle of relevance without content, or would establish a different value for which the relevance would merely be a means. 'Moral' or 'motivational relevance', for instance, leave a principle of relevance devoid of any practical meaning even when the fundament is given, because the question which remains then is with respect to what moral value or with respect to what kind of motivation should something be relevant?. On the other hand, when the terminus is defined in denotative terms, it is the value of the terminus which is given its normative significance by the 'principle of relevance', not relevance itself. For example, when something has to be socially relevant (or 'of practical relevance to the interests of society at large'), and the social goal is simultaneously defined as the greatest happiness of the greatest number of citizens, it is this particular happiness value which is made the subject of the relevance principle. The relevance principle tho, holds independently of the kind of terminus involved, that is, independently of the focus of relevancy. Setting aside forms of relevancy which are gradations of value-dependent relevancy on a decision-theoretical level, such as 'topical' or 'primary' and 'marginal' or 'minor relevance', the object of the relevance principle is therefore nothing else than pragmatic or discriminational relevance. Pragmatic relevance in the ground-world is itself merely a type of discriminational relevance, namely the relevance of distinctions made by the speaker or writer between words, phrases, statements, and so on. It is the relevance of a speech act done where an alternative act could have been done, that is, where a decision between different acts has been taken. It is in this decision that one or more distinctions are, or have been drawn. The very need of a principle of relevance was demonstrated in this field in the first place. When we concluded --in the Book of Instruments-- that even 'purely descriptive theories' ought to be true and relevant, this true and this relevant referred to statements made as part of a theory. But making a statement is a speech act in which a person distinguishes one class of things from another, and in which `e decides to mention some things and not to mention other things. Since the pragmatic relevance involved in speaking and writing is only a special kind of discriminational relevance, and since discriminational relevance is the most extensive form of relevance which can be the subject of a nonpropositional relevance principle which does not fix a focal determinant, it is this form we must be dealing with when talking of such a principle. 1.1.4 WHY TAKING THE UNIVERSAL VERSION? Those who agree that one should adopt a (non-meta-)doctrinal, nonpropositional principle of discriminational, nondoxastic relevance, might still disagree about the adoption of a personal or a universal version of this principle. The personal version only puts an end to the dependence on internal nonrelevance. The relevance of the distinction they make does, then, not depend on a causal connection between this distinction and an attitude or practise of making another nonrelevant distinction by themselves. The universal version goes further. If possible, this version puts an end to the dependence on external nonrelevance, when a distinction made by others is nonrelevant. The difference between the personal and the universal version of the relevance principle has no bearing on a moral agent`s right of personhood to choose for the one or the other version. In both cases `e exercises `er own personal freedom to make a normative decision, albeit a more demanding one when espousing the universal version. What is also the same in both cases, is that either version has an active and a nonactive component. The nonactive component may also be called "restrictive" or "proscriptive". For P (the personal version) it reads, "one should not make a distinction which is not relevant", while the addition for U (the universal version) is, "or the relevance of which depends on a nonrelevant distinction made or on the not making of a relevant distinction". The active component may also be called "prescriptive", and reads for P, "one should make a distinction which is relevant", while the addition for U is, "unless this relevance depends on a nonrelevant distinction made, or on the not making of a relevant distinction". As noted in section I.7.4.2 --that is, 7.4.2 of the Book of Instruments-- the choice whether to assume that other people act from the same normative theory (as in the universal version) or not (as in the personal version) cannot be determined by a mathematical or logical calculus. The question of action versus nonaction is more complicated tho, because many consequentialists argue that there is no difference between an action and a nonaction when the effects are the same. But usually the effects are taken to be something like the amount of pleasure or suffering the act or omission or abstention brings about, and not a quality inherent in the action or nonaction itself. When a quality in an action or nonaction itself is a value or disvalue as well, the matter is not so simple anymore, and that is why we have to postpone the discussion of the proscriptive and prescriptive readings of our normative principles until a later chapter. The question of the difference in versions themselves we must tackle now, however, for a personal version of the principle of relevance would practically exhaust all its normative vigor. Those who suggest that people need or can only adopt the personal version of the relevance principle, do not only accept that people would show less strength in matters of relevance in practise, they must also hold that it is not the case that people ought to display more strength in such matters, even tho they had every ability and opportunity of doing so. On the other hand, those adopting the universal version of the relevance principle do hold that one should display as much strength in such matters as one can. If one cannot possibly do anything more than what is required according to the personal version, this is also what is required according to the universal version. Yet, the underlying attitude is quite different. Those pleading for the personal version tend to reconcile themselves to what they but too easily assume cannot be avoided. Thus, where the majority in a community discriminates against a minority, they have this discrimination determine the 'relevance' of their own distinctions, as tho submitting to the will of a monolithic Exclusionist. All these people embracing the personal version of the relevance principle are therefore themselves part of, or constitute, the very majority which --they claim-- is beyond their control. To illustrate what it means to accept the universal version of the principle of relevance, or the criterions doing away with assigning relevance to both internal and external nonrelevance, we will give some time and attention to a concrete example at the end of this division. 1.1.5 WHY A CATENICALLY NEUTRALISTIC INTERPRETATION? The fundament of relevancy is a distinction: a distinction which should not be made if it is irrelevant, but which may --both on the proscriptive and on the prescriptive account-- be made if it is relevant. The distinction is drawn on the basis of a factor which divides the world, or a domain of discourse, into two or more parts. Examples of such divisions are a 'world' consisting, or said to consist, of human and nonhuman beings; or a 'world' said to consist of men and women; or a predicative 'world' with mental health as distinct from mental disability. Sometimes, what is presented as 'one' division of the world may involve several factors of distinction, like when the world is said to consist of human beings, (nonhuman) animal beings, nonanimal living beings (or plants) and nonliving beings. All these differences in themselves, however, are not relevant or irrelevant: humans are there just being human, whereas nonhumans are there just being nonhuman; mental health is there just being mental health, whereas mental disability is there just being mental disability. It is the way in which a difference is taken up in a speech act, or in a nonlingual act, which is pertinent or impertinent. A distinction is not made until a difference is taken up (or, if imaginary, created) and members on one side of the divide are somehow treated differently from members on the other side of the divide. The difference in treatment may, then, be a difference between being mentioned and not being mentioned, between being allowed to enter a certain place and not being allowed to enter that place, between being worshiped and not being worshiped, and so on. Now, if the distinction made, or the difference in treatment, is irrelevant, the relevance principle requires that either all members be mentioned, or that no-one be; that either everyone be allowed to enter a certain place, or that no-one be; that either everyone be worshiped, or that no-one be. Predicates like being-mentioned and being-allowed-to-enter are noncatenical. Being-worshiped, however, is a special kind of being-honored, and being-honored, being-dishonored and the neutral being-neither-honored-nor-dishonored are concatenated. Let us assume that a situation in which everyone would be worshiped (if possible at all) needs no explanation, but what does a situation in which no-one is worshiped look like from the honor-catenary point of view? We assume then, too, that to worship means to honor greatly, and that all beings which are catenal with respect to the honor-catena are also catenal with respect to the catena of being-honored, and vice versa. In the situation in which no-one is worshiped some honor-catenals might be dishonored, some might be honored, nor dishonored, and others might be honored but not so greatly that it would amount to worship. This implies, however, that in a situation in which no-one is worshiped, honor-catenals could still be treated in very different ways, but also these dissimilarities have to be relevant on the relevance principle. In other words: for catenated predicates it does not suffice to say that all things concerned should either have them or not have them, if any difference in treatment is irrelevant. For catenated predicates the precise formulation is that all things concerned should in such a case have the same catenated proper predicate. Hence, all of them should be worshiped or otherwise honored to the same degree, all of them should be dishonored to the same degree or all of them should be neither honored, nor dishonored. It is plain, then, that the relevance principle does by no means prescribe that all honor-catenals should be worshiped, honored, dishonored or neither honored, nor dishonored; that is, it does not prescribe any particular predicate of the honor catena (or of the catena of being-honored). Yet, it apparently does prescribe a predicate of the original catena`s difference-catena, namely the neutrality of the honor-difference catena. In the event that a difference in honor-catenary treatment between two honor-catenals is irrelevant, both should have the neutral predicate of the honor-difference catena. This leaves us with the question of what to think about noncatenical predicates. They do not admit of degrees and an entity either has them, or does not have them. If, and insofar as, these predicates are really noncatenical and do not have any bearing on predicates which are catenated, we need not bother about them from the standpoint of the relevance principle. But --as noted in the Book of Instruments-- all noncatenical predicates do appear to indirectly admit of degrees somehow, or to cause something which does admit of degrees. Even if a predicate being mentioned once would not be catenical in any way whatsoever in a domain in which everything is and can be mentioned only once or not at all, it may be construed as a catenated predicate as soon as there is one thing which is or can be mentioned twice. And again, the relevance principle will then not prescribe that something be mentioned not at all, or once, or twice or more times, but only that all things will be mentioned the same number of times when a difference in treatment is irrelevant. A living being can be mentioned twice or many more times, but it can be killed only once and therefore, so it seems, we cannot in the same way devise a catena on the basis of the number of times that something can be killed. Killing and being-killed are therefore purely noncatenical --one would say. What the principle of relevance teaches on the intentional level is only that if one living being is killed on purpose and another one not, there should be a relevant difference between the two living beings. It does in no way teach, for example, that living beings must be killed, or for that matter, must not be killed; to conclude this, at least one other principle is needed. Altho killing itself is not catenical, it can have, of course, an enormous impact on the happiness-catenary state of sentient beings thru the suffering and anxiety it causes in the being (possibly) killed and those living with it. There ought to be a relevant difference between two (kinds of) living beings if one is made to suffer more than the other. The relevance principle thus requires in the first instance also neutralness with respect to the happiness-difference catena. (Note that in questions of killing the right to personhood plays a great part, but that there is no likeness between this metadoctrinal consideration and the doctrinal considerations we are involved in here. It is in the chapter on life and nonlife that we will deal with the subject of killing from both a doctrinal and a metadoctrinal perspective.) In "Equal, unless .." (I.5.1.3) it has been argued that the only two systematic approaches to the burden-of-proof issue in matters of relevancy rest on an equal,unless- or on a different, unless-tenet. It has been demonstrated there that almost all theorists on issues like equality, justice and nondiscrimination speak of "departures from equality" and of "differences having to be justified". Hence, where the relevance principle implies that there should be difference-catenary neutralness when a distinction is irrelevant, and that there may be difference-catenary unneutralness where it is relevant, all these theorists maintain, catenically speaking, that it is the unneutrality in question which has to be justified, not the neutrality. If people were omniscient, it would not matter whether they opted for the equal, unless- or the different, unless-approach, just like equal, unless different and different, unless equal are tautologies which merely signify the same from a purely truth-conditional standpoint. Since people are not omniscient, however, the equal, unless tenet favors neutralness in general and difference-catenary neutralness in particular. A possible exception is the case of purely noncatenical predicates which do not have any bearing on a catenical one, but in such a case the relevance principle does not favor unneutralness either, whether interpreted with equal, unless or different, unless. The equal, unless tenet favors neutralness, because only when we can be 'sure' that a distinction is relevant may we make it with the ensuing difference-catenary unneutralness. When we are in doubt, however, that a distinction is relevant, we are not allowed to make it. Yet, it could still be that the distinction is relevant nevertheless, and that we maintain neutralness where unneutralness would be allowed (on the proscriptive view) or even prescribed (on the prescriptive view). The equal, unless tenet is therefore neutralistic in a catenical sense in that it normatively puts neutralness above any degree of unneutralness. When we choose the equal, unless tenet and reject the different, unless one, we do not take this decision because most people adhering to a systematic code have traditionally also implicitly or explicitly preferred the former to the latter one. This fact will only make it easier for us to pursue on our course without having to lose ourselves in an endless dialectic of arguments and counterarguments. Later it will turn out that we actually choose the equal, unless tenet as the basis of our interpretation of the principle of discriminational relevance because it is neutralistic to do so. 1.1.6 THE NORM [OF INCLUSIVITY] INFORMALLY An ideology, attitude, practise or action shall be inclusive, that is, it shall include, take into consideration and respect all matters of the field it covers, without arbitrarily and exclusively choosing, or being appealed by, matters of one kind and not choosing, or not being appealed by, those of another kind. It shall not stimulate alienation from specific things due to a tendency of excluding or exclusivity, or due to ignorance. It shall not arbitrarily endow certain things with highness, while attributing lowness to other ones. It shall be as broad in orientation as possible while simultaneously refraining from inadmissible generalizations. This is inclusive theory and practise as governed by the norm of inclusivity. (The words matter and thing are to be understood in their widest sense here. They do not only refer to material things but also to events and phenomena; not only to systems of primary predicates but also to systems of secondary predicates and other predicative systems; not only to nonpersonal matters or things but also to persons or groups of persons.) When saying that all matters of a field covered by an ideology, attitude or practise should be included, taken into consideration and 'respected', we certainly do not use respect in the sense of thinking high of, treating with high regard or honoring. The principle of relevance --in other words: the norm of inclusivity-- does not as such prescribe any particular predicate of the honor-catena, let alone the, or a, positivity of this catena. It is a practical corollary of the principle tho, that where it is impossible to treat literally everyone with high or with low regard everyone should be treated with neutral regard. Regard is, then, used in the same sense as respect when it means concern (and what is someone`s 'concern' is, again, a 'matter for consideration'). The norm of inclusivity does not require that we honor, but that we show concern --in the first instance-- for everything and all matters we meet on our way. Every inclusive ideology, attitude or practise shall concern, and show concern for, all matters of the field it covers. It shall not result from arbitrarily and exclusively thinking high of things, such as particular sorts of sentient beings, of bodily qualities or of personal characteristics; and it shall not result from arbitrarily eliminating or ignoring other things of a different sort. It may seem paradoxical but inclusiveness does need a certain type of exclusion, namely the exclusion of exclusiveness. (Compare freedom which needs a certain type of control, namely the control over attempts to interfere with other people`s freedom.) Without the exclusion of exclusiveness, inclusiveness would lose every meaning. Exclusivist ideologies, and exclusive or exclusionist attitudes and practises, are the only matters an inclusive body can never include, take into consideration or respect. In general we employ, and will continue to employ, the phrases exclusive(ness), exclusivity, exclusion and to exclude in such a way that the irrelevance of the exclusion or the act of making something exclusive is already part of the meaning of the phrase. This usage is not different from that of discrimination when it does not just mean making a distinction but making an irrelevant distinction. In informal parlance this nonrelevance is, or can be, part of the meaning of phrases like respect, regard and concern too, and it definitely is part of the meaning of arbitrariness. Arbitrary is that which is selected without reason, while that which is selected for a reason (even a random distribution) has relevance at least as an implicit criterion. An arbitrary decision is not just a decision made on the basis of one`s own opinion, rather than on the basis of a general rule or law; it is a decision on the basis of one`s own opinion to do something with respect to which one`s own opinion is not unique, that is, a decision which concerns other people as well. When an action solely concerns oneself in every respect, it need not be arbitrary at all to decide by one`s own opinion. But a ruler who uses `er power without thinking of other people`s opinions and feelings is, indeed, 'an arbitrary ruler' as `e rules over others, not just over `imself. It is easy to speak of "arbitrariness", "respect" and suchlike when it is agreed on already what correct or incorrect behavior would be in the first place. It is when people disagree that a guideline is needed most, and the norm of inclusivity is then not the sole one but an important one. Each question of inclusivity, however --and with it each question of what is 'arbitrary', or of what is 'respect'--, boils down to a question of relevance. This does or did not only apply to rulers of whole countries, but equally, for example, to the person or persons who take the decisions in an office or company, whether private, worker-owned or government-owned. These decisions do also concern the relationship between the manager or management and the workers employed by them, or by whom they are employed themselves. One such decision might be that the employees or workers must dress and/or adorn themselves in a particular way, perhaps even dependent on their gender, if not gender and age, or gender, age and class. Talking of "arbitrariness" and "respect" will then not carry anyone much further, and it might be illustrative to see what role the universal version of the principle of relevance can play in such situations. We will analyze this role in an imaginary example. For the sake of clarity we must leave out other normative considerations than those of inclusivity (or relevance) and truth in this example. 1.1.7 'THE MANAGER AND THE APPEARANCE OF `ER WORKERS' The focus of relevancy is getting and keeping as many clients as possible. We will accept this determinant as it is, for it is only relevance and inclusivity which interest us at this place. (As an ultimate value we would definitely condemn such a determinant.) The factor of distinction is the appearance of the workers who have to personally deal with those clients. We assume that in a strict sense all people considered are or would be doing their work equally well, whatever they are wearing or not wearing, so long as they have the job. It is essential to this example that the quality of work is defined in terms independent of the number of customers that actually are attracted or will be attracted. We also assume that a number of clients will not do business with the firm in question if the workers of this firm they have to deal with, dress or adorn themselves in a way these clients find objectionable for reasons which are false or irrelevant to the quality of the service rendered to these clients. (Also this requirement is inherent in this kind of example. The fact that the client dislikes the clothes or adornments is by itself no sufficient reason not to do business with the persons, the men or the women concerned. For the sake of argument, the falsity or irrelevance of the client`s reasons must be recognized by the manager at least vis-à-vis `er own workers.) The question is now whether the employer can morally --so far as the relevance principle is concerned-- require a worker, a female worker or a male worker to dress or adorn `imself so that no customer will stay away (granting that there is such a fashion). The manager might give the following justification for not employing a person of 'undesirable' appearance: (a1) the object of business is to make money and to get as many clients as possible --note that if this were really the only objective, `e would have to do business with any customer, also a fascist regime, for instance--; (a2) the worker`s appearance repels clients or potential clients; (a3) hence, appearance is relevant in respect of the person`s position in the firm, and firing or not hiring a person with an appearance which keeps clients away is not to be denounced as discrimination. (b) If there are also people who would not like to deal with members of, for example, racial or ethnic minorities (easily recognizable by their skin color, accent, and so on), this is a different case --the manager might argue-- because people cannot alter their color or other ethnic characteristics, whereas they should be able to dress or adorn themselves in an adequate way, that is, a way all clients find 'normal' for human beings, or for men or for women. (c) To hire or refuse to hire somebody on the grounds of `er race, ethnicity or sex is illegal --the employer might finally argue-- but to do this on the basis of somebody`s personal appearance is not. From the standpoint of the universal version of the relevance principle the employer`s 'relevance' is circular because: (a) --given our basic assumptions-- the customers stay away for false or irrelevant reasons. These 'reasons', or rather the attitudes underlying them, are themselves morally objectionable. The relevance with respect to the focus therefore depends on external nonrelevance (or nonrelevance and/or falsity). (b) The workers may be able to adjust their personal appearance (whereas nobody can sufficiently change, say, `er skin color or female gender) but this 'freedom' is not to the point, as the question is precisely whether the worker should do so from a normative point of view. (Negative) freedom is then already presupposed, that is, both the freedom of the worker to dress and adorn in widely divergent ways, and the freedom of the company (private or governmental) to discriminate or not to discriminate on the basis of appearance, ethnicity, gender, marital status, sexual orientation, political or denominational ideology adhered to, or what have you. Such 'freedom' merely refers to an absence of practical constraints, not to any normative justification (or it must be on the grounds of some principle of liberty). And, it has to be stressed again that the question of whether an action is right or wrong should not be confused with the question of whether it should be forbidden or not. (c) While freedom to change is not an argument for or against, the legality of an action is in itself not an argument for or against its being normatively justifiable either. (Something is not immoral because the law disallows it, nor is something moral because the law does not disallow it.) If clients have prejudices concerning personal appearance as they have prejudices concerning race and sex, it is not any better to base a judgment of relevance on the occurrence of the former prejudices than to base it on the latter, altho the former thing may be legal and the latter not. As the causal connection between the worker`s personal appearance and the number of customers attracted depends on a case of external nonrelevance, the employer may, according to the universal version of the relevance principle, not require `er employees to change their appearance just to make sure that no (biased) customer will be repelled by this appearance. This conclusion holds when the argument is taken at face value. However, if the very existence or continuation of the firm or job itself is at stake, the worker`s appearance does matter in a different way. Under this condition, the company at issue would have to keep or hire a person for a job which would be lost if `e were indeed kept there or hired for this job. Not being able, then, to do `er work well in the strict sense (because not at all) in the near future, even the worker `imself could recognize this as a reason not to keep or employ `im. The relevant factor is, then, not personal appearance, but the quality of work to be done and remaining to be done in the strict sense. The implications of this proviso are not necessarily as far-reaching as one might suspect. Firstly, it must be a particular job which will be lost if a particular person of 'unwanted' appearance stays with this firm or is put on this job. If only the total number of jobs of the same kind would diminish, the work left could still be done just as well by people of the (formerly) disputed appearance. Secondly, a general decrease in employment and business will only result if the client does not go to anyone else to get the service `e wants. It will not result if the client is going to get it anyhow. Sure, no business person would like to see `er clients go to a competitor (but a business person endorsing the relevance principle would like to see `er discriminating clients go elsewhere). This presupposes, however, that the client can go to a firm which complies with `er every wish, however discriminatory. And this presupposes that there is such a firm which can do that legally and/or without being controlled morally by the rest of the community. Thirdly, the question is not really whether one or more jobs would be lost if a company were to employ bodies of 'unwanted' appearance, but rather whether more jobs would be lost than if the company refused to employ people discriminated against by a certain category of clients or potential clients. The number of clients lost would only be more in the former case, if the number of (potential) clients who stay away if the firm gives in to people who discriminate against some of its workers, were less. Hence, the proviso will or will not have far-reaching implications dependent on the situation. All those endorsing the relevance principle can try to make sure that the conditions of the proviso clearly do not hold. Their moral strategy should be to make it as difficult as possible for discriminating clients to go to a different firm. Furthermore, they themselves would not deal with firms giving in to that sort of customers. When looking at this matter it is absolutely necessary to keep sight of the fact that the above example would remain of the same kind if people`s biases with respect to ethnicity, nationality or denominational convictions, for instance, were substituted for those with respect to dress and adornment. If someone would let business prevail over a conscientious interpretation of the universal version of the relevance principle in the latter case, `e had no reason not to let it prevail in the former case, judging from the normative standpoint. And when `er doxastic or purported 'relevance' does objectively speaking not hold, a distinction made by `im on the grounds of any of these factors is discriminatory. Thus, in the event that the client is a country which requires the employees of a company to belong to a monotheist religion, it is the task of all people espousing the universal version of the principle of discriminational relevance to ensure that the proviso does not hold, and that this distinction is not relevant for the company in question. This entails in the first place that they themselves refuse to deal with such a country and with people doing business with such a country under those conditions. 1.1.7.0 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- FROM IRRELEVANCE SET FREE You shall know when an utterance is likely to be false, and the presence of the truth shall bind everyone. You shall know when a distinction is likely to be irrelevant, and the absence of irrelevance shall free everyone. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1.2 DISCRIMINATION AND ATTITUDINAL CONSISTENCY 1.2.1 CONDEMNATORY MEANINGS OF DISCRIMINATION When we define discrimination as (act or instance of) making a nonrelevant distinction or as practise of making nonrelevant distinctions, we will be talking about something else than someone who fights racism (or ethnocentrism), but who calls it "racism and discrimination". The statement of such a person saying that 'e opposes 'racism and discrimination' is terminologically as bizarre as that of someone saying that 'e loves 'women and (also) human beings' or, for that matter, 'men and (also) human beings'. If racism denotes the belief, attitude, practise or act in which one or more nonrelevant distinctions are made between human beings on the basis of race, ethnicity or skin color, then racial discrimination is simply part of it. Perhaps some confine the meaning of racism strictly to the belief or attitude, but then the corresponding form of discrimination is racial discrimination and not discrimination in general. Conversely, what corresponds to discrimination is not racism but exclusivism. (This term, however, we will use ourselves to refer to discriminatory practises and acts as well.) By speaking of "racism and discrimination" it is suggested that discrimination is nothing else than racial discrimination (and that exclusivism is nothing else than racism), and that it would be wrong because it has something to do with race. This is about the narrowest conception of discrimination possible. The practical implicature of this (seemingly exclusive) antiracism, when recognized and mentioned as an ideal in isolation, is that people might be allowed to make nonrelevant distinctions on all other grounds than race. (This also applies to the exclusive emphasis on a right to freedom from racial discrimination.) Altho we all denounce discrimination, and are talking about discrimination in a condemnatory sense, it is not race or any other particular factor which is at issue here, but the principle of relevance itself which is violated regardless of the kind of factor concerned. Our own definition of discrimination is therefore etymologically entirely justifiable. Yet, we must admit that etymology is never a sufficient argument in itself. (Thus, (to) live derives from caelebs which means unmarried, but no etymologist, celibate or not, can seriously maintain that 'to live is to be unmarried'.) Another fact -- and a more important one -- which favors our definition, is that it does seem to agree with what many ethical theorists have always understood by discrimination in general, or by racism, sexism and so on, in particular. Sexism, for instance, has been described as counting sex as relevant in contexts where it is not. (See I.5.1.2.) As regards the grounds for discrimination between human beings of different races which racists sometimes offer, it has been said that they are 'not relevant to the question of the capacity for bearing acute pain' and that they 'therefore should be disregarded'. It has been pointed out, in turn, that if this argument is valid against discrimination on the basis of race, it is valid in an analogous way for discrimination on the basis of species. Taken literally our definition might still be considered too broad compared with the traditional usage of the word (not so much by those who speak of "racism and discrimination", but by many others). For lots of people 'discrimination' seems to be confined to irrelevant (or nonrelevant) distinctions which are disadvantageous to people (sometimes sentient beings) in a social environment. This typically moral (rather than generally normative) use of discrimination also explains why quite a few theorists tend to speak of "a discriminatory action or practise based on a morally irrelevant property" or "factor". Hence, they do not only qualify the fundament of the relevance relation (a distinction) but also its terminus (a moral goal or other moral entity) and even the effects of something that is not part of the terminus proper. Not only would making an irrelevant distinction when alone on a deserted island not count as 'discrimination', making an irrelevant distinction to someone's advantage would not either. Yet, if one wants to regard the happiness, well-being or interests of personal, human or sentient beings as an end in itself, this requires an extra principle of happiness or another maxim of that nature (besides, possibly, the right to personhood). All these additional terminological and normative considerations do not concern the principle of relevance as such, and from the point of view of this principle they do not justify a narrower sense of discrimination than we started out with. Sometimes theorists do not explicitly refer to the nonrelevance of the distinction drawn, or to the 'making of distinctions' (leaving irrelevant as superfluous). Instead, they speak of a difference in treatment or favor on a basis other than individual merit. In this formulation it is implied that such a difference made is never relevant. Also when the reference is just to favor (instead of difference in favor), it carries implicitly with it that the favor itself is not justified, as it is founded upon -- again -- a nonrelevant distinction. (If the distinction actually is relevant, the term favor would not be employed to imply partiality.) Finally, discrimination is sometimes also defined as making an unjustified distinction, but the only thing this definition is good for, is that it tells us that there are 'just' and 'unjust' distinctions. Just and unjust themselves are normative or evaluative concepts which do not describe any factual(-modal) state of affairs. According to the relevance principle, a distinction is unjustified because it is not relevant, and not the other way around. It is only with this principle in mind that unjustified can be substituted for nonrelevant. All the above definitions are 'objective' in that discrimination can even occur when the group or person concerned does not notice it, or feel it that way. The normative question on the performatory level is what is discrimination? and not what do people discrimination believe to be? or when do people feel discriminated against?. The latter, doxastic notion is primarily interesting from the empirical point of view of the social sciences. Thus, one phenomenological sociologist attempted to define discrimination by means of a discrepancy between the (doxastic) relevances prevailing in different groups. This discrepancy was said to be one between an 'objective' and a 'subjective' definition of a concrete group situation. The 'subjective definition' is the one of the afflicted member of the group and the 'objective definition' the one of those 'imposing a typification' on this individual and the group 'e belongs to. At the same time the sociologist in question wrote that others create the 'group' and invest it 'with a fictitious scheme of relevances which can be manipulated at will'. Somehow, 'e had to intuitively admit that discrimination involves more than a mere difference in relevancy judgments, and that some people are indeed discriminated against by others 'imposing fictitious schemes' on them. 1.2.2 DISTINGUISHING NONRELEVANT DISTINCTIONS The ideas on typification and the relevance of descriptions are interesting from quite another standpoint, especially when it is argued that any name 'includes a typification' and that to 'find a thing or event relevant enough to bestow a separate name upon it, is the outcome of the prevailing system of relevance'. When talking of "types" the traditional theorist may think of plants and animals, of human beings of various races, of men and women, of people of various religions, and so on, but on a different level attitudes and practises drawing on these typifications can themselves be subjected to a typification as well. Traditional language has only believed a few of these attitudes and practises to be 'relevant enough to bestow a separate name upon them', namely rac(ial)ism, ethnocentrism, tribalism, sexism, ag(e)ism, nationalism, plutocracy in a sense, and a few more. A more recent introduction has been speciesism but traditional language has no separate name for types of discrimination which -- one would say -- have abounded in most (or all?) parts of the world, such as the making of nonrelevant distinctions on the grounds of class ('classism'), political or denominational ideology adhered to ('religionism' if on the basis of religion), language spoken or written, educational or marital status, sexual propensity, mental or physical disablement, and so on and so forth. The question whether these forms of discrimination are not as bad, as bad, or worse than, say, racism and sexism, is itself an empirical question (given the right normative postulates, or if defining bad in purely eudaimonistic terms). When suggesting, tho, that only certain types of discrimination have been identified by name because they have been (believed to be) more important, this must be understood as 'more important in a certain respect'. If this is in respect of people's happiness or well-being or freedom, then one introduces a certain kind of determinant which is not essential to a systematic typology of discrimination itself. Central to the whole question of discrimination is that a nonrelevant distinction can be drawn on the basis of any factor or cluster of factors, real or imaginary. When saying "cluster of factors", one should think of something like race and gender, if it is maintained that they encompass several characteristics combined, rather than a single one. We definitely must object to what some people do, when they mix up various entirely dissimilar types of discrimination based on different factors or clusters of factors. One theorist has argued, for example, that racists would identify people by 'national, religious or physical characteristics (such as skin color)'. And certainly, if a group of people identified by physical characteristics like skin color is looked upon as innately inferior, or superior for that matter, to others, this is racism (or ethnocentrism). But if they are identified by national characteristics, this is nationalism (or some cultural variety of ethnocentrism). And if they are identified by religious characteristics, this is religionism, whether abnegational (if treated as inferior and excluded) or aggrandizemental (if treated as superior and made exclusive). It cannot be denied, of course, that in practise the diverse forms of discrimination often go together. They may even be anchored to each other by homonyms in the language. Several terms in traditional parlance can either denote a member of an ethnic group or an adherent of a particular religion. Now, a person who is hostile to or discriminates against people defined by one of these terms probably does not care at all whether the victims of 'er hostility are the members of an ethnic group or the adherents of a particular religion. If this is the case, an expression of the form anti-...ism may suffice to denote these types of exclusionism. But the same applies, or would apply, to the aggrandizemental, 'pro-...ist' forms of discrimination in which an exclusive or favored status is or would be given to one of these 'ethno-religious' groups. For a systematic classification it is essential to keep all these categories apart as their combination is often (or always?) itself the result of the prejudice that all people of one ethnic group or nation would or should all adhere to (the same) religion or to the same political ideology. Those who have the effrontery, for example, to call other human beings "members of a particular religion" or "religious community", altho those human beings do not believe in the tenets, nor in the god(s) and/or demon(s) of that religion, often invoke the faith by birthdogma. This dogma is -- as we know already -- nothing else than the materialist invention of those who only hold relevance, and especially truth, in contempt. Until now we have merely looked at distinctions made on the basis of a single factor or a real, or purported, cluster of factors, that is, infrafactorial distinctions. But the act of singling out a limited number of types of discrimination, bestowing a separate name on them with a negative connotation, and not mentioning and not caring about all other forms of discrimination, is itself an instance of exclusivism from the point of view of the relevance principle proper. In place of being infrafactorial however, it is interfactorial, that is, made between the factors (or clusters) themselves. One or more factors are, then, overvalued with respect to (all) other factors which are undervalued, or vice versa. This is what one theorist is concerned with when saying that it is 'a challenge to every human to recognize his attitudes to nonhumans as a form of prejudice no less objectionable than racism or sexism'. And this is also what another theorist has in mind when saying that 'sexual equality is only part of justice in general and not a priori more important to establish than other forms of justice'. ('E calls this itself a 'sort of sex discrimination', but such use of discrimination is wider than ours as we will reserve this term in accord with everyday language for infrafactorial nonrelevant distinctions, made in this case between females and males.) Thus, it would itself be a manifestation of making a nonrelevant distinction to be exclusively concerned with nonrelevant distinctions drawn on the basis of race, of gender, of sexual orientation, of class, of political or religious ideology adhered to, and so on, and not with discrimination per se. Of course, it is not possible for one person to fight all discriminatory attitudes in practise, but it is possible to take them all into consideration, and not to indulge in any kind of discrimination oneself. As a matter of fact, not treating all types of discrimination alike (or the factors on the basis of which discrimination takes place) requires a material distinction to be drawn, whereas treating them alike requires nothing in this respect. Each type of discrimination may be manifested in different ways, for example, in an 'intermediary' or 'nonintermediary' way, and in an 'affirmative' or 'exemplary' way. In an intermediary manifestation the object concerned is not directly excluded or made exclusive, but the nonrelevant distinction is found in an intermediary system such as the language spoken or written, the symbolism of a denominational doctrine (religious or not) or in that of a political doctrine endorsed by a government. An example of its antithesis, an (affirmative) nonintermediary manifestation, is that people are bodily excluded from entering certain places. The following instances of intermediary manifestations are not less discriminatory, however: * the existence and use of derogatory expressions to denote members of certain groups * the belief that the (only) supreme being and its/'er incarnation(s) (if believed in) are exclusively male or exclusively female, or are a member of only one particular race or people * the display of religious or party-political symbols by the state or another nondenominational (or interdenominational), nonparty institution or person representing such an institution. In the case of an exemplary manifestation of discrimination it is the frequency distribution of examples given, or used to illustrate a particular point, which is unequal or disproportional. Its antithesis, an affirmative manifestation concerns distinctions which are nonrelevant even when made only one time. Discrimination in the use of someone's examples is much more difficult to prove, as people often maintain that each example separately is 'completely arbitrary'. Thus, if a commercial or a primary school book shows a married couple of which the man works outdoors and earns the money, whereas the woman keeps house for her husband and the children, this one commercial and this one example in a children's book does not yet prove anything: 'it could have been the other way around'. However, if all commercials and school books in a certain country or subculture fit this same pattern, there can be no doubt about the occurrence of an exemplary form of discrimination (on the basis of gender, marital status, having a job, children, and so on). This is not to suggest that exemplary discrimination is easy to prevent. Maybe, we, too, can be blamed for a choice of examples of determinants of relevancy and types of discrimination which is also (too) one-sided. But then, we are clearly less partial in the choices we make than any traditional theorist usually has been or still is; that is, any traditional theorist on discrimination, justice and human or natural rights. To eventually reach a state of impartiality in which even in our choice of examples no type of distinction is under- or overvalued, a classification of all forms of violating the relevance principle as systematic as that of plants and animals might be very helpful. The basics of such a classification system we will discuss in the next chapter. 1.2.3 THE CLUSTERING OF ATTITUDES AND PRACTISES The proposition that racial discrimination is to racism as discrimination is to exclusivism, needs a refinement, because it is not exclusivism in general but infrafactorial exclusivism which corresponds to racism. Exclusivism in general is every belief, attitude, practise or act which violates the norm of inclusivity, that is, in which a nonrelevant distinction is made on the basis of a certain factor, not only between nonfactors like people but also between factors themselves. Two differences between exclusivism and discrimination are therefore that exclusivism may be interfactorial, and that it may also be a belief or attitude. Moreover, exclusivism does not only denote acts of exclusion (like exclusionism, or discrimination in a traditional, narrow sense), but also acts of making oneself or others exclusive. As such it also concerns sentiments and opinions. Altho discrimination itself does not refer to beliefs and attitudes, strictly speaking, we will speak of "discriminatory beliefs and attitudes" too, since it is a belief or attitude which often occasions a practise or instance of discrimination. When we talk of "beliefs and attitudes", the meaning of belief is relatively clear: it is an opinion or a system of (disciplinary) thought. The meaning of attitude needs further clarification tho, and the role of attitudes with respect to people's conduct is much more complex as well, particularly in questions of discrimination. 'Attitudes' may be considered as hypothetical constructs in which a person's diverse thoughts, feelings and tendencies to act are arranged into a more or less coherent pattern. The cognitive aspect of someone's attitude concerns 'er thoughts and beliefs; the affective aspect the feelings, such as emotions or volitions, 'e has with respect to an issue or a thing; and the conative aspect the person's behavioral intentions. Some social theorists say that an 'attitude' is constituted by a number of 'opinions' about one subject or with respect to one kind of object, and that, then, an 'ideology' is in turn constituted by a number of attitudes of one and the same person. This, however, does not agree with our terminology according to which an 'ideology' is, first of all, a system of disciplinary thought, and a person-independent or suprapersonal system. Moreover, it would only be applicable to the cognitive aspect of the relationship between 'opinion' and 'attitude', and also between 'attitude' and 'ideology', unless an 'ideology' would, indeed, be one person's more or less coherent set of attitudes. It is a rule that the more coherent the pattern is into which someone's thoughts, feelings and tendencies are arranged, the better 'e is able to operate without the tension caused by dissonance. Imbalance between attitudinal elements, such as between cognitions, or between the cognitive and affective aspects of an attitude, motivates an individual to change, except when the inconsistence exists below a level of awareness and does not implicate the individual's self-conception. The most influential theory on the positive relationship between attitudinal elements has been the so-called 'theory of cognitive dissonance'. According to this theory dissonance causes tension, and this tension motivates a person to change 'er attitude until internal balance is restored. What is important is that so long as intra-attitudinal inconsistence exists, the attitude remains unstable. The ways subjects react towards different kinds of thing are similar in that they all reflect negative, in that they all reflect neutral or in that they all reflect positive feelings. The consistence underlying these feelings is psychosocial and not necessarily logical; the strategies individuals employ to attain 'consistence' are often little rational. Observed are not so much the rules of strict deductive logic, but rather those of a sort of 'psycho-logic'. Psychological consistence must therefore be distinguished from a higher-plane logical consistence (higher-plane because it has to fulfil more conditions). Not only are the cognitions, affects, conations and actions pertaining to one attitude related, also attitudes themselves do not exist in isolation and tend to covary. With the help of certain scales and factor analysis it is, then, possible to assess different attitude clusters. One social scientist thus elicited what 'e considered to be the fundamental dimensions of political attitudes: tender-mindedness / tough-mindedness and radicalism / conservatism. Other investigations have extracted different patterns of attitude dimensions. The attitude clusters have been linked to personality and (sub)cultural norms. Thus one group of researchers found that of the people they interviewed those who made negative statements about one minority group (distinguished on the basis of race, ethnicity or denominational ideology adhered to) also made them about other minority groups (distinguished on the basis of the same or other factors). They discovered a coherent cluster of statements reflecting an -- what they called -- 'authoritarian' attitude and personality. Those who have such a personality tend to be nationalistic, (mono)theistic, antifeministic and aggressive according to the study in question. When considering the view of one person, this person's overall belief is consistent if 'er convictions and views cohere, that is, show a systematic connection. This connection may be purely theoretical, but it may exist in practise as well. In the latter case beliefs cohere if they are somehow correlated in psychic and/or social reality. Such factual-modal connections are not only found in the studies already mentioned, but also found or suggested by several others. One theorist speaks of a close relationship between contempt of women (by men), sexual inhibition, discrimination of homosexuals and an antidemocratic ideology in which great emphasis is being laid on authority. This complex of attitudes 'e calls "patristic". Its antithesis is the so-called 'matrist(ic)' complex in which psychic and social phenomena tend to go together, like joyful appreciation of sexuality, the belief in the equality of men and women, and a democratic attitude. According to 'im the 'patrist' attitudinal complex is associated with orthodox religion, with fascism and with social systems in which the leader or a number of individuals with some special, exclusive status are glorified. (This complex corresponds to what is called "the authoritarian personality" in the previous study.) 'Matrism', on the other hand, would be associated with the open society. Unfortunately, the employment of the terms matrism and patrism is as deplorable as feminism when used to denote 'antisexism' (or still worse: 'antimasculinism'). This kind of terminology is itself an intermediary manifestation of sexual exclusivism, firstly, because both attitudinal complexes do not depend on somebody's gender nor on some pater or mater rearing a child, and secondly, because the terms refer to a sexual distinction, whereas they are applied to a person's whole attitude and total behavior, of which sexuality is not more than one aspect. However, roughly speaking, one may read for "matrist(ic)": "open", "nondiscriminatory"; and for "patrist(ic)": "closed", "discriminatory" or "exclusivist(ic)". When doing so, such a theory may be regarded as another valuable contribution to a better understanding of the correlations between human beliefs and actions, even tho the suggestion of 'patrist' and 'matrist' eras succeeding each other in the course of history (as made by the same theorist) does not deserve our further attention. A correlation between the attitude towards other human beings and the attitude towards other animate beings (animals) has also been mentioned already. The exploitation of slaves, women and animals is attributable to one and the same mechanism -- it has been argued -- which systematically favors a person's own group to the prejudice and detriment of others. The former group is often labeled "the ingroup" and the latter one "the outgroup". While all these studies and theories deal explicitly with particular forms of discrimination, like sexism and speciesism, it has also been said that one should not so much look at the content of belief systems but at their structure. Thus, a continuum from open to closed belief systems has been proposed. An individual's responses would, then, be defined by 'er position on this continuum. Yet, if attitudinal systems have such a structure it is only because of the interrelatedness of attitudes, and because of some form of interattitudinal consistence. (Later it has been said by the same theorist that social and political behavior can be better understood and explained by means of the concept value than by means of attitude. It would, then, be especially important to know the order of someone's doxastic values. However, 'everyone' believes in values like peace, freedom and security, and it is not these doxastic values as such which count but their interpretations and the conditioning of people by their own and other people's beliefs, opinions, feelings, tendencies and actions.) 1.2.4 INCLUSIVITY AS A CRITERION OF ATTITUDINAL CONSISTENCE The question of whether all the correlations suggested between cognitions, affections and conations, and between whole attitudes, really exist; and if so, whether they are causal connections; and if so, which one of both relata is the cause and which one the effect, is itself a problem of empirical science. From a normative standpoint it is not necessary to postulate that all attitudes, and also practises, do indeed lend each other support, that when a person displays, for example, one kind of discriminatory attitude 'e will probably display the other kind as well. Yet, not postulating such correlations is something else than postulating that they do not exist. Even a utilitarian, or other person exclusively interested in the harmfulness or harmlessness of kinds and acts of discrimination must, strictly speaking, consider clusters of kinds and acts of discrimination which are correlated. Whether these 'clusters' are so small that they solely comprise one kind or act of discrimination, or whether one cluster comprises literally all kinds and acts of discrimination is, then, an empirical problem again. Social scientists have admitted that the concepts of 'consonance' and 'attitudinal' or 'psychological consistence' are vague. A complete clarification of the meanings of these notions has not come forth yet. In spite of this, the researcher has to be able to denote a priori whether a relationship between, say, two cognitive elements is consonant or dissonant. And when speaking of "consistence", 'e has to make clear what it means that the components of individual or social attitudes, that is, cognitions, affects and behavioral tendencies, and also practises or actions themselves, cohere. These attitudinal components, practises and actions are not necessarily incoherent because they are different, even when pertaining to the same object or issue. Sentiments, beliefs, thoughts, and the practical realization of a person's beliefs and thoughts in actions, almost all admit of degrees; that is, almost all of them have intensities which may be equal or unequal. Nevertheless, psychic-social phenomena, such as emotions, volitions, convictions and actions of largely different intensities are still coherent when pertaining to the same object or issue so long as the directions in which they work are the same. Even when they do not pertain to exactly the same object or issue, but when the connection is logically possible, people speak of "logical coherence" without requiring that there be any necessary connection. Hence, with respect to a given set of cognitions, the logical criterion of coherence is basically reductive (or 'negative') in that it only eliminates those cognitions which cannot be logically combined with the other cognitions. It does not require, nor provide a common denominator for those cognitions tho. All it demands is that the combination of different thoughts, sentiments, tendencies and actions not be logically invalid. In this sense coherence is not more than the absence of truth-conditional incoherence. For a structural foundation an attitudinal system requires a standard of coherence according to which the attitudinal components can be assigned to two or more different ground-world categories. Starting from such a 'positive' criterion, thoughts, sentiments and actions cohere when they belong to the same category, that is, have a specific common feature, while they do not cohere when belonging to different categories. The criterion to be suggested here for structural consistence is the norm of inclusivity itself. On the basis of this norm, ground-world thoughts, beliefs, sentiments, behavioral tendencies and actions are either inclusive, when in accordance with it, or exclusive, when not in accordance with it. It is, then, either because of their consistent inclusiveness (or 'openness') or because of their consistent exclusiveness (or 'closedness') that normatively significant ground-world beliefs show structural consistence; and it is, then, because of the inconsistent combination of inclusive and exclusive beliefs that they are structurally nonconsistent, even tho they may be logically consistent. With a structural criterion like (the norm of) inclusivity it becomes possible to determine what kind of belief or attitude belongs to the same category as another kind of belief or attitude. (What is meant exactly by kind will have to be pointed out by means of the classification system already mentioned. Such a system is also a prerequisite for any adequate scientific research with respect to attitudinal consonance or consistence.) The norm of inclusivity holds independently of any factual-modal condition, independently of any empirical fact or correlation. Yet, if the interplay between especially attitudes and practises which are discriminatory could, indeed, be proved to exist, it would for many people (save thoroughly monistic utilitarians) probably be easier to accept that the harmlessness or harmfulness of particular types of such attitudes and practises is not of immediate import. It would, then, need no further explanation that with the endorsement of the requirement of discriminational relevance all forms of making nonrelevant distinctions become equally condemnatory on principle; that is to say, on this principle. 1.3 TWO PRINCIPAL ATTITUDES 1.3.1 THE EXCLUSIVE AND THE INCLUSIVE ATTITUDES We know already that several psychological and sociological studies have shown that discriminatory attitudes (and beliefs) tend to covary. To prove, however, that the correlations hold for all types of discrimination, or infrafactorial exclusivism, it is not only the conceptual apparatus of a complete classification system of exclusivisms which is required. Even with such an instrument available, the conclusive proof will have to wait until the first society can be studied which has been free from any exclusivism for a number of generations. Can we wait that long? The answer is No, we cannot, because it is precisely by waiting for such an inclusive society to come that it would never emerge. Strictly speaking, we do not need any empirical presuppositions with regard to correlations between exclusivist attitudes and practises, and we shall not pretend that we know that such correlations exist in the ground-world. (However, ground-world correlations in general must be distinguished from the impact of exclusivist ideology itself.) Nonetheless, if the assumption is correct, it means that a particular belief, attitude or practise which should be displayed according to some doctrinal principle (the norm of inclusivity in our case), cannot be displayed, to a certain extent, when it is demanded in combination with (too many) exclusivist beliefs, attitudes and practises. Thus if (infrafactorial) exclusivisms do covary strongly, every ideology or normative doctrine which propagates a nonexclusivist ideal, but which simultaneously is founded on a multitude of exclusivist elements of belief, is doomed to failure as far as that ideal is concerned (but unfortunately, not necessarily in other respects). This, in turn, may explain why quite a few 'universal ideals' have never been realized even after millenniums of one exclusivist ideology's hegemony over large parts of the world. It is therefore very worthwhile to take a closer look at the plausibility of the assumption that the different kinds of infrafactorial exclusivism do indeed lend each other support. We shall first do this by discussing a number of imaginary, yet quite realistic, cases. To start with, let us consider a group of people of one race who believe that their own race is an intelligent one, altho other races may be more musical. They also believe in a supreme being which has (once) exclusively revealed itself in the person of somebody of their own race. What is, then, the chance that these people at the same time are of the opinion that anybody of any race should be eligible for any job or office, for example, that of the president of the country? If the people in question show a consistent pattern of sentiments and opinions, the chance is nil. Because of the fact that they find members of other races perhaps musical but not intelligent, they will not expect anyone of a different race to be intelligent enough for a position of authority. Because of the fact that they believe that the supreme being exclusively revealed itself in a person of their own race, they will readily associate their own race with supremeness and supremacy (if not consciously, then subconsciously) and they will be of the opinion that superior tasks should be assigned to superior people, namely members of their own race. The chance that the persons in question are for racial equality in the occupational field, not only formally but also in practise, while accepting all its consequences, may be expected to be much smaller than in the case of people who do not have the ideas mentioned (because their ideas are inclusive or less exclusive). In the exclusivist belief of the former group there always remains one office which definitely never was held, and definitely never will be held, by somebody of a different race: the office of the supreme being or its purported (onetime) representative on Earth. Let us now consider a man who thinks that physical beauty only concerns women, or women and girls; that it is their task to cook, to wash and to make everything look nice, including their own bodies; he does not feel that males are ugly, but he believes that boys and certainly men cannot (or should not) distinguish themselves, or be distinguished, on the basis of their physical appearance (other than the criterion that they should not look 'feminine'). Let us assume that this man also believes in a supreme being which has the characteristics of a male person, of a 'father' who rules the family of 'mankind', and that 'He' has exclusively manifested 'Himself' in one living person, namely a male human being on the planet Earth ('His son' or '(last) prophet'). What is the chance that he at the same time is of the opinion that every man and every woman should be able to occupy any post he or she is qualified for, such as the highest position in his religious organization? Again, if this person shows a consistent pattern of sentiments and opinions, the chance is nil. Since he judges women by their beauty (or ugliness) and not by their technical or intellectual skill, he will easily attribute a lack of technical and intellectual ability to them, and he would not like to see them in high positions accordingly. And since he refers to the supreme being as "He", attributing to 'Him' all the characteristics of a male person, he will easily associate his own sex with supremeness and supremacy (if not consciously, then subconsciously) and he will be of the opinion that superior jobs or positions should be given to superior people, namely men. And again, the chance that this person shows no consistent pattern of sentiments and opinions, that is, that he is for sexual equality in the field of jobs and positions, may be expected to be much smaller than in the case of someone who does not have the ideas mentioned. In the man's exclusivist belief there remains always one office which definitely never was held, and definitely never will be held, by a woman: the office of the supreme being or 'His' purported representative on Earth. The question of correlation does not only play a role with respect to thoughts, feelings and tendencies in the same field, it also plays a role with respect to thoughts, feelings and tendencies in different fields. Consider, for example, a person who believes that the office of head of state should be held by someone who(se body) is the (male) child of the previous head of state (somebody of 'er own race), and that certain other people should be granted an (upper-class) state income on the basis of their being related to the present or previous head of state. Let us assume that this person also feels that complete nudity is indecent, that certain (so-called 'private') parts of the body should always remain hidden in the presence of other people or bodies, except, perhaps, for a spouse and for pressing (other) medical reasons. Let us further assume that this same person has a great influence on the building of new homes in the town or city where 'e lives, and that 'e uses this influence to build family homes only, that is, homes for married couples with children, altho many (if not most) households do not consist of one male adult, one female adult married to him and one or more children. What is the chance that this person is of the opinion that anyone of any race should be able to get any job 'e is qualified for? Altho the question of racial equality lies in another field than that of family membership, nudity and the composition of households, the chance is still nil if the person considered shows a consistent pattern of sentiments and opinions. Because of the fact that this person believes that certain offices ought to be held, and certain incomes ought to be received, on the basis of relationship only, the belief that offices ought to be held, or for that matter, not to be held, on the basis of race only agrees with this. Not being able to look objectively at the phenomenon of nudity, and being subject to purely emotional reactions of inhibition and fear, 'e would similarly show a purely emotional reaction of insecurity when confronted with people of another race in a high position. And as this person has no interest in people who live alone or together in households of a different composition than (what presumably is, was or will be) 'er own, 'e will have a lesser interest in people who live alone or together in households of a different race than 'er own, and more generally, in people of a different race than 'er own. 'E will not find other races (or a particular other race) as interesting and likable as 'er own race, nor will 'e assign an equal importance to other races, and accordingly 'e will be of the opinion that at least certain exclusive positions (like that of the head of state) should remain the privilege of 'er own race. The chance that the person focused on in this third example will not show a consistent pattern, and that 'e will not have racist opinions, sentiments or tendencies in any way, will be smaller than the chance that 'e does have them, unless this pattern is or has been upset by interfactorially exclusivistic effects. For example, if it is taboo in the community in which the person lives to be a racist, or to openly display racism in ground-world conduct, whereas it is not taboo to defend monarchism, to be a prudist and to discriminate between households on the basis of their composition, then it is obvious that the correlation in such a community between racism and the three other infrafactorial exclusivisms may be weaker or even absent. But it is, then, weaker because it is counteracted by a force especially exerted to mitigate or offset the ill effects of a particular form of discrimination (say, when racism is not merely taboo, but when exclusive antiracism has even become a fashion). As soon as that force is not strong enough anymore, or as soon as it has to be divided over too many fields in order to counteract not just one, but several infrafactorial exclusivisms, the discriminatory beliefs and practises which once seemed to have been quelled, will reemerge. It is not until that moment that correlations between exclusivisms in entirely different fields may indeed turn out to exist, even tho they are (temporarily) absent because of an interfactorially exclusivistic counterforce. In theory the possible combinations of beliefs, feelings and tendencies a person can have, and of the things 'e can do, are innumerable. But each thought, feeling, tendency or action is either exclusive or nonexclusive, however unrelated the fields they belong to may seemingly be. And if there is indeed a strong correlation between exclusivist beliefs, feelings, tendencies and actions on the one hand, and inclusivist beliefs, feelings, tendencies and actions on the other, there are not only structurally but also in practise two basic combinations. They are: the combination of all the former beliefs, attitudinal components and actions which reflect the exclusive attitude; and the combination of all the latter beliefs, attitudinal components and actions which reflect the inclusive attitude. Between these two principal atitudes there is a fundamental divide. More or less consistently people exhibit either the one or the other attitude in the things they believe in, and in the way they feel and act. To the extent in which feelings and thoughts about the world around them show a pattern of consistence (an either inclusive or exclusive one) we cannot divorce the way people deal with one facet of life from the way they deal with other facets of life. Certain exclusive beliefs or feelings which seem harmless on their own may in fact be correlated with other exclusive beliefs or feelings which have a pernicious influence on the attainment of cardinal inclusive ideals. All exclusive beliefs, thoughts, feelings, tendencies and actions, however harmless at first appearance, do reflect one of the two principal attitudes: the exclusive attitude. When an ideology is exclusivistic, it contains exclusivist factual, modal and/or normative beliefs or thoughts; it arouses or exploits exclusivist feelings; it creates or depends on exclusivist tendencies; and/or it incites people to act in an exclusivist manner, either by exclusion or by exclusivity. Exclusivist ideologies are the product of exclusive attitudes but once having established themselves, they perpetuate these very attitudes (which by then can correctly be called "exclusivistic"). Altho 'exclusivism' as an explicit ideology in itself does not exist (yet), it is a way of thinking, feeling and acting which has had, and still has, an enormous impact on all aspects of human and nonhuman life, not only in its active, infrafactorial form of discrimination, but also in its interfactorial and passive forms. The absence of exclusivism as an ideology in which the violation of the norm of inclusivity would be an end in itself has been 'most generously made up for' by religious, theodemonical, political and other ideologies or traditions with out-and-out exclusivistic contents and records. 1.3.2 CAN FEELINGS ABOUT MIXED SCRIPTURES BE STEADY? Usually an ideology is organized or centered round a body of writings which are considered authoritative by those concerned. In the case of a theodemonical ideology such writings are said to be 'sacred', because they would be connected in a supernatural or symbolic way with the supreme being itself, or with another principal being. Sacred, theodemonical or religious scriptures are called "holy books" too, but holy can also mean perfect, good or pure and, like heal and health, comes from the same root as whole. In this sense it is the norm of inclusivity itself, when taken proscriptively, which is the 'holiest' of all norms. (Theoretically it would be even 'holier' not to make any distinction under any circumstances. However, those adhering to such a principle have, wisely, never spoken about it.) In order to associate the 'holiness' of the norm of inclusivity as little as possible with exclusivist writings, we shall call them "sacred" rather than "holy". This also stresses their built-in or purported immunity from criticism. What theodemonical, sacred writings have in common with the authoritative writings of certain political or other ideologies, is that they are exclusivistic but not necessarily in every respect and in every detail. They may contain passages compatible with the ideal of inclusivity, and that is why they are 'mixed' in a way: mixed exclusive-inclusive. In spite of this, they entirely deserve the epithet exclusivist(ic), because inclusivism does not allow for any exclusive belief, attitude or practise, and definitely not for a preponderance of such beliefs, attitudes and/or practises. Add to this the perpetual overrepresentation on the wrong side of especially monotheist and certain political ideologies in questions of abnegational discrimination and preferential treatment and it is clear that their mixed character never made theodemonical and other mixed writings inclusivistic. Even during an absolute and uninterrupted reign of a thousand years (and many centuries more than that) the holiness promised in theodemonical scriptures never prevailed for any considerable length of time, let alone any 'holiness' as radiated by the norm of inclusivity. Perhaps it is not always clear that the mixture is one of exclusive and inclusive elements, but that exclusivist ideology is often terribly mixed (if not confused) is quite obvious. Exclusivist scriptures may recommend peace, justice, equality and a class- and stateless society at one place, while glorifying war, submission, lordship and the dictatorship of one particular class and the state at another place. Theodemonical tales in particular are tales of both tenderness and violence, of both bliss and disaster. A male god of love may try to spread his faith, and adherence to it, with a sword, sulphur and fire, lopping the heads off nonbelievers who will not convert, driving entire peoples into the sea and destroying complete cities. Theodemonical scriptures do not only speak of people who are to be sacredly stoned, but also about the sort of man who should be allowed to throw the first stone. A latter-day 'prophet' (that is, ethical theorist) has religiously tried to modernize this Stone Age passion by suggesting that not only adulterous women but also adulterous men should be punished this way, which would strip it of its sexism. Neither the ancient prophet of the religious writings nor the latter-day theorist did pronounce upon stoning to death itself as a penal practise, thus implicitly accepting and perpetuating its sacredness. The mixed nature of most scriptures is also the reason why the ideologies in question are so incoherent (and plagued by schisms). Or, maybe, it was the other way around: the ideologies of the people who produced those scriptures were just too disordered to start with. The pitiful result of this is that their scriptures are often only coherent where they are immoral, and only moral where they are incoherent. The incoherence may even be a straightforward contradiction, for example, when a divine prophet is reported both as saying, "he that is not with me is against me" and as saying, "he that is not against us is for us". Those faithful to incoherent, mixed scriptures like these ones will therefore in practise have to choose between the exclusivist statements and the statements which are not incompatible with the ideal of inclusiveness, interdenominational inclusiveness in particular. (It does not help to say that no prescription is more important than, for example, the injunction to love, if some other, venomous or abominable prescriptions are not less important.) Altho the adherent may continue to pay lip-service to a theodemonical or political document as a whole, 'e is forced (or 'allowed') to make a choice where the different stories or exegeses of such a document cancel each other out. However, the adherent cannot then base 'er final choice of what to say and what to do in concrete cases on emotions or doxastic norms emanating from the ideology's scriptures themselves. The interpretation of an incoherent or polyinterpretable, denominational or political doctrine must be governed by external emotions or doxastic norms, if not the adherent's character itself. The attitude underlying the interpretation of mixed scriptures may, then, be humanistic or antihumanistic, fascistic or antifascistic, libertarian or antilibertarian, egalitarian or antiegalitarian, and so on. The follower of sacred or political writings which speak of peace, tolerating people and respect for life in one place, and of holy wars and of fiendishly brutal aggression towards the same people and towards nonhuman animals in another place, must choose 'imself which order to strive for, and which of the rules laid down in those writings 'e will take seriously. If 'er choice between the norms and values of the religion or political ideology is not made purely at random or intuitively, 'e must base it on norms and values not belonging to this religion or this political ideology proper. And it is these external considerations determining 'er decision which might be more or less of an inclusive nature (for example, if the follower's interpretation is humanistic or egalitarian). Or, if the follower's choice was intuitive, this choice might be expressive of an inclusive ideal. Any person adhering to an incoherent or polyinterpretable, exclusivist doctrine can therefore in practise think and behave in conformity with the norm of inclusivity so far as 'er relationship with other people is concerned, however much the doctrine 'e formally espouses may deviate from the inclusivistic one. This is a reason why it remains absolutely necessary not to confuse the total rejection of exclusivist ideologies with an exclusion of the people adhering to or sympathizing with such ideologies, unless these people show disrespect for other people's rights to personhood. It is, then, especially important that they do in no way infringe upon the rights of personhood of people who do not adhere to, and who do not sympathize with their religion, theodemonism or political creed, say, by trying to impose their own systems, rules or symbols upon them. When the adherents of an exclusivist ideology founded on mixed scriptures display some kind of humanist, libertarian or egalitarian attitude which is as close as possible to an inclusive one, we are, of course, glad that they do so. Yet, we have to be very cautious (if not suspicious), not only because of the contradictions in their ideology itself, but also because of those between the attitude exhibited and large parts of the doctrine they claim to espouse. Given that there are indeed many correlations between exclusive beliefs, feelings, tendencies and actions in the same and in entirely different fields, their feelings or attitudes with respect to the mixed scriptures of their ideological doctrine simply cannot be steady when there are too many discrepancies to cope with. Their ideology allows them to take on an attitude tomorrow, completely different from that of today, without any change of faith or allegiance. Since the norms and values of that ideology are incoherent or admit of widely divergent interpretations, the adherents may but too easily modify their views, or pick just another set of norms and values, when times or circumstances have altered, and when it suits them. Their present emphasis on some liberal, egalitarian or peaceful aspect of their creed may be 'warranted' for them, but so is a possible, future (and so was a past) emphasis on the most monstrous and murderous exclusionism preached in other parts of their sacred scriptures or political writings. That's the negative: the scandalous episodes, statements or implications which are exegetically hushed up or explained away to prevent the general public from seeing thru the total scheme of such a theodemonical or political ideology. Instead of giving up a 'partially inclusive' attitude by changing it into a more exclusive one, the adherents of a religion or political doctrine whose scriptures are mixed may also change their attitude into an inclusive one by giving up their exclusivist ideology. (Partially inclusive is a contradiction in terms, but contradictions is precisely what this section is about.) It is, then, not necessary that all interest in the ideology's scriptures be lost as well. But if not, they are not authoritative anymore and have become merely of anthropological, historical, literary or speculative-philosophic significance. Whether people who adhere to an exclusivist ideology founded upon mixed scriptures will finally abandon their attitude and interpretation or their ideology itself, in either case we must conclude that the feelings which characterize them cannot be expected to be steady and independent of times and circumstances. Those feelings may only be partially and contingently inclusive in practise at a certain moment at a certain place --that's all. Their instability is one of the reasons that the implementation of ideals compatible with the norm of inclusivity has never stood the test of time when pursued and carried out by people with mixed scriptures in their hands. 1.3.2.0 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A PROVINCE OF INCLUSIVITY When a nation* treats the neglected as the preferred, and the preferred as the neglected; and when a nation treats the lesser as the greater, and the greater as the lesser; and when it thus includes the adherents of theodemonical and of nontheodemonical** denominations in a single one; and when it thus includes the denominational and the nondenominational in a single one -- that is, those who*** believe in the existence of a god and/or demon, those who believe in the nonexistence of a god and/or demon, and those who neither believe in the existence nor in the nonexistence of any god or demon --, then such a nation shall have entered one of the provinces of inclusivity. * : instead of "(such) a nation" one may read "this government", "you", and so on ** : instead of theodemonism one may take another factor of distinction, for example, the question of whether a denominational doctrine is religious or nonreligious, or the factor gender ***: instead of "those who" one may read "the person who", "what", and so on Example of another Province of Inclusivity: When you treat the neglected as the preferred, and the preferred as the neglected; and when you treat the lesser as the greater, and the greater as the lesser; and when you thus include male and female in a single one; and when you thus include the sexual and the nonsexual in a single one -- that is, what is only male, what is only female, what is both male and female, and what is neither male nor female --, then you shall have entered one of the provinces of inclusivity. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1.4 UNIVERSAL IDEALS AND OMNIFARIOUS FAILURES 1.4.1 JUST A FEW EXAMPLES There is a number of ideals which have somehow been professed for centuries or millenniums by adherents of practically all ideologies, political or nonpolitical, religious or nonreligious: * peace, peaceful coexistence and security * democracy (as opposed to the dictatorship of one or a few) * equality or nondiscrimination (particularly with regard to nationality, race, ethnicity and gender) * tolerance * personal freedom and fulfilment. Not many people are openly against any of these ideals. Yet, humankind is, and has been, perpetually faced -- also for centuries or millenniums -- with all kinds of failure, like the following ones: * civil and international wars and conflicts * dictatorships * abnegational discrimination and preferential treatment * intolerance * unnecessary restrictions of personal freedom. It seems incomprehensible that humankind appears to have universal ideals, but that it is not capable of actually establishing a society in which these ideals are carried thru. There must be something that overrules the ideals formally adhered to, or paid lip-service to; something that prepares human beings, or people, to act to the contrary. Let us therefore take a closer look at the examples given. 1.4.2 PEACE INSTEAD OF WAR No country probably starts a war merely because it likes to fight, unless it would be ruled by a mad dictator. And no country starts a war merely because it has to fight ('unless' its arms industry has obtained so much power that it can force the country into war in order to boost its own sales figures). Whatever the reason that a country is involved in a war, it will always have some rationalization for its conduct. Such a rationalization may formally replace the desire: * to attack a different political and/or socioeconomic system * to spread the established, denominational ideology and/or to prevent another ideology from freely gaining more and more support * to subjugate a national, racial, ethnic or linguistic community considered inferior * to expand territory and/or to increase the power and wealth of the ruling class, and, perhaps, also the rest of the nation. Each of these 'justifications' prepares citizens for war. The desire to attack people with a different political or socioeconomic system may be rationalized by referring to 'their' desire (fictitious or not) to destruct 'us', by referring to the economic malaise 'their' system is in, by referring to the lack of personal freedom or to the exploitation occurring in 'their' society. In a process of political indoctrination the citizens are continuously confronted with the shortcomings and excesses of the politics and economics of the enemy or potential enemy. The dangers of their system are underscored again and again, thus making the citizens ready for war when needed. "We want peace, but they do not want it!" To remain level-headed under such circumstances would probably mean that one would be able to distinguish advantages and disadvantages of both economic systems, that one would recognize certain defects in both political or economic systems, and that one could accept the idea that one politico-economic system might be better for one country, while another system might better suit another country, at least temporarily. But in societies which are getting ready for war, any degree of objectivity is taboo, because someone who would see any advantage in the system of the enemy (even when overshadowed by its disadvantages), or who would dare to point at any comparable drawback of 'er own system (even when offset by its advantages), would be regarded as collaborating with 'the enemy'. In such an atmosphere all information about people's own side is interpreted in a way that it answers to their positive expectations, while information about the other side has to confirm to their negative expectations. There is much similarity between the desire to attack a different political or socioeconomic system and the desire to attack a different religious or denominational system, but there are some important differences too: the ideals for which people are willing to fight are likely to be conceived of as 'higher' than any other ideal. The fear of a different denominational ideology can be stronger than any other fear of a different system, while the rationalization of religious warfare is more egregious than any other rationalization of warfare. History has proved but too often that it can be sufficient in a religious conflict to brand others as "pagans", "infidels" or "atheists" in order to sanction an attack on them without any 'further' rationalization. But more often than not, a difference in religion, or denomination in general, has coincided with a different political, economic, racial, ethnic or linguistic identity, and it is this difference in identity which may be used as a more rational cover-up in place of the recognition of the denominational incompatibility of the rival communities, both in civil and international wars. Even when a nondenominational argument was or is used as a pretext of attack, the attackers may not refrain from openly expressing the gaudy belief that the supreme being (or 'God') would be there to exclusively save their nation and head of state (especially when this is a monarch), thus betraying that theodemonism certainly has to do something with the conflict in question. While the desire to fight a different political or denominational system may be one cause of conflict, the desire to suppress people who are considered inferior, is another one. The more doubtful certain individuals are about their own status and the more life leaves them with feelings of insecurity, the stronger their need will be to strengthen their own identity by degrading others. It is by looking down on others that these individuals believe themselves to be placed on a higher footing. When the object of degradation is another racial, national, ethnic or linguistic group, this can readily lead to serious conflicts. And again, it is seldom or never possible to completely separate these conflicts from concurrent political, socioeconomic and religious or mixed religious-irreligious differences. The fourth cause of conflict on our list is the desire to expand territory. A larger territory means more resources; more resources means a wealthier country; and a wealthier country means more power for the ruling class and, perhaps, more prosperity for all, or most, classes. This in itself can be believed to be a sufficient reason (and has in colonial times definitely been a sufficient reason) for the rulers of a country to subjugate foreign territories. However, the land-hungry aristocrats, politicians and others who gave themselves up to these adventures, were but too eager to use nice-sounding arguments for their territorial expansions instead of admitting pure selfishness. So would annexation of the foreign territories to the empire bring civilization to the so-called 'savages' living there. This 'civilization' was to be understood as conversion to the religion of the smart conquerors, who brought with their sword a book of words along: their Manual of Divine Justification. All civil and international conflicts are conflicts between people who differ in one or more of the following respects: politically, socioeconomically, denominationally, ethnically and/or linguistically; and in all these conflicts the rival parties show an exclusive attitude towards each other in one or more of the following ways: * by providing and allowing only biased information about the other party * by making inadmissible generalizations about the people and the system of the other party * by not treating members of the other party, or individuals relevantly similar to them, as equal human beings, and in a national context as equal citizens * by not respecting the adherents of other religions, of religion in general or of nonreligious denominations as persons * by stimulating alienation from the other party (in a national context by concentrating their own or the other party in certain little accessible areas, in an international context by making travel to and from other countries difficult or impossible) * by believing that their own party would have Mono's or another principal being's support in the conflict. While all may claim to be in favor of peace, it is this exclusive attitude which prepares people for war. An exclusive attitude is not just reflected in a limited number of sentiments and opinions which have a direct bearing on a civil or international conflict, it is a fundamental inclination by which a person or community more or less consistently exhibits a pattern of exclusive beliefs, feelings and thoughts in all fields. The correlation which exists between exclusivisms is not necessarily a causal relationship (two of them may be caused by a third factor, or a different third and fourth factor), but the fact that the combination of inclusive sentiments and opinions with exclusive sentiments and opinions leads to inconsistence, implies that every exclusivism contributes to the acceptance of other and more exclusivisms. Some relationships are very obvious: * providing and allowing only biased information on a certain socioeconomic doctrine, for instance, is only one step away from providing and allowing only biased information on a certain denominational doctrine * making inadmissible generalizations about a different race, for instance, is only one step away from making inadmissible generalizations about the other sex, about those with a different sexual preference or about those who speak a different language or dialect * not treating the members of an ethnic minority as equal citizens, for instance, is only one step away from not treating the members of any minority group as equal citizens * not taking into account irreligious convictions in a predominantly religious society, for instance, is only one step away from not taking into account personal convictions at all * stimulating alienation from disliked foreigners, for instance, is only one step away from stimulating alienation from disliked fellow-citizens such as those belonging to a different caste or social class * believing that one's own party would have the exclusive support of the supreme being in a conflict, is only one step away from believing in the supremeness or superiority of one's nation, one's own language, one's own race, one's own class and one's own political system. Since conflicts are caused by the exclusive attitude of one or both of the parties involved, every exclusivism is either the cause of a possible conflict (and therefore of national or international insecurity) or contributes to this cause, however unrelated to such a conflict it may seem. A society in which measures and beliefs which offend against the norm of inclusivity enjoy official and exclusive recognition is not only due to suffer from internal frictions, but will also create the conditions leading to international conflicts. Altho it may seem that the internal frictions have nothing to do with the international conflicts, they result from the same official sanctioning of exclusivism. To be more concrete, let us compare two ideologies, both of which recognize a supreme being. In ideology A the supreme being does not have the predicates of one particular race or sex, nor does it have a representative on the planet Earth or elsewhere who did belong or must belong to one particular race or sex; in ideology B the supreme being has the predicates of a particular sex and judging by its ('his') representative on Earth, also of a particular race. In ideology A there is a second (minor) principal being, but this embraces all races and sexes; in ideology B this nonsupreme being is of the opposite (inferior) sex, but of the same specific race. Ideology A is not exclusively related to the conditions of any particular country or part of the world; ideology B can clearly be identified with one particular country and its neighbors. Now, which of both ideologies makes the greatest chance of being the cause of a bloody, civil or international war in which different races or ethnic groups will be fighting each other? And which of both ideologies makes the greatest chance of activating racism and sexism? If there is a difference in chance, the answer to these questions is obvious! But the answer to these questions would not be different, if we asked which of both ideologies made the greatest chance of having a one-sided view of socioeconomic systems, of ignoring ethnic and linguistic minorities, of promoting the acquisition of more wealth for oneself or one's nation to the detriment of others. The next question would be, which of both ideologies would make the greatest chance of being the cause of any civil or international war. With the few characteristics given of both ideologies in this example, it may seem entirely unjustified to think of an answer to this question. But when we think of the interrelationship of all inclusive sentiments and opinions on the one side, and all exclusive ones on the other, we must conclude that even a small number of inclusive features indicates an inclusive attitude, and even a small number of exclusivist features an exclusivist one. Since these attitudes are fundamental inclinations, the answer to our last question is obvious as well. Let us once more compare two ideologies, neither of which is theodemonistic. Ideology A does not relate to any particular social class, whether constituting a minority or a majority; ideology B relates exclusively to a particular category of social classes (which represents a majority, however). For ideology A the public expression of different opinions and the distribution of information from any source should be free, that is, not excluded; for ideology B the free availability of information and the expression of individual ideas in public is not permissible if it contradicts its own dogmas. For ideology A one politico-economic system (or variant of such a system) may be better for one country, while another system (or variant of the same system) may be better for another country at a certain time; for ideology B there is only one acceptable politico-economic system, irrespective of time and place. Which of both ideologies makes the greatest chance of being the cause of a bloody, civil or international, war in which different social classes or politico-economic systems (or variants of the same system) are fighting each other? And which of both ideologies makes the greatest chance of stimulating the development of internal and/or external (international) absolutism? If there is a difference in chance, the answer to these questions is obvious again! And it would be the same if we asked which one would make the greatest chance of having a one-sided view of religion (not even recognizing its denominational value), of subjecting or ignoring ethnic or linguistic minorities, of promoting or yielding to the fulsome adoration of political or party-leaders. When we conceive again of the fact that even a small number of exclusivist characteristics denote an exclusivist attitude (in one of its many gradations), this is also the obvious answer to the question which of both ideologies would make the greatest chance of being the cause of any civil or international war. It turns out that the ideal of peace and peaceful coexistence is formally entertained by practically whole humankind, but that it is overruled by two types of exclusivist measures and beliefs reflecting one and the same principal attitude: * those which are the or a direct cause of civil and international conflicts; and * those which are not the or a direct cause, and are seemingly unrelated, but which, in fact, contribute inadvertently to the emergence of these exclusivisms. Permanent peace and security can never be established so long as either or both of these two types of exclusivist practises and beliefs prevail in any field. 1.4.3 DEMOCRACY INSTEAD OF DICTATORSHIP When democracy is believed to fail or is not vigorous enough to be defended, it will easily revert to the absolute rule of one person or family or a small omnipotent political or military body. This dictatorship will present strong arguments for its suspension or abolition of the democratic system. With these arguments it often conceals its fears of the participation in government of certain socioeconomic classes and of denominational, ethnic or linguistic groups whose presence it does not consider desirable, to say the least. The conditions which are responsible for the outbreak of a civil or international war are very much similar to the conditions under which a dictatorship can come into being. The same exclusive attitude which motivates some individuals to aggress against fellow-citizens or other nations induces them to attack a democratic system for the sole benefit of a privileged minority, or to support such an attack. No society is democratic because those in power allow the country to be ruled by politicians who have the same or similar political and denominational convictions as they have themselves. Just as freedom cannot be measured by the fact that it permits conformity, but only by the degree in which it allows deviation from the standards, so democracy cannot be measured by the fact that it permits politicians of a limited range of political creeds to rule, but only by the fact that it allows politicians of any political creed (in which people's moral right to personhood is respected) to rule when the people so prefer. It is not until the majority of the people elect representatives whose ideology significantly deviates from the beliefs of those in power that it may turn out that a country has never been a democracy. The powerful conspirators behind the screens who take on the rule of the country themselves in such a case, only remove the last resemblance of a democratic system. In their exclusionist opinion it had never been acceptable to permit politicians with certain political or denominational ideals essentially different from their own to have a major say in the country's affairs. Democracy as a form of government in which the power is officially vested in nothing else than the majority of the citizens of a country is in itself a fertile soil for dictatorship. Altho almost all adults may have the right to vote and to be elected in such a system, any majority of voters has absolute power over any minority of voters, even when that minority represents up to 49% of the population. Many issues in democratic societies can be reduced to the question whether party or coalition A will be able to impose its own values on B, or whether party or coalition B will be able to impose its own values on A. It is in such an atmosphere of majoritarian competition that one party might simply forget that it needs at least 51% of the votes to impose its ideology on the nation, and if it happens to have powerful connections, or if it knows to operate strategically, a dictatorship is easily established, if only that of a state in which solely one party or coalition has and can have legal status. Democracy as such does not guarantee inclusive equality, altho individual democratic countries may guarantee certain rights of certain minorities or near-majorities (such as both sexes) in their constitution. On the other hand, a political system based on inclusive equality (and the right to personhood in particular) would be a democratic one in that no minority could impose its own values on the majority of people. But it would differ from other democratic systems in that a majority could only override a minority where there is no other choice than uniformity, that is, where differentiation to accomodate the preferences or convictions of different groups or individuals is impossible. The decision in question must, then, not in any way depend on other decisions or systems which were or are somehow discriminatory. Only in such a society need democracy not degenerate into an institutionalized fight of exclusivism against exclusivism above which the threatening sword of dictatorship hangs forever. Not seldom is the exclusive attitude of dictatorial rulers complemented by an exclusive attitude of those ruled over. In addition to the fact that the dictatorial rulers and the people ruled over may share a common fear of the same ideological, ethnic or linguistic group, or of the emergence of a certain social class, the desire of the rulers to rule may be complemented by the desire of the others to be ruled. Or, it may be complemented by their belief that it is normal that there is one or a small number of omnipotent leaders surrounded by an endless mass of obedient minions. Especially in societies which have a strong theodemonist organization it is believed to be natural that a higher level in the hierarchy has absolute power over lower levels, and that the man at the top of this theodemonical hierarchy is an infallible fuehrer in his field. In the ideology of these organizations even the supreme being itself is claimed to be an absolute and almighty ruler commanding reverent fear and submission from the believers. The male at the top of the human part of the hierarchy is said to be its (or 'His') present representative in the material universe: not showing deep respect for him and his orders is interpreted as disrespect for the omnipotent Mono 'Himself'. It is evident that such beliefs and such organizations, which glorify the concentration of power in one person or personified being, prepare common people to unconditionally surrender themselves to the dictatorial rule of potentates, not only in the religious organization but also in the political organization of the state. When there is a personal union between the ruler(s) of the state and the ruler(s) of the mono- or polytheist (temple) society concerned, or when these rulers cooperate very closely, the acceptance of religious, political or military dictatorship by those who adhere to the particular or a related religion will be very easy indeed. In submitting to the control of the dictator naive people are made to feel as if they were administered the first rights by the supreme being itself. Using the word god in the pragmatic sense of the most powerful leader(s) of the community of believers it is, perhaps, a fact that they are directed by (the) 'god'. However, these theonomous pawns do not realize that this does not mean that they would be directed by (the) supreme being itself in any way or in any sense. The difference which exists between the inclusive attitude and the exclusive attitude is of fundamental significance for the establishment and maintenance of a democratic system which is not apt to be replaced by a dictatorship at some time. Any exclusivist belief, feeling or practise will contribute directly or indirectly, intentionally or inadvertently to the emergence of the exclusivist attitude both among those in power and among those they are likely to lord it over, and thus to the possible emergence of a dictatorship. However solemnly human beings may profess democracy, it is the inclusiveness of their beliefs, feelings and practises which counts, not only in the fields which are clearly related to the institution of democracy but in all fields. 1.4.4 EQUALITY INSTEAD OF DISCRIMINATION All reasonable persons seem to agree that human beings should not be discriminated against on the basis of their nationality, race or ethnical identity, while the most obvious discrimination on the basis of sex has become equally unpopular. Yet, racial and ethnical equality often does not go much further than the absence of legal discrimination. When it comes to the appointment or election to the better or best jobs and positions members of racial or ethnical minorities (or sometimes majorities) are often very much underrepresented. And people may conceive of members of these groups as equal citizens and equal partners at work, to have them as friends (that is, persons with whom they spend leisure time together), as neighbors or as in-laws is but too often viewed as something different. The reason why they may not want to get too close with other ethnic groups may partially be that they do not feel at ease with aliens or in an alien environment; partially it is the fear and dislike which result from misconceptions and inadmissible generalizations. The fact that somebody belongs to a certain racial or ethnical group may at a certain place and time (under the conditions as they have been so far) be correlated with sometimes unfavorable factors. If this correlation is not a product of the imagination, it is still a purely statistical relationship which does not characterize any particular person of the group in question, but when generalizing, the unfavorable (nondoctrinal) quality is automatically projected onto each individual member of the group. Such does not only happen to races or ethnic groups but also to the sexes and to all other groups of society distinguished on the basis of a ground-world quality and not treated as equals in some way. Even when and where men and women are formally considered equal citizens, they have still been discriminated against all over the world in many other respects (also in the law). That the legal discrimination of women is on the way to extinction, does not mean that they would not remain extremely underrepresented in (the higher-level or better-paid) official positions. Also when women are considered suitable for a number of jobs (especially those in which men do not have to be their subordinate), they may be the first, if not the only, ones to be held responsible for the housekeeping and the upbringing of the children. (In sexist dictionaries homemaker is not person managing a household but one who manages a household (especially) as a wife and mother.) On the other hand, a number of jobs may not be generally considered very masculine, and men were, or still are, the first, if not the only ones, to be held responsible for the maintenance of the family and the defense of the country or community (against other men). The traditional differentiation between the functions of females and the functions of males all over the world has degenerated into a system of roles female human beings have to play and roles male human beings have to play in order to achieve the highest possible status in their (sub)culture. This division into roles goes far beyond what can be explained from the features which define whether one has a male or female body. From a purely biological standpoint it is not less preposterous to suppose that the excellence of the behavior of men and women would lie in their aggressiveness or arrogance, and in their weakness or affectedness respectively. One unfavorable factor engendering the underrepresentation of a race, ethnic group, sex and in particular a social class in the higher positions, is the lack of education among members of such a group. This is reflected in its disproportional representation at the medium and higher levels of education, especially at the university level. Such a negative disproportionality can be a result of many factors, like: * the financial inability to pay for a higher education (which in itself is a sign of socioeconomic inequality) * the fact that no-one tries to arouse the intellectual interests of such a group or to encourage its members to continue their study, coupled with the belief of a substantial part of the general public that the group in question lacks the skills for doing so * the fact that within the family the intellectual interests of the children, or exclusively of the girls, are not aroused either, combined with the parents' belief that education leads to estrangement from the children's family and/or community, or from the role the girls will later have to play in family life. All these and other factors demonstrate that it is relatively easy to bar discrimination by the government, by corporations or by individual citizens, but that it is far more difficult to establish a state of equality in which a group formerly stereotyped or otherwise discriminated against is no longer underrepresented in social and political life. However, it does not follow that a group is discriminated against when it is underrepresented in a certain respect, because it may on the average have, for example, fewer qualified people, or fewer people who aspire to a particular (type of) position, even when all forms of discrimination are, and have been, absent. We cannot divorce the discrimination of one particular group from the discrimination of any other particular group, whether this group is distinguished on the grounds of physical factors like skin color, family membership, sex, sexual orientation or age, or on the grounds of cultural factors like language, social class, wealthiness or ideological (political, religious, nonreligious) convictions. However much the groups discriminated against may seem to differ, they all suffer from one and the same attitude: the exclusivist attitude. A community or individual discriminating on the grounds of any of the factors mentioned or not mentioned is likely to discriminate abnegationally or to show a discriminatory preferential treatment of more groups on the basis of more factors, if not avowedly, then possibly in a hidden way, since the one exclusivism contributes to and reinforces the other exclusivism. Only the fundamental conviction as portrayed by the inclusive attitude to keep aloof from all discrimination, whatever physical or cultural factor is involved (with the exception of exclusivisms themselves), can save any particular group from the continuous threat of being discriminated against, from being ignored, from (irrelevant) unequal treatment and from (unjustified) underrepresentation in certain sectors of society. It is erroneous to assume that the attitude of a group which itself is, for example, stereotyped or withheld equal opportunities would be inclusive because this group tries to put an end to its own state of being discriminated against. In fact the attitude of this group may be more exclusivistic than the attitude of the (other) discriminators. This may express itself in misconceptions and generalizations with regard to those not belonging to this group, in a tendency to keep exclusively to themselves and thus to estrange themselves from the rest of society, in a preferential treatment of fellow-members, in a desire to distinguish themselves from the rest of the public by a purposely provocative behavior and appearance, or in other exclusivist beliefs, feelings and actions. The exclusive interest in their own emancipation, and the lack of interest in the liberation and equality of other groups which are ignored, stereotyped or withheld equal opportunities may be part of this pattern. Because of the fundamental discrepancy between inclusive beliefs, feelings and thoughts on the one hand, and exclusive beliefs, feelings and thoughts on the other, the abnegational discrimination or discriminatory preferential treatment of any particular group is correlated with all other exclusive convictions, sentiments and opinions on the side of the discriminators and with all exclusive convictions, sentiments and opinions on the side of the discriminated. Neither discrimination in general, nor any particular form of discrimination (sexism, racism, and so on) can ever be completely overcome, if we do not attack the principal attitude which is behind it in all fields and among all parties. 1.4.5 TOLERANCE INSTEAD OF INTOLERANCE In many (sub)cultures it is quite common that people love their neighbors as themselves, provided that they are like themselves; that is, speak the same language, dialect or sociolect, belong to the same ethnic group and social class and adhere to the same religion (or irreligious ideology). Chances become much smaller that the same people love their neighbors if they have moved in from another area, belong to a different race, speak a different language or adhere to another religion (when they are members of a sect, for instance) or to no religion at all. Altho they may now not love them, they may still tolerate them. Chances become much smaller that they will even tolerate their neighbors if they are not willing to sing the (exclusivist) national anthem, if they do not style themselves or others on the basis of ancestry, if their household is not the usual household reflecting the traditional, fixed concepts of sexual role differentiation, or if they bring their children up in a way that they are believed to 'spoil' the other children in the neighborhood. If these people would be asked whether they are against tolerance, they might be surprised by the question, because who would ever suggest this. Yet, these same people could not tolerate, let alone 'love', that sort of people as are now moving into their area, especially when they are not 'even' house-dwellers but caravan-dwellers or nomads. Maybe they could stand one or two of these families or 'even' nonfamilies, but more would follow, and the neighborhood would lose its good reputation, they believe. It comes as no surprise that in a climate of tolerance unequal treatment remains the rule, since tolerance refers to a one-sided relationship in which one party (the one which tolerates) agrees that it is willing to put up with the other party (the one tolerated). When the tolerating party represents the majority, this implies that it is willing to allow deviations to a certain extent, but it does certainly not imply that these deviations are treated as equal. Both intolerance and the ideal of tolerance as a peaceful coexistence of unequal parties are manifestations of one and the same attitude which only differ in the degree of exclusiveness and the manner of exclusion. 1.4.6 BEING FREE INSTEAD OF BEING UNFREE Many countries, and also international organizations, guarantee the freedom of 'man' in their constitution or in another legal code. Thus they intend, or purport, to guarantee every person's freedom of conscience and right to pursue 'er own personal fulfilment without having to fear imprisonment or other curtailments of this freedom. But rather than being aimed at the termination of all exclusive measures based on the subjective judgments of particular groups or of citizens in a particular position these codes are often not much more than rhetorical products conceived in an atmosphere in which it was, or still is, unfashionable to admit any form of oppression or discrimination. They outlaw a limited number of political, judicial and social practises (particularly in the field of political and religious convictions, in the field of racial relations, and in the field of women's rights) which are, at least in the open, called "unacceptable" by a majority of nations or citizens. Notwithstanding the fact that these codes have only a limited scope, they often are ignored in specific measures by the very nations or citizens who pretend to support them. And so it may happen that a certain country recognizes the ideal of personal freedom and fulfilment, and that at the same time many citizens in such a country are unjustly imprisoned or otherwise restricted in their freedom, ignored or treated as inferior, simply because they were never meant to be included or treated as equals in a preconceived and preconditioned system. Freedom is to be defined here not as mere absence of constraints but as availability of options. 'Complete freedom' is, then, the maximum availability of options in a situation in which no-one's right to personhood is violated. As such it reaches far beyond the question of governmental deprivations and restrictions. Some interpret freedom as the freedom to start and to own a private business, and to employ others; this is indeed one type of freedom, felt most deeply by the business person or employer when 'e has the funds or when 'e succeeds ('has made it'). But if the ones employed and the unemployed remain poor, they do not share in this freedom, because they have only a very small number of options: most things they just cannot afford. And it is but too often forgotten that poverty is a relative quality related to the average wealth at a certain time (and usually also a certain place); it is not an absolute financial condition for which the criterions would remain unchanged while the average moves up. Accordingly, the number of options workers, and perhaps also unemployed people, have, may increase, but their freedom not, if the relative position of this number with respect to the average quantity and quality of options does not change. Freedom also reaches far beyond bodily and pecuniary matters. Someone can be a 'free person', that is, free to move around and rich enough to afford the most sophisticated, technical appliances, and yet have less freedom than those living in places where the problems which have made many of these appliances necessary are nonexistent; where people have, for example, the full choice of enjoying the whole of nature without being bothered by noise, water- or airpollution; where the collection of plant and animal species is still complete and where people have only to walk to it to see, hear, smell, taste and feel it all. (Maybe, this is not the description of another place but of another time.) Restrictions of freedom do not only come from outside, but as much from within. Wherever people go and whatever they achieve, they take themselves with them. Exclusivist laws may be abolished, financial worries may be forgotten and the soundness of nature may be restored again, but many persons will still have to live with inhibitions, with feelings of alienation or with obsessions. In public they feel embarassed for their own or someone else's naked body. When alone and approached by foreigners, or in a foreign country, they feel nervous. And they are possessed by a compulsory feeling to smoke, to drink alcohol or to take other drugs. All these feelings diminish the number of options a person has, and therefore take away some of 'er freedom. The restriction of liberty (in its more serious forms oppression and the feeling of oppression) is thus inflicted by both the active constituents of exclusivism, such as exclusions, and the passive or sentimental constituents of exclusivism, such as inhibitions and obsessions. All ideologies which embrace or stimulate exclusivisms, or which have an exclusivist interpretation of the concept of freedom, such as a purely physical or a purely political one, may be expected to contribute to the curtailment of freedom; if not actively, then in the way it is experienced. Hence, universal freedom cannot be achieved unless a wholly inclusive attitude is developed both in the others and in ourselves. 1.4.7 "... AND AT LONG LAST THEY REALIZED HOW TO PROCEED" The norm of inclusivity not only colligates several moral and nonmoral, normative principles which were already, at least partially, recognized by many people (such as that one should not discriminate on the basis of race or gender), but also all other antiexclusivist principles which were never elicited before. It is thru this norm that the interconnection of all antiexclusivist, normative principles, or subnorms, is disclosed for the first time, and it is thru this norm that a fragmentized sense of one aspect of morality is elevated to normative insight. Those who profess a belief in universal ideals compatible with the norm of inclusivity (and also the right to personhood), like enduring peace, security, democracy, equality and liberty, will solely be able to make these ideals come true if they develop an inclusive attitude both in themselves and in others. If their beliefs, feelings and tendencies show a pattern which does not accord with this norm, then all these beliefs, feelings and tendencies (however unrelated to a particular ideal they perhaps seem to be) may be expected to work together so as to establish or preserve a generally exclusive attitude. And it is this very attitude which is then bound to overrule the inclusive ideals formally adhered to or paid lip-service to, and to overrule the inclusive normative principles formally recognized. For 'where inclusiveness is, there is no exclusive craving, and where exclusive craving exists, inclusiveness is not'. The fundamental discrepancy between inclusive ideals and principles on the one hand, and exclusivist or exclusive convictions, sentiments and practises on the other, makes it impossible to combine them permanently. Only by wholly dissociating themselves from all manifestations of exclusivism can persons and peoples ever achieve their inclusive and universal ideals. 1.4.7.0 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- WHERE THERE IS A WILL Where there is a will, there is a way, or there can be made a way. A way of class-neutral* inclusiveness: choose it, and the wounds caused by the irrelevance of caste* or class* will be healed, in yourself and in society at large. A way of ethnic* inclusiveness: choose it, and the wounds caused by the irrelevance of race* or ethnicity* will be healed, in yourself and in society at large. A way of sexual* inclusiveness: choose it, and the wounds caused by the irrelevance of gender* or sex* will be healed, in yourself and in society at large. Where it is believed that there is no way, and where it is not attempted to make a way, there simply is no will. * : any other factor of distinction and facet of inclusivity may be mentioned ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 THE MANIFESTATIONS OF EXCLUSIVISM 2.1 HOW TO SURVEY A MORASS OF IRRELEVANCE 2.1.1 HOLDING ON TO A TREE WITH DISTINCTIVE RAMIFICATIONS "A classification of all forms of violating the relevance principle as systematic as that of plants and animals could be very helpful": this is what was stated in the previous chapter. There it was pointed out, too, that traditional language has already bestowed a special name on a limited number of exclusivisms. Racism, sexism and nationalism are three stereotyped examples. In one respect we find ourselves in the primeval position of the science of biology before it started to methodically classify plants and animals. Every vernacular language already used to have names for a certain number of kinds of living being, but other kinds of living being had no names at all. And the vernacular name was not necessarily the name of a species, that is, a specific name; quite often it was a superspecific name denoting an entire genus, or a subspecific name denoting a subspecies, race or variety of the species. Similarly, a vernacular or traditional language may at the moment have a word for sexism and racism, without having a word for exclusivism on the basis of age or denominational doctrine adhered to. Or, such a language may have a word for anthropocentrism (a name on the specific level) and for infrafactorial racialism (a name on the subspecific level), without having a word for abnegational anthropic exclusivism, interfactorial racialism and other exclusivisms on the specific, subspecific and other levels. The analogy between the classification of plants or animals and the classification of the myriad manifestations of exclusivism in the world is only valid insofar as it is descriptive. A classification is descriptive if concerned with taxons recognized as separate entities from the beginning on, particularly when they do already have a name in the vernacular or traditional language. Such a classification has to search for the criterions which divide and unite the taxons known. (Alternatively, this aspect has been called "the accidental aspect".) However, when novel taxons emerge, or are made to emerge, due to the process of categorization itself, the classification is speculative (or 'functional' as it has also been called). That it is 'speculative' does not mean that the taxon or taxons do not exist in reality; if so, they merely have not been discovered or recognized yet. It is precisely because a systematic arrangement suggests their existence that the taxonomist or other person starts looking for them. (Thus, physicists have discovered new particles on the basis of a partially speculative classification system.) From our point of view it is important that the norm of inclusivity rejects both exclusivisms which did and do exist and exclusivisms which will exist, or which could be made to exist. This is because our world-view is, unlike the scientific one, primarily normative. For us it is particularly the speculative aspect of surveying 'the irrelevant' which, if systematic, makes it possible that the recognition of direct and indirect manifestations of exclusivist beliefs, thoughts, feelings, tendencies and actions is no longer dependent upon everyday or traditional language. The absence of a suitable terminology for many manifestations of exclusivism in the conventional vocabulary of this and other tongues need, then, no longer be prejudicial to our moral outlook. The reason is that the limited number for which there is a simple word in that conventional vocabulary (and for which a descriptive, accidental classification would suffice) must not be considered as approximating, let alone representing, the total range of exclusivism in any way, even not in purely moral contexts. Yet, if discrimination or exclusivism is wrong, every form of discrimination or exclusivism is wrong, regardless of what or whom is disparaged, and regardless of the gravity of the exclusivist attitude or practise from other angles. The more orderly a classification of the violations of the norm of inclusivity, the greater the number of actual or possible manifestations which will be brought to light, and the better this classification will clarify the scope of the inclusive norm itself. (This will require the introduction of quite a few technical expressions. If the number of these new expressions seems large, or too large, the reader or listener should not only compare it with the technical terms and scientific names biologists were forced to introduce but also with something like pneumonoultramicroscopicsilicovolcanoconiosis in medical jargon. In any event the terminology of the present classification system of exclusivisms will be much simpler than the tables of exclusivist forms of address covering so many superfluous pages in traditional dictionaries and diaries.) No systematic taxonomy will include hybrids in its 'primary' system, because hybrids are the offspring of two members (such as animals or plants) of different subspecies, species or genera. To determine these subspecies, species or genera a scientist or other person must already have a system in which these nonhybridous taxons are classified at 'er disposal. The 'primary' system is therefore already presupposed before anyone can speak of "hybrids". Similarly, the classification of exclusivisms starts with that of singular exclusivisms, that is, exclusivisms of which the object of exclusion or exclusivity is determined by one single factor. Plural exclusivisms, on the other hand, are constituted of different kinds of exclusion or exclusivity. As the x-raying of singular exclusivisms should be sufficient to indirectly reveal and locate plural exclusivisms as well, we shall not endeavor to systematically categorize the latter in this Model. Given that exclusivism amounts to violating the norm of inclusivity, not violating this norm (while being able to do so or to want this) in the same respect and 'in the same way' is a particular form of inclusivity. Hence, we shall say that 'every manifestation of exclusivism is antithetical to a certain facet of inclusivity'. By arranging the facets of inclusivity so as to run parallel to the manifestations of exclusivism, the survey of exclusivisms can indirectly also serve as a survey of the facets of inclusivity. We could not do the reverse, however, for several singular manifestations of exclusivism (male and female exclusivism, for instance) may correspond to only one facet of inclusivity (gender-neutral inclusivity), whereas a singular manifestation of exclusivism will never correspond to two or more facets of inclusivity. The word irrelevantism may be employed as a synonym of exclusivism, but an obvious difference is that exclusivism stresses what is irrelevant according to the interpretation laid down in the norm of inclusivity. It could also be said that the usage of exclusivism, and also of inclusivism, is denominational, that is, ideological, while the usage of irrelevantism and relevantism is, for example, more philosophical. In a philosophical context the equal, unless approach might thus be called "the position of relevantistic egalitarianism" rather than "inclusivistic egalitarianism". In practise tho, it is the interpretation of principles and people's attitudes which count, and therefore the antithesis between an interpreted exclusivism and its manifestations on the one hand and an interpreted inclusivity and its facets on the other. For the purpose of the classification system to be presented in this chapter we shall confine ourselves to nonrelevant distinctions drawn by human agents or decision-makers. Moreover, we shall use the phrase human being in the conveniently ambiguous sense of either human body or human person (that is, person who has a human body). But even the task of x-raying all attitudes and practises in which nonrelevant distinctions are or can be made by human beings may seem impossible. The impossibility of this task, however, need not deter us from classifying those human, contemporary and historical, singular exclusivisms which are already named in traditional language, those human singular exclusivisms which are related to them and should be listed, if the former ones are, and a number of other singular exclusivisms, particularly in the sphere of human or happiness-catenal relations. It is theoretically possible to x all these exclusivisms or irrelevantisms by using a system of dichotomous subdivisions in such a way that every lower-level exclusivism which does not belong to the one subdivision belongs to the other, whether it is mentioned itself or not. When representing this system of dichotomous subdivisions in a diagram the resulting picture roughly resembles that of a tree (or of a tree turned upside down). Starting from (universal) exclusivism each branch then represents a lower-level manifestation of exclusivism. An easy way to keep track of the ramifications of human exclusivism is by using a binary-decimal system of numbering. Such a system consists of the decimal equivalents of the numbers obtained by reading the code of an entirely dichotomous classification as one binary number (instead of as a set of binary numbers each representing one classificatory level). (For example, the decimal number 9 corresponds to a binary number 1001 which stands for 1.0.0.1.) This system requires that every nomenclatural level of a trichotomous, tetratomic, pentatomic or polytomic subdivision be replaced first by two or more levels of dichotomous subdivisions. But if the nondichotomous subdivision is not logically exhaustive, this only enhances the reliability of the classification system, because the dichotomous taxonomy, if properly applied, has a built-in safeguard against neglecting or arbitrarily leaving out any lower-level exclusivism. When, in this chapter, a name is succeeded by a letter and one or more numbers in parentheses, X stands for manifestation of eXclusivism, N for facet of iNclusivity or Neutral-inclusivity, while the number is part of a binary-decimal enumeration system. Furthermore, it should be noted that we will use exism as a convenient abbreviation of exclusivism (and re as short for with respect/regard to). An alternative abbreviation of exclusivism is x-ism (or Xism when capitalized). Exism and x-ism will later be used too as abbreviations of extremism in the catenical sense. 2.1.2 INTEGRAL EXCLUSIVISMS AND THE FACTOR OF DISTINCTION We have never defined what factor of distinction means in terms of our ontological framework. In a strictly dichotomous system a 'factor of distinction' is just the fact, possibility or 'question' of having or not having a certain predicate. But when we speak of factors like age and race as 'factors of distinction', we do not think in strictly dichotomous terms, for the question is here not one of having or not having a particular, proper age or race predicate (let alone of having or not having some predicate age or race). In this case the age or race predicate may vary itself and may either be proper or improper. Age predicates can be construed as catenated predicates, but the exact status of race predicates very much depends on the definition of race in general and of belonging to a certain race in particular. If factors exist where a distinction can be made between having or not having a noncatenated, proper predicate, or where catenality exists, then race seems to refer to a cluster of factors, rather than to a single factor, even if one only reads "skin-color" (which is not more than a reference to a part-attribute of the body). When we treat racism as a singular exclusivism, rather than as a plural one, the definition of singular can therefore not be taken in too strict an ontological sense. We are capable of exactly defining singular and factor in our ontology, but in the case of the classification of exclusivisms this does not appear to be necessary. For we are not so much interested in what kind of major, irrelevant distinctions are, or can be, made by people with an ontology like ours, but also, and especially, by people with an entirely different ontology. They may take it for granted that body and 'mind' are two things existing side by side, and that a factor like race is a single factor. As racists do indeed treat race as a single factor, we shall treat racism as a singular exclusivism accordingly. The same applies to all other seemingly singular exclusivisms which may be plural in strictly catenical terms. A manifestation of exclusivism of which the object of exclusion or exclusivity belongs to one particular field such as that of gender, age or race, will be referred to here as a 'unitary (manifestation of) exclusivism' if there is no other manifestation of the same hierarchical level belonging to the same field. For example, exism on the basis of gender (X.582.1) is a unitary manifestation. Male exism (X.582.50) pertains to the same field, but like female exism (X.582.51) it is of a lower level. Both male and female exism are manifestations of gender-based exism themselves. A combination of two or more unitary manifestations is a 'compositional (manifestation of) exclusivism'. Here the object of exclusion or exclusivity does not belong to one particular field, but to one of the fields of a particular combination of fields. For example, interideological exclusivism (X.156) is a compositional manifestation of which exism on the basis of denominational doctrine adhered to (X.313), on the basis of political ideology adhered to (X.625), and on the basis of one or more gods believed in (X.10033) are lower-level manifestations, some of them unitary, some of them compositional themselves. If one arranged the world as a series of concentric circles with each circle representing a sort of ingroup-outgroup distinction, then the smallest circle would enclose the (human or nonhuman) 'ingroup' which is the object of a unitary exism. By widening the circle the 'ingroup' would become the object of a compositional exism: the wider the circle, the higher the level of exclusivism. The two or more distinct (types of) things or matters which are the object of a compositional manifestation may be very similar and do always belong to a certain category which unites them in view of a particular criterion. Because they can exist independently, and are entirely formed into a whole by themselves, both unitary and compositional manifestations will be called "integral (manifestations of) exclusivism". For example, both ego-centered exclusivism and speciesism are integral exclusivisms. In section 1.2.2 of the previous chapter we have already differentiated 'infrafactorial' and 'interfactorial exclusivisms'. In the case of the former exisms the factor named is the factor of distinction, whereas in the case of the latter the factor named is the object of exclusion or exclusivity itself. An interfactorial exism has a different factor from the infrafactorial one of the same name. Thus the factor of distinction of infrafactorial racialism (X.597.1) is race, but the factor of distinction of interfactorial racialism (X.597.0) is not race, or not race in the same sense. If it is also race, then the question whether the factor of distinction is race or not. But the factor of distinction might also be another one which distinguishes race from other factors. If so, then the rac(e) in racialism denotes the object of exclusivism, not the factor of distinction. This illustrates a feature of the general nomenclature of exclusivisms, whether it concerns the nominal or adjectival parts of their names. They refer either to: 1. the factor of distinction, that is, the criterion of subdivision (as in sexism and ideological exclusivism), or to: 2. the object of exclusion or exclusivity, that is, the class or quality to which an unequal or disproportional value is explicitly or implicitly attributed (as in androcentrism and religionism). One can distinguish an infrafactorial and an interfactorial variant of every integral exclusivism. The interfactorial variant can be treated as a unitary manifestation, but the infrafactorial variant may be either unitary or compositional. For example, the interfactorial variant of politico-ideological exclusivism (X.625.0) pertains to situations in which the factor political ideology itself is judged or treated as more, or as less, important than other factors, while there are no (relevant) reasons for doing so. The infrafactorial variant (X.625.1) however, differentiates between people or their characteristics themselves. Political ideology is, then, still too vague or general a factor; and at least we should distinguish a political doctrine which people may or may not espouse from a political party they may or may not be a member of, or vote for. It is then doctrine-related politico-ideological exism (X.1251) and party-related politico-ideological exism (X.2501) which are the unitary exisms concerned, and not politico-ideological exism itself, even when infrafactorial. As the criterion of subdivision changes for every unitary and compositional level, the antithetical facet of inclusivity changes accordingly. Hence, every other integral exclusivism is antithetical to another facet of inclusivity. Just as every lower-level integral exism is a manifestation of a higher-level exism, so every lower-level facet of inclusivity is itself a facet of a higher-level facet of inclusivity. Thus local exism (X.1223) is a manifestation of (subnational) territorial exism (X.611). In an analogous way supralocal inclusivity (N.1223) is a facet of territorial inclusivity (N.611). So far we have mainly discussed the formal features of the classification of integral exclusivisms. In the other divisions of this chapter we shall take a closer look at substantive criterions for the subdivision of these exclusivisms. 2.1.3 DIMENSIONAL MANIFESTATIONS If the field belonging to an integral manifestation of exclusivism is, or can be, divided into two or more parts, classes or sections on the basis of the integral manifestation's factor of distinction, then the manifestations of exclusivism pertaining to any of these parts, classes or sections can be labeled "dimensional manifestations". The objects of the dimensional manifestations belonging to the same field together determine the dimension of the object, or types of object, of the integral manifestation. It is on the basis of the factor age, for instance, that juveniles and adult, young human beings can be distinguished from middle age and old ones. Exism with respect to age is age-based exclusivism (X.297.1). Exism with respect to any of these four groups is, then, a dimensional manifestation of age-based exism, such as old-age-centered exclusivism (X.297.73). In this example the subdivision is tetratomic, but the classification of dimensional manifestations allows for any kind of subdivision: dichotomous, trichotomous, tetratomic or higher. A reason to differentiate four age groups is that, supposedly, the social categorization on the basis of age generally comprises these four groups. But in the event that three or five groups would be a better approximation, three dimensional or five dimensional manifestations of age-based exclusivism might be distinguished in place of, or besides, the four mentioned. If only two dimensional manifestations are distinguished, they will be called "dichotomous manifestations"; if three, then "trichotomous manifestations"; if four, then "tetratomic manifestations". Dichotomous manifestations are either 'lateral' or 'disjunctive'. They are lateral if it is possible to belong to both classes, or to have both qualities, distinguished on the basis of the integral manifestation's factor of distinction. They are disjunctive if the predicates or systems distinguished are mutually exclusive, that is, cannot be combined. Exism with respect to left-handedness (X.578.50), for instance, is a lateral manifestation of handedness-based exclusivism (X.578), because a human being can be 'both left- and right-handed' or ambidextrous. Similarly, exism with respect to homosexuality (X.4671.50) is a lateral manifestation of relative orientational erotic exclusivism (X.4671), because a human being can love, or make love with, both somebody of 'er own and of the opposite sex. On the other hand, exism with respect to a mentally disabled person as mentally disabled person (X.4877.14) is a disjunctive manifestation of mental ability-based person-centered exclusivism (X.4877), because a person either has a mental disability on this view, or not. (Those who make the distinction must draw a line between health and disability somewhere.) The other disjunctive manifestation of the same dimension (X.4877) is exism with respect to a mentally healthy person or mentally healthy people (X.4877.15). If a lateral manifestation pertains to one of two possibly conjunctive, complemental 'fields' (like that of left-handedness, or that of right-handedness), it will be called "a complemental manifestation". Complemental manifestations are situated on the lowest lateral level. Their object is solely one class or characteristic quality, or solely the complement of this class or quality (in the field as determined by the exism on the unitary or compositional level). Complemental exclusivism is a form of unilateral exclusivism. A unilateral exism like single-handedness-related exism can be either complemental like single-handedness-based exism or 'supercomplemental' like single-handedness-centered exism. The object of a supercomplemental (manifestation of) exclusivism is either the one or the other class or quality which is a separate object of one of the complements. Any dimensional manifestation which is of the -related form (with number x) can be further subdivided into a -centered form (with number 2x) and a -based form (with number 2x+1). Finally, a lateral exclusivism is either unilateral or bilateral. Bilateral exclusivism is the conjunctive exism of which the object is the combination of both qualities which are the separate objects of the complements, or of which the object is the class of things having both these qualities. An example of this is again ambidexterity-centered exclusivism (X.578.13). (A complete list of the lateral manifestations of this form of laterality-based exism will be given in 2.3.4.). To discover or clarify the implications of a complemental or disjunctive manifestation of exclusivism, it may be very useful to apply the method of dichotomous substitution. This technique requires the consistent substitution of the (name of the) object of a complemental or disjunctive exism for (the name of) its complement or contrary. (It should be most illustrative when applied to a whole book, play or film suffering from androcentrism, gynocentrism or some other strain of dichotomous exclusivism.) By thus generating a mirror image the existence and exclusivity of a complemental or disjunctive exism can be demonstrated, with its implication. Moreover, those who believe, or pretend to believe, that a distinction is made on the basis of a relevant factor will (if maintaining that their exclusion or exclusivity is not exclusivistic) be more urgently forced to make it plausible that the distinction concerned is relevant to a legitimate goal. Three examples of a dichotomous substitution of names are: a. re complemental handedness-based exism (X.578.25): Replace left- by right-handed and vice versa. For example, i hate their left-handedness (in the sense of insincerity) is reflected in i hate their right-handedness (which is not used in the sense of insincerity) b. re complemental gender-based exism (X.528.25): Replace man by woman, he by she, and so on, and vice versa. For example, I thank thee, O Father Lord of heaven and earth is reflected in I thank thee, O Mother Lady of heaven and earth c. re the disjunctive manifestations of religiousness-related person-centered exism (X.2507.7): Replace religious (if referring to religious people as people) by irreligious, and vice versa. For example, freedom of religion (in the sense of freedom for people adhering to a religious denomination) is reflected in freedom of irreligious denominationalism (in the sense of freedom for people adhering to an irreligious denomination). In order to make it easier to discern the various, actual or potential, dimensional manifestations of an integral exism, figure F.2.1.3.1 shows them all together in a cladogram. Each kind of manifestation in this cladogram is preceded by its binary-decimal number. These numbers can solely be assigned to exclusivisms and not to their antitheses, for all dimensional manifestations of one integral exclusivism are antithetical to the same facet of inclusivity. This is the facet antithetical to the integral exism itself, because within the totality of an integral exism and its dimensional manifestations there is only one criterion of subdivision (from which the emergence of two or more classes or predicates is the result). A parallel dichotomization or nondichotomous subdivision of the facet of inclusivity antithetical to the integral exism concerned would not make sense. Since it had to be founded in exclusivist criterions it would be self-contradictory. 2.1.4 COMPONENTIAL MANIFESTATIONS The exclusive attitude towards a quality or thing may be an anti-attitude or a pro-attitude. In the former case a low, or negative, value is assigned to an object of exclusion; in the latter case a high, or positive, value is assigned to an object of exclusivity. This may be done consciously and explicitly, or unconsciously and implicitly. Of course, it is not necessarily the case that assigning a low value to something, or having an anti-attitude, is in itself exclusivistic. Such would even make it impossible to have an anti-attitude towards exclusivism. It follows from the adherence to a normative doctrine that one assigns values and develops an anti-attitude towards one thing and a pro-attitude towards another, like the doctrine itself, its norms and the ideals associated with these norms. Whether such an anti-attitude and such a pro-attitude are exclusivistic depends on the doctrine, its norms and its ideals. Now, an exclusivism is aggrandizemental if a high(er) value is assigned to a certain class or characteristic quality, and abnegational if a low(er) value is assigned to that class or quality. In other words, in the case of aggrandizemental exism an object is regarded, felt or treated as superior, possibly even by giving or allowing it an exclusive position in the physical sense; in the case of abnegational exism it is regarded, felt or treated as inferior, possibly even by excluding or by not admitting it in the physical sense. (That there is no justification for these judgments, feelings and treatments is already implied in their being exclusivistic.) A form of aggrandizemental exclusivism with an own name in traditional language is favoritism. Dependent on its definition the term favoritism is only used when the exclusivism is shown in practise, and when the object of exclusivity is a person or group of persons. The antithetical facet of inclusivity is neither expressive of aggrandizement, nor of abnegation, but neutral in this respect. Inclusivity, that is, neutral-inclusivity, is therefore always flanked by these two sides of exclusivism. This level on which exclusivist aggrandizement and exclusivist abnegation together lay stress on the neutrality of inclusiveness will be termed "evaluative". The evaluative distinction is only one of (at least) three ways to subdivide an integral exism, or (if present) a dimensional manifestation of such an exism. A second distinction is the 'agent-relative' one between internal and external exisms. An internal exclusivism is an exclusivism held by someone who has 'imself the characteristic which is the object of the exism, or who belongs to the exclusive or excluded class 'imself, whereas an external exclusivism is an exism held by someone who does not have that characteristic, or who does not belong to that class 'imself. Internal is not the same as self-regarding; only the combination of internal and aggrandizemental is (granted that the class to which someone belongs is part of the 'self'). An exism can be both internal and abnegational, that is, self-abnegational. An example is a person who speaks a dialect and feels inferior in respect of someone speaking an official variant of the same language, because 'e believes that speaking a dialect would be something inferior. The expression other-regarding might refer to an external, aggrandizemental exism, but it seems to be used too for an attitude or practise which is neither abnegational nor aggrandizemental towards others, that is, a nonexclusivist one in this respect. In the latter sense it could not be called "other-regarding", for instance, to believe that one or more official state functions ought to be reserved for members of a certain family to which the 'believer' does not belong 'imself. All the same, such an exclusivist belief is both external and aggrandizemental. Neutral-inclusivity, however, is not only not aggrandizemental or abnegational, it is not (exclusively) internal or (exclusively) external either. The norm of inclusivity prescribes the inclusion of other classes than the ones to which one belongs oneself, and of other persons on equal terms with one's own class, characteristics and person, and vice versa. (This is the inclusivistic alternative for the agapist love thy neighbour as thyself.) Besides the evaluative and agent-relative aspects of exclusivism there is a third important distinction, namely between those exisms which are of the active type and those which are of the sentimental type. This distinction will be termed "symptomatic". An exclusivism is active if it is actively expressed, that is, if it involves the implications of the exclusivist attitude or action for the object which is excluded or (made) exclusive; it is sentimental if it involves exclusive sentiments and tendencies, or the implications for the subject who holds the exclusivism 'imself. (The reason that it is not called "passive" here, is that a person who is the 'passive' object of an active exism need not be the subject of such a 'sentimental' exism 'imself.) Active exclusivisms refer particularly to the conative aspect of attitudes and to actions, whereas sentimental exclusivisms refer particularly to the cognitive and affective aspects. It has to be borne in mind tho, that when an exclusivist idea or cognition is actively expressed the speech act itself is an action, and the exclusivism active, if, and insofar as, the implications for the object are concerned. For the basic distinction is not between elements of one and the same attitude, but between the particular implications it has for the object on the one hand, and for the subject itself on the other. By combining the evaluative, agent-relative and symptomatic aspects, we arrive conceptually at nine components of an integral or dimensional exclusivism. However, de facto the external abnegational component of an exism is equal to the internal aggrandizemental component of the exism which is its 'complement'. By complement is, then, to be understood the set of all classes or characteristics other than the one excluded or made exclusive, but belonging to the same field. Thus the external aggrandizemental component also equals the internal abnegational component of the exclusivism's complement. The external components of exclusivism need therefore not be dealt with separately in the present classification system. External abnegational female exism (such as the belief in the inferiority of girls or women by boys or men), for instance, is de facto the same as internal aggrandizemental or self-aggrandizemental male exism (the belief in the superiority of males by males), and external aggrandizemental male exism (the belief in the superiority of males by females) the same as self-abnegational female exism (the belief in the inferiority of females by females). Not only are female and male exism themselves antithetical to gender-neutral inclusivity, but also all their componential manifestations. Components like aggrandizemental exism which are distinguished on the basis of only one criterion (such as the evaluative one) will be termed "elemental" here, and components like self-aggrandizemental exism which are distinguished on the basis of two or three criterions "compound". In the names we shall use for these compound components self- stands for internal, aggrandizing for aggrandizemental (and) active and abnegating for abnegational (and) active. Figure F.2.1.4.1 shows the classificatory cladogram of componential manifestations with their binary-decimal numbers. It depends on the integral exclusivism in question which manifestations do occur and are, or were, most common, and should therefore be actually mentioned separately, whether elemental or compound. If they are mentioned, it is roughly in the following forms of behavior and states of mind that human componential exclusivisms are expressed: a. aggrandizing-exclusivism (comp.4): *commandment or prescription of a certain characteristic quality (rated positive in a normative sense on other than relevant grounds) *exclusive involvement, contact with and/or preferential treatment of something/someone/people belonging to a certain class or with a certain quality (rated positive on other than relevant grounds) b. sentimental aggrandizemental exclusivism (comp.5): *exclusive respect for, or worship or idolatry of something/someone/people belonging to a certain class *obsession or sentimental preoccupation with a certain characteristic quality (rated positive); if internal (that is, sentimental self-aggrandizemental) (comp.10) also: *arrogance or (aggrandizemental) self-consciousness (regarding one or more of one's own qualities rated positive) c. abnegating exclusivism (comp.6): *prohibition, restriction, condemnation or (complete) disregard for a certain characteristic quality (rated negative in a normative sense on other than relevant grounds) *exclusion of something/someone/people belonging to a certain class or with a certain characteristic (rated negative) from equality, that is, stigmatization and/or abnegational discrimination of certain classes or characteristics d. sentimental abnegational exclusivism (comp.7): *hatred, irrational fear or distrust of, uneasiness with, or alienation from something/someone/people belonging to a certain class (rated negative on other than relevant grounds) *nausea, phobia, discomfort, inhibition or ignorance with respect to a certain characteristic (rated negative); if internal (that is, sentimental self-abnegational) (comp.14) also: *shame, shyness or (abnegational) self-consciousness (regarding one's own characteristic(s) rated negative). 2.1.5 OPERATIONAL MANIFESTATIONS In section 1.2.2 three ways have been mentioned in which every type of discrimination may be manifested: an intermediary, an affirmative and an exemplary way. Words like way and type are still very vague, but now we can be more precise: the intermediary, affirmative and exemplary manifestations of componential, dimensional or integral exclusivisms are their operational manifestations. They differ in the agency thru which the exisms operate, that is, in the manner of taking effect. If there is no intermediate agency thru which a componential or higher-level exclusivism operates, or produces an effect, the exclusivism is either affirmative or exemplary. (Both of them are therefore 'nonintermediary operations'.) As mentioned before: in the case of an affirmative manifestation of exclusivism a distinction need in principle only be made once. If it is active and abnegational, it is a form of exclusionism. The antithesis of this is integrationism. In the case of an exemplary manifestation of exclusivism it is an unequal or disproportional frequency distribution which betrays the fact that a nonrelevant distinction is made or present in a certain sequence of examples, actions or occurrences. Nonetheless, also in an exemplary operation the object of exclusivism is literally the immediate object of exclusion or exclusivity. We will not subdivide the exemplary operations of exclusivism any further, but there is one affirmative operation which deserves some special attention here, namely existential exclusivism. This is an operational manifestation of exism in which something in the universe is made exclusive (if aggrandizemental) by regarding it as the sole reality, or in which something is excluded (if abnegational) by not regarding it as part of reality (while its existence is at least as plausible as that of qualities or classes which are taken to exist). Typical examples are those of philosophers or other people who claim that everything is material or that everything is nonmaterial, if not a dream; and those of politicians or other people who claim that there are no members of a certain political, denominational or sexual orientation living in their country. (These latter cases are actually hybridisms of nationalism and certain kinds of existential interideological exism or existential erotic exism.) In the event that an exclusion or exclusivity takes place with the intermediary of language, the symbols or norms of a denominational doctrine, or other such agency, it may be labeled "an intermediary (operation of) exclusivism". Altho there are innumerable ways of excluding something or someone, or of making something or someone exclusive, it is of paramount importance to recognize that there are many intermediary manifestations of exclusivism besides its affirmative and exemplary ones. For example, a certain exclusive theory or practise may have infiltrated into the language, or a certain exclusive attitude may dominate a particular ideology. To fight sexism, ethnocentrism and all other forms of integral exclusivism is also to fight the intermediary manifestations of sexism, ethnocentrism and all other forms of integral exclusivism. When it is language which is the transmitting medium, we will call the intermediary exism "a lingual (operation of) exclusivism". (Such a lingual exism must not be confused with a 'linguistic exclusivism' which is an integral exism with language, or something linguistic, itself as object.) One of the processes underlying lingual exism is 'semantic generalization' by means of which emotional responses are said to be generalized not only from objects to words, but also from words to objects, and from words to other words with similar meanings. It is generally agreed upon that the emotional components of beliefs, or of attitudes, can be created by the emotive connotations that words and phrases transfer along with their meanings. And that without the subject even having to come into contact with the object itself. The lingual transmission of emotional responses is but one aspect of lingual exclusivism. Also the grammar and general vocabulary of language itself can convey, and continue to convey, irrelevantist conceptions for a very long period of time. (In order not to be so indecent as to offend ad nauseam against traditional standards of lingual, inter- and infrafactorial gender-related exism no examples shall be given here again.) A second intermediary operational manifestation we should distinguish is 'the emblematic (operation of) exclusivism'. This is the effectuation of exclusivism by means of emblems, that is, objects or figures of objects which symbolize and suggest another object or idea, or symbols, figures or devices adopted as identifying marks. The object or idea suggested may be exclusivistic itself, but it may also be that the use of the emblem as such is exclusivistic. In the latter case emblematic exclusivism can also denote the use of a linguistic or infraideological symbol. Yet, if, and insofar as, the symbol itself is a means to effectuate, or a product of, exclusivism, we shall speak of "lingual" and "(infra)ideological exclusivism" respectively. A notorious example of emblematic exclusivism is the exclusive display of the emblem of one particular ideology by the state or another organization which is supposed to represent people of different ideologies, or all citizens regardless of their ideology. (When such an emblem is ostentatiously put on coins or bills, the ideology which is meant to profit from it is often a theodemonical creation. The irony of this situation is that both emblem and devil derive from ballein: en-ballein, that is, (to) throw in and diaballein, that is, (to) throw across, slander. And indeed, emblematic exclusivism is not only an instrument to impress others with the power and influence of the reigning state ideology, but also a way to misrepresent and damage the reputation of those people and beliefs which cannot be associated with the ideology emblematized.) Also in a purely ideological context (which is not non- or interideological) exclusivism can, and often does, operate in an intermediary manner, particularly in the field of denominationalism. The kind of operations here concerned are 'infraideological (operations of) exclusivism'. (Note that emblematic exclusivism is interideological if its object is a type of ideology.) When the intermediary is an ideology's doxastic norm, or the formulation or interpretation of such a norm, the operation will be termed "normative" in this Model. An obscene expression of normative sexualism is, for example, the theist commandment that the desire of a woman ought to be to her husband, and that her husband ought to rule over her (without the reverse being demanded as well). Other norms are often formulated in a more indirect way, and altho less obvious, may express a much more serious (if not horrendous) form of normative exclusivism. Thus the 'Supreme Being' of a theodemonical ideology may order 'His' followers to exterminate all people who do things he personally dislikes, and who believe things he personally disbelieves. The doxastic norm is, then, simply not to do or believe what is such a god's abomination, however much his extreme, supernatural hatred may be founded in favoritism towards what the authors of his own scriptures used to love and believe in front of their neighbors. The form of intermediary exclusivism inherent in the norms of theocentrist ideologies for which norms are nothing else than products of a divine will, can hardly be distinguished from that kind of operation in which not the theist norm, but the god itself is the medium of exclusion or exclusivity. Yet, in other respects the difference is a clear one, and therefore we will indeed differentiate normative exclusivism and 'principal exclusivism', of which supreme and nonsupreme, divine exclusivism are not the only manifestations. Since the principal being of an ideology is not necessarily a god, principal exclusivism is of a higher classificatory level than the form of exclusion or exclusivity which operates thru the belief in a divine agency. In the context of exclusivism, however, denominational principal beings are either gods (when believed to be normatively superior) or demons (when believed to be normatively inferior). But more important than this subdivision is the distinction between the supreme being believed in and all other, nonsupreme principal beings. Therefore it is supreme exclusivism which should have the honor of being distinguished first, that is, before nonsupreme divine and demonical exclusivisms. Supreme exclusivism is found in a mono- or henotheist ideology which projects (irrelevantist) exclusiveness or an exclusion onto its supreme being, or onto one of this being's images or avatars. If the supreme being or its incarnation(s) are believed to be necessarily and/or exclusively, say, men, this is a supreme manifestation of aggrandizing male exism (X.582.50.4.21). Moreover, if they are believed to be necessarily and/or exclusively male beings by males (especially the male authors of sacred scriptures), this is a case of supreme self-aggrandizing male exism (X.582.50.8.21). Since we are, in this chapter, ultimately concerned with the principle of relevance, and not with that of truth, we will not consider the question here whether the supreme being does really exist; and if so, whether it is a human or anthropomorphic being (or something different altogether); and if so, whether it is a monosexual being; and if so, whether it is a male being; and if so, whether it is a man (and if so, whether it is a father). What we are presently concerned with is, firstly, that even if it did exist, and even if it were a man, its being a man (and father and/or son) would not be relevant (saving, perhaps, when artificially inseminating virgins or mothers who have to remain immaculate). Secondly, it is in the choice of the belief in the type of being which is to receive the epithet supreme that the irrelevant distinction is made of (only) linking maleness up with supremeness. (And we are talking about supremeness, not just about something like divinity or courtesy ladyship.) This time the cladogram belonging to our classificatory survey (figure F.2.1.5.1) shows both the operational manifestations of exclusivism and the antithetical facets of inclusivity. For, unlike dimensional and componential manifestations, different operational manifestations of the same higher-level exism are usually antithetical to a different facet of inclusivity. This is so, particularly because the immediate object of exclusion or exclusivity may be different, even tho the ultimate object is not. Thus the immediate object of an infraideological exism is an ideological entity (such as a real or imaginary, principal being or norm), of an emblematic exism an emblem or similar symbol, and of a lingual exism a linguistic entity (such as a word). Not only do these objects differ from each other, they also differ from the object of the nonintermediary manifestations which are the ultimate object of the intermediary ones as well. Where the immediate objects of exclusivism are different for operational manifestations, the facets of inclusivity pertaining to them must also be different. Moreover, even the 'objects' of nonintermediary manifestations are dissimilar in a sense. However, when the object distinguished on a lower level is itself the product of an exclusivist activity, there is no facet of inclusivity to be subdivided any further. This is the case when nonsupreme principal exclusivism (operational manifestation 20) is subdivided into demonical and nonsupreme divine exclusivism (op.man. 40 & 41). Here the antithesis remains as it is: the nonsupreme principal facet of inclusivity (operational facet 20) with the supreme facet of inclusivity (op.f. 21), itself a facet of principal infraideological inclusivity (op.f. 10). 2.1.6 THE GRAVITY OF THE DISTINCTION We define god and demon as (infra)ideological, principal being conceived in violation of the norm of inclusivity. This means that a 'supreme being' is by definition a 'god' when the belief in such a supreme being is exclusivistic, but that it is not a god when such a belief does not violate the norm of inclusivity. Of course, it is questionable whether in practise the exclusivist content of theodemonical religion can be divorced from its supernaturalist content; that is, the violation of the principle of relevance from that of the principle of truth. But if not, this does not matter, since we reject the violation of either principle. It is merely for a deeper insight into the phenomenon of exclusivism (both contemporary and historical) that it it is very worthwhile to look at the belief in one or more gods and/or demons as an aspect of exclusivist ideology. Predicates which are exclusively or disproportionately attributed to the supreme being or to gods (and their heavenly abode) do, then, implicitly receive a high value, whereas predicates which are exclusively or disproportionately attributed to a devil or to demons (and their hellish realm), or to nothing at all, implicitly receive a low value. This may seem relevant when the predicate is a value-laden one like goodness itself, but it is questionable in some cases and extraordinarily wicked in too many other cases. Whether the operation is a divine one, like supreme exclusivism, or a demonical one, like devilish exclusivism is, then, irrelevant. When the theodemonist wants to debase a certain characteristic or thought, or to humiliate a certain group of people, 'e can either do this by exclusively associating it with the demonical and with divine abomination, or by exclusively associating the complement of that characteristic, thought or group of people with the divine and with what exorcizes the demonical. The direction in which the effects work is the same in both cases. It follows that demonical exclusivism is in itself no greater or lesser evil than divine exclusivism, and vice versa. We have now touched on a complicated subject, namely the gravity of the operations or manifestations of exclusivism. It is obvious that from the angle of relevance exclusivisms are equally objectionable when the number of nonrelevant distinctions and the degrees of under- or overvaluation are the same. Yet, from the point of view of personhood, for instance, murdering someone is a much more serious mode of exclusion than, for example, speaking about someone in derogatory terms. From the point of view of happiness catenality an act of discrimination which does cause suffering (or more pain than pleasure on the whole) is more serious as it causes (on balance) more suffering or a more intense suffering. And from a conceptual denominational perspective exclusivism inherent in a conception of the supreme being is the most serious of all modes of exclusion or exclusivity, and therefore rightly deserves the name supreme exclusivism in more than one sense of supreme. Evidently, the gravity of a nonrelevant distinction drawn depends on a number of considerations. Altogether it depends on the whole normative doctrine espoused. As we are still in the process of developing such a doctrine, it would be premature to say much more about the gravity of exclusivist manifestations at this place. Moreover, exclusivisms as exclusivisms (and thus discrimination as discrimination) may indeed be judged from the sole standpoint of the norm of inclusivity. It is infringements of people's personhood which should be judged from the standpoint of the right to personhood as infringements of people's personhood; and it is suffering which should be judged from the standpoint of a happiness-catenary principle as suffering. When our survey shows that the tree of life does not thrive in a morass of exclusivism, there is hardly any need for explaining that people are bound to suffer too in such an environment. 2.2 EXCLUSIVISTIC BUT NOT SUBANTHROPIC 2.2.1 SOPHISTIC 2.2.1.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- WHAT WE CAN SPEAK ABOUT What we can speak about, we can define and propose in a coherent manner. What we cannot define and propose in a coherent manner, whether it concerns factual, modal or normative conditions, we have to pass over in silence. What we do not have to pass over in silence, whether it concerns factual, modal or normative conditions, is what we can define and propose in a coherent manner, and thus what we can speak about. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A fundamental distinction of ontology is that between 'the world' and 'thoughts about this world'. In more technical terms, between propositional reality and nonpropositional reality or the ground-world. Things in the latter world, like ourselves as human beings, can have both nonpropositional predicates and thoughts, that is, things with propositional features. However, ground-world things cannot have such propositional features themselves. With regard to the phenomenon of exclusivism, this means that a nonpropositional object can be excluded or (made) exclusive on the basis of: 1. a nonpropositional predicate it has; or on the basis of 2. a thought, or system of thought, it has or is somehow related to. In the former case the exclusivism concerns only ground-facts (or ground-modes), in the latter case also facts (or modes) of thought. If the nonpropositional object is excluded or (made) exclusive on the basis of a nonpropositional predicate it has, the exclusivism is 'basic', both in the sense of being nonpropositional itself and in the sense of not being related to a thought or system of thought. If the nonpropositional object is a person who is excluded or (made) exclusive on the basis of 'er thoughts, or the body of thought 'e embraces, then the exclusivism is called "thought-related person-centered)". But because of the object concerned such an exism is still classified as "nonpropositional". If both the object and the feature on the basis of which it is excluded or (made) exclusive are propositional, we do not classify the phenomenon, because the norm of inclusivity is a ground-norm which only deals with distinctions in the ground-world. Yet, some things are differentiated in the ground-world while the factor of distinction appears to be one dealing with the nonsubstantive features of theorizing itself. This concerns, then, quite abstract things like 'reason' and 'experience'. In thought-related person-centered exclusivisms it is people who are treated differently because they do believe in a particular god, or do not believe in that god, or because they believe in the dictatorship of a particular class, or do not believe in the dictatorship of that class. Now, in what will be called "sophistic exclusivism" (X.3) here, it is nonpersonal ground-world things which are treated differently because of a nonrelevant distinction which is made with respect to a thought or system of thought as thought or system of thought (or as a mode of thinking). Thus it has not so much to do with the content of thought (for example, with what it has to say about gods and demons or social classes), but with its relations with the persons thinking. This form of exclusivism is labeled "sophistic" since it deals with the way wisdom can be attained and communicated; and this by deceptively submitting the several ways as mutually exclusive roads of which only one is the true or good one. At least three types of sophistic exclusivism should be listed: a. presentational exclusivism (X.13): this concerns the antithesis between symbolic exclusivism and literalism or 'realism' with respect to the communication of thought; b. emotion- (and reason-) related exclusivism (X.14): this concerns the antithesis between feeling and reason as guiding people's thinking and thought-related acting; and c. experience- (and reason-) related or epistemological exclusivism (X.15): this concerns the antithesis between experience and reason as sources of knowledge. The complemental manifestations of experience-related exism are experience-centered and reason-centered epistemological exism. If aggrandizemental, experience-centered exism involves, or is nothing else than, empiricism (X.15.50.2). And similarly, reason-centered exism involves, or is nothing else than, apriorism or rationalism (X.15.51.2). We have already discussed these 'sophisms' in Knowledge and faith (I.4.3.1). Granted that it is not true that experience is the sole source of knowledge, or that reason is, the belief that it is, or the desire to prove that it is, is exclusivistic. Inclusivistic is the assumption that experience and reason both are sources of knowledge, unless there is the strongest evidence to the contrary. (But what would that evidence have to be: exclusively empirical? or exclusively rational?) This is the epistemological facet of inclusivity (N.15). The complemental manifestations of emotion-related exism are emotion-centered and reason-centered emotion- (and reason-)based exism. If aggrandizemental, emotion-centered exism involves, or is nothing else than, emotionalism (X.14.50.2). This is the belief in emotions, personal feelings, private experience, natural impulses and/or primal instincts as guides for all thinking and acting, or the tendency to look at things in a purely emotive way. It also involves subjectivism as a theory which stresses the subjective elements in experience. If aggrandizemental reason-centered emotion-related exism involves, or is nothing else than, emotion-related rationalism (X.14.51.2); if abnegational, then irrationalism (X.14.51.3). Typical of irrationalists in this sense is their misology, that is, hatred of argument or reasoning. (This component is sentimental abnegational: X.14.51.7.) De facto irrationalism amounts to aggrandizemental emotion-centered exism. Both complemental manifestations of emotion-related exism are antithetical to emotion- (and reason-) related inclusivity (N.14). This facet of inclusivity emphasizes that personal feelings and impulses may be relevant when the belief or action they are to guide do only concern one's own person, whereas they are irrelevant as the sole guide in a belief or action that reaches beyond the scope of one's own person. A 'rational' or intersubjective approach is, then, required where different people have different feelings or emotions, but have to cooperate nevertheless. This is not to say that no emotion should ever be taken into account (as the exclusive rationalist might claim); it does mean, however, that no personal emotion, or addition sum of personal emotions, can ever be the sole guide in interpersonal affairs. In the question of how thought or propositional attitudes are, can or should be presented there are people who exclude or badly undervalue the meaning of symbols, or of nonverbal symbols, in interpersonal communication. They are literalists or 'realists' who exclusively trust in (what they believe to be) 'exact' language as a means of communication and who will only accept the explicit substance of something presented. Evidently, this position is not tenable, and not only because also everyday language makes abundant use of figures of speech which cannot be taken literally. And in other fields than the linguistic one it is not tenable either; at least, if it is agreed that things like national holidays, public ceremonies, flags and traffic signs are all symbols or symbolic occasions which do convey a meaning even when not one word is spoken. Whether they convey wisdom is not a question of their symbolic presentation, but of the content and foundation of the symbolism -- a different matter altogether. Literal and symbolic presentations can be, and usually are, combined. Therefore literalism or exclusivist realism (X.13.50) is a complemental manifestation. Its complement is symbolic exclusivism (X.13.51). As the name betrays, this is an exclusive or exaggerated belief in symbols as means of communication, that is, symbols other than those used in literal and exact languages. It does not take into account that symbolism is by its very nature ambiguous and can admit of widely divergent interpretations. Only in combination with a more or less literal system of communication can symbols acquire, not just a meaning, but a proper meaning. (Thus there will be no love lost between us and those who substitute symbolism for every attempt to literally present and interpret a world-view.) The facet of inclusivity in which both literal communication and symbols are treated in their own right may be called "presentational" (N.13). It is when this presentational inclusivity is applied to our own denominational doctrine that its meaning can be fully grasped. As discussed in the Book of Instruments, symbolism is an essential part of denominationalism, but so is in our case the literal presentation of what we believe in and stand for. This literal presentation is our main concern in the present book, for we shall only employ metaphors and symbols to characterize views arrived at via considerations independent of metaphorical or symbolic language. In the Book of Symbols it will become clear, however, that literalism certainly is not our exclusive concern. 2.2.2 SUPERANTHROPIC Nonsophistic exclusivisms have no bearing on propositional reality at all; or if they do, the exclusion or exclusivity concerns people who have a special relationship with certain thoughts or systems of thought. But also people are nonpropositional entities and therefore the subdivision of nonsophistic exclusivism is a subdivision of nonpropositional reality itself. That is to say, for the classification of the manifestations of exclusivism we are not going to distinguish between predicates and the things having these predicates. The object of exclusion or exclusivity is conceived of as being the same in both cases. Moreover, in this chapter we will confine ourselves to primary things having primary predicates, at least as far as nonpropositional reality is concerned. Exclusivism as a belief, attitude or practise pertains to a nonpropositional being with a mental faculty. While one particular person or personified being (the 'self' or 'ego') is the subject of the exism, its object can in principle be anything that somehow relates to the ground-world of the primary domain. A very useful way of distinguishing the kind and extent of nonsophistic exclusivism is, then, to relate it to the species the subject belongs to, or 'er body belongs to. This 'species' does not necessarily have to be the biological species (with or without the pseudobiological name Homo'sapiens in the case of human bodies or persons who have such bodies). It could theoretically be any group of three or more living or nonliving (nonpropositional) things to which the subject belongs 'imself, and of which 'e has a certain image which is of greater significance than any other similar image. (The minimum is 3, if there has to be a subspecific level between the level of the self and that of the species.) If a species is the object of exclusion or exclusivity, the manifestation concerned is a manifestation of 'specific exclusivism' or 'speciesism' (X.10). (The meaning of specific is here relating to a species.) If the object of the exism is a subclass of the species (but not the subject 'imself), it will be called "a subspecific exclusivism" (X.9). (This subspecific may or may not relate to a taxonomic subspecies.) If the object of the exism is a superclass of the species, that is, a class of which the species itself is a subclass, it will be called "a superspecific exclusivism" (X.11). For the purpose of the present chapter we have assumed that all persons are human beings (without having assumed the reverse). It therefore accords with this assumption to read "human" or "anthropic" for "specific", "subanthropic" for "subspecific" and "superanthropic" for "superspecific". The facets of inclusivity antithetical to superanthropic and anthropic exism have the same name: superanthropic inclusivity (N.10 & 11). The name of the facet antithetical to subanthropic exism is anthropic inclusivity (N.9). At least three types of manifestations of superanthropic exclusivism can be x-ed, namely spatiotemporal, biotic and mental ones. Mental superanthropic exclusivism (X.47) is exism re the superanthropic class of conscious beings, or re the mental or 'the mind' in a superspecific sense. It is merely mentioned here because of its existential aggrandizemental operation which involves, or is nothing else than, superspecific (epistemological) idealism (X.47.02.13). This is the belief that the nature of reality would exclusively lie in (a superspecific type of) consciousness. Idealism may also be of an anthropic or lower order. The 'opposite' of idealism, materialism, which teaches that reality is exclusively spatiotemporal, concrete or material, may be conceived of as existential aggrandizemental spatiotemporal exclusivism (X.45.02.13). Spatiotemporal exclusivism(X.45) is exism re a superanthropic class of spatiotemporal or concrete beings. The unitary manifestation of spatiotemporal exclusivism does not only comprise materialism as the antithesis of idealism, but also an exclusive or disproportionate attention for, or preoccupation with, material things and relations. A historically important manifestation of compositional spatiotemporal exism is geocentrism or aggrandizemental Earth-centered exclusivism (X.11705.02). Geocentrism takes Earth, that is, the planet inhabited by the human species, as the exclusive center of perspective and valuation. Thus geocentrists even used to believe (or religious inquisitors forced them to 'believe') that the Sun would revolve around the Earth, while the Earth would be at rest. A principal operation of geocentrism is the belief that one or more gods and/or demons or its/their incarnation(s) can only be found on Earth or in the atmosphere enveloping it, and nowhere else in the universe. But principal Earth-centered exism can be abnegational too, for example, when it is professed that the supreme being is a god that can (usually) not be found on Earth, or in the atmosphere enveloping it, but that dwells in a 'heaven' far above and away from this earth. Heliocentrism is aggrandizemental Sun-centered exclusivism (X.2927.02) and also a manifestation of spatiotemporal superanthropic exism. In heliocentrism the Sun is an exclusive center of perspective, because it is taken as the center of the whole universe, for instance, or of another system extending beyond the superanthropic Solar System. The belief in a sun-god, which is or has been part of various religions, is a form of supreme (or perhaps, nonsupreme divine) heliocentrism. In addition to mental and spatiotemporal superspeciesism biotic exclusivism (X.46) has been mentioned as a type of superanthropic exclusivism. This is exism re a superanthropic class of living beings, or re life itself, that is, life versus nonlife, or the biotic versus the nonbiotic. When life itself is the object of exclusion or exclusivity, the class of living beings is universal, and the biotic exism unitary instead of compositional. If aggrandizemental, this life-centered exclusivism (X.46.02) is a form of exclusivism in which life in itself is conceived of and/or treated as superior to nonlife. Living beings would thus merely as living beings have a higher, ultimate value than nonliving beings; or nonliving beings would, unlike living beings, have no (intrinsic) value at all. The facet of inclusivity antithetical to this manifestation of superanthropic exclusivism is 'suprabiotic' or 'life-transcending inclusivity" (N.46). Our suprabiotic, supranthropic inclusivism entails that we shall not embrace any separate, independent 'principle of life' with 'life' as an ultimate value. What the implications of this position are, and what they are not, will be discussed in the chapter Life and Nonlife. A narrower version of superspeciesism than life-centered exism is animal-centered exclusivism (X.93.0); animalism is a manifestation of it. As a cognition animalism is the belief that a god or demon must necessarily have, and does exclusively have, animal (including human) characteristics, altho they may gradually exceed normal, natural power, size and/or intensity. Moreover, one god or demon may combine the characteristics of different human and nonhuman species. However, if every god is portrayed as a human-like being and every demon as a (partially) nonhuman animal being, for instance, then this is not superspeciesism but a manifestation of self-aggrandizemental speciesism. 2.2.3 ANTHROPIC AND EGO-RELATED From the superspecific (or superanthropic), to the specific (anthropic), to the subspecific (subanthropic), the circle enclosing the collection of things which are the object of exclusion or exclusivity becomes narrower and narrower. It is narrowest when object and subject coincide, that is, when the person 'imself, or 'er body, is the center of exclusion or exclusivity. Because it is one particular person we are then talking about that is contrasted with other persons and (the rest of) the world, we shall label it "the self" or "ego". All manifestations of exclusivism related to this ego are, then, forms of 'ego-related exclusivism' (X.8). Together with superanthropic (X.11), anthropic (X.10) and subanthropic (X.9) exism, human ego-related exism (X.8) is part of a tetratomic subdivision of nonsophistic exclusivisms (X.2). When ego-related exism is unitary (X.8.0), it is 'ego-centered', for the ego then functions as one whole on which the irrelevantism is centered; when it is compositional (X.8.1), it is 'ego-based', for the exism then only centers on a part or aspect of one's own person. Egoism and egocentrism denote an aggrandizemental component of ego-centered (or -based) exism. But ego-centered exism, as the name of an irrelevantism, refers to the object which is the ego, or a factor which distinguishes between what belongs to the ego and what does not belong to it. Ego-centered exism may therefore not only denote an over- but also an undervaluation of the self. The latter, abnegational, form of ego-centered exism involves altruism as an exclusive regard for, or dedication to, the interests of others (X.8.03). It is not that a person takes the interests of others into account which is altruistic, since this is simply a form of self-transcending inclusivity (N.8.0); it is that 'e totally neglects 'er own personal interests in order to serve the purely personal interests of others (especially when looked on over a longer period of time). A special operational manifestation of egocentrism (the aggrandizemental component) is normative egocentrism (X.8.02.22) or what philosophers have called "ethical egoism". The sole, ultimate norm of this doctrine is that a person should do what promotes 'er own greatest good. Even in making second- and third-person moral judgments, a normative egocentrist goes by what is to 'er own advantage. 'E may be unselfish, friendly and social-minded in practise; but if so, then either because 'e does not act on 'er own principle, or because 'e believes that such behavior will be to 'er own advantage in the long run. By describing normative egocentrism in this way, the ego-distinction is made in the content of the norm, but it can also be made in the application of a norm or rule. This may, for example, be the case in normative abnegational ego-centered exism when a norm or rule which is not ego-related in itself is exclusively applied, or believed to apply, to others. Both ego-based and anthropic exclusivism can be subdivided into a physical and a nonphysical variant, while the nonphysical (or 'mental') variants of both of them have cognitive, affective and conative manifestations. Physical ego-based exclusivism (X.16) may be further subdivided into bodily ego-based exclusivism (X.32), when it concerns a person's own body in the strict sense, and nonbodily ego-based exclusivism (X.33), when it concerns 'er personal, material possessions other than 'er own body. A sentimental (self-)aggrandizemental component of bodily egoism is narcissism: the preoccupation with, or exclusive love of, one's own body (X.32.05). A similar component of nonbodily physical egoism is the preoccupation with, or exclusive attention for, one's own external, material possessions. Both these components are forms of, what might be called, 'possessive egoism'. (However, in everyday usage, possession often refers to external possessions, and is not meant to apply to one's body or its parts.) If aggrandizemental, physical anthropic exclusivism (X.20) involves anthropomorphism. The divine operational manifestation of this form of speciesism is anthropomorphic homotheism (X.20.05.10). As a cognition this is the belief that the supreme being (if monotheistic) or the gods (if polytheistic) necessarily and exclusively have human physical characteristics, such as corresponding to the parts of the human body and such as determining its/their power, possibly only gradually exceeding what is normal for earthly human beings. This divine belief is an anthropic extension of narcissism: human homotheists who thus create the supreme being or gods in their own image have the divinity of mere being. (It is a piteous sight indeed to see homotheist man pine away for love of the god upon whom he so piously reflects while looking at him in the water.) Homotheism need not only be anthropomorphic tho; usually it is nonphysical as well, for example, anthropopathic. That is, homotheists also tend to believe in a supreme being or gods that necessarily and exclusively have human feelings, such as a personal will, cultural feelings of love and hatred, and a susceptibility to honor and dishonor, possibly --again-- only gradually exceeding an intensity which is normal for earthly humans. Anthropopathism in general is affective (nonphysical) anthropic exclusivism (X.336), but homotheism is often of the cognitive nonphysical sort too. As a cognition, supreme cognitive homotheism, for instance, is the belief that the supreme being or other gods necessarily and exclusively have human and possibly superhuman knowledge and cognitions. In an extreme fashion it is the belief that the supreme being would be, and must be, an omniscient being, as or with a (super)human sort of mind. This 'immaculate' ideological conception does definitely not allow for a supreme being that would not know more than the average human being, let alone a supreme being that would not 'even' have a (super)human sort of mind. All principal and nonprincipal, physical and nonphysical, types of aggrandizemental anthropic exclusivism may be called "anthropocentrism" (X.10.02). There is no special name for abnegational anthropic exism in general, but there is one for sentimental abnegational anthropic exism, namely misanthropy (X.10.07). Its opposite is speciesist philanthropy (X.10.05) when the subject is not interested in, or shows no concern for, the well-being of nonhuman, mental or sentient beings as well. Also humanism is speciesistic, and another form of anthropocentrism, if, and to the extent that, it asserts the dignity and capacities of human beings in contrast to (nontheodemonical) nonhuman beings. (But historically it is rather contrasted with homotheist theocentrism.) A comprehensive ideology is anthropocentristic in a normative sense --perhaps not in an ethical sense-- if , and to the extent that, its norms or ideals are exclusively applicable to humans or humankind. In general, normative anthropocentrism is expressed in the confinement of theodemonist or nontheodemonist ideological norms or ideal states of being to the human and/or anthropopathic condition; that is, to the situation in which human beings and/or personified beings with human thoughts, feelings and tendencies happen to find themselves. When nonphysical anthropic exism is regarded as a unitary manifestation, it may be called "mind-centered anthropic exclusivism" (X.21.0), or "mind-centered anthropocentrism", if aggrandizemental (X.21.02). An interesting operational manifestation of the latter exism is the existential one (X.21.02.13), which involves, or is nothing else than, anthropocentric (epistemological) idealism or personalism. As a cognition it is the belief that only humans (and possibly one or more anthropocentrically conceived personified beings) have a mind (or mental predicates), and that these human (or anthropocentrist) minds or personalities constitute the only reality. Its antithesis, existential mind-transcending supranthropic inclusivity (N.21.0013), involves perceptual or epistemological 'realism' or 'objectivism'. As suggested above, there are not only superanthropic and anthropic strains of idealism; there is also an egoistic strain. It is the existential manifestation of aggrandizemental mind-centered ego-based exclusivism. As a cognition this is the belief that one's own mind would constitute the sole reality. Another name for it is solipsism. The only consistent form of ideal( exclusiv)ism might be nontemporal solipsism, namely the belief that one's own 'mind' in its present (but not in its past or future) modification would be the sole reality. Perhaps this belief is not exclusivistic in itself; it would only drain the word reality of all meaning. And not only that: reality could never have acquired a meaning to start with. There are several ego-related terms in the present language which sometimes are employed as synonyms, sometimes not, namely egocentrism, egoism and egotism. Of these three terms it is egotism which is also used in the special sense of talking about oneself too much, or of excessively using the singular first person pronoun. This 'egotism' is a lingual operation of sentimental self-aggrandizemental exclusivism. It does not only involve an exceedingly frequent use of the singular first person pronoun, but also the capitalized use of only this pronoun in the traditional written variant of the present language (with I instead of i). 'Egotism', 'egocentrism' and 'egoism' are all frowned upon by most people. That is to say, many people may not frown upon what is egotism, egocentrism or egoism, but they frown upon what they call "egotism", "egocentrism" or "egoism". The employment of any of these terms presupposes that the distinction a person draws between 'imself and others, or everything else, is not relevant. When it is relevant, or rather believed to be relevant, in regard of a goal believed to be legitimate, no-one will be blamed for being an egoist. This shows but too clearly that egoism is nothing else than one of the innumerable manifestations of exclusivism. 2.3 PHYSICAL SUBANTHROPIC 2.3.1 RELATIVE TOTAL Like anthropic and ego-based exclusivism, also subanthropic exclusivism can be subdivided into a physical and a nonphysical variant, that is, into physical subanthropic exclusivism (X.18) and nonphysical subanthropic exclusivism (X.19). Physical is, then, used in the sense of of or relating to the body and contrasted with the essentially personal or mental. The nonphysical should also be understood as comprising everything that is a product of 'the human mind', that is, the cultural. The distinction between what is purely physical and what is mental or nonphysical is, perhaps, rather vague, but if so, we can live with this vagueness, since the subdivision between the physical and the nonphysical will not leave any irrelevantism out. Should an irrelevantism not be caught on one side of the divide, it will be caught on the other. This, in general, is the great asset of dichotomous classifications. Given that the body is somehow the object of physical subanthropic exism, it may be that the body as a whole is the object, or a part of it, such as the hands or the sexual organs. If the whole body is the object, we shall speak of "total physical subanthropic" (X.37), and if only part of it is the object, of "partial physical subanthropic exclusivism" (X.72). Thus, we will classify racism as a form of total physical exism, and sexism as a form of partial physical exism. For someone arguing that a human being's whole body is that of a woman or that of a man, too, just like a human being's whole body does or does not belong to that of a particular race, this may seem odd. Yet, it is ultimately the sexual organs a human being has (or used to have) which in the case of sexism determine whether this being is a male or a female. And a human being does not have racial organs like it has sexual organs, or organs with a racial function like it has organs which serve for secretion. Everybody has a skin-color, to be sure, but this is a (part-)predicate, not a part of the body. But altho the distinction between total and partial can reasonably be made, there are forms of physical subanthropic exism which can be either partial or total. They will be called here "partial total physical sub- subanthropic exclusivism" (X.73) and will be discussed in section 2.3.3 of this division. In total physical exism it is the whole body which is the object of exclusion or exclusivity, or a characteristic of the whole body, rather than of a particular part of it, or particular parts of it. The characteristic in question, however, can be or resemble that of a one-place predicate, or be relational. In the former case we will label the total physical exism "absolute", in the latter case "relative". Relative total physical subanthropic exclusivism (X.75) concerns a physical relationship of a whole human being with other human beings, or with nonhuman beings. Three types of this form of exclusivism will be briefly considered here: 'parental', 'household-based' and 'residential exclusivism'. Parental exclusivism(X.300) is exism re parenthood or childlessness. The object may be parenthood or childlessness in a 'biological', that is, generative, sense, or in a 'social' sense comprising adopted children and parents as well. (Adoption must, then, not be understood in a purely formal sense: such adoption is 'cultural', that is, 'nonphysical'.) The disjunctive manifestations of both generative and adoptive parental exclusivism (X.600 & 601) are parenthood-centered and childlessness- centered exclusivism (if generative: X.600.14 & 15). A few manifestations of generative parenthood-centered exclusivism are: a. the order to produce offspring by someone who does not have children of 'er --historically, 'his'-- own (this is an external aggrandizing component); b. the obsession or sentimental preoccupation with 'biological' parenthood by someone who cannot have a child of her or his own (sentimental external aggrandizemental); and c. hatred, uneasiness or ignorance with respect to (generative) parenthood by someone who has no children 'imself (sentimental external abnegational). Manifestations of generative childlessness-centered exclusivism are: a. discomfort or abnegational self-consciousness with respect to one's (generative) childlessness, for example, when not able to produce any offspring (sentimental self-abnegational); and b. condemnation of (generative) childlessness, for example, when the person condemned has chosen not to have any children, by someone who has children of 'er own (external abnegating). Household-based exclusivism (X.301) is exism re the type of household (a) human being(s) constitute or belong to. If the categorization of a household is based on the number of people in such a household, the exclusivism is of the quantitative type. Dimensional manifestations of quantitative household-based exclusivism (X.603) are, for example, single, dual and plural household-centered exism. A 'single household' is the household of a person living on 'er own. A 'dual household' is, for example, the household of a couple living together without children or other human beings. A plural household may be called "a family" so long as its members need not be consanguineous or married to each other. Preferential treatment of, or exclusive orientation towards families with one mother, one father and one or more children, and discrimination or neglect of singles and couples without children, are de facto forms of aggrandizemental nondual plural household-centered exclusivism (X.603.21.2). Discrimination or neglect of families with (two parents and) one or more children, and preferential treatment of, or exclusive orientation towards, singles and/or couples without children, are de facto abnegational components of the same dimensional exism (X.603.21.3). Residential exclusivism (X.302) is exism re the fixedness of the relationship between a person's or group's residence and the land. The first disjunctive of this attitude or practise concerns nomads and caravan- or boat-dwellers, that is, people without a fixed residence who maintain a migratory way of life by traveling from place to place; the second disjunctive concerns house-dwellers or members of a settled community. Abnegational discrimination of, and a lack of respect for, people without a fixed residence by house-dwellers amounts to self-aggrandizing house-dwelling-centered exclusivism (X.302.15.8). 2.3.2 ABSOLUTE TOTAL The type of subanthropic exism in which a human body as a whole is referred to without having to simultaneously refer to other human beings or things as well, is absolute total physical subanthropic exclusivism (X.74). At least two manifestations of this type of exclusivism deserve our attention here, namely 'etatic' and racial, or other forms of generative, exism. Etatic is the word we shall use for age-related; it derives from aetas and indicates age in the sense of the number of years a human or other sentient being has lived. (When etatism is employed as short for etatic exclusivism it should not be mistaken for the differently pronounced homograph traditionally denoting a doctrine which advocates state intervention in either a large or too large a number of fields.) If the object of age-related exism is the factor age itself, then it is age-centered exclusivism (X.297.0); if it is an age group, then age-based exclusivism or agism (X.297.1). An example of abnegational age-centered exism is the attitude of vehemently condemning racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination or exclusivism, while participating or tacitly acquiescing in all sorts of agism. Both age-centered and age-based exism are unitary, but the former is interfactorial, and the latter infrafactorial. As already discussed in section 2.1.3, the dimensional manifestations which can be distinguished for a tetratomic subdivision of age-based exism are juvenile (X.297.19), adult young-age(-centered) (X.297.37), middle-age(-centered) (X.297.72) and old-age(-centered) exclusivism (X.297.73). A few components of these nondichotomous manifestations are: a. discrimination of juveniles, often called "minors", by adults, for example, with regard to human rights, their chances, access or acceptance (X.297.19.13); b. discrimination of juveniles and middle- and old-age people by young adults (X.297.37.8); c. preoccupation with youth, possibly leading to exclusive behavior, such as excessive artificial attempts to look or stay young (X.297.37.11); d. fear or distrust of, uneasiness with, or alienation from, young (adult) people and their thoughts and way of life, particularly by older adults (X.297.37.15); e. discrimination of children and adults under a certain age, considered (too) young, and other adults over a certain age, considered (too) old by adults who are, or would be, neither (too) young nor (too) old themselves (X.297.72.8); f. sentimental preoccupation with old age, or exclusive respect for old-age people by young and middle-age people who aggrandize old age in certain or in all respects (X.297.73.11); and g. fear or distrust of, uneasiness with, or alienation from, the elderly and their thoughts and way of life (X.297.73.15). The exclusion or discrimination of children and young and middle-age adults by elderly people (X.297.73.8) involves the institution of gerontocracy. The relegation of the elderly to old-age homes or 'total institutions' is a form of old-age exclusionism (X.297.73.13). Generative absolute total physical subanthropic exclusivism (X.149) is the exclusion or exclusivity of a whole human body on the basis of subanthropic physical characteristics relating to biological generation. In the broadest sense these characteristics are racial, in the narrowest sense familial. Thus we shall distinguish racial exclusivism, generative familial exclusivism and one variant in between, namely generative ethnical exclusivism. Generative is added because familial and ethnical irrelevantism can also be cultural, that is, nonphysical. Racial exclusivism or racialism (X.597) is exism re one or more, but not all subspecies of humans distinguished by, among other things, a particular color, that is, pigmentation of their skin, and possibly the application of this exism to anthropically conceived beings. (Some antiracists have claimed for nonontological reasons that human 'races' would not exist at all, but this preposterous existential abnegational racialism is due to their inability to differentiate the truth- and the relevancy-conditional. Rejecting the distinctions made by racists they feel forced to contend that it is not true that these distinctions would exist, because they cannot comprehend what it means that they would not be relevant, whether truly drawn or not.) Generative ethnical exclusivism (X.596) is exism re one or more, but not all, ethnic communities belonging to one of humankind's races, and possibly the application of this exism to anthropically conceived beings. Generative familial exclusivism (X.299) is exism re consanguineous members of a human family or group of families smaller than an ethnic community, such as a caste. We shall now first examine some of the componential and operational manifestations of racialism. Like etatic exclusivism also racialism can be manifested in an inter- and in an infrafactorial way. Aggrandizemental race-centered exclusivism, for instance, is among other things an exclusive or disproportionate attention for race-discrimination in comparison with other forms of discrimination. (Thus it has been pointed out by others before that an overemphasis upon race as a factor of distinction will be counterproductive when trying to combat racism.) It also refers to a practise or policy of making irrelevant, racial distinctions without considering or treating one race, or group of races as superior or inferior to the other. This is what (racial) apartheid in the literal sense is supposed to stand for, and which not only has been, or still is, advocated by a privileged racial minority, but elsewhere also by racial minorities which used to be, or still are, the victims of racism themselves. This type of interfactorial racialists all hold that people should go to, and have, their own 'homeland' (or at least their own schools and clubs) on the basis of the race they belong to. In theory none of them need advocate or support any form of infrafactorial racialism as well (as their separate but equal slogan may suggest), but in practise both manifestations of racialism usually or always go together. Infrafactorial racialism is race-based exclusivism or racism and the aggrandizemental component of this exism is, as a cognition, the belief that a certain race or group of races would be superior. If sentimental, it is the preference for one or more characteristics of that race or group of races per se, leading to exclusive behavior or preoccupation with those characteristics. (Some theorists have argued that the wrongness of racism does not lie in the irrelevance or arbitrariness of the racial distinction made, but in practises like slavery and other forms of oppression. These theorists, however, confuse racism as racism with violations of personhood in particular: slavery and oppression are wrong even where and when no racial distinction is made at all.) Active abnegational racialism is the exclusion of members of another race or of other races (than considered superior) from equal treatment and from equality in general. A most vicious example of this abnegating exclusivism is the policy of racial 'apartheid' as actually implemented and according to which even rights of personhood are violated because of people's skin-color (and because of their opposition to that policy itself). If sentimental, abnegational race-based exism is uneasiness, possibly fear, alienation or ignorance with respect to members or characteristics of a race or group of races believed or felt to be inferior. As a cognition, supreme aggrandizemental race-based exism is the belief that the supreme being and/or its earthly incarnation(s) or last prophet can/do exclusively belong to, or has an exclusive or special relationship with, one particular race: the so-called 'chosen race'. It is also the custom of depicting the supreme being and/or its divine avatar(s) or prophet(s) as having the skin-color or other characteristic of one particular race. A closely related form of principal racialism is demonical abnegational race-based exism. This involves the custom of depicting the devil or demons, and possibly its/their demonical incarnation(s), as having the color or other characteristic of one particular race or group of races. Ethnical exclusivism is ethnocentrism when aggrandizemental (X.596.02). The manifestations of generative ethnocentrism and abnegational ethnical exclusivism in general follow a pattern analogous to that of aggrandizemental and abnegational racialism. A difference may be that it has never been attempted (or been possible) to exterminate a whole race, while it has been attempted to exterminate whole ethnic communities of millions of people. Such genocides or attempts at genocide are acts of ethnical exclusionism which almost defy every description of their gruesomeness. Yet, when people are killed by the same enemy in, for example, the same concentration camp either for their belonging to a particular ethnic or national group or for their belonging to a certain ideological or nonideological minority, one shall not add to this gruesomeness by exclusively mentioning, or showing compassion for, the members of one group and by thus completely ignoring all others who had to go thru the same ordeal, sometimes better, sometimes worse. It is very sad, indeed, when even the descriptions of mass murders suffer from ethnical exclusivism, whether infra- or interfactorial, whether abnegational or aggrandizemental. It is even sadder when political and military opponents of the mass murderers later turn out to display some of the very same discriminatory and authoritarian attitudes themselves. (To argue that 'only' 49%, or some smaller percentage, of the people killed belonged to other groups, is an unsavory majoritarian kind of reasoning which nourishes the exclusionist neglect of, and feelings of hatred towards, minorities in the first place.) An external sentimental abnegational component of infrafactorial ethnical exclusivism is xenophobia. This operation is, like physical forms of exclusion, affirmative, that is, nonintermediary. It is often combined with lingual abnegational ethnical exclusivism, an intermediary operation which involves the use of pejoratives to denote the members of a certain people or ethnic group. Another intermediary operation of ethnical exclusivism is supreme ethnocentrism. This is the belief that the supreme being and/or its earthly incarnation(s) or last prophet can, or does, exclusively belong to, or has an exclusive or special relationship with, one particular people: the 'chosen people'. It is also the doctrine that all members of one particular ethnic group would be guilty of the murder of the supreme being's sole incarnation, a doctrine for which certain sacred books are a fertile soil, and which has been religiously employed to 'justify' all sorts of abominations. The history of humankind proves that affirmative, exemplary and intermediary forms of ethnocentrism always tend to go together with abnegational ethnical exism, if not in the same person with respect to different ethnic groups, then in different persons with respect to the same ethnic group. Thus, it is probable that those who consider themselves members of a chosen or superior people, or who adhere to an ideology claiming or implying that they do belong to such a people, shall once be chosen as the victims of the abnegational component of the same exclusivism. The demise of abnegational ethnical exclusivism and racialism can only be brought about when not anyone of whatever people or race does suggest anymore that 'er people or race would be superior. So long as some people believe in their ethnic superiority or in a 'more equal' relationship with the supreme being, its incarnation(s) or its 'last' prophet on the basis of their ethnicity, there will be no ethnical inclusivity. A recrudescence of the most monstrous kinds of ethnocentrism and other forms of generative subanthropic exclusivism (to say nothing of religionism and nationalism) must then always be feared for. What applies to racial and ethnical exclusivism applies in principle equally to familial exclusivism and therefore we can be relatively short about this integral manifestation. For discrimination on the basis of caste (which will return under class-based exclusivism) there is no special name in this language, but there is one for 'nepotism', a form of familial exism. Nepotism is discrimination against nonrelatives, or favoritism shown to a relative on the basis of family relationship. If physical and generative (that is, if the relationship is a consanguineous one), nepotism is self-aggrandizing generative familial exclusivism (X.299.08). The familial exclusivist need not favor 'er own family tho, 'e may also favor, and assign an exclusive status to, another family, especially one particular family in 'er community or country. Such external aggrandizing generative familial exclusivism (X.299.09) is an indispensable ingredient of monarchism if adhered to by people who are not members of the 'chosen family' themselves. Whether internal or external, aggrandizemental familial exclusivism differs only from aggrandizemental racialism and ethnocentrism in being the narrowest aggrandizemental type of generative subanthropic exclusivism. So long as this narrowest type continues to exist, no subject can expect the broader types to disappear. 2.3.3 PARTIAL-TOTAL Under the heading of partial-total physical subanthropic exclusivism (X.73) we shall list two types of attitude or practise. (This listing is 'open' in that it is not suggested that there would not be more than two of them.) They are physical ability- and physical appearance-related exclusivism. Both of them may be 'total' in that they refer to the ability or appearance of the whole body , or 'partial' in that they refer to the ability or appearance of parts of the body. Physical ability related subanthropic exclusivism (X.292) is exism re the physical ability of (a) human being(s), or re the able-bodied versus the disabled (or 'handicapped'). Physical appearance-related subanthropic exclusivism (X.293) is exism re the bodily qualities of (a) human or anthropomorphically conceived being(s) which make it/them appear more or less pleasant or unpleasant. The disjunctive manifestations of ability-related exism are ability-centered and disability-centered exism. Self-aggrandizing physical ability-centered exclusivism (X.292.14.8) is discrimination of physically disabled people by (physically) healthy people. This may express itself in the relegation of the disabled to special or exclusive cells of the human environment. Altho people may be obsessed or sentimentally preoccupied with their physical health, the preference and care for physical health as such is not exclusivistic, if, and insofar as, this health is of practical significance and relevant to their legitimate goal(s). Shame or abnegational self-consciousness with regard to one's own physical disability (or 'handicap') is a sentimental manifestation of self-abnegational physical disability-centered exclusivism (X.292.15.14). The external variant of this manifestation is fear of, uneasiness with, or alienation from (physically) disabled people; or fear or ignorance with regard to a physical disability by people who are healthy themselves in this respect. The disjunctive manifestations of appearance-related exism are beauty-centered and ugliness-centered-exclusivism. Aggrandizing beauty-centered exclusivism (X.293.14.4) is preferential treatment of, or favoritism towards, good-looking people, particularly in a context which is not purely personal or erotic. Sentimental aggrandizemental beauty-centered exism is a preoccupation with physical beauty and sentimental self-abnegational ugliness-centered exism involves shame of, or discomfort with, one's own ugliness. An intermediary form of abnegational ugliness-centered exclusivism is the ancient custom of depicting a devil or demon, or an earthly incarnation of it, (exclusively) as an ugly, partially or entirely anthropomorphic or human being. Perhaps, this demonical operation should be classified under absolute total physical subanthropic exism together with the divine and demonical operations of racial and ethnical exclusivism. 2.3.4 PARTIAL: LATERALITY-BASED We shall only discuss one form of partial physical subanthropic exclusivism here which does not relate to questions of sexuality, discharge of bodily waste matter and nudity, namely physical laterality-based exclusivism (X.289). The object of this exism is the habitual use of only one or both sides of the body. (Not only is it 'partial' because a 'side' is merely a 'part' of the body, but also because it always concerns certain parts of the body like somebody's hands.) Altho physical laterality certainly does not only concern the habitual use of one's hands, we shall confine our attention here to this integral manifestation. But also hands can be used in different ways for different activities, and we shall also confine handedness-based exclusivism (X.578) to writing-related handedness-based exclusivism (X.1157). (Altho 'natural' sociobiologists may object that our hands were never supposed or intended to be used to write with, this is irrelevant.) Writing-related handedness-based exclusivism is exism re the habitual use of only one or both hands when writing or drawing. The lateral manifestations of this unitary irrelevantism can serve as good examples for other unitary manifestations, both physical laterality-based and other ones. These manifestations are (with their binary-decimal numbers): * unilateral (12): single-handedness-related (exism re the habitual use of only one hand, as opposed to ambidexterity); * bilateral (13): double-handedness- or ambidexterity-centered (exism re the habitual use of both hands); * supercomplemental (24): single-handedness-centered (exism re the single-handedness of human or humanlike beings, whether left-or right-handed); * complemental (25): complemental (single-)handedness-based (exism re the left- or right-handedness of human or anthropomorphically conceived beings); * first complemental (50): left-handedness-centered or manual sinistral (exism re the habitual or much easier use of the left hand); and * second complemental (51): right-handedness-centered or manual dextral (exism re the habitual or much easier use of the right hand). Componential manifestations of (writing-related) handedness-based exism are: a. abnegational exism re ambidextrous people or manual ambidexterity; b. aggrandizemental exism re right-handed people or manual dexterity; and c. abnegational exism re left-handed people or the use of the left hand. A lingual operation of ambidexterity-centered exism is the infiltration of the abnegational component into the language, for example, thru the pejorative use of words like double-handed and ambidextrous. A similar manifestation of manual sinistral exism involves the abnegational use of the words left(-handed), sinister and gauche. An evaluative opposite of these lingual operations is the infiltration of aggrandizemental (writing-related) manual dextral exism into the language. Examples are the aggrandizemental connotation of the words right(-handed) and dextrous or dexterity. As we have seen so many times before, a god is a perfect instrument for exclusivity and a demon for exclusion. It need therefore not surprise us when theodemonists believe, or once believed, that 'the devil' would be left-handed. 2.3.5 SEXUAL BUT NOT EROTIC 2.3.5.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE EXCLUSIVE POEM OF THE ONLY MALE GOD (There is a compositional manifestation of human exclusivism, of subanthropic exclusivism, of physical subanthropic exclusivism. There is a unitary manifestation of sexual exclusivism. There is a dimensional manifestation of gender-based exclusivism, of unilateral gender-based exclusivism, of complemental gender-based exclusivism. There is a componential manifestation of male exclusivism, of aggrandizemental male exclusivism, of aggrandizing male exclusivism.)* There is an operational manifestation (of self-aggrandizing male exclusivism, of intermediary self-aggrandizing male exclusivism, of ideological self-aggrandizing male exclusivism,)* of (principal)* self-aggrandizing male exclusivism. It is supreme self-aggrandizing male exclusivism. It is the image created by men of a male supreme being: the man-god, where there is no authoress, where there is no goddess. It is the male incarnation of the supreme being: the son-god, where there is no daughter, where there is no mother. It is the divine inspiration of a male superior being: the last prophet, where there is no prophetess, where there is no priestess. 'He' is the King, for the King is 'He': Son and Father, Creature and Author, Symbol and Man above all, symbol of self-aggrandizing male exclusivism, (symbol of male exclusivism, symbol of gender-based exclusivism, symbol of sexual exclusivism, symbol of physical subanthropic exclusivism, symbol of subanthropic exclusivism,)* symbol of exclusivism. It is when men and boys exclude, are excluded or exclusive, it is when women and girls exclude, are excluded or exclusive, it is when the supreme being is conceived of as a male god, it is when the supreme being is conceived of as a female god, that there is no gender-neutral inclusiveness, (that there is no sexual inclusiveness, that there is no physical anthropic inclusiveness, that there is no anthropic inclusiveness,)* that there is no inclusiveness. [*: lines between parentheses and the word principal may be deleted altogether, but not separately] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- All forms of partial physical subanthropic exclusivism somehow related to the sexual and/or excremental functions or parts of the human body can be labeled "sexual-excremental" (X.145). Sexual-excremental matters are a, or the main, concern of traditional exclusivist morality, both bourgeois and antibourgeois. Many pages in sacred books and codes of law have been, or still are, spent on relating unto the religious believer or the proletarian citizen whose urinogenital organs 'he' is allowed to see or touch, or rather not to see or touch, and in which place he is allowed to eject his semen, or rather not to eject it. Religious believers who find the present classification of exclusivisms sometimes rather detailed or too explicit, particularly in matters of sexuality, discharge of bodily waste matter and nudity, can simply be advised to read the relevant sections of their own books. On the other hand, they should, perhaps, not be advised to do that, for it might only confirm them in their opinion that it would be normal that moral notions like decent and indecent do not so much refer to the selling of one's conscience but to the selling of one's body; and do not so much refer to discussing the erection of nuclear missiles or other weapons for killing people, but to discussing the erection of a penis or ('even worse') a clitoris. Sexual-excremental matters are also the concern, or a main concern, of sociobiology or sociobiological philosophers, and when we call a spade "a spade", we do in this respect nothing else than what sociobiologists do who write about the same things. However, contrary to the position taken here, a certain species of sociobiologically inspired animal beings try to 'warrant' ideological presuppositions by means of biological-materialist analyses and biased speculations. While explaining to people what the penis and vagina were (and still are) 'intended' for, the same kind of sociobiologist is not so honest to draw the conclusion that in that case their hands were never made to hold banknotes; or that their lips were never made to say prayers; or that their lungs were never made to inhale smoke. No such member of the sociobiological species will ever argue with the same fervor that the human body was not supposed to be used for killing other human bodies, or for building weapons aimed at the wholesale destruction of life on Earth. Exclusionist sociobiologists have willingly promoted racist, antifeminist, antihomosexualist and similar causes by drawing normative conclusions from the descriptions of mere correlations (if not of their own speculations) and from the utilitarian use or misuse of the concept of function and the value of happiness. The ideology of these exclusivists is nothing else than a doctrine of naturalness in a more modern, 'scientific' guise. This is very obvious when it is argued that 'nature is interested in making its creatures like what is good for them' and when this is used as a premise to 'prove' that certain groups of people should not do what they like. It follows from the nature of sexuality that sexual exclusivism or sexualism (X.291) probably has the largest number of possible subdivisions of all forms of partial physical subanthropic irrelevantism. It follows from the overemphasis upon sexual affairs that interfactorial sexual exclusivism is an important unitary manifestation of it. It is exism re the sexual qualities, that is, gender and/or sexuality, as distinct from the nonsexual qualities of human or anthropically conceived beings. Its antithesis is suprasexual (anthropic) inclusivity (N.291.1). The most marked sexual qualities are those of having male or female, sexual organs and all the characteristics that usually go with it. The fact that a person's body has male or female parts and predicates is a very easy object of social categorization. Sex- or gender-related exclusivism (X.582) therefore probably is, or has been, one of the most widespread and thoroughgoing irrelevantisms of (male and female) human history. Yet, it is not necessarily the case that one of both genders would always have had to 'suffer from' sex-discrimination, whereas the other would always have been better off because of this exclusivist attitude and practise. That a nonrelevant distinction is made between female and male, human beings by no means implies in itself that the total situation of the one gender is ameliorated, and that of the other deteriorated. Or, it may be that the situation of one gender is better in times of peace but worse in times of war. Moreover, what is 'worse' and what is called "suffering" may depend on an individual's or group's peculiar wants and interests. In this context worse and suffering are often used as purely happiness-catenary terms. The occurrence of 'suffering' or 'bad' situations in these terms is not what concerns discrimination as discrimination tho. Theoretically it could be that a community that discriminates on the basis of gender is a happier one on the whole than one which does not. This is precisely a reason why we are forced to reject utilitarianism (and sociobiological doctrines which rest on it). Those who reject it with us should therefore not continue to speak about sex-discrimination as if it were by definition a form of injustice in which one party must endure pain and distress, while the other would only benefit from it. A gender distinction is relevant or not, regardless of anyone 'suffering' or benefiting from it, unless perhaps, happiness or utility is the sole value embraced. (Note that when we speak ourselves of "something or someone suffering from sexism or exclusivism", it is the subject of exclusivism, that is, the moral agent or decision-maker, who is said to 'suffer', not in a factual, happiness-catenary, but in a normative, sense.) Gender-centered exclusivism (X.582.0) is the interfactorial variant of gender-related exclusivism. It stands for policies of sexual apartheid and things like an obsession or sentimental preoccupation with the distinction male/female. It also stands for showing no or too little attention for sexism and other forms of gender-based irrelevantism. Its antithesis is gender-transcending inclusivity (N.582.0). Gender-based exclusivism (X.582.1) is the infrafactorial variant whose antithesis is gender-neutral inclusivity (N.582.1). (To illustrate the difference between both manifestations of exclusivism and both facets of inclusivity: the traditional so-called 'neuter' use of he and man is gender-centered and -based exism; the reactionary use of she instead of he for human beings in general is also gender-centered and -based; the antisexist use of she or he and men and women when not dealing with sexual or sexualist matters, is gender-neutral, but still gender-centered; and our use of 'e, 'er and person in contexts which are not sexual, nor sexualistic, is both gender-neutral and -transcending.) Two but too obvious dimensional manifestations of gender-based exism are male exclusivism (X.582.50), the first complemental, and female exclusivism (X.582.51), the second complemental. The aggrandizemental components of both exisms are androcentrism and gyn(ec)ocentrism respectively. 'Masculinism' is a breed of androcentrism if, and to the extent that, it exclusively serves the interests of men or boys, even, or especially when this infringes the equality of the sexes. Similarly, 'feminism' is, properly speaking, a breed of gynocentrism if, and to the extent that, it exclusively serves the interests of women or girls. However, those 'feminists' who protect the interests of women and girls against the effects of sex-discrimination, and those 'masculinists' who protect the interests of men and boys against the effects of sex-discrimination, work for an antisexist cause. They take an interest in the conditions of females and males in order to contribute to the equality of both sexes, that is, to gender-neutral inclusivity. A sentimental abnegational component of male exism is misandry, and of female exism misogyny. Both componential manifestations are nonintermediary. Of the intermediary manifestations we have examined many cases of lingual, gender-based and -centered irrelevantism in the Book of Instruments. This was necessary as we could not even have communicated in a gender-neutral and -transcending language, if we had not first disposed of these sexist or sexually irrelevantistic elements in the traditional variant of this language. Since this operational manifestation of gender-related exclusivism is already dealt with at several other places in this Model, we will not discuss it here anymore. The same applies to the principal operations of gender-related exclusivism, particularly to supreme androcentrism. With the canonical prose poem at the beginning of this section no further comment is needed to describe the Model position on this sort of supreme violation of the norm of inclusivity. There is also a bilateral manifestation of gender-based exclusivism (X.582.13). The abnegational component of it involves neglect of hermaphroditism and/or androgyny or gynandry. If sentimental, this concerns discomfort or ignorance with respect to androgyny or gynandry. On the other hand, androgyny or gynandry can also be overemphasized. Typical of this breed of bilateral sexualism is the incitement directed at men to develop their so-called 'feminine' qualities, and the incitement directed at women to develop their so-called 'masculine' qualities. This proposal draws on the very presuppositions of unilateral gender-based exclusivism itself, and merely perpetuates them. The antithetical gender-neutral and -transcending position is to develop or not to develop one's qualities, regardless of what sexualists call them. Only those human qualities are (wholly) 'feminine' which no male can develop, and (wholly) 'masculine' which no female can develop. It is, then, both nonsensical to ask human beings to develop the qualities they cannot develop, and to ask them to develop the partially 'feminine', partially 'masculine' qualities they can develop indeed. For femininity, masculinity, gynandry and androgyny are neither good nor bad in themselves. 2.3.6 EROTIC: ACTIVITY-BASED AND RELATIONAL After having reviewed a number of manifestations of gender-related exism, we should now x some forms of sexualism which can be subsumed under erotic exclusivism (X.583). At least three types of erotic exism can, then, be distinguished: activity-based, relational and orientational sexualism. Activity-based sexualism (X.2333) is exism re one or more kinds of sexual activities in which a human or anthropically conceived being is sexually aroused or satisfied. Relational sexualism (X.2334) is exism re the (number and/or type of) sexual relation(s) or contact(s) of such a being (while the 'type' is not a question of gender or sexuality in itself). And orientational sexualism (X.2335) is exism re its sexual orientation. These are all manifestations of compositional erotic exism (X.583.1) which are compositional themselves. The sentimental aggrandizemental expression of unitary erotic exism (X.583.0) is obsession or sentimental preoccupation with the erotic, that is, with sexuality in general. Its evaluative opposite (sentimental abnegational) is uneasiness, inhibition or ignorance with respect to sexuality in general. Activity-based sexualism is either autoerotic or socioerotic. Autoerotic exclusivism (X.4666) is a unitary exism of which the object is autoerotic masturbation, that is, sexual stimulation of oneself by oneself. Especially children have been the victim of the autoerotic exclusionism of parents and priests; no child has ever been the victim of autoerotic masturbation itself. Supernaturalist seers have eagerly exploited the credulity of children by telling them that they would become blind and get all sorts of other diseases by doing 'it'. (Those who were smart enough continued until they had to wear glasses.) In exceedingly exclusivistic milieus some children even killed, or attempted to kill, themselves, because they had the godless urge to masturbate at least as frequently on their own as their parents would 'make god' together. But as a sexual activity autoerotic masturbation has never been looked down on in isolation. The kinds of socioerotic activities, in addition to autoerotic masturbation, which have played, or still play, a role in the sexualist theater are too numerous to be named when we consider both the aggrandizemental and the abnegational, both the active and the sentimental components of erotic sexualism. But at least two of them should be mentioned here because of the special religious, sociobiological, political and juridical interest they have enjoyed, or still enjoy. They are vaginal and anal copulation. (A phrase like sexual intercourse is too vague to indicate what the sexualists in question, and we, are talking about or thinking of.) There have been, or still are, countries or states in which the first kind of sexual activity was, or is, the only sexual activity between human beings sanctioned by law; there also have been, or still are, countries or states in which the second kind of sexual activity was, or is, the only one illegalized between human beings, or between male human beings (regardless of whether those involved have a steady relationship or not). Altho in these two examples the sexual statism is aggrandizemental with respect to vaginal copulation and abnegational with respect to anal copulation, the lingual operations of both forms of erotic exclusivism seem to be abnegational. Thus both fuck(ing) (denoting vaginal copulation or copulation in general) and bugger(y) (denoting anal copulation) are also used in the traditional variant of this language as vulgar or coarse terms to express annoyance or disapproval. The pathology of the usage of the word buggery is quite peculiar. In this word anal-copulation-centered exism is historically allied, firstly, to racialism or ethnical exclusionism (since the word bugger derives from the name of a certain people or nation looked on as inferior); secondly, to religious exclusionism (as the word was once used to refer to heretics, thus suggesting that only they would engage in anal intercourse); and thirdly, to antihomosexualism (by way of the illusion that all those engaging in anal intercourse would be homosexual, or that all male homosexuals would engage in anal intercourse). This historical process of lingual operations illustrates but too well how seemingly 'completely different' types of discrimination or exclusivism, such as sexualism and ethnical and ideological exclusionism always have lent, or still do lend, each other support. When saying that relational exclusivism does concern both the number and the type of sexual relations or contacts, type does not refer to the sexual activities of the partners involved (or lack thereof), nor to the gender of the partners involved. It does not refer either to what someone may or may not have promised his or her partner. Promises are important, and breaking a vow can be very serious indeed, but it is, then, not the principle of relevance which is at stake, but rather the principle of truth (besides happiness-catenary considerations). When talking of "the type of sexual relation", it is in this context things like the duration or durability of a relation which are factors, and, for but too many exclusivists, also the question of whether one of the partners involved receives money for sexual services rendered. In the latter case the (often sterile) members of the exclusionist colony watching the comings (and goings) will be ready to speak of "prostitution" and to denounce the (often sexually overdeveloped) workers as "whores". When people have to sell their bodies because they must in order to survive, or against their will, this certainly is a debasement, but this applies to everyone who has to sell 'er body (or parts of it) or 'er physical capacities in some way. Most of all it applies to people whose ideals are debased by their interest in money and the protection of those who have most of it. What some of the sexual totalitarians who would like to forbid all prostitution tend to conveniently forget, is that those who ask money for sexual acts, may receive less of it altogether than those who are 'happily married' to a rich person, but would never have loved and married 'im, or stayed with 'im, if 'e had not been wealthy. It may now be argued that it is not only the money but the number of different contacts a prostitute is involved in that counts. If this argument were valid, it would not apply to prostitutes with one or a limited number of (perhaps very rich) clients, and it would equally apply to the clients themselves and to others with two or a limited number of relations or contacts -- a line of reasoning which may even be appealing to out-and-out 'moral' theoreticians. The unitary manifestation of relational sexualism of which the object is the number of sexual relations or contacts a human or anthropically conceived being has, has had or is allowed to have, is quantitative relational sexualism (X.4669). Dimensional manifestations of it are, for example: (a) exism re a person who has no sexual contacts or re the quality of not having any sexual contacts (whether with prostitutes or nonprostitutes); and (b) exism re a person with more than one sexual relation or the quality of having more than one sexual relation at the same time or in the same period. (An obsession with 'scoring as many lays as possible', or something quantitative of that kind, is, strictly speaking, not a manifestation of exclusivism, but of extremism.) To determine whether an attitude towards the number of sexual relations or contacts (with prostitutes or nonprostitutes) is exclusivistic or not, it is not sufficient to establish that there is a difference in attitude towards having no sexual contact, only one relation, or more relations or contacts. Thus, in a region and time of an epidemic outbreak of a disease, or when there is a relatively great chance of contracting a disease which cannot (yet) be cured, there may be good reasons --even if there are or were no other reasons-- to prefer only one or no sexual relation to several or many relations or contacts, or the one type of sexual activity to the other. If the chance involved is significantly greater than, for example, the chance of being mutilated or killed in a car accident, then the distinction made could be relevant to a legitimate goal (one's physical health). It is especially when combined with gender-based sexualism and quantitative matrimonial exclusivism that quantitative relational sexualism becomes interesting. In certain sexist societies and subcultures it was, or still is, 'normal' that men have (had) any number of sexual contacts (again, with prostitutes or nonprostitutes), whereas girls or women are supposed to abstain from sex, and to remain virgins, until meeting the one boy or man they are to spend their whole lives with (and who will take care that they will not have sexual contacts with any other human or male human being). Once more this double standard of morals towards boys and men on the one hand, and girls and women on the other, demonstrates but too clearly the extremely intimate connections between the different members of the school of sexual irrelevantism. A formalization of this double standard in the institution of marriage will be discussed in the next division. 2.3.7 EROTIC: ORIENTATIONAL The last taxon of sexualist manifestations that we shall examine here contains those exclusivisms which can be classified as "orientational". Even if we confine ourselves to defining sexual orientation in terms of gender, its definition can be either absolute or relative. In an absolute sense someone feels, or can be, sexually attracted to male human beings, to female human beings, to both or to neither. A human being that feels attracted to men or boys will enjoy meeting and being with a nice, lovable man or boy; a human being that feels attracted to women or girls will enjoy meeting and being with a nice, lovable woman or girl; a human being that feels attracted to other human beings will enjoy meeting and being with another, nice, lovable human being; a human being that does not feel attracted to male, female or human beings, will not experience the pleasure of meeting or being with a nice, lovable male, female or human being as far as the joy of erotic interchange is concerned (but 'e may enjoy such a meeting for purely social, or other, reasons). These are the four fundamental theses of love in a sincere sense, whatever mess the lovers of venomous sexualism make of it. Yet, this picture of sexual orientation and satisfaction is often overshadowed by another conception of sexual orientation. It is the relative one, according to which someone's orientation is not defined in terms of females, males and humans but in terms of members of 'er own sex, the opposite sex, or both sexes. For example, when describing someone as "heterosexual" it is suggested that this person would love (or be sexually attracted to) somebody else as somebody of the opposite sex. A 'heterosexual' boy or man, for instance, would not love girls or women as females, but only as specimens of the opposite sex. (Traditional ideologies which are exclusively truth-conditional cannot comprehend the difference between these two aspects.) Relevantly described, the boy or man in question is 'gynophile' and not 'heterosexual', if he loves females because of their feminine qualities and/or capacities. (It is then only a later, truth-conditional inference that he is also heterosexual, since he is both male and 'gynophile'.) The relative description of the state of love affairs may be germane to special cases, like those of people who have only become hetero- or homosexual because the great majority of their neighbors were heterosexual; and it may be germane to special circumstances, like those of monosexual people looking for a partner or wanting children of their own, but it is a rather odd conception to stick with thru thick and thin, regardless of the context. Not surprisingly the exclusion and exclusivity of people and characteristics on the basis of their propensity usually rests on taking love in this relative way. It is, then, manifested in all sorts of relative orientational sexualism (X.4671). What has been said of other forms of interfactorial sexualism does hold for the relative orientational type of it as well. Thus, the aggrandizemental component of it involves an exclusive or disproportionately great emphasis upon discrimination on the basis of homo- or bisexuality or sexual propensity in general, whereas the abnegational component of it involves a complete disregard, or disproportionately little attention, for the same discrimination on the basis of sexual propensity, particularly in comparison with the attention paid to other forms of discrimination. The dimensional manifestations of infrafactorial orientational sexualism follow a pattern similar to that of writing-related, handedness-based exism. For "single-handedness" must then be read "monosexuality", for "ambidexterity" "bisexuality", for "left-handedness" "homosexuality" and for "right-handedness" "heterosexuality". Historically there certainly is much more resemblance between the attitude towards, and treatment of, left-handedness and ambidexterity on the one hand, and homo- and bisexuality on the other than just the fact that their formal positions in the two dimensional cladograms are the same. Abnegational components or operations of homo-, hetero- and bisexual exclusivism are, for example: a. the belief or feeling that homosexuals are, or that homosexuality is, inferior to heterosexuals or heterosexuality; b. uneasiness (possibly hatred, fear, distrust or ignorance) of a heterosexual with respect to homo- or bisexuals, or homosexuality (possibly also with respect to his or her own homoerotic by-feelings); c. uneasiness (possible hatred, fear, distrust or ignorance) of a homosexual with respect to hetero- or bisexuals, or heterosexuality (possibly also with respect to her or his own heteroerotic by-feelings); and d. the use of pejoratives in colloquial language and of ignorant or stereotypical descriptions in exclusivist dictionaries to denote homo- or bisexuals. Since homosexual females and males, and perhaps also bisexual ones, have always been a minority in larger societies, it is they who have been victimized most by discrimination on the basis of relative sexual orientation (particularly when the object of the supernatural hatred of orthodox monotheists or of the 'objective' hatred of biological materialists). In this respect they can be compared to discriminated-against ethnical, denominational and political minorities which also used to lack the power to enforce their equality as persons. They can also be compared to other classes of human beings exploited, molested or bothered because of particular sexual characteristics or activities. In the past the attitude of certain parents vis-à-vis the masturbation of their children, for instance, has definitely not been more enlightened when it concerned their sexual relationships with others, for example, when one of their partners turned out to be 'of the wrong race'. The measures taken have often only been much worse when one of their partners turned out to be 'of the wrong sex'. It was quite predictable that after an era of abnegational homosexual exclusivism (or antihomosexualism) a reaction would follow, that is, an attitude of aggrandizemental homosexual exclusivism as popularized in slogans like Glad or Proud to be gay. It is this kind of slogan which demonstrates how exclusivist prohomosexualism, too, fell straight into the trap of the relative conception of sexual orientation. No-one is glad or 'gay' because 'e is homosexual or, for that matter, nonhomosexual, and no-one should have the arrogance of being proud of 'er homosexuality or other sexual propensity. This merely provokes a reaction in turn. A homo- or bisexual female can be made happy when meeting and being with a nice, lovable woman or girl, and so can a hetero- or bisexual male. Similarly, a homo- or bisexual male can be made happy when meeting and being with a nice, lovable man or boy, and so can a hetero- or bisexual female. (And all of them can be made unhappy when meeting, or being confronted with, a sexual totalitarian.) Whether the people concerned are then of the same or of a different gender is irrelevant from the inclusivistic standpoint. 2.3.8 OTHERWISE PARTIAL To conclude our treatment of sexual-excremental matters, at least two nonsexual exclusivisms should be mentioned. They are excremental and nudity-related exclusivism. Excremental subanthropic exclusivism (X.581) is a compositional manifestation concerning eliminatory acts and products of the human body, and can be fecal or urinary. Typical of the former unitary exism is its lingual operation, namely the expletive use of a fecal term like shit. Those who do not want to become vulgar in an irrelevantist way (or who do not want to be pinned down by psychoanalysts as being stuck in an anal phase) can always use expressions like Bother!, Crisis! or 'Xclude! as expletives to utter their annoyance, pain, disgust or similar emotions. The last expression also puts extra stress on the exclusion or going away of something exclusivistic, or anything else not wished for, without exclusively and excessively emphasizing the elimination of bodily waste matter. (An elimination which is by itself relevant, of course, to maintaining good health.) Another manifestation of the lingual operations of excremental (but also sexual) exism is the deletion of everyday terms referring to feces and urine, or the acts of discharging waste thru the anus and urination, from self-repressive dictionaries. These are lingual operations of the sentimental abnegational components. (A fine Religious Science Propagational Dictionary of more than 1200 pages, for instance, may tell the user that Life, Love, Principle and Truth all mean God, that man means spiritual image and likeness of God, and it will spend not less than seven lines on what something like Religious Science is supposed to mean, but it will in a religiously 'scientific' way ignore that words like shit, piss, arse and cunt are frequently employed terms in the language it purports to describe; and if not frequently employed in the written language, then at least infinitely more frequently in the spoken language than life, love, principle and truth in the supremely eccentric sense of god.) Nudity-( and clothing-)related subanthropic exclusivism (X.1161) is a unitary exism re the nudity or state of being (partially) dressed of (a) human or anthropomorphic being(s). It is listed under sexual-excremental exclusivisms, because its object is the urinogenital or excremental organs and the parts of the human body closely associated with sexuality and with the discharge of bodily waste. It does not really concern parts of the body like the feet or the head, and if it does, it is either another form of nudity-linked exism or simply a manifestation of sexualism (as when women have to cover their faces or heads, but not men). The disjunctive manifestations of nudity-related exism are nudity-centered and clothing-centered or vestiary exclusivism. If sentimental and abnegational, nudity-centered exism is self-repression, shame, discomfort and/or ignorance with respect to human nudity or nude people; if active and abnegational, it involves the exclusion of nudity and the discrimination of nude people, or people who want to be without clothes. If nudism is not nudity- and clothing-inclusive, for example, because it does not take into account climatic and weather conditions, then it is a manifestation of aggrandizemental nudity-centered exism. Abnegational nudity-centered or aggrandizemental clothing-centered exism is prudism. Its most manifest form is genital vestiary exclusivism, that is, the compulsive habit of always keeping the genitals covered, even in hot weather when the person in question does not mind to expose the rest of 'er body. In societies or communities that are exclusionistic in this respect 'regular' beaches are prudist beaches, while nudists are relegated to a spot as far away as possible. In religiously or politically totalitarian societies or communities that are even more exclusionistic in this respect, the existence of public beaches, parks or areas where people can be clothed or in the nude as they themselves prefer is made impossible altogether. 2.4 BASIC NONPHYSICAL SUBANTHROPIC 2.4.1 PERSONATIVE The two main subdivisions of nonphysical subanthropic exclusivism (X.19) are thought-related (person-centered) exclusivism (X.39) and basic nonphysical subanthropic exclusivism (X.38). Since all nonphysical subanthropic exisms are nonsophistic, basic can be understood here in the sense of non-thought-related. Therefore we must first explain what is meant by thought-related exclusivism. Thought-related person-centered exclusivism is exism re a nonphysical ('mental' or 'cultural') characteristic of a subclass of human beings which is directly related to the content of their thoughts or system of thought, or exism re such a subclass itself. Standard examples of thought-related exclusivism are the exclusion or preferential treatment of people on the basis of the denominational or political ideology adhered to. In the next and last division of this chapter we will treat of the manifestations of this thought-related exclusivism. Basic nonphysical subanthropic exclusivism can, in turn, be subdivided into personative and nonpersonative, basic nonphysical subanthropic exclusivism (X.76 & 77). A personative basic exclusivism is a form of basic nonphysical exclusivism in which a human being is characterized personally in the context of a human subculture, or in which a group of human beings is invested with an own, collective personality. Because of the kind of exclusivism concerned the quality on the basis of which the human being or group of human beings is characterized must be a nonphysical one. This also includes characteristics which might be believed to be 'physical', like the territory (say, a region or country) where a person lives; but when the definement of such a territory and of the exclusivism depend on the existence of a 'cultural', 'political' or other nonphysical institution, the characteristic itself and the exclusivism of which it is an object are ultimately nonphysical as well. The whole classification system of exclusivisms developed thus far contains only two so-called 'closed listings of four exisms' --closed, because any additional exism cannot be logically conceived of. The first one was the tetratomic subdivision of nonsophistic exclusivism (X.2) and the second one is the following, similar subdivision of personative basic exclusivism (X.76): nonphysical individual (X.304), subnational (X.305), national (X.306) and international (union-based) exclusivism (X.307). National and international exclusivism are forms of territorial( ex)ism with respect to a nation or a particular union of nations respectively. Subnational exclusivism is either territorial or nonterritorial. If it is territorial a local, a regional and a state-based (subnational) variant can be distinguished. (Instead of "state" one may also read, for example, "province" or "republic", so long as it is part of a greater, sovran whole.) Nationalism (if territorial), tribalism (if territorial), (regional or local) sectionalism, (regional or local) provincialism, and localism are globally well-known examples of territorial personative exclusivism. In practise these manifestations are more often than not constituents of a hybridism or other plural exclusivism in combination with exisms such as generative (particularly ethnical) physical subanthropic or linguistical and/or ideological, nonphysical subanthropic exclusivism. Two intermediary manifestations of territorialism worth mentioning are normative territorialism and supreme localism. As a cognition the first operation refers to the belief that it would depend on the kind of society or 'culture' (defined in territorial terms) whether egalitarian principles or norms and values of the same generality would apply or not. Also this normative territorialism is usually linked up with normative racialism or ethnical exclusivism. The source of this territorial conception of morality is, firstly, the boundless faith in what happen to be the cultural norms of a particular country or other territory at a particular time, and secondly, the dire confusion of normative principles themselves and the empirical conditions under which they are to be applied. An example of supreme localism, the other intermediary operation referred to, is that of a god who has taken exclusive possession of a certain city, or who is believed to be the 'Great King' of that city in particular. This form of localism cannot be divorced from ethnocentrism and aggrandizemental nationalism. A supreme example of the latter kind of territorialism is the belief in and the description of one particular country as "the Holy Land". Two nonterritorial forms of subnational exclusivism are class-related and nonphysical familial exclusivism. Class-related exclusivism (X.2441) is exism re a socioeconomic class or caste (as a cultural phenomenon). Class-related exism greatly resembles many other forms of exism we have already discussed, such as generative familial exclusivism and race-, age- and gender-related exclusivism. Moreover, class-based exclusivism or 'classism' has already received so much philosophical, political and scientific attention that we need not dwell on the nonrelevance of class-distinctions and their abuse for too long here. Perhaps a note on class-centered exclusivism should suffice at this place. Those who contend that the primary function of ideology is to support class interests, and that everything people think, feel and do is part of one great struggle of the classes for power, suffer from aggrandizemental class-centered exclusivism in the most objective of ways. It has been pointed out in the Book of Instruments (I.6.1.2) how the words ideology and class are used in a number of different senses in this reasoning. If the claim is to approximate to objective reality in some degree, socioeconomic class is certainly not the only meaning of it; yet, that is what is our concern here, not 'classes' like age-groups, sexes or denominations. However, in the politics of countries in which different socioeconomic classes still exist, the aggrandizemental class-centered exclusivism of one party seems to be wedded to the abnegational class-centered exclusivism of the other. (The road to class-neutral and -transcending inclusivity is very narrow indeed.) The number of lower- and middle-class people and generations in the past who have adhered to, and loyally defended, a religious or political ideology whose sole ultimate function it was to serve the interests of the upper-class, is so great that it is incomprehensible that this number will ever be equaled in the future. It is in these people's naivety, and in their ignorance of class- or caste-distinctions implicitly taken for granted, that the abnegational nature of their attitude lay, or still lies. Leaving class-related exclusivism behind, we continue with nonphysical familial exclusivism (X.1221). This is exism re a family or a member of a family personated and distinguished on the basis of a nonphysical quality which it has or is believed to have as a whole or within a whole. (In this context family is used in the sense of a consanguineous-matrimonial group of humans, whether they belong to one household or not.) The manifestations of nonphysical familial exism do for a large part reflect those of nonphysical individual exclusivism (X.304), and will therefore be discussed together here. Nonphysical individual exism is exism re a human individual distinguished on the basis of a personal nonphysical quality. Both individuals and whole families can be distinguished from other individuals or whole families among other things by reference to their title(s), power, wealth or fame. And in both cases a title may be hereditary or nonhereditary. Hereditary title-based familial exclusivism (X.39073) is exism re a caste or family with a hereditary title like imperial or royal. In the case of individual exism (X.9729) it concerns titles like prince or princess. Both forms of titular exclusivism involve the institution of aristocracy, aristocratic exclusivism in general and caste-based exclusivism insofar as it is titular and familial. Hereditary title-based familial exclusivism is also, together with the sexism inherent in the asymmetrical distribution of individual titles over both sexes, indicative of monarchist polities. Wealth-based familial, and especially individual, exclusivism (X.19538 & 2434) involves the institution of plutocracy or plutocratic exclusivism in general. If being known and liked by an unusual number of people is considered something honorable in itself, and loved for itself, then fame-based familial, and especially individual, exclusivism (X.19539 & 2435) involves the institution of timocracy or timocratic exclusivism in general. In practise, title-, power-, wealth- and fame-based exclusivism are often closely related to each other and to other singular and plural exclusivisms. The types of familial exclusivism listed above are actually types of interfamilial exclusivism. But since the object of familial exism is a group of individuals, it also has infrafamilial manifestations. Thus, authority-based infrafamilial exclusivism (X.4887) is exism re the authority of (a) family member(s) personated and distinguished on the basis of 'er/their position within the family. Patriarchy is a hybrid of the aggrandizemental component of this exism and androcentrism; matriarchy is a hybrid of the same component of infrafactorial exism and gynocentrism. Individuals are not only treated or regarded differently by reference to hereditary titles, but also by reference to a positional title or academic degree. Here a 'positional title' is meant to be a nonhereditary title someone has acquired because of 'er rank, office or other position, whether academic or nonacademic. An (academic) degree is a title conferred upon someone because 'e has successfully completed a major program of study or something equivalent to it. There are considerable differences with respect to desert and the context in which they could be relevant (if ever) between hereditary titles, positional titles and degrees. Even when people are called by a title because they have personally proved that they possess a certain skill or praiseworthy quality, the question always remains why people with a lesser skill or quality should not get a 'lesser title' instead of no-one at all. This question is particularly justified in monarchist or aristocratic societies in which titles (and state incomes) are conferred on (and given to) infants and people on purely biological-materialist grounds. But even an extraordinary, official act of distributive justice in which everyone who had some special skill acquired by working more or less hard, and in which everyone who had some special praiseworthy quality proved under conditions more or less hard, were titled in a way proportionate to the degree of 'er skill or motivational goodness, would not abrogate the custom of title-based irrelevantism by itself. For the practise which is most showy and ignoble in this respect is the employment of a title in a context which is not relevant, simply because the skill or quality in question is not pertinent to the kind of situation concerned. But it is certainly not only the people styling themselves, say, "doctor" or "general" in circumstances in which their being a doctor or general is not relevant who indulge in or surrender themselves to titular irrelevantism. The invisible, dextrous hand of exclusivism puts exactly the same names on the lips of the untitled. All titular exclusivists see a master, a lord, a princess, or what have you, where there is nothing else, where there is nothing less, than a human being, perhaps skilless or vicious, perhaps skilful or morally good, perhaps both, perhaps neither. Positional and degree-based, titular individual exclusivism are closely related to intellectual (individual) exclusivism (X.2439), a form of exism to be distinguished in addition to title-, power- wealth- and fame-based exism. Intellectual exism can, for example, be intelligence-linked when the object is (an individual with greater than average) intelligence, or knowledge-linked when it is (an individual with more than average) knowledge in general or in a particular field. Intelligence- and knowledge-based, individual exism manifest themselves especially in combination with an attitude towards intelligence and knowledge as tho they were ultimate values in themselves. The intellectualism of which they are a subspecies is itself a subspecies of mental individual exclusivism together with the manifestations of mental ability-related exclusivism (X.4877). This is the analog of physical ability-related exism (X.292) as mentioned in section 2.3.3 (Partial-total). It needs no further elucidation here, since the manifestations of both exclusivisms run entirely parallel. 2.4.2 NONPERSONATIVE A basic nonphysical subanthropic exism will be termed "nonpersonative" here if the object is primarily something that is neither a person nor a group of persons invested with personality (while indirectly concerning a human subclass nevertheless). We will consider marriage and language as objects of nonpersonative manifestations of irrelevantism. This listing is definitely not exhaustive. Also technological exclusivism (X.617), for instance, is a form of nonpersonative exism, that is, exism re the technological development of a society. If aggrandizemental, this manifestation involves the institution of technocracy: the exclusive government or management of society by technical experts. Technocratic exism as a brand of technological exism is notorious for its exclusion of relevant nontechnical factors and the confusion of means and ends. But technological exism can be abnegational too, for example, when technology, or modern technology, is disposed of by people who pursue a variety of ends which can only be attained simultaneously with the aid of the very technology they want to discontinue, or prevent, the use of. Not only marriage but also celibacy is the object of marriage-( and celibacy-)related or matrimonial exclusivism (X.309). Marriage- and celibacy-centered exclusivism (X.309.0) is a unitary exism re the marital status of a human or anthropically conceived being, while marriage-( and celibacy-)based exclusivism (X.309.1) is a compositional exism re (someone or people with) a certain type of marriage or (someone or people living in) celibacy. Compositional matrimonial exism can be quantitative or duration-based. In the former case it concerns the number of times someone is married or allowed to marry, in the latter case the duration of a marriage. The dimensional manifestations of quantitative matrimonial exclusivism (X.619) for a trichotomous subdivision are: marriage-, celibacy-, monogamy- and polygamy-centered exclusivism. ('Marriage-centered' must not be confused with 'marriage- and celibacy-centered exclusivism'.) As mentioned before, these forms of exclusivism are intimately connected with quantitative relational and gender-based sexualism. The law of a sexist society may institutionalize the hybrid of these two sexualisms by giving men the opportunity to marry more than one wife (polygyny), while excluding women from having more than one husband (polyandry). It is often naively and erroneously said that a certain religion allows polygamy or 'plural marriage', but this is irrelevantist, truth-conditional phraseology when that religion allows only men to have more than one spouse (that is, polygyny). Whether a marriage relationship can exist between one or more men and one or more women or not, it is always sexualistic in a relative orientational sense, if such a relationship can solely be formalized for people of a different gender. The ancient, biological argument that human beings of the same gender could not get children is, firstly, out of date from a medical-technical point of view; secondly, inconsistent if people of a different gender who could not get children either are allowed to marry nevertheless; and thirdly, out of place where children cannot only be produced physically by oneself, but can also be adopted physically or formally. Aggrandizemental marriage-centered exclusivism is exism re married people on the basis of their marriage which is believed or felt to be good or better than celibacy (whether living together with someone, or whether having a sexual relationship with someone or not). The sentimental external abnegational component of the same exclusivism is uneasiness (possibly hatred, fear or ignorance) of unmarried people with married people or the institution of marriage. This involves misogamy. (Traditional language is so unsystematic as not to have a term for the hatred of celibacy.) The hybrid attitude of matrimonial and sexual exclusivists is not only put into effect in the above affirmative ways, it is also manifested in the use of a title like miss for unmarried women only. In combination with etatic exclusivism the derogatory use of an expression like old maid is another manifestation of it. Miss was, or still is, a legal and official child, old maid a nonlegal, nonofficial child, of matrimonial and sexual exclusivism. No child of either of these two parents has ever been legitimate, let alone a child of both of them. Language is another object of nonpersonative irrelevantism we have mentioned. On the highest level, exclusivism on the basis of language must first be subdivided into inter- and infralinguistical exclusivism. Interlinguistical exclusivism (X.310) is, then, exism re the (form of) language of a particular community, whether that (form of) language is officially recognized or not. The object of interlinguistical exism need not be a 'language' in some sense of a standard, international or nonregional language (as in language-based exism); it may also be a dialect or regional variety of such a language (as in dialectal exism) or even an accent which is phonemically correct (as in accentual exism). (Accent-based exism does not concern a different pronunciation in the sense of an alternative choice of correct phonemes: this will be classified as an infralinguistic characteristic.) The object of dialect-based exclusivism is a dialect which is not officially recognized as "a language", or if it is, which is compared with other dialects of the same language. Some componential manifestations of language- and dialect-based exclusivism (X.1243 & 1242) are: a. the belief or feeling that the language or dialect which a person speaks 'imself (and which may be recognized as an official language), or the languages or dialects of a group to which 'er own language or dialect belong, are superior to, or better than, other languages or dialects (self-aggrandizemental); b. the exclusion or discrimination of other languages or dialects than a person speaks imself, because 'e believes or feels that 'er own language is superior (self-aggrandizing); c. the belief or feeling that a particular language or dialect, or group of languages or dialects, is inferior in all or in certain fields (abnegational); and d. uneasiness, possibly shame or ignorance, with respect to a person's own language or dialect (sentimental self-abnegational). Infralinguistical exclusivism (X.311) can be exism re spelling (orthographical), pronunciation (pronunciational infralinguistical), vocabulary (vocabular), meanings (semantical) or, perhaps, other aspects of a language or dialect. Lingual exclusivism as a particular kind of operation of a componential, dimensional or integral exism is not a form of vocabular or semantical exclusivism, because its object is not a vocabulary or the meaning of a word, but another one which is only treated differently in the use of such a word. Moreover, the 'exclusion' of lingually exclusivistic words in a language or dialect is not an incident of vocabular or semantical exism, because this rejection is founded on relevant grounds. For it follows from accepting the principle of discriminational relevance that violations of this principle must be rejected. Since all our communication has been assumed to take place here thru the medium of written language, we have already discussed the orthographical facet of inclusivity at a much earlier moment in time, namely in the Book of Instruments in the context of the cultural norms and values of linguistic systems (I.3.4). There it has been made clear what the inclusivistic position entails, and we therefore need not expatiate on this subject now. Much of what applies to spelling, applies to pronunciation, vocabulary and the meanings of words as well. What typifies infralinguistical exclusivism in general is the belief or suggestion that a language or dialect would be some kind of rigid, monolithic system of communicable propositions (almost) without any variants or options at all. It has been explained why this belief is untenable and the suggestion preposterous. It has also been argued that consistence is a very important criterion in questions of linguistic correctness. The emphasis on this requirement is certainly not exclusivistic, for consistence is also a criterion of relevance itself, at least in the norm of inclusivity. And just as consistence does not prove relevance, so consistent usage does not prove the correctness of a linguistic variant. It is therefore not always easy to find out whether the rejection of such a variant should be x-ed as a manifestation of infralinguistical exclusivism. However, in the absence of nonexclusivist teachers, dictionaries and encyclopedias it is one thing to look on exclusivist teachers, dictionaries and encyclopedias as co-advisors in these matters, and quite another thing to look on them as authorities. 2.5 THOUGHT-RELATED SUBANTHROPIC 2.5.1 THOUGHT-RELATED BUT NOT DENOMINATIONAL 2.5.1.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE ADJECTIVES FORGOTTEN OR CONCEALED When they claim that he is the greatest thinker of all times, be on your guard, for he may only be the greatest exclusivist thinker, or the greatest thinker of their own sort of ethnic culture, they are referring to. When they claim that he is the first modern thinker, be on your guard, for he may only be the first modern monotheist thinker, or the first modern thinker of their own species, they are referring to. When they forget or conceal the adjectives of exclusivism, be on your guard, for there is no thinker of inclusivity who is claimed to be the greatest of all times and whose thought is ethnocentric, anthropocentric or theocentric. When they forget or conceal the adjectives of exclusivism, and when they talk in terms of he and his, they have not yet reached the vantage point of the Norm, and it is, then, no catenical or relevantist thought they are referring to. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- By saying that discrimination because of the denominational or political ideology someone adheres to is a standard example of thought-related person-centered exclusivism (as we did in 2.4.1), a number of classificational levels of thought-related exism have already been skipped. Following our typification of thought itself (as expounded in I.6.1) the two kinds of thought-related exclusivism to be distinguished first are disciplinary and nondisciplinary thought-related exclusivism (X.78 & 79). The two kinds of disciplinary thought-related exclusivism to be distinguished next are then (inter)ideological exclusivism (X.156) and nonideological disciplinary exclusivism (X.157). And, as we have also differentiated comprehensive ideology or denominationalism and specialist ideology from the beginning on, interideological exclusivism is either specialist ideological or denominational exclusivism (X.312 & 313). The branch of specialist ideological exclusivism of which discrimination because of someone's political convictions is an active affirmative manifestation is politico-ideological exclusivism (X.625). When speaking of "the discrimination", "exclusion" or "preferential treatment" of people on the grounds of the political or denominational ideology they espouse, or on the grounds of any other thought they may have, the irrelevance of the distinction between them and others is already presupposed in the use of discrimination, exclusion and preferential treatment. This is especially important when the thing rejected, or conceived of as inferior, is not a person or group of people, but a particular thought or system of thought. Whereas it may not be relevant to make a distinction between people on the basis of their thoughts, it may be 'highly relevant' to make a distinction between these thoughts or systems of thought themselves. Thus it is on the grounds of the principle of discriminational relevance itself that irrelevantist systems of thought are inferior in a normative sense. Hence, we have every reason not to associate ourselves with them, since we have an inclusivistic alternative. Yet, this does by no means imply that we would have a reason to always reject a whole person who thinks in exclusivist terms. To reject a person as person 'e would have to impinge upon our own or someone else's right to personhood. So long as no right of personhood is impinged on, it should be possible for every inclusivist to coexist with an exist. For us as adherents of a denominational doctrine, the prime mover of all exclusivist matter is thought-related subanthropic exism on the basis of someone else`s denominational convictions or someone`s own denominational presuppositions. Yet, before dealing with the basics of this manifestation of ideological exism, we should briefly discuss the manifestations of thought-related subanthropic exism which are not denominational first. Formally speaking, those nondenominational manifestations are not only the specialist ideological ones, but also nondisciplinary and nonideological, disciplinary thought-related exism and even disciplinary and ideological, thought-related exism in general. (In this sense, exclusivisms which are not denominational encompass denominational exism: they need not be undenominational.) Nonetheless, we shall confine ourselves to politico-ideological exclusivism. The unitary manifestation of politico-ideological person-centered exclusivism is exism re someone or people distinguished on the basis of 'er or their belonging to a politico-ideological group. The comparison is then not with people of other political groups, as in the case of the compositional manifestation of it, but with people distinguished on the basis of other ideological or nonideological characteristics. If aggrandizemental and sentimental, unitary, that is, interfactorial, politico-ideological exism becomes manifest in an exclusive or disproportionate attention for, or preoccupation with, people distinguished on the basis of their belonging to a political group. Typical of this exism is a preoccupation with the persecution or discrimination of people on account of their political affiliation as distinct from the persecution or discrimination of people on other grounds. For example, to call a society "a free society" merely because people are not persecuted for, or discriminated against on the basis of, their political convictions, is only one instance of interfactorial politico-ideological exism. (To call it "a free society" because people are not persecuted for their religious convictions either is only an instance of a little bit broader type of interfactorial ideological exism.) The minimum society that may be called "free" in this respect is a society in which people are not discriminated against on the basis of their (ideological) convictions in any way, whether these convictions are political or nonpolitical, religious or nonreligious, and whether in an affirmative way, in an exemplary way or by means of the state`s phraseology and symbolism, that is, in an intermediary way. Infrafactorial politico-ideological exism has been classified as "compositional" because the 'thought' to which it is related may be of several types. Firstly, it may be a political doctrine in the strict, theoretical sense. Political doctrine-related (person-centered) exclusivism (X.1251) is, then, exism re someone or people adhering to a particular political doctrine, or re a characteristic concomitant with adherence to such a doctrine (but not re that doctrine itself). Secondly, the 'thought' concerned may be that of a political party, however inconsistent or pragmatic. Thus political party-related (person-centered) exclusivism (X.2501) is exism re someone or people sympathizing with a certain political party, or re a characteristic quality of members or sympathizers of such a party. The worst form of party-related exclusivism is apparently the ideological exclusionism of a one-party state, that is, a state in which only one political party is permitted and recognized. Yet, it is not necessarily the case that the leaders of such a one-party state suffer more from politico-ideological exclusivism than those of a multi-party state or country in which only one party is outlawed. Maybe, the one party in the one-party state happens to admit of a greater internal diversity of opinions than the two or so legal parties manage to represent in a multi-party state. We thus touch on the complicated subject of 'democracy', that is, democracy not only for those with whom the powerful agree but also for those with whom they disagree, and democracy not only for the rich and educated but also for the poor and illiterate or less educated. Altho we cannot discuss this subject further here, it is obvious --also from our brief discussion of it in the previous chapter-- that politico-ideological exclusivism is certainly not the only manifestation to be blamed where democracy has failed. There have always been, or still are, people in power who exclude, or try to exclude or discredit, fellow citizens on the basis of many other factors than the political ideology they adhere to. One such factor, and a most important one, is their denominational belief. This factor does not only concern the denominational convictions they used to have in the past, it concerns not less the ones they presently have, and the ones they will have in the future. 2.5.2 PRIMACY- AND PRINCIPLE-RELATED If denominationalism is not used in the sense of (adherence to a) comprehensive ideology but in an unfavorable sense, it is a synonym of denominational exclusivism (X.313). The three main criterions to differentiate the types of denominational exclusivism are the same ones as the main criterions to differentiate the types of denominational doctrine. They relate to questions of (1) primacy, (2) principle and (3) principalship. The first criterion, that of primacy, has not yet been mentioned at all, and its proper treatment has still to be postponed until a later chapter. It applies to a fundamental choice which every denominational doctrine, or everyone choosing such a doctrine, has to make: the choice between (a) the belief that a universal norm or norms did, do and will exist independently of their being propagated by some authority, and (b) the belief that it is some authority who made or makes the universal norm(s). In other words: do i believe in the right norm(s), or do i trust in an authority because i believe that `e has chosen the right norm(s) versus are norms right because an authority i trust in has chosen and recommended them, or recommends them. Those who opt for the first alternative implicitly or explicitly give primacy to the normative; those who opt for the second one give primacy to the authoritative. As we will see, denominationalists of the former persuasion can be called "normists", whereas those of the latter persuasion are 'theocentrists'. The second criterion, that of principle, is easier to explain. It relates to the principle(s) or kind of principle(s) which a particular denominational doctrine embraces or violates, whether under the (belief in the) primacy of the normative, or under the (belief in the) primacy of the authoritative. To typify our own denominational doctrine as "an inclusivist one" is to use a criterion of principle, the principle being that of discriminational relevance interpreted in a neutralist way. The third criterion, that of principalship, has to do with the principal being(s) playing a role in a particular comprehensive ideology. If such an ideology starts from the primacy of the authoritative, it must have at least one principal being, namely the authority on whose will and decisions the rightness of norms is believed to depend. Thus the belief in the primacy of the authoritative implies a belief in principalship if someone does adhere to a denominational doctrine at all. (If someone believes in the primacy of the authoritative, but does not 'see' any god or other authority, it will lead to nondenominationalism.) Conversely, the belief in principalship does not imply that one believes, or has to believe, in the primacy of the authoritative. That is why principalship is another criterion than primacy. We will discuss denominational exclusivism which is somehow related to principalship in the next section. The disjunctive manifestations of primacy-related (person-centered) denominational exclusivism (X.1252) are theocentrist- and normist-person-centered exclusivism (X.1252.14 & 15). These manifestations are disjunctive instead of lateral, because one cannot consistently believe in the primacy of both the normative and the authoritative at the same time. (Someone may be so inconsistent as to believe in the primacy of the normative with respect to one principle and that of the authoritative with respect to another, but then it does not make sense to classify the exism as "primacy-related".) An ancient form of external abnegational normist-person-centered exclusivism is the description of normists who do not believe in the authority of any god or someone's own god as "atheists", or worse, in a derogatory way. Judging atheist by its literal meaning, however, the exism is rather a form of principalship-related denominationalism. But then, of course, all these types of denominational exclusivism are too closely connected to be treated differently by the biased believer. 'Er Authority, Law and Principal Being are a sacred trinity that is certainly not meant to be taken apart. As regards principle-related (person-centered) denominational exclusivism (X.1253) we will only consider one principle and unitary manifestation of it. The principle is truth, and the criterion not so much whether truth is recognized or not (because every ideology does this in name), but the way in which it is interpreted. In the denominational field this underlies the distinction between supernaturalist or religious and nonsupernaturalist or nonreligious doctrines. (On our model supernaturalism is a denominational violation of the principle of truth, but for the purpose of this classification it suffices to speak of a different interpretation of this principle.) When truth or supernaturalism is the principle, principle-related denominationalism is religiousness-related (person-centered) denominational exclusivism (X.2507). The disjunctive manifestations of this unitary exism are religion-related (person-centered) exclusivism (X.2507.14) and irreligious-person-centered exclusivism (X.2507.15). We say "religion-related" because religious-person-centered exclusivism (X.2507.28) has still to be distinguished from religion-based (person-centered) exclusivism (X.2507.29). Religious-person-centered refers to the distinction between religious and irreligious people, whereas religion-based refers to the distinction between (people of) the one religion and (of) the other. 'Religionism' is aggrandizemental religion-related exclusivism, whether religious-person-centered or religion-based. (Hence, a 'religionist' is not just someone adhering to a religion but someone discriminating on the basis of adherence to religion, or to a particular religion.) As is generally the case with disjunctive manifestations of the same type, the aggrandizemental component of the one corresponds de facto to the abnegational component of the other. Thus aggrandizemental religious-person-centered exclusivism or religious exclusivism (X.2507.28.2), that is, exism re religious people who are believed or felt to be superior or good on the whole corresponds to abnegational irreligious-person-centered exclusivism (X.2507.15.3), that is, exism re non- or irreligious people who are believed or felt to be inferior, if not wicked. (Irreligious may be used instead of nonreligious here because it is now subject to an exclusivist attitude or practise.) Similarly, aggrandizemental irreligious-person-centered exclusivism or irreligious exclusivism (X.2507.15.2), that is, exism re irreligious people who are believed to be superior or good on the whole corresponds to abnegational religious-person-centered exclusivism (X.2507.28.3). Altho we believe that supernaturalism is a violation of the principle of truth and that the human mind should therefore be purged of it, it is religious belief itself which must be considered normatively inferior because of its being supernaturalistic. This religious belief should not be confused, however, with the religious person adhering to such a belief: 'e may even be normatively superior because of 'er good conduct in other respects. And if 'e isn't, it is 'er right of personhood to have religious convictions. Should a religious person voluntarily ask to be exorcized 'imself of spiritual ideas which are inconsistent or too implausible to be true, or to have remained true, we may assist 'im. Yet, we must not force such an operation on 'im. In the event that these spiritual ideas are, and remain, the evil cause of 'er own infringements of other people's rights of personhood, there are always suitable measures which can be taken. (Unlike certain sacred books of religious or monotheist ideology, none of the books of this Model calls for the wholesale slaughter of denominational opponents, neither literally, nor figuratively.) The encroachment by religious people upon the moral rights of personhood of other religious and of nonreligious people, especially in countries where the majority of the citizens were, or still are, religious, is an affirmative manifestation of active self-aggrandizing religionism. The gravest and most bloody examples of this religionism have been the civil and international wars between people or nations fighting in the name of a different god, or in the name of the same god, but for different socioeconomic and national interests. This religion-based exclusivism, however, is only one aspect of religion-related exism. Warfare amongst religious people themselves may be a serious affirmative manifestation of it, yet we must not forget the intermediary manifestations which prepare people for such affirmative actions. An intermediary manifestation of religious-person-centered exism is the employment and propagation of religious symbols by the state (whether or not in connection with religious feasts). The evaluative opposite of this emblematic manifestation and of all similar, nonemblematic manifestations of religionism is abnegational religious-person-centered exism, which involves the encroachment by nonreligious people upon the moral rights of personhood of religious people. What it does not involve, however, is the nonuse of religious symbols by the state even tho religious fanatics have but too often claimed that such nonuse would be antireligious. Time and again these unteachable out-and-outers have to be told that the state has to represent citizens of all denominations, and citizens of no denomination, by not exclusively associating itself with the denominational belief of any group in particular. When governments that do not allow the display of religious emblems in public buildings and during public ceremonies display the emblems of a party-political ideology instead, this is in itself no abnegational religious-person-centered exism, but a brand of politico-ideological exclusivism. Such is no better nor worse than religionism. 2.5.3 PRINCIPALSHIP-RELATED It is not logically necessary for a denominational doctrine to profess the existence of one or more principal beings. It is even not necessary that any principal being does play a role in such a doctrine. (But if it doesn`t, the doctrine must be a normist one.) The being in principal being refers to a kind of entity among other entities to which the norm(s) of a denominational doctrine somehow apply. The principal refers to the main, or one of the main, roles played by such an entity. In a normist doctrine a principal being need not be an authority but, of course, it must be something else than one of the norms itself. A principal being is a 'god' in our terminology if it serves as a denominational medium of aggrandizemental exclusivism in some way, and a 'demon' if it serves as a denominational medium of abnegational exclusivism. Obviously, these definitions start from 'regular' theodemonism. The definition of god does not hold for 'pantheism', for instance; but rightly so, for pantheism is totally devoid of any principal being and of any sensible distinction between the divine and the nondivine. Where everything is divine, nothing is, and where everything is a principal being, no being is. It is therefore important not to lose sight of the fact that on our definition a 'god' is a principal being. Finally, if a so-called 'god' is supernaturally conceived but does nowhere serve as an instrument of aggrandizemental nor as one of abnegational exclusivism by way of the things it kills, forbids, is ashamed of, dislikes or ignores, we shall not call it "a god" but rather "a mythological curiosity" or something of that ilk. Such nonexclusivist supernatural conceptions seem to be extremely rare or nonexistent tho. Denominationalism on the basis of the god(s) and/or demon(s) recognized in the doctrine someone adheres to is theodemonism-related (person-centered) exclusivism (X.2508). Denominationalism on the basis of the principal being(s) recognized in the doctrine someone adheres to, whether theodemonical or not, is general principalship-related (person-centered) exclusivism (X.2509). When it concerns the concept of a superior being, the two forms of principalship-related exism will be called here "theism-related" and "general superiority-related exclusivism" (X.5016 & 5018) respectively. The twin manifestation of theism-related exism is demonism-related exclusivism (X.5017). This latter exism pertains both to the attitude towards people who believe in a devil (and possibly even more demons) and to the attitude towards people who do not believe in a devil or demon. We will now finish our classification of integral exclusivisms with one unitary manifestation of theism-related and one of general superiority-related exism. Since the cladograms of theodemonism- and general principalship-related exclusivism have exactly the same structure, both unitary manifestations at the end are quantitative. Quantitative theism-related exclusivism (X.10033) is exism re a person or group of people on the basis of the number of gods recognized; quantitative general superiority-related exclusivism (X.10037) is exism re a person or group of people on the basis of the number of superior principal beings recognized. The dimensional manifestations of quantitative theism-related exclusivism for a trichotomous subdivision are: theist-, atheist-, monotheist- and polytheist-person-centered exclusivism (X.10033.10 & 11 & 20 & 21). (The subdivision is trichotomous because theist(ic) is mono- or polytheist(ic).) It is not necessary to mention the componential and operational manifestations of theist- and atheist-person-centered exclusivism; they will tell the same story as religious and irreligious person-centered exclusivism. The only thing which deserves to be mentioned separately in this language is lingual external abnegational atheist-person-centered exclusivism (X.10033.10.13.10). It is the infiltration of external abnegational atheist-person-centered exism into traditional language and involves (the acceptance of) the employment of ungodly in the sense of wicked, outrageous or unreasonable to refer to other people by those believing in one or more gods themselves. It is precisely such an attitude of calling people who do not believe in the same things as themselves "wicked" which has made the belief of traditional theists notorious for its intolerance. But apart from the immorality of this attitude, it is also a very unwise one to take, because if not discontinued, this kind of language is bound to backfire. A theist may be right if `e claims that an atheist who neither believes in gods nor in norms has no reason not to be wicked. But so far as normist non-theodemonists are concerned the situation is rather the other way around. The reason why will be revealed when we are going to study the question of denominational primacy. However, there is one great comfort for those suffering from abnegational atheist-person-centered exclusivism: the adherents of the present, inclusivistic doctrine shall never be allowed to call any person "wicked", or "godly" in the sense of wicked, just because that person believes in one or more gods or demons and does not believe in the primacy of the normative. Quantitative theism-related exclusivism is paralleled by quantitative general superiority-related exclusivism. Of this unitary exism we will only mention the first and the second disjunctive manifestations. The first disjunctive of quantitative general superiority-related exclusivism (X.10037.14) is exism re a person or group of persons recognizing one or more superior principal beings in their denominational system of thought; the second disjunctive (X.10037.15) is exism re a person or group of persons who do not recognize any superior principal being in their denominational system of thought. Exclusivism with respect to people who recognize a/the supreme being is of the former type, and exclusivism with respect to people who do not recognize a/the supreme being of the latter type. If 'every' supreme being were a god, this manifestation of exclusivism would not have to be mentioned again. The second disjunctive would then simply be atheist-person-centered exism and the first one theist-person-centered exism so far as the supreme being is concerned. But a supreme being is not necessarily a god, and the supreme being is not. When we examined the role of normative supremeness in denominationalism (I.6.2.4) it was pointed out that it is erroneous to assume that a supreme being and a (sole) god would be identical. And it was argued too that every denominational doctrine has at least an implicit notion of what is, or would be, normatively superior or supreme. Having chosen the norm of inclusivity as the first norm of our doctrine, we have implicitly recognized relevance as being superior to irrelevance. On our model the supreme being, or the image of (the) supreme being, therefore cannot be the product of any form of supreme exclusivism. In other words, it cannot be a god or the image of a god. But we have, then, merely established what the supreme being, or the image of (the) supreme being, cannot be, or must not be of necessity. Inclusivism does not constitute a complete denominational doctrine nor does it furnish us with a substantive picture of supremeness; not by itself and even not in combination with the principle of truth and the right to personhood. The reason is simply that the norm of inclusivity as an interpreted principle of discriminational relevance presupposes a choice of one or more values. Altho some of the values which people have selected, or still select, are already illegitimate from the standpoint of relevance itself, it is not, and cannot be, correct that all other values would be legitimate and representative of normative supremeness. Hence, the fundamental question we are now faced with is what is the superior goal, or what are the superior goals, of discriminational relevance?. The fundamental choice leading to its answer we have already made in adopting that interpretation of the principle of discriminational relevance which is neutralistic. 2.5.3.0 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUPREME BEING ABOVE GOD AND DEMON The supreme being does not necessarily live or exist on Earth nor in a place away from this earth. It may, but it need not -- and it is irrelevant. The supreme being does not necessarily have a human form and feelings nor a nonhuman form and feelings. It may, but it need not -- and it is irrelevant. The supreme being does not necessarily have the color of your own race nor that of any other race or people. It may, but it need not -- and it is irrelevant. The supreme being does not necessarily have the attributes of the male sex nor those of the female sex. It may, but it need not -- and it is irrelevant. If it were any of these things of necessity, or if it had any of these things of necessity, it would be a god or a demon. And as a god or a demon it could never be the supreme being. For supreme being is neutrality with regard to all of us, and with regard to all others. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 THE NORM OF NEUTRALITY 3.1 BASICS 3.1.1 FORMULA OF THE NORM The norm of neutrality is the ground-norm obtained by taking the non-metadoctrinal, nonpropositional principle of catenated neutrality and by refining or interpreting it in a relevantistic way. In short: it is the relevantistic interpretation of the principle of neutrality. 3.1.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF CATENATED NEUTRALITY The ontological position of the norm of neutrality is not different from that of the norm of inclusivity. The principles of which the norms of neutrality and inclusivity are interpretations are both (non-meta-)doctrinal and nonpropositional. Thus in the first instance both norms belong to a first-order normative doctrine, that is, a normative doctrine about the ground-world. We have seen how in this ground-world the principle of relevance of which the norm of inclusivity is an interpretation is supplementary to the principle of truth. Truth in isolation is not worth anything, for truth always needs relevance in the end. Similarly, the principle of neutrality of which the norm of neutrality is an interpretation is supplementary to the principle of relevance. Relevance in isolation is not worth anything either, for also relevance needs a focus of relevancy in the end. It is the principle of neutrality which ultimately furnishes this determinant. Like the principles of truth and relevance, the principle of neutrality is a normative principle. This means that by adopting the principle neutrality is considered normatively superior, like truth and relevance are considered normatively superior. Just as the principle of relevance only tells us that relevance is superior to irrelevance, so the principle of neutrality only tells us that neutrality is superior to unneutrality. It does not imply that neutrality would be superior to truth, for instance (assuming that such an assertion would make sense at all). Theoretically, the quantity belonging to a focus of relevancy can be a binary quantity, that is, a quantity whose value is either 0 or 1. (Say, 1 for fulfilling a promise, and 0 for not fulfilling it.) In such a case there is no neutral value (and no unneutral one) in the strict, direct sense. On the catenical construction there simply is no neutral value, because the existence of such a value requires both that the quantity in question can be larger (or positive) and that it can be smaller (or negative). But in every other, noncatenical sense of neutral which somehow still agrees with the word`s original meaning of not which of two, a binary quantity does not have a neutral (or unneutral) value either. For example, it might be argued that a flower either has stamens or pistils, or that it does not have them. In the former case it would not be neutral, in the latter case it would. But the nonneutrality which purports to represent only one value here (1, for instance), actually represents two values, namely the having of stamens (the organs producing male gametes) and the having of pistils (the female counterpart). This is the reason why the lack of both stamens and pistils has been termed "neutral" in the first place. Yet, this is not the sort of 'neutrality' the principle of catenated neutrality is concerned with. It would only be exclusivistic to adhere to a principle according to which it were superior to have neither female nor male reproductive organs, or forthat matter, only female or male ones. Any principle which made the exclusion or possession of certain organs or parts normatively superior or inferior in itself, would be exclusivistic. And so would any principle which made a whole group or class normatively superior or inferior in itself; for example, the class of nonsexual beings as distinct from the class of sexual beings, or vice versa. If the quantity belonging to the focus of relevancy admits of three or more degrees, it will be a catenary quantity. (This does not mean that some artificially construed quantity which can take on three or more values must be catenary.) In this case one of the nonextreme values is neutral; which one will depend on the catenization. The neutrality is, then, the predicate on the line between negative predicates on the one hand, and positive ones on the other, while there is not, and cannot be, another set of nonlimiting predicates from a logical and catenical point of view. So, unlike the existence of two sexes on Earth (with the possible addition of a third, nonsexual division) the existence of one or more negativities, one or more positivities and of one concatenate neutrality in between, is not logically contingent. Moreover, a predicative principle like the principle of catenated neutrality does not distinguish one kind of nonpredicative primary thing, or part of a thing, from another kind of thing, or part of a thing, but one kind of predicate from another kind of predicate. By thus differentiating between predicates, it teaches what proper predicate a thing should have or not have, that is, what the thing should be and do, or what it should not be and not do. To say that catenated neutrality is superior, as in the case of the principle of catenated neutrality, is to say that the catenal in question should have the neutrality of the catena in question. It is not yet to say more than that. It may not be 'possible' for the catenal to be neutral at all, for instance. Or, it may be 'possible' to be neutral in one respect, and to be neutral in another respect, but not to be neutral in both respects at once. The modal condition as expressed by the word possible need not be of a physical nature. It can also be of a catenical character. For example, a primary thing which is unneutrally catenal with respect to a certain catena, but neutrally catenal with respect to the increase catena of that catena, has first to become unneutrally catenal with respect to the increase catena before it can become neutrally catenal with respect to the original catena. But when it is neutrally catenal with respect to the original catena, it can, catenically speaking, also be neutrally catenal with respect to the increase catena. From the perspective of the principle of neutrality the situation in which the primary thing is neutrally catenal with respect to both the original and the increase catena is normatively superior to any situation in which it is not; that is, all other things being equal. The ceteris paribus clause (all other things being equal) is a crucial one, for it is not hard to conceive of all sorts of situations in which happiness-catenals would supposedly be 'terribly distressed' if 'everything' were neutral or equal, and if 'nothing' were allowed to change. Apart from the question of whether literally everything could indeed be neutral or remain the same, such reasoning is fallacious. The argument that happiness-catenals would be very unhappy under certain so-called 'neutral' conditions, is not an argument against neutrality, but an argument against unhappiness, which by itself is a plainly unneutral predicate. According to the principle of catenated neutrality a situation in which a thing`s catenality is neutral or less unneutral is a better one than a situation in which its catenality is unneutral or more unneutral, granted that there is no difference in happiness-catenality in both situations, nor any other catenary difference in any other respect. If there is such a difference in happiness-catenality, or in other respects, the ceteris paribus clause does not hold any more. Of course, in practise this will often be the case, yet to grasp the meaning of the principle of catenated neutrality we must start with varying one quantity at a time. For each catenical aspect, neutrality is superior to unneutrality, and perineutrality to non-perineutral unneutrality, all other things being equal. To have meaning in the first place, the principle of neutrality can solely apply to nonnormative aspects, since it is a normative principle itself. If, and insofar as, concepts like goodness or praiseworthiness and badness or vice are normative concepts, the principle of neutrality is not applicable to them, even if they are or were catenary concepts. It is precisely the function of the principle of neutrality as a normative principle to establish what is good (namely neutrality or the promotion of neutrality) and what is more or less bad (namely unneutrality or the promotion of unneutrality); and what is recommendable (namely striving for neutrality) and what is more or less vicious (namely striving for polarity). Hence, it would be erroneous to start from the idea that goodness in a purely normative sense would be the positivity of an explicit triad (the 'goodness catena'), and to argue next that one should be neither good nor bad on the principle of neutrality. It follows precisely from this principle itself that goodness in a purely normative, universal sense would be the neutrality of a badness catena, that is, a bipolarity-catena or quasi-duad. That it is good to be neutrally catenal or bad to be unneutrally catenal, and that it is recommendable to strive for neutrality or vicious to strive for unneutrality as an ultimate value, is what is immediately implied by the principle of catenated neutrality itself. 3.1.3 WHY A CATENICAL PRINCIPLE? Without a normative principle any focus of relevancy would be equally acceptable. And without such a principle any distinction could be made relevant, unless the same distinction would already have been drawn in the focus of relevance itself. (But in the absence of any principle applying to the determinant to be selected, other than the principle of relevance itself, it would be very difficult to find another suitable candidate to warrant the distinction in question.) That a comprehensive normative doctrine does need one or more principles governing the choice of focuses needs no further explanation, but why should it be the principle of catenated neutrality? This question consists of two parts: firstly, why should the normative principle concerned be a catenical principle; and secondly, why should according to this principle neutrality be superior to polarity (other things being equal)? Nonexclusivist ground-world principles do not distinguish between primary things (or parts of things) as primary things per se; if they do distinguish between primary things, then indirectly because of a predicate they have, but which they do not have as a matter of logical necessity. A nonexclusivist ground-world principle merely distinguishes between the one predicate and the other. Now, such a predicate may be determinative or nondeterminative, proper or improper, privative or nonprivative, and catenated or noncatenated. Since a normative principle must inform us of what a primary thing ought to be and/or do, the predicate in question should at least be determinative. Moreover, the principle must also inform us adequately in terms of our ontology what a thing should be and/or do, and therefore it must be definable in such a way that it solely refers to proper predicates or to sets of proper predicates. This will also dispose of pseudopredicates like belonging-to-a-certain-class-of-primary-things or having-certain-primary-things-as-component-parts. (Being-male and being-female are notorious examples of such pseudopredicates.) It need not yet automatically dispose of an improper predicate like catenality, for catenality is having a proper, catenated predicate. Nonetheless, the fact that there does not really exist a predicate of catenality may already be sufficient reason not to believe in any normative principle of catenality. It need not automatically dispose of privative predicates either, particularly those which are the negation of a proper predicate, for the principle might just lay down what a primary thing should not be or do. A noncatenical ultimate ground-world principle would prescribe that a primary thing ought to have the one noncatenated, nonnormative predicate rather than the or an other of the same noncatenical aspect. (Altho it may also on the basis of a catenical principle be better to have the one noncatenated predicate rather than the or an other, this would merely be so for derivative, not for ultimate, reasons.) A truly noncatenical aspect has two predicates which are each other`s negation; if it has more than two, it can either be subdivided into such aspects, or there is actually a catenary ordering principle underlying it. In the event that the principle of ordering the noncatenical predicates is in fact catenary, the normative principle concerned is ultimately a catenical one (assuming that the normative value of the noncatenated predicates is determined by the position they occupy on the basis of the ordering principle). In the event that an aspect is truly noncatenical, the quantity in the determinant concerned is binary, and one of the two predicates privative. A catenical aspect, too, has a privative predicate (namely the noncatenality), but besides this, it has at least three proper, nonprivative predicates (the catenated ones). One could say that the value of the determinant is 0 for the privative predicate and 1 for the nonprivative one; if the aspect is catenical, 0 for noncatenality, 1 for catenality. Some might now argue that in the case of a noncatenical aspect the nonprivative predicate is normatively superior to the privative predicate, because the nonprivative predicate 'is' something, and the privative one nothing. The analog in the case of catenical aspects is that catenality is having something (that is, having a proper predicate), whereas noncatenality is having nothing. But if a privative predicate is nothing --which is correct--, then it is not inferior either. And if a nonprivative predicate is the only thing of an aspect, there is nothing it could be superior to. It might be replied that it is the person or other thing having the nonprivative predicate which is superior (good in a motivational sense, for instance), but then existence cannot be the reason why it would be, because such a person or other thing would exist nevertheless, regardless of its having the nonprivative predicate or not. This argument from the normative superiority of existence is as nonsensical as the historical argument that a perfect being exists because existence itself is supposed to be a mode of perfection. Evil exists too, and unfortunately its existence is not to be preferred to its absence. (On such a preposterous schema something like killing nonpersonal sentient beings would in itself be normatively superior to not killing them, that is, doing nothing.) There does not seem to be any reason why a noncatenated ground-world predicate would in itself be normatively superior to a noncatenated predicate of the same aspect, or even why catenality would be normatively superior to noncatenality, or vice versa. That is, there does not seem to be any doctrinal, ground-world principle to this effect which is universal and ultimate. Only so far as particular noncatenical aspects are concerned may there be very good reasons to consider the one noncatenated predicate better than the other. Isn`t fulfilling a promise, for instance, normatively superior to not fulfilling one, or not stealing better than stealing? Altho we must agree with this, such does not prove, or even make plausible, that keeping-a-promise and not-stealing are prescribed by ultimate noncatenical principles. Stealing is even no purely descriptive or factual-modal notion and thus cannot even be the subject of a correctly formulated normative principle. An analysis of stealing or property will make a principle of not stealing a derivative one, that is to say, a principle based upon other ultimate principles (one being the metadoctrinal principle underlying the right to personhood). And even tho keeping a promise can be analyzed in purely factual-modal terms, adopting an ultimate principle of promise-keeping is an arbitrary ad hoc procedure. We will see that such a principle can be founded in the ultimate (non-ground-world) principle of truth and a derivative (ground-world) principle of beneficence, and that we do not have to introduce it as an additional ultimate principle. We still do need a catenical ultimate doctrinal ground-world principle to justify our choices of determinants of discriminational relevance, and to justify our interpretation of the principle of discriminational relevance itself. Granted that we have already adopted the noncatenical metadoctrinal principle, and the noncatenical principles of truth and relevance, there is no need for an ultimate doctrinal ground-world principle which is noncatenical as well. 3.1.4 WHY NEUTRALITY? We have suggested that there is no universal, noncatenical, ultimate, doctrinal ground-world principle. Isn't it equally plausible that there is no universal catenical, ultimate principle either? This would mean that, for example, neutrality were superior to unneutrality one time, and that it were inferior to extremity another time. And not only this; it would mean that one had to strive for neutrality on the basis of an ultimate principle one time, and that one had to strive for extremity on the basis of an ultimate principle another time. But why would neutrality be superior and have to be chosen as a goal in the one case, and would extremity be superior and have to be chosen in another? What would be the relevant difference between the catenical aspects concerned? If there always is such a relevant difference, the whole system of so-called 'ultimate' principles boils down to one system with one ultimate principle understood and interpreted in a relevantist way. If the distinction between aspects governed by different ultimate, catenical principles is not always relevant, then the collection of these principles is irrelevantistic and exclusivistic in its ground-world effects. But such effects offend against the norm of inclusivity. A (positive) utilitarian would say that people ought to aim at (non-happiness-catenary) neutrality when this produces more happiness than unhappiness. On the other hand, when it produces more happiness than unhappiness to aim at extremity instead, they ought to do that. (Aiming at the greatest happiness possible is just such an example.) The relevance of the distinction between aspects --`e might claim-- is precisely this: where (non-happiness-catenary) neutrality produces the greatest utility, neutrality should be the goal; where some form of unneutrality produces the greatest utility, this form of unneutrality should be the goal. On this view there is only one ultimate, catenary principle, namely that of the greatest happiness. (For a negative utilitarian it is enough to minimize unhappiness.) However, the utilitarian still has to demonstrate that `er 'relevance' does not depend on external nonrelevance, that is, that the distinction `e draws between the happiness-catenary aspect and all other aspects in `er selection of the ultimate principle is itself relevant. Now, there are indeed good reasons to assume that the position of the happiness catena is a special one. As a matter of fact, we shall later take this special position of the happiness catena into consideration ourselves. Yet, our choice of an ultimate, catenical principle must not depend on such an assumption, if only because an ultimate principle of happiness would discriminate between primary things which are happiness-catenal and primary things which are not. Moreover, a sole, ultimate principle of happiness would not be compatible with our neutralist interpretation of the principle of discriminational relevance. A utilitarian interpretation of this principle would make equality and nondiscrimination in the inclusivist sense a contingent matter. Therefore, the sole, ultimate, catenary principle is not the extremist principle of (the greatest) happiness or utility. That principle is not even truly catenical, because it is merely concerned with one catena in particular, and not with catenas in general. Given that our equal, unless interpretation of the principle of discriminational relevance is egalitarian, that is, neutralistic, there is only one ultimate, catenical principle which is compatible with it; and that is the principle of neutrality. Solely the relevantist-egalitarian formulation of the norm of inclusivity is in keeping with our sense of justice, and therefore this egalitarianism or neutralism with respect to the making of distinctions is certainly a very important reason for universal neutralism. (Equality itself could not be conceived of as an ultimate principle, for this would require a justification of the distinction between difference-catenary and other catenical aspects.) To make it plausible tho that neutrality is ultimately indeed superior to polarity, at least as a basic rule to start from, more examples are needed. Of course, counterexamples which seem to make this principle implausible can be adduced too. Thus, not only unhappiness is normatively inferior on the principle of neutrality, but also happiness when compared with a neutral state of being neither happy, nor unhappy --the crucial presupposition being that all other things would be equal. Such apparent counterexamples we will deal with later in this chapter (in 3.4). Besides the egalitarian argument for the superiority of neutralness, there is a systematic, catenical argument. It is that the neutrality is not just a predicate of the catena but a special and central one. Suppose that the highest normative value were assigned to an unneutral proper predicate, then the first arbitrary choice would be between a negative and a positive predicate, and the second arbitrary choice would be the degree of negativity or positivity. For a nonderivative catena it does in itself not matter which side is called "the negative" and which side is called "the positive one". To argue that it is '(most) logical' to consider positivity superior and negativity inferior, is tantamount to arguing that what is superior and what is inferior might as well have been the other way round. This is not the sort of guideline one would expect from a normative doctrine. Nonetheless, one might still wonder why a predicate (or the thing having it) would be more inferior as it becomes more unneutral or extreme. Could not the neutrality be superior, while all unneutral proper predicates would be equally inferior? Such an evaluation would imply that being-perineutral or being-extreme made, normatively speaking no difference. But especially where the neutrality principle provides the goal to aim at, it makes an enormous difference whether something or someone aims at perineutrality, rather than at extremity, and hardly any difference whether it or `e aims at perineutrality, rather than at neutrality. From this angle it must therefore be assumed that not only neutrality is superior to unneutrality, but also perineutrality to non-perineutral unneutrality, and nonextreme unneutrality to extremity. A third argument in favor of neutrality is the hypothesis of mean-neutrality as it is actually assumed to be true in scientific theories. As explained in the Book of Instruments (I.2.6.3) this hypothesis underlies the principle of the conservation of mass and energy and similar, physical principles of conservation. (Principles is to be preferred to laws as principles does not presuppose a supernatural lawgiver.) It is because the mean energy increase in a closed system has to be, or is taken to be, 0 that no energy will melt into, or spring from, nothingness. (If the system is called "closed" altho 'energy' may flow in and out, it is the mean increase of mass which is 0.) The fact that for every process the decrease of electrical charge is the same as the increase of charge agrees with this hypothesis as well. Other principles of conservation are those of rotation and momentum. In all these cases the total amount of the quantity concerned does not change, or --to put it differently-- the quantity is 'conserved'. The conservation principles in these interactions are immediately related to the catenical symmetries in the predicates of the interacting bodies or particles. That is why physicists tend to use the notions of symmetry (or the symmetry of a process) and conservation (or the principle of conservation) interchangeably. These two notions together express the regularities in the subatomic world of particles and antiparticles between which there is such a basic symmetry. The search for an 'ultimate, fundamental symmetry' in nature is therefore nothing else than a search for the last principles of conservation and the common denominator of all of them. A different type of argument in favor of neutrality does not so much center on states of constancy or neutrality, but on attempts or forces to attain neutrality and to maintain delicate balances in nature. Altho there is no logical connection between these descriptions and the normative principle of neutrality --like there is no logical connection between facts and any normative principle--, they put neutrality in a greater perspective and narrow the gap between processes initiated by persons for normative reasons and processes occurring in nature which are not intentional but aimed at the same good nevertheless. Induction currents, for instance, work against the change by which they came into existence. The very attraction between positively charged particles on the one hand, and negatively charged ones on the other, and the repulsion of entities of the same polar kind, is a phenomenon which contributes to electroneutrality in general. Furthermore, if the external conditions of a system in equilibrium (as concentration, pressure, temperature) are changed, the balance will shift in such a way that the change introduced will be leveled as much as possible. (The neutral or neutral-directed concepts here are equilibrium, balance and leveling; the unneutral concept is change.) In thermodynamics it is a principle (or 'law') that every system which can take its own course aims at maximum entropy. Now, entropy is a tricky physical notion which can be defined in several ways, dependent on the quantity or dimension the theorist is most interested in. 'E may think of it in terms of unavailable energy in a closed system, or in terms of 'chaos' or 'disorder' because of the movement of matter in chance patterns. Yet, however irregular the movement of individual molecules may be, the maximum entropy of the system as a whole is a state of overall uniformity or homogeneity. In this state the concentration is the same in all subsystems, that is, the same as the mean one for the entire system. For the system as a whole, maximum entropy corresponds to a complete chemical equilibrium and the greatest order possible in that the density is the same throughout. It is this order the system aims at, and which remains once it has been attained. There are numerous other phenomena which demonstrate that the whole world is fully alive with a quest for neutrality. Particularly in biology there is an abundance of examples of living beings or ecosystems which try to restore every balance upset. Tho an act in quest of neutrality in one respect may conflict with an act in quest of neutrality in another respect, the fact that 'nature' itself, to which any ideology is alien, has always known some principle of 'neutrality', of 'equilibrium', of 'harmony', or whatever it should be called, makes the cultural selection of such a principle a well-considered and inspiring choice. But perhaps this natural 'canon of equilibrium' is not a principle we can really draw from nature. Maybe it is merely neutralist imagination or a prejudgment. The principle of conservation does not seem to hold for all physical quantities, and there are also enough examples of the destruction of natural equilibriums. As mentioned in the Book of Instruments (4.3.1) it has been suggested that it is people who prescribe the laws of science to nature. (And for so-called 'laws' this is quite obvious.) There is one thing, however, which we certainly do not prescribe to nature but to ourselves. That is, that it is the absence of neutrality which requires our explanation or justification more than anything else, and that it may even suffice to explain or justify polarity by referring to a neutrality of another aspect, or to a striving for such a neutrality. Conservation, symmetry and equality are explanations, justifications or goals in themselves, both in the field of natural science and in the field of the normative. In everyday life, too, it is considered rational to start from the assumption that the chance that one thing will occur is the same as the chance that another thing will occur, until or unless one has good reasons to suppose that the one chance is bigger than the other. Indubitably, this general attitude towards neutral notions like equality and symmetry is im- or explicitly founded in a neutralist postulate. 3.1.5 WHY A RELEVANTIST INTERPRETATION? The forces which restore, or endeavor to restore, disturbed equilibriums in nature, achieve, or endeavor to achieve this, with counteractions (such as a higher reproduction or reproductive capacity in the event of a diminishing population). But each counteraction has to be as unneutral as the disturbance it is meant to offset in order to be wholly effective. The striving for maximum entropy in systems which can take their own course has neutrality as a result, that is, a homogeneous concentration throughout a closed system, but the changes in concentration in the different parts of such a system are unneutral themselves. The process in which the change in an external condition of a chemical system is leveled as much as possible is a reaction process which is basically unneutral itself, yet aimed at neutrality, that is, equilibrium. Induction currents work against the change by which they came into existence, yet these forms of electricity are as unneutral as the change which caused them. The principles of conservation of momentum, of rotation, of charge and of mass and energy imply that increase-catenary neutrality, or the state in which the total amount of these quantities does not alter, can only be maintained with an equally unneutral counterchange for every alteration. These are all examples of a neutrality needing a certain kind of polarity. Striving for neutrality in the event of polarity therefore requires increase-catenary polarity, that is, polarity with respect to the increase-catena of the original catena whose neutrality is strived for. If good is equated with of superior normative value, the neutrality strived for is 'good', whereas all unneutralities concerned are 'bad' on the principle of catenated neutrality. But if the neutrality strived for is 'good', and if right is equated with promoting the good, the act of striving for neutrality is 'right' even tho such an act requires comparative unneutrality, that is, a form of 'badness'. On the other hand, an act of striving for polarity may require the same degree of polarity, and thus be equally bad, but wrong as well. Strictly speaking, the principle of neutrality solely determines what is 'good' or 'bad' on the performatory level, whether in the sense of what is superior, or in the sense of what actually or probably promotes what is superior. Without further refinement it cannot even determine what is 'right' in that it promotes neutrality or intends to promote it, for what promotes neutrality is unneutral in itself. On the decision-theoretical level, however, 'right' is indeed what is decided to promote a neutral cause, and 'wrong' what is decided to promote an unneutral cause. (Note that in the context of this chapter we must always read "prima facie right" and "wrong", or add insofar as the norm of neutrality is concerned.) Even when the distinction between goodness and rightness is made with regard to the neutralist evaluation of the ground-world, the principle of neutrality needs at least to be refined or interpreted in such a way that the polarity which is inherent in the striving for (the greatest chance of) neutrality cannot itself be the object of a right action. Otherwise it would even be right to offset and upset acts or processes aimed at neutrality. Given that this is not right, our interpretation of the principle of neutrality is of the neutral, unless type: one should not aim at polarity, unless such polarity serves a neutral purpose. This is tantamount to saying that neutrality is normatively superior, but that some aspects (first of all the auxiliary ones) have to be treated differently on the basis of this principle, because such a distinction between aspects is relevant to a neutral end. What nonauxiliary (or 'notional') aspects can or must be treated differently if the neutrality of a certain catena is indeed a legitimate goal? To answer this question we should, among other things, look at each catena's position in a derivation system. Let us call the catena with the neutrality which can be chosen as an end in itself "catena A". Obviously, if the neutrality of A is a legitimate penultimate end (with neutrality per se as ultimate end), the neutrality of the increase catena of A can only be a legitimate end as well if the state of affairs in question is neutral from the angle of A. The superiority of increase-catenary neutrality is therefore a conditional one, given that an original catena takes precedence over a derivative one. What holds for the neutrality of the increase- or differentiation-catena, holds for the time-differential catena of A: rest or constancy are normatively superior, unless movement or change over time promote neutralness in terms of the original catena. This is the relevant distinction we draw between two types of constancy and two types of change over time -- 'relevant' that is, in respect of an original catena. Now, what is said to 'promote' neutralnesss may still be a question of physical modal conditions, or a question of catenical relations. And as we are in this context concerned with catenical relations, we can be more precise. We must, then, distinguish between neutrality-differentiation and -differential catenas with an aspectual value 0 for the differentials, and positivity- or other differentiation and differential catenas with an extremely positive or other unneutral aspectual value. The special relationship is, then, between the neutrality of the original catena and the positivity of both the active and the passive neutrality-differentiation catenas and of the neutrality-differential catenas. If we do not refine the principle of neutrality and accept that positive, active and passive, neutrality-differentiation and neutrality-differential change are 'bad', then it will not follow that we should abstain from this kind of badness. We could also refine the principle's formulation and say that it does not apply to the positivities of the neutrality-differentiation and -differential catenas of a catena whose neutrality is unconditionally superior. Whether we opt for the one or the other approach, it does not affect the content of the norm of neutrality. What does affect this content is the catenical distinction which has to made between different aspects. Sometimes positive polarity can be a sign of neutralization, and negative polarity a sign that something is becoming, or is made, (more) unneutral. Just as it does not make sense that neutralization would be inferior to increase-catenary neutrality, or that neutralization would be as inferior as polarization, so it does not make sense to believe that something that is merely a sign of neutralization would be normatively inferior. The neutrality of such a catena would therefore not be superior. A possible example of a catena which has such a signal function is the happiness catena. This catena will be discussed when we examine the concept of the well-being of sentient beings and the principle of beneficence. The principle of neutrality does not lay down what empirical value of a quantity which can assume three or more values is the neutral one and corresponds to the catena value 0. However, given the neutrality of the original catena A, and granted that this neutrality is of superior value, another neutrality cannot be a penultimate end if it belongs to a catena which has been factitiously derived from A. (See I.2.5.3 for the difference between factitious and nonfactitious derivations.) This includes all modulus-catenas. Hence, it cannot be argued that, for example, moderateness is the opposite of extremeness, and that therefore it would be the neutral limit-element between moderateness and extremeness which were normatively superior. The principle of neutrality can solely hold for nonfactitious derivations, basic catenas included. A special type of nonfactitious derivation is, then, the bicatenal bivariant comparative catena for which the neutral value corresponds to equality. Since this catena is neither factitious nor a differentiation or time-differential catena, the principle of neutrality is unconditionally applicable to it. Bicatenal bivariant equality is normatively superior to the concatenate inequality, regardless of the original catena values concerned. This derivative principle is the principle of equality; of catenated bicatenal bivariant equality, to be precise. We will review this principle and traditional objections to it in a separate division of this chapter (namely 3.5). There is at least one more connected series of predicates with regard to which the principle of neutrality does not seem to make sense from a purely conceptual point of view. (Other points of view would require other normative, ground-world principles and would mar the fundamental character of the present analysis.) It is the temporal auxiliary series. If someone were to say that existing-now is normatively superior to existing-in-the-past and to existing-in-the-future, there would be no way to promote this form of the good. The course of time itself cannot be influenced, and things which exist in the future, will exist at a time which is then the present moment. (Or --as a sage of old had it--, 'there is no limit to the present moment'.) Time is an aspect different from all others, and people are even willing to accept the asymmetry of time in that they believe that they can only go forward in it, and not backward. Such asymmetry causes irritation and is being challenged by theorists in search of a ubiquitous and eternal, fundamental symmetry in nature. On our neutralist model it would be nice if the belief in the asymmetry of time proved to be mistaken (provided, of course, that we have not to put up with unneutrality elsewhere). But if there is any factor that 'behaves' differently, it is the factor time, and therefore it is correct that the principle of neutrality does not apply to such an auxiliary predicate. It is also time-differential catenas it does not unconditionally apply to, not any of the other differential catenas. It should now have become clear why the principle of neutrality has to be refined or interpreted in a relevantist way. There are distinctions to be drawn between certain kinds of aspect which are either relevant from the perspective of the superiority of neutrality itself or from the perspective of the adoption of the principle of neutrality. To sum up: the principle of catenated neutrality, whether its formulation is refined or whether it is interpreted in a relevantist way, only applies to: a. connected series of nonauxiliary, nonevaluative, primary predicates --therefore it does not apply to normative, modal and temporal, auxiliary series with auxiliary predicates like goodness, probability and being-in-the-future-- b. catenas which are not factitious --therefore it does not apply to modulus-catenas and certain other difference catenas-- c. catenas with respect to which a primary thing does not need to have an unneutral predicate, if it is to strive for, attain or maintain the neutrality of an original catena --therefore the neutrality of an original catena takes precedence over polarities of differentiation and time-differential catenas-- d. catenas of which one of the monopolarities is not a sign of neutralization with respect to another catena --therefore it does not seem to apply to the happiness catena as we will see later--. It is thinking of the last two types of catena that one can say "neutrality is good, neutral-directedness is right". 3.1.5.0 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE CATENICAL DAO By our stillness we shall be supreme. By our movement we shall bring it about. [This canonical prose poem was partially inspired by a two to two-and-a-half thousand years older saying. Literally, dao means way. The 'dao' of a certain school is the 'way' which that school offers to the students, or the way they are taught. Special meanings are ultimate principle of the universe and right way of life.] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3.1.6 SPATIOTEMPORAL NEUTRALITY AND NEUTRAL-DIRECTEDNESS So far as catenas of the zero- and first levels of reiteration are concerned, the following catenas turn out to be the interesting ones from the neutralist perspective: (a) basic catenas; (b) bicatenally derived, bivariant difference catenas; (c) differentiation and time-differential catenas conditionally; (d) other differential-catenas and quotient-, integral- and product-catenas. The norm of neutrality does not discriminate between the material and the nonmaterial world, or between spatiotemporal and non-spatiotemporal reality in any way. Hence, it is merely to illustrate the basic meaning of the norm of neutrality that we will briefly consider here what is superior or inferior according to this norm with regard to a number of simple, spatiotemporal dimensions. Since this illustration cannot become too technical, we must leave out quotient-, integral- and product-catenas, and thus we will not be discussing the exact derivation of, say, the smallness catenas, altho they are associated with simple dimensions like surface area and volume. Since the principle of neutrality does not apply to time, or a connected series of time predicates, the basic catenas to which it does apply are related to three or more spatial dimensions. We will confine ourselves to one spatial dimension and will term the catena associated with it "the longitude catena" (cp. 'latitude' and 'altitude catena' for a second and third, spatial dimension). Assuming that there is such a catena is tantamount to assuming that there is a neutral longitude between positive longitudes on the one hand, and negative longitudes on the other. But obviously, there is no fixed 'neutral' point; conceptually speaking, we could choose any, provided that it is not at the 'end' of the universe. And so far as we know, there is no empirically given neutral longitude either. Many theorists will, perhaps, be eager to point out that time and space are relative notions, but the matter is not that simple. For if relative is supposed to mean something like comparative and difference-catenary, this presupposes the existence of an original catena of the difference catena in question; let us say, at least in a conceptual sense. Furthermore, to say that relative means relational will not help very much either, because having a one-place predicate of a basic, spatial catena can be construed as having a two-place relation with a thing at a hypothetically neutral point. Even if it is true that the neutral longitude is superior to any other longitude, this seems to have no practical significance. On the hypothesis of mean-neutrality the neutral longitude is the mean longitude of all longitude-catenals, that is, not just the longitude-catenals in the 'universe' we happen to live in, but in all 'universes'. (And on the average all longitude-catenals in whatever 'universe' have the same, neutral position.) This plainly does not give us an empirical clue either. However, if there were such a given, neutral point, it would be better for a material object to be at this point. The farther away a spatiotemporal thing would be from this point, the worse it would be, normatively speaking and all other things being equal. For the same reason as it is arbitrary to fix a so-called 'universally neutral' longitude-catenary point, it is arbitrary to fix any point, and therefore we need not discuss the bicatenal monovariant positivity-difference catena of the longitude catena at all, tho this catena is not factitious. The first result (and a spectacular one) does not come in until we start to consider the bicatenal bivariant difference catena of the longitude catena. In the context of this catena a difference in longitude is either positive or negative, and having the same longitude is neutral. According to the principle of neutrality longitudinal equality is therefore superior to longitudinal inequality, whether positive or negative. And the same holds for the other spatial dimensions. Any force aimed at spatial equality, that is, at having the same spatial position, is therefore neutral-directed. One such neutral-directed force is in fact the dominating force in the universe at large. It is called "gravitation". It is only claimed here that gravitation is a neutral-directed force with respect to the bicatenal bivariant difference catenas of the spatial catenas. The reverse is not true, namely that any such neutral-directed force could not be anything else than gravitation, for the nuclear force or 'strong interaction' which holds protons and neutrons together in the subatomic world is a similar kind of force. But why was gravitation not mentioned before as one of the great neutral-directed forces of nature among other examples of striving for neutrality? The reason is that on the face of it the force of gravity, and also the nuclear force, seem to be forces aimed at extremity (at extreme proximity, to be precise) and it needs a little bit of catenical analysis to show that this view is mistaken. Neither the positive extremity of the proximity catena nor the fact that a force like gravitation is manifested by acceleration determines its being neutral-directed, or not, in terms of the norm of neutrality. The proximity catena is a modulus-catena of the bicatenally derived, bivariant positivity-difference catena of the longitude catena (and similar, spatial catenas). It is therefore a factitious catena. Nonfactitious is the original catena: the bicatenally derived, bivariant difference catena itself. And it is with respect to this catena that a force is neutral-directed or not. What has happened is that the distinction between a positive difference in longitude and a negative difference in longitude was not believed important (and rightly so), and that any such difference has been called "distance". Since this 'distance' is usually by definition positive, having-no-distance or being-at-exactly-the-same-point came to be thought of not only as a limiting case (which is correct), but also as an extreme case (which is fallacious in terms of the original catena). Distance always being positive, and having-no-distance merely being a limiting case, people started talking about "large" and "small distances", thus introducing a new catena of predicates: proximity (corresponding to a small distance), the vague being-neither-close-nor-far (a distance which is neither small nor large) and farness (a large distance). The principle of neutrality, however, does not apply to this modulus-catena, because original catenality takes precedence over derivative catenality. (Why it does not apply to acceleration either, we will discuss shortly.) Life on Earth, or on any other planet, is unthinkable without the mutual attraction between this planet's mass and bodies at or near its surface, or between material entities (such as bodies, particles and quanta) in general. The scope of this neutral-directed attraction is universal. It is present on the level of galaxies and on the level of our daily life (as the force of gravity) as well as on the level of the subatomic world (as the nuclear force). The force of gravity and the nuclear force themselves are not normatively superior; instead it is their being directed at what is normatively superior which should impress us. Now, skepticists may easily come up with examples of particularly gravitational effects which are nothing to be joyful about. They may point at children or people falling into deep ravines or out of windows of tall buildings and being crushed to death because of the earth's attraction. (Yes, Mother Earth's love can be rather ponderous.) Apart from the fact that they then put all emphasis on a few exceptional cases, they do not seldom confuse people or mental beings and material bodies. In the strict sense, gravitation is a neutral-directed force which does not affect mental beings at all, but only bodies, including those of people. Furthermore, a body may have all kinds of other properties which are dramatically changed when it hits the earth, yet the question of the normative evaluation of those changes is a different question altogether. People or children, too, may be in agony when they fall, or have fallen, from a great height. Nevertheless this great unhappiness is not what gravitation is about. Gravitation is a force operating in the spatiotemporal field, and to say that it is neutral-directed is to say that it aims at neutrality in this field, a neutrality which is normatively superior, all other things being equal. A world governed by gravitation may only be compared with a world without gravitation when the latter world is equally happy, equally unhappy, or also neither happy nor unhappy. Where neutrality needs to be restored, established or maintained, this requires certain kinds of polarities of the differentiation and time-differential catenas. Differentiation with respect to the basic longitude catena is a change of longitude, time-differential bipolarity is movement. But this change and this movement is change and movement with respect to an (imaginary?) neutral point or a body located at this point; it is not change and movement with respect to an arbitrary other body. The latter predicates do not belong to the differentiation and time-differential catenas of the basic catena but of its bivariant difference catena. It is positive neutrality-differentiation and time-differential catenality which is needed to further the neutrality of the original catena. The neutralities of these catenas are constancy and rest. They are superior, unless positivity, that is, a change or movement in the direction of the neutrality of the original catena, is needed to promote the cause of original neutralness. Negativity, that is, a change or movement in a direction away from the original catena's neutrality, is normatively inferior in all instances. Whether positive or negative, change and movement can never be ends in themselves on the norm of neutrality; if allowable, they must always serve a more urgent, neutral end. On the other hand, constancy and rest may be taken as ends in themselves, unless a more urgent, neutral end requires change and movement. (What is more urgent follows, firstly, from the position of the neutrality in the derivation system concerned, and secondly, from the relative weight of neutralities belonging to different derivation systems, an issue to be discussed later.) When the distance between two objects becomes smaller and smaller (and their difference-catenary value approaches 0), we say that they move with respect to each other, or simplifyingly, that the one object is at rest, while the other moves towards it (particularly when this latter object is much smaller and lighter). This movement itself tho can theoretically be a constant movement, when the velocity is uniform, or a changing one, when the velocity is not uniform. Not only can the movement or velocity itself be directed towards the neutrality of the original catena, also the change of movement or velocity can. In the case of positive neutrality-differentiation it is positive positivity-differentiation which promotes the original neutrality. Positive neutrality-differentiation would then work against any change in velocity which would bring the original end of neutrality nearer. Hence, the type of acceleration manifested by the force of gravity is the positivity of the time-positivity-differential catena of the time-neutrality-differential catena of the spatial bicatenal bivariant difference catenas. (Note that this positivity does not represent the 'essence' of acceleration. 'Acceleration' is, properly speaking, increase of velocity regardless of the object's position and direction, and thus it would be the negativity of the time-positivity-differential catena of the modulus-catena of the neutrality-differential catena of the bicatenal bivariant difference catenas. This should demonstrate how simple mathematical-physical quantities only show the surface structure of catenary reality.) 3.2 MISASSOCIATIONS AND NONNEUTRALIST ATTITUDES 3.2.1 THE NEGATIVITY-NEGATORINESS MISASSOCIATION To designate a set of attributes or relations the extensionality of a catena it is necessary to identify the neutral predicate and two polar predicates which are each other's opposite. Strictly speaking, it is not necessary to know which of the polar predicates is positive, or should be called "positive", and which one is negative, or should be called "negative", as long as one of them is positive and the other negative and catenated to it. In the traditional variant of the language which is our present means of communication, positivity is often associated (or rather, 'misassociated') with affirmation, and vice versa, whereas negativity is associated with negation, and vice versa. (The same is true for related and ancestral languages, which explains the etymological family relationship between negative and negate(d) in the first place.) This process in which negativity is associated with something that implies or entails negation, and in which negatoriness is associated with something that implies or entails negativity, will be referred to as "the negativity-negatoriness misassociation". It is either caused by the paronymy and homonymy of the terms in question (such as the ambiguity of negative) or by a factor of which the paronymy and the homonymy themselves are consequences too. Those who confuse negativity and negatoriness tend to value, for example, happiness, activity and honor positive, because their names are of an affirmative nature; and they tend to value un-happiness, in-activity and dis-honor negative, because the names of these predicates are of a negational nature. Originally the effect may have been the other way around, however: since happiness, for instance, was experienced as 'something positive', it acquired an affirmative name, and since unhappiness was experienced as 'something negative', it acquired a negatory name. As the term for the positivity is often unmarked and that for the negativity marked (especially when prefixed), there is a tendency in the present language to evaluate predicates expressed by means of marked terms negative, and those expressed by means of unmarked terms positive. (It has been argued that therefore the use of purportedly unmarked, gender-linked terms such as he and man for both females and males, coincided, or still coincides, with a positive or higher evaluation of what is traditionally masculine and a negative or lower evaluation of what is traditionally feminine, for she and woman are, and never were, analogously employed in an unmarked way.) Not happy means unhappy only within the narrow framework of the catena's bipolarity, that is, the subset of all happiness- and unhappiness-predicates. But too often is the bipolarity thought to represent all catenary possibilities, and is not positive equated with negative. That sentient being is not happy is, then, believed to mean the same as that sentient being is unhappy. The state --actually, 'both states'-- of indifference, of being-neither-happy-nor-unhappy, is then ignored altogether. The hereditary taint of traditional language is clearly expressed in the fact that the opposite of a positive predicate can be formed very easily by means of prefixes such as un- or dis-, whereas people have to resort to clumsy circumlocutions to describe the neutrality which limits that predicate. Even neither positive nor negative does not denote neutrality alone, for something that is noncatenical is also neither positive nor negative; yet, it is not neutral nevertheless. People are thus saddled with a vicious circle: as they often cannot express themselves easily with respect to neutrality or the condition of not having any predicate of a certain catena, they do not think about these nonpositive, nonnegative alternatives, and as they often do not take these nonpolar alternatives into consideration, traditional language enables the speaker only to express 'imself in an easy, 'natural' way when speaking of the positive or negative properties and relations of things, and when confusing the fact of having a neutrality with the fact of not having any predicate of the catena in question. (It is precisely one of the objectives of the catenical analysis to break thru this vicious circle.) Increase and all other predicates relating in some way to more and directed to are always to be evaluated positive, because the mathematical meaning of positive which we have taken as prototypic is itself greater than zero. Augmentation, intensification and aiming at something are, then, positive concepts, but predicates like happier (or more happy) and heavier (or more heavy) are only positive, if the corresponding predicates (happiness and heaviness) are also (taken to be) positive. If unhappiness were positive and happiness negative, happier would also be negative, and unhappier positive. Similarly, if lightness is positive, it is not heavier which is positive but its opposite lighter. In spite of the misassociation of positive with agreeable and good, even agreeableness and goodness need not be positive predicates. The name agreeableness is affirmative and disagreeableness negatory, and this gives us a purely linguistic reason to conceive of agreeableness as a positivity and of disagreeableness as a negativity. (But this does not say anything about nonpropositional reality: in another language it could be the other way around.) The name goodness, however, is not more affirmative than badness, and thus there is even on this view no more reason to call goodness "a positivity" than there is to call badness "a positivity" (and goodness "a negativity"). Even when thinking in catenary instead of auxiliary terms, goodness and badness need not be opposites of each other limited by a neutral attribute neither good nor bad or indifferent. If goodness is the promotion of the normatively superior on the performatory level, then goodness and badness are indeed opposites, but if good is the normatively superior itself, then goodness and badness are each other's supplement, or what would be each other's supplement from a catenary perspective. Goodness then 'limits', on the neutralist view, 'bipolar' badness. Strictly speaking, it is not badness which is bipolar, but bipolarity which is bad. This is one of the reasons for speaking of "an auxiliary series" rather than of "a catena of goodness and badness". 3.2.2 THE HIGHNESS-CATENARY MISASSOCIATION The meaning of high (as well as low, and to a lesser extent also of superior and of inferior) is as broad as the meaning of positive (and of negative). High may mean strong, strict, luxurious, noble, serious, exalted and so on, while it literally, that is, originally, refers to strong positivity in physical space dimensions: elevated, tall (that is, to positively altitude-catenary deep-or-highness predicates). In compounds high may refer to every advanced state: high-born, high-frequency, high-minded, high-spirited, high-tension and so on. Because high is suited for all kinds of purpose, provided that there is talk of an advanced degree of realization, it is used to normatively evaluate things or states of affairs as well. Highness-catenary misassociation is now the process in which normative highness (that is, a high or superior, normative value) is associated with something which is high in a factual-modal sense, or in which a certain form of nonnormative highness (or superiority) is associated with something which is high in a normative sense. It is caused by the homonymy of the terms for the highness-catenary and positively altitude-catenary shallow-or-lowness-catenary predicates in question, or by a factor of which the homonymy itself is a result too. Catena values are assigned on theoretical grounds, for example, on the basis of their relationship with empirical values, or on the basis of the relationship of the catena concerned with other catenas. In ordinary language values are called "high" when they are positive or very positive, and "higher" when they are more positive or less negative. Therefore the (very) positive empirical values and the positive catenical values may be considered 'high' in a purely empirical or catenical sense. Given the existence of a catenical normative principle, and following traditional language, nothing would, then, appear more 'self-evident' than that a high normative value is to be associated with a high catena value, and that normative highness or superiority is inherent in positivity. Thus those who do not understand that language is not only a product of their thought, but that their thought is also a product of their language, will but too easily, consciously or unconsciously, adopt some normative principle of the form the more positive, the superior. The idea that something is superior in a normative sense, because it is more positive or higher in a factual-modal sense, will then be accepted as 'normal'. On such a reckoning negativity automatically has a low normative value, and neutrality, or perineutrality, falls somewhere in between. A traditionally common form of highness-catenary misassociation is the assignment of normative highness to objects in a higher state of development or evolution. Examples are a higher evaluation of the human species as compared with other animal species, because this species has reached a higher evolutionary plane; or, a higher evaluation of intelligent people as compared with other people, because intelligent people have a higher intelligence quotient; or, a higher evaluation of technologically advanced societies as compared with so-called 'un-' or 'under-developed societies' which are still on a lower plane of technical development. Examples where primary things draw their normative highness from their physical highness are mountains, columns or other tall objects adored for their highness or tallness. (In the event that they are relatively long and narrow, there is the additional phallic element in the worship of such objects.) But highness-catenary misassociation works in both directions. Not only can high or tall things become superior in some doxastic, normative sense, things which are superior in such a sense also tend to be conceived of in traditional thought as high or tall in a physical sense. And if not visibly high or tall on Earth, then high in the sky where supernaturalists locate the abode of the god(s). In a one-god setting Mono 'in the highest' is thus said to be attended by angels 'on high'. Familial exclusivists do not shrink from speaking of "high-born", and from using a title like Highness for people who are believed to be honorable simply because of their family relations. These so-called 'high-born' people can also be higher in a normative-religious sense: they are then 'high' (for example, king or queen) by the grace of Mono, the 'Most High' of the theodemonist religion adhered to. Indeed, it once was, or still is, normal in religionist countries that people who style themselves "high-born" and "highness" (and who were, or still are, styled by collaborators in this way) also held, or still hold, a high political office, such as that of head of state. They even used to be, or --incredible as it may sound-- still are, both head of state and head of the established temple society of their country. Such religionist systems are actuated, among others, by a number of highness-catenary misassociations which substantially diverge from the values of neutral and inclusive thought. Where the antiquated paradigm of highness has not yet ceased to reign, it is high time that the paradigm of equality and relevance be substituted for it. 3.2.3 EXTREMISM The essence of extremism is the lust for the most, such as the highest status, the most reverence, the greatest happiness, infinite power, and so on and so forth. Extremism's motto and fundamental principle is The most is the best. As an ideology of maximization it creates, or responds to, an urge whose sole bounds are those of the most positive or of the most unneutral polarity. As has been said of the acquisitive urge, the urge of the maximizer 'tends to increase in infinity'. If ultimate, it involves, indeed, the greatest alienation possible from the person's proper, neutral finality. Two of the pillars of extremism are the highness-catenary and the negativity-negatoriness misassociations. When 'e is only able to define neutrality in terms of neither nor or not polar, and when 'e cannot dissociate negatory phrases in 'er language from negativity and what is bad, the extremist will try to get away from neutrality as far as possible. And when 'e is only able to define the good in terms of high and superior, and when 'e cannot dissociate this normative highness from factual-modal forms of highness, the extremist will try to get higher and higher in factual and modal respects as well; that is, until the wax of 'er wings melts in the heat of the infinitely bright light which is 'er final objective. A concrete example is the lust for power. The extremist always wants more and more of it for the sake of power itself. If 'e is a theodemonical supernaturalist, 'er supreme ideal is that of one all-mighty god that rules over the whole universe; if 'e is an atheist political totalitarian, it is that of one all-mighty party that rules over all peoples. For the exist power --the most power, to be precise-- is an end or ideal in itself. The acquisitive urge of the extremist is closely related to this potence fetishism. It is the urge for property, not as a means to something nonextreme but as an ultimate end; and it is not just the urge for some property but for more and more property. A special case of this is a perpetual greed for money, not for money as a means to something nonextreme but, again, as an ultimate end, as something 'e can never have enough of. Perhaps, the extremist will justify 'er interest in money or property by referring to another end, and by explaining that property is only a means to it. But then, the other end itself is, in turn, an extremist end, such as more and more freedom (in the sense of available options) for the sake of freedom as freedom; or more and more happiness ad infinitum for the sake of happiness as happiness (like in positive utilitarianism or eudaimonism). Unfortunately, as the x-ist becomes more and more estranged from 'er proper finality 'e only becomes more and more unhappy, and as 'er positive freedom grows it only becomes harder and harder for 'im to fill it out and to remain continually satisfied. In the spatiotemporal field extremism is the striving for the highest, the biggest, the farthest and the fastest. Extremists love to participate in competitions for such things as the tallest building (or self-supporting structure) in the world; they love weapons which can reach further and destroy more than any other weapon ever could; and they love to build on cars, trains and planes to make them run or fly faster than ever before, not for some nonextreme reason, but because speed has become an end in itself for them. When trying to jump as high or as far as possible, or when trying to ride or swim as fast as possible, or when trying to score as many goals as possible, is good for the bodily health of human beings, extremists make the means also here into ends in themselves. And once height, distance, speed and winning the race or match have become ends in themselves, they will do everything to attain these ends, however detrimental to their own or other people's health they may be. Games or events which originally were meant to be sportive have thus degenerated into extremist, nationalist and sexually irrelevantist undertakings. Being the first and seeing countrymen or -women become the first, then seems to be the sole thing that counts, whatever pushing, drugging and intimidation may be needed to attain this goal. (So far as the exclusivist degeneration of sports is concerned, the equivalent with regard to the arts is that people do not admire works of art for their own qualities anymore, but only for the name or nationality attached to them, if not for the ideology they are expressive of.) Also in the sexual and familial field extremism is the striving for the most and the fastest. Particularly when people have just been freed from the shackles of puritanism and religion, but are still under the spell of the traditional ideology's lust for the most, fucking as early and as much as possible, or with as many different partners as possible, becomes something good for its own sake. The tradition which required that human beings would have as little sex as possible, and of one variety only, has then merely been replaced by a new fashion in extremism, namely that they must have as much sex as possible and of the greatest variety possible. At the same time it should be added to this that the traditional ideologues who attempted to restrain sexuality as much as they could on the one hand, did not refrain from stimulating married men and women to produce as many children as possible on the other. Extremism is not just a nonneutralist attitude; it is the most unneutralistic attitude there is. Altho the old distinction between quantity and quality is an obscure one (especially when exploited by antonymical dialecticians), one could say (since we have the instruments to clearly explain the difference) that extremism is the ideology of quantity, whereas neutralism is the ideology of quality. A but too revealing symptom of extremism is, for example, the the world's most sickness. This is a disease cities, countries and other territorial or social units suffer from which claim to be 'the world's fastest growing', to have 'the world's foremost or most famous cultural centers', 'the world's most exciting sights', 'the world's largest such-and-such' and 'the nation's' or 'the world's longest so-and-so', and so on and so forth. Obviously, it is here not the type of urban growth which counts, not the kind of culture which flourishes, not the sort of buildings which are constructed. If there are nonextreme goals and objectives at all, they are entirely immaterial. But now --it might be objected-- if the goal is formulated in evaluative terms like in the (world's) best, the (world's) nicest or the (world's) finest, there is nothing against it. Doesn't the neutralist 'imself also aspire to what is best or most neutral? Why then not the best or most neutral in the world? The correct reply to such an argument is that it makes use of a terminological trick and confuses original and derivative catenas. Neutralism and extremism refer to the neutrality and extremity of an original catena. Extremity is then what is most positive or, if negativity is included, most (bi)polar. It is only in this original context that most means extreme. The term most neutral cannot refer to the original catena, because with respect to this catena something just is, or is not, neutral. It is when the neutrality-difference catena is considered that something is more or less neutral or unneutral, and thus also most neutral or most unneutral. The difference is now that on the extremist account the greatest positivity, or positivity and negativity, of the original catena is good or best, whereas on the neutralist account the neutrality is good or best. This difference is not only big -- it is plain as well. So far as evaluative words like nice and fine are concerned, the use of these words in an extremist way is more symptomatic of local, national and other forms of territorialism, and more symptomatic of contempt of the principle of truth than of extremism itself. Our catenical definition of extreme could easily be marked by a considerable departure from the neutral, but a traditional definition of extreme is radical or marked by a considerable departure from the usual or traditional. From the point of view of an original catena this latter definition is, of course, preposterous, for the usual or traditional might be extreme itself, for example, extremely inequitable. It is, then, neutrality which is marked by a considerable departure from the traditional. To make any sense at all, the traditional definitions of extreme and extremism must implicitly refer not to an original catena but to a positivity-difference, differentiation or time-differential catena. (We shall not consider the use of extremism in some sense of terrorism, for terrorism is, first of all, a serious violation of people's rights of personhood. Extremism may encourage such terrorism, but a particular person could be an extremist without ever becoming a terrorist, or without ever supporting terrorism.) The implicit reference to nonoriginal catenas is quite apparent in definitions of extreme and radical such as tending or disposed to make extreme changes in existing views, habits, conditions or institutions. Those who are opposed to such extreme changes are not opposed to these changes because they are extreme or great, nor because they are changes; they want to leave the situation ('exist' or not) as it is, simply because it is in their own personal interest, since they benefit themselves from the inequalities which are existing or traditional. As it is fallacious to let a differentiation catena have priority over an original catena, it is those who want to maintain traditional, extreme or great inequalities and those who want to make nonextreme inequalities bigger who are the real extremists: they are the ones who hold views which are as far from being moderate as possible. Those who want to maintain traditional, nonextreme or smaller inequalities are lesser unneutralists. And those who strive for equality in a relevantistic way, however much this equality may deviate from what is usual or traditional, are the neutralists. Some exponents of traditionalism who are afraid of joining either neutralism or extremism might instead suggest a 'compromise' between the two. In a similar way this would have to be a 'compromise' between inclusivism and exclusivism. But people who seriously argue for such a settlement will merely demonstrate a complete lack of catenical insight. There simply is no 'compromise' between neutralism and extremism, for neutralism itself is the compromise between negative extremism (or lesser unneutralism) on the one hand and positive extremism (or lesser unneutralism) on the other; and there is no 'compromise' between the need of inclusivity and exclusivist demands, for inclusivity itself is, as it were, the compromise reached between abnegational exclusivism on the one hand and aggrandizemental exclusivism on the other. Those who suggest a so-called 'compromise' between abnegational exism and neutral-inclusivity are in favor of nothing else than abnegational exism; and those who suggest a so-called 'compromise' between aggrandizemental exism and neutral-inclusivity are in favor of nothing else than aggrandizemental exism. There is no compromise between neutralism and extremism, because neutralism, as founded on the norm of neutrality, is itself the compromise. 3.2.4 PROTONEUTRALISM AND PROTORELEVANTISM To claim that everything is, or should be, neutral (or for example, at rest or equal), and to neglect or ignore that in a certain respect neutral-directed polarity is prerequisite for neutrality, is protoneutralism. Likewise, to claim that everything is, or should be, one (or of a kind), and to neglect or ignore that in a certain respect a distinction might be relevant, is protorelevantism. Protoneutralism is contrary to relevantism, because relevantism does make a difference between certain catenical aspects and between polarity which is relevant to a certain end, and polarity which is not. Protorelevantism, too, is contrary to neutralism, because neutralism does not literally consider all catenical aspects and all neutrality and polarity as 'one', but assigns a different normative value to neutral and unneutral predicates dependent on the kind of aspect concerned. There are several variants of protoneutralism and protorelevantism and ancient protoneutralist or protorelevantist theories and ideas can be found in at least two of the world's continents, if not everywhere. (In no way are those ancient theories and ideas typical of the thought of one particular race or people. Those who speak of "western" and "eastern thought" may want us to believe this, but these people heavily draw on monolithic conceptions of what 'western' and 'eastern thought' is supposed to be. Their attempts to expose all sorts of absolute differences between both is plainly racially or ethnically inspired, also when their racialism or ethnocentrism is external aggrandizemental. What may be correct is that there are considerable gradual differences between all ancient systems of thought taken together in one part of the world, and all ancient systems of thought taken together in another part of the world. This, however, does not justify ignoring minority thinkers altogether. If full respect is paid not only to racial or ethnical minorities, but also to philosophical and ideological minorities, examples of protoneutralism and of protorelevantism can be found in both --what certain people have preferred to call-- 'western' and 'eastern thought'; and perhaps, also in something like 'northern', 'equatorial' and 'southern thought'. Nonetheless, thinking is a predicate of persons, not of bodies, and therefore it is a materialist aberration to classify thought, or systems of thought, in terms of the country or continent the body of the person thinking comes from. Hence, we had better forget about 'western-versus-eastern' attempts at dividing and straitjacketing global thought in a nonsystematic, nonsubstantial way.) Now, taken literally, there is no traditional or ancient system of thought which says that everything is, or should be, 'neutral'. What such systems actually teach, is something we interpret in our present-day catenical terms as 'neutral'. Key concepts are, then, equality, symmetry and harmony. Equality is the ideal of egalitarianism, an old ideal whose discussion we will delay until our treatment of the principle of equality (in 3.5). Of the other two notions, symmetry has always been identified with beauty and perfection, while harmony is not only by ancient thinkers but still by modern thinkers believed to be inherent in nature. In one protoneutralist world-view there is said to be a 'harmonious cooperation of all beings' which obey 'the internal dictates of their own natures'. It has already been explained in Antonymics and antonymical metaphysics (I.2.3.4) that the yang-yin doctrine and similar antonymical doctrines are antineutralistic from the standpoint of our catenical ontology (and exclusivist as well). Yet, when world-views based on these types of metaphysic start speaking about "(dynamic) balances" between the one side and the other, and when both sides are really opposite to each other, the result of such a balance (whether 'dynamic' or not) is a form of neutrality. However, the 'balance' aimed at is not always a balance like that between lightness and darkness, or between being active and being passive; it has also been argued that the virtuous man or person should 'maintain a dynamic balance between good and bad'. On this naive, protoneutralist view (which was mentioned in I.7.2.1 before) the moral agent should not strive for the good at all, for this task would not only be impossible, it would not even be a task 'e should undertake. Those who take this kind of reasoning seriously --and even in modern times there are people who have done this-- must have a very twisted sense of goodness indeed. Perhaps they are striving for a dynamic balance between rationality and irrationality, for conceptual discernment is certainly not part of their dynamist enterprise. If a normative principle of neutrality is to make any sense, it just cannot be applicable to normative predicates themselves. (Or, if it can, it does not add anything to our knowledge, for example, when defining good as neutral. But even then, the idea of a balance between the neutral and the unneutral is as mistaken as the idea of a 'compromise' between neutralism and extremism.) When protoneutralist systems of thought deal with opposites like light and dark, active and passive, that is, monopolarities of modulus-catenas or other catenas without a fixed neutral empirical value, they do not really center on neutralities in the strict sense, but rather on perineutralities. Such perineutralities are explicitly recognized as superior, when moderateness or moderation is taken as sign of virtue This protoneutralist position is known as that of the doctrine of the golden mean: every virtue is a mean between two vices. (Note how this view combines the view of neutrality as a limit-element in a context of non-perineutral polarities with the hypothesis of mean-neutrality.) Thus modesty is a mean between bashfulness and pretentiousness, 'proper pride' between humility and vanity; courage between cowardice and rashness. In the same vein truthfulness has been called "a mean between mock-modesty and boastfulness". But it has been rightly pointed out by a modern philosopher that this applied at the most to truthfulness about oneself, and that the conception of truthfulness as a mean in general is as absurd as the belief in some mean between partiality and impartiality. (This being a reference to someone who knew very well how to change base elements into gold: this golden mean adept claimed that 'e had always 'endeavored to steer the narrow line between partiality on the one hand and impartiality on the other'.) For us it is evident why there is no superior mean between two opposite types of truthfulness: firstly, truthfulness in itself is not a catenated predicate; and secondly, it is a propositional predicate dealing with the relation between the ground-world and propositional reality. It is a fallacy to apply a ground-world principle to a concept such as truthfulness. Protoneutralist theories like the doctrine of the golden mean formulate some ostensibly universal, seemingly neutralist or perineutralist, principle and then drown in their own muddy sink of inconsistence, because they never bothered, or were never able, to develop an adequate ontology first. Altho we will now examine some protorelevantist ideas or systems of thought, the distinction between protoneutralism and protorelevantism is not always easy to draw, something which need not concern us, as the distinction between neutralism and relevantism or inclusivism is often vague or nonexistent too. An example of where the distinction seems to be absent can be found in an ancient philosopher who maintained that nothing on the world changes. When thinking of change as a bipolarity, this implies that everything in the world remains the same in the concatenate sense. This is a neutral view, particularly in an ontology which does not differentiate fact and value, or the factual-modal and the normative. But it seems that the change referred to was primarily a change in the noncatenated sense of coming into being or ceasing to be. (This meaning of change can still be catenical if, and insofar as, it denotes catenalization and decatenalization.) It is with this in mind that 'the only true being' was said to be 'the one, infinite and indivisible'. No distinctions, neither 'true' nor 'false', could be made on this protorelevantist account. The claim that nothing changes is itself the antithesis of the claim of a contemporary philosopher that everything changes. This alternative thesis became beloved by latter-day dialecticians who contented themselves with the idea of a world in perpetual flux and continually plagued with wars and struggles. Antineutralist tho the ancient thesis itself may be, it is remarkable that the same philosopher presents us with a conception of 'cosmic justice' in which the strife of opposites never issues in a complete victory of either side. Instead, opposites are said to combine to produce harmony and unity in such strife. This is a protoneutralist theory not much different from the one of a dynamic balance between yang and yin. The similarity becomes even more remarkable when we are told that not only things like day and night, summer and winter are one, but also war and peace, and good and evil. This presupposes a war between war and peace and a form of justice in which neither goodness nor badness will ever win. Now, it could be argued that the dialectical synthesis, however nonsensical, is already contained in the thesis that everything changes. It could be argued too that it is relevantist neutralism which is the synthesis of the thesis that literally everything displays, or should display, polarity, and the equally frivolous antithesis that literally everything is, or should be, neutral. Dialecticians believing in this theory should thus not remain stuck in the former outmoded stage, but progress with us to the synthesis of thesis and antithesis. Thereafter they may, of course, forget about antonymical metaphysics altogether. Such an ideological change for the good would be a revolutionary one indeed. The idea of the oneness of the totality of all things returns under different guises in several philosophical and ideological systems. Certain mystics have it that the unity of all things is attained in a state of consciousness in which 'one's individuality dissolves into an undifferentiated oneness'. This experience of oneness with the surrounding environment, which is said to be the main characteristic of their meditative state, can (but need not) be explained in relevantist terms. For where there is no goal and no striving, there is no relevant distinction, and where there is no relevant distinction there is no (legitimate) way to divorce oneself from the rest of this world and to divide it. (This is also the gist of the canonical prose poem The world, one and uniform.) However, the irrelevance of any distinction we might make, does not preclude the true existence of a multitude of things and events around us. If acknowledged for truth-conditional reasons they are --on certain ancient accounts-- claimed to be 'manifestations of the same ultimate reality' nevertheless. This ultimate reality or ultimate, undefinable reality is, then, the unifying notion of the religious or philosophical doctrine concerned. Some modern scientists have proposed similar ideas, probably not so much as scientists but as philosophers or ideologues. (They may speak of some "unbroken wholeness", for instance.) All the above forms of protorelevantism are naive in that they do not discern the difference between the factual (that everything is one) and the normative (that everything should be one); in that they do not discern the difference between the truth-conditional and the relevancy-conditional aspects of living and thinking; in that they refuse to openly commit themselves normatively, while implicitly employing at least one normative principle (that of oneness); and in that they have no reply to the actual existence of inequality, of extremist strife, and of the lack of harmony and unity in the world. They must either admit that also these evil phenomena are manifestations of the 'one ultimate reality', or deny this and explain the (normative) difference between a so-called 'ultimate' and a 'nonultimate' reality. In the former case they support extremism and lesser unneutralism directly; in the latter case they support it indirectly by not being prepared for a confrontation with concrete, real-life issues. Also we will use expressions like oneness and the ultimate. Yet, whereas it is poetry when a person uses such expressions after first having analyzed the reality 'e is confronted with and the reality 'e proposes, it is obscurantism when a person founds 'er entire belief in notions like oneness and the ultimate, while remaining wholly mystified by them. 3.3 ON NEUTRAL TERMS 3.3.1 THE MORPHEMES OF NEUTRALISM 3.3.1.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE PRINCIPLE OF CATENATED NEUTRALITY The belief that high and positive matters demand a high or positive evaluation because of their highness or positivity is a result of confusing the positivities of highness catenas of entirely different types. The belief that negatory matters correspond to negative ones and demand a low or negative evaluation because of their negatoriness is a result of confusing negatoriness and negativity. These beliefs lead to nonsensical or false notions, incompatible with the unique status of neutrality as a catenated limit-element, incompatible with the order of nature, and incompatible with realism and inclusivism. Surpassing these beliefs is the principle that neutral matters are normatively superior, that they demand the highest evaluation, and that positive matters must be treated as negative ones since they are equally unneutral. Where positivity is needed to compensate for negative polarity, and where negativity is needed to compensate for positive polarity, the world is fully alive with a quest for harmony and equality. If the principle underlying this quest is understood in such a way, that a certain kind of polarity is relevant to neutral ends, it is called "the ananorm". ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Language is needed not only to make communication possible and easier, but also to render the information to be conveyed more accurate. It is by means of new morphemes and expressions that a world of opportunities can be opened up which otherwise would remain enveloped in a haze of circumlocutions which were not intended. The confusion of negatory terms with negativity is but one example. Since traditional language has not recognized the special import of neutrality, it has forced people to use circumlocutory and/or negatory phrases like neither nor and indifference to express neutralness. Because of their negatory structure, and in alliance with modulus-catenary derivations, these phrases and neutrality itself have subsequently been associated with negativeness. It is at the same time this hereditary taint of traditional language which makes it seem more 'positive' to keep adhering to the extremist or lesser unneutralist ideologies underlying it. The old, established linguistic system often stimulates the living-on of partial conceptions, merely because people can express themselves in an easier and linguistically '(more) normal' way by sticking to them. Like in science, the introduction of a new and viable, denominational paradigm or doctrine is always accompanied by a novel conceptual apparatus and symbolism. This conceptual apparatus may, linguistically speaking, contain old words which keep their meanings individually but whose combination yields a new meaning, and also new words with new meanings (which always, somehow, have to be explained in traditional terms.) It is solely as a last resort that a scientist or denominationalist should introduce neologisms to escape the confinement of traditional or everyday language, because many of 'er readers and listeners are not always capable of coping with information in a language which deviates too much from a way of speaking which is familiar to them. On the other hand, the great asset of neologisms is that they are not tainted with inapposite connotations like those inherent in the negativity-negatoriness and highness-catenary misassociations. And another reason for the employment of such neologisms can be, both in science and denominationalism, that they enable the writer or speaker to cut a long, complicated story short. In denominationalism there is the additional, symbolic dimension of words and expressions, especially when they are not found in old paradigms. When traditional scientists or technologists do need a new morpheme, that is, a new affix or an entire new word, they tend to look exclusively at the morphemes of their own language, or of the ancestral language(s) of one particular family of languages, even when presenting such a new morpheme as an element of a so-called 'International Scientific Vocabulary'. (The difference between international and interlinguistic seems already too difficult to cope with.) Of course, there is nothing scientific about such an ethnically, territorially and interlinguistically exclusivistic procedure devoid of any systematic substance in terms of lingual structure. We ourselves shall not pursue such a course for the few novel morphemes we need. Our selection shall not be founded in an exclusive interest in one particular family of languages. And while, perhaps, not scientific in any ideal, up-to-date sense, it shall not be as chaotic and structureless as the phraseology of many (or most?) traditional scientists. All new morphemes of the interlinguistic neutralist conceptual apparatus belong to one lingually systematic series of morphemes. Since the significance of this series as a whole is greatest from a symbolic point of view, the choice of the first three morphemes to be introduced here will not be explained and justified in this book. They are elements of the so-called n-a series of neutralist morphemes which will be presented in the Book of Symbols (in S.2.3). At this place we will confine ourselves to a brief explanation of their meanings. The grammatical function(s) of the three new morphemes of neutralism will depend on the type of language concerned, but in this and related, inflectional languages they all serve as prefixes, while one of them is also the root of the adjective nanaic. The interlinguistic, standard pronunciation of the first one, ana-, is änä (with ä as in far), but for reasons having to do with the present language in particular, it may also be pronounced as äna| (in which a| is a schwa). The standard pronunciation of the second prefix, nan-, is nän. This prefix may also be pronounced as na|n, and those who pronounce non- as nä|n (in which ä| is either ä or a schwa) may pronounce nan- as nan (with an ash as in map). The standard pronunciation of the third prefix, nana-, is nänä. Variants of this prefix are näna|, nana| and, if the emphasis is on the second syllable, na||na. The pronunciation of nanaic is nä||naic (with aic as in archaic, mosaic and prosaic). (The diacritics used here belong to an overlay system on the standard spelling of words in which each diacritic indicates for one alphabet letter a particular way of pronouncing this letter, while | indicates the beginning of a stressed syllable.) The meanings assigned to the three morphemes above are: a. ana: of or relating to superior neutrality (without being a form of neutrality); thus the ananorm means the norm of neutrality and ananormative means normative with respect to the norm of neutrality; b. nan-: neutral and limiting the unneutral predicate(s) in question; thus nanhappiness, for instance, is the neutral limit-element between happiness and unhappiness; nan- need not denote a neutrality which is superior according to the ananorm; c. nana-: of or relating to what is aimed at or furthers what is ananormatively superior; thus, nanaic (with nanaicity as noun) is neutral-directed in this particular sense; nanapolar (with nanapolarity as noun) does not refer to the nanaic primary thing but to the primary predicate involved; for nanaically compare archaically, mosaically and prosaically. 3.3.2 THE VALUES OF NEUTRALISM The principle of catenated neutrality is a principle of being, that is, of the normativeness of being. It is on this principle that catenated neutrality --or certain superior forms of (catenated) neutrality, to be more precise-- is a performatory value in our normative model. Since superior neutrality does not relate to acting persons in particular, it is also a nonagential value. The principle of neutrality actually colligates several traditional nonagential values like stability, harmony, equilibrium, and also equality, under one universal value. As a universal and axiomatic value neutrality is of course an ultimate value as well. And as an ultimate value it is also a perfective value. To sum up: ananormatively superior neutrality is as a value, firstly, performatory and nonagential and secondly, axiomatic, ultimate and perfective. An ultimate value is always perfective, but penultimate values can be perfective, corrective or instrumental. Furthermore, there are as many penultimative perfective values as there are types of catenas of superior neutrality. It is the neutrality of every such type of catena which is superior to concatenate unneutralities, and neutralness as a secondary predicate is, as it were, the common denominator for all these neutralities. Hence, the neutrality of a basic catena is a penultimate value, and so is the neutrality of the bivariant difference catena. This latter neutrality, which is called "equality", is therefore a derivative value which is penultimate and perfective. But there is, in turn, a great variety of bivariant difference catenas, and specific types of equality are antepenultimate or of a lower derivative level. Yet, however low their derivative level, they remain perfective. The positivity of any neutrality-differentiation or -time-differential catena is a corrective value from the ananormative standpoint. In general this kind of positivity is a penultimate value. The positivity of 'the' neutrality-differentation catena and of 'the' neutrality-differential catena with respect to time are, then, antepenultimate as values per se and penultimate as corrective values. Any state of being, force or act which causes positive neutrality-differentiation, that is, a decrease of polarity, is an instrumental value. The relationship between instrumental value and corrective or perfective value is of a physical or empirical nature. Hence, it is on the basis of scientific knowledge or empirical assumptions too that we can be justified in considering a certain state of being, force or action valuable. The term nanaic refers both to what is neutral-directed from a purely catenical perspective and to what is neutral-directed from an empirical perspective. Nanaicity in general is a penultimate ananormative value, whether it is corrective or instrumental. Corrective nanaicity is nothing else than the kind of positivity already mentioned as a penultimate value. (Note that, if the distinctions are made, nanaic stands to nanapolar as neutrally catenal to neutral in the strict sense, since it is the primary thing itself which is nanaic, while the predicate this thing has is nanapolar.) Ananormative values like neutrality, equality and nanaicity are nonagential and apply both to the material and to the nonmaterial ground-world, both to nature and to nonnature (or culture), both to personal and to nonpersonal beings. For example, not only is the action of a person who promotes some form of superior neutrality nanaic, but also a physical force like the force of gravity is nanaic. Nonetheless, a physical force is nanaic or not, whereas a person's action which is not nanaic was, perhaps, intended to be nanaic (or, if it is nanaic, was, perhaps, even not intended to be nanaic). That is why the Book of Instruments teaches us to distinguish performatory values from intentional and motivational values, and performatory ethics from decision-theoretical ethics (in I.7.2). So far we have only listed performatory values. The nonperformatory ananormative value which plays a role too is 'anafactiveness' or 'anafaction'. (The form -factive in anafactive is an adjectival combining form meaning making or causing; for -faction in anafaction compare benefaction. We will see later under what conditions benefaction is a special type of anafaction.) Anafactive means having the intention to be neutrally catenal or nanaic. If having the intention is indeed the only thing that counts, the value concerned is purely intentional. This is intentional anafactiveness or anafaction. Strictly speaking, the motive of a person's action or behavior could then still be something else than neutrality. To make sure that neutrality or nanaicity is also the moral decision-maker's motive, one could speak of "motivational anafactiveness". Anafactiveness in general is a decision-theoretical value, intentional anafactiveness an intentional, and motivational anafactiveness a motivational value. What is motivational anafactiveness in neutralism is 'virtuousness' or 'a virtue' in terms of traditional morality. However, anafactiveness is an uncontaminated word without the ancient stain of exclusivist badness inherent in virtue. (See I.7.2.1.) It needs no further explanation that the main values of neutralism are perfective neutrality proper, nanaicity or nanapolarity and anafactiveness. Something that is neutrally catenal (and ananormatively superior) is not nanaic with regard to the same catena and, even if it is a person, need not be anafactive; something that is nanaic is not neutrally catenal with regard to the same catena, and need not be anafactive either; and a person who is anafactive need not be neutrally catenal, nor act nanaically, with regard to the same catena. Thus neutrality, nanaicity and anafactiveness are really three different values. In the end it is neutrality tho, which is the ultimate value; nanaicity, nanapolarity and anafactiveness are 'only' penultimate values. It might be objected that nonultimate values like nanaicity and anafactiveness are still very general and 'abstract', neutralist values. That they are as general as they can be is correct, yet we will not continue our analysis here with a discussion of antepenultimate and lower-level, derivative values. First of all, our present subject is the values of neutralism as neutralism. We could, for example, take equality as a penultimate perfective value and discuss the different types of equality as antepenultimate perfective values, but such would amount to a treatment of the values of egalitarianism. Naturally, egalitarianism (if relevantistic) is part of neutralism, but --and this is the second reason-- we will treat of equality and the principle of equality, and of a number of other, 'more concrete' values and principles later in this chapter, and in the chapters following. There is another question, also a rather 'abstract' one, which demands our attention first. It is To what does one commit oneself by recognizing an ananormative value or goal?. 3.3.3 THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEUTRALISM Even if there were no people in the whole universe (not in the past, not in the present and not in the future), neutrality proper would still be superior to polarity. The attraction between material bodies, the attraction between particles with an opposite electrical charge, the quest for equilibrium and, in general, for order and harmony in nature, would still be nanaic forces. It is only persons tho who can recognize the neutralness of states of being, or the nanaic nature of changes, as values. To embrace neutrality and nanaicity as values is to accept a world-view in which the material and the nonmaterial, the natural and the nonnatural, and the personal and the nonpersonal are meaningfully related. Such a world-view is not just an ethical one dealing exclusively with people and the effects or right-making characteristics of people's actions (or even worse: 'human actions'). It is a total world-view which also comprehends the nonpersonal (and nonhuman), the natural and the material. And because the one principle underlying this weltanschauung is a normative one, it is a denominational weltanschauung. (Evidently denominational is then not used in the traditional way to refer to some kind of religious organization. As a matter of fact something denominational need in our modern sense not be connected with any social organization.) From the perspective of our denominational doctrine the question is not What should material or natural bodies do, or not do? but What should people do, or not do, who recognize neutrality and nanaicity?. To answer this question let us start with what cannot be contested by any manner of means. It is that the least the norm of neutrality requires from people is that they shall never choose an unneutral, ultimate or perfective end. Some ends are not catenical (like speaking the truth and not speaking the truth) and therefore neither neutral nor unneutral; some ends are unneutral but will serve neutrality in the end. This is acceptable. What is not accceptable is that something unneutral like inequality, change, happiness, unhappiness, honor or dishonor is subscribed to as an ultimate or perfective value in itself. To do this will probably lead to more or greater unneutrality in the world, but even if it does not (on the purely performatory level), the attitude of the person concerned is anti-anafactive or 'vicious' in traditional terms. The very minimum requirement of neutralism is the proscription of anti-anafaction. This proscriptive or restrictive side of our denominational doctrine can be labeled "the nonactivating idea of neutralism". It is nonactivating because it does not require a person to do something, but to abstain from doing something. The intrinsic duty involved is thus a nonactivating one. (Consequentialists often argue that there is no moral difference between an act and an omission, but --even apart from nonconsequentialist considerations-- their argument presupposes that a certain value like utility has already been chosen as a goal. They then claim that nonaction is as bad as action when it has the same consequences with respect to that goal. Our point is here, however, the choice or non-choice of goal itself, an issue which precedes any talk about consequences or effects.) Whereas the norm of neutrality does not imply more than a prohibition of anti-anafaction on the nonactivating side, on "the activating idea of neutralism" it implies more, namely the prescription of anafaction. In activating neutralism one has the intrinsic duty to choose neutrality as ultimate goal of one's actions, and one must exert all nanapolar strength possible to fight polarity. In nonactivating neutralism anti-anafactiveness is a decision-theoretical disvalue which should not be embraced, whereas in activating neutralism anafactiveness is a value which should be embraced. Nonactivating neutralism requires no energy; it only requires that one not use one's energy for the wrong purpose. This side of neutralism need therefore not be problematic. On the other hand, activating neutralism requires energy, energy which should be used for the right purpose. Here problems can arise much easier, because, firstly, one has to choose a specific objective; and secondly, one has to make sure that one's action does indeed promote the cause selected. Moreover, in the ground-world the pursuance of one anafactive duty may for empirical reasons conflict with the pursuance of another anafactive duty. An argument which cannot be put forward tho, is that activating neutralism itself prescribes polarity and would therefore be inconsistent. Activating neutralisn does indeed prescribe polarity but of a kind which is not ananormatively inferior. Hence, it is fully compatible with the superiority of ananormative neutrality. It is something else that an activity which is nanaic in one respect, can be unnanaic in another respect for empirical reasons. Nevertheless, such an activity should always be nanaic on the whole, or more nanaic than unnanaic. In the last chapter of this book we will discuss what role the principle of catenated neutrality can play in the deliberation about such kinds of conflict. Neutralism in general does not unconditionally require action, even not nanaic or anafactive action. Only if people act, should they ultimately aim at neutrality, insofar as the catenical aspects of their actions are concerned. Activating neutralism can require action, but only action from a person as a person. The reason is that a person has a body, but that 'e is no body. Therefore, the requirement of anafactiveness is solely applicable to personal whole-predicates and to what was, is or will be created, maintained and destroyed by people. This does include the material, natural and nonpersonal too, but merely if, and to the extent that, it was, is or will be affected by people with anti-anafactive intentions, or whose actions have or did have unnanaic effects on balance. Where it is necessary to restore an equilibrium, or to create a harmony which never existed before, this will indeed also involve people's own bodies and other purely material things. Yet, unlike neutrality and nanaicity, anafaction does not concern matter as matter. In the strict sense the neutrality of the norm of neutrality denotes for persons only the neutralities of aspects with respect to which persons are catenal (not their bodies or other nonpersonal primary things). The material and natural world has its own nanaic forces, and people as people are no part of it. It is only when they have transgressed against neutrality or nanaicity in their bodies, or in other material things, with the intention to do so (or with the knowledge that they did so and could prevent it) that they will have to restore their bodily or material neutrality, or that they will have to take nanaic action with regard to these material bodies. In itself there is nothing 'wrong' in the sense of anti-anafactive with moving about, for instance, as a result of bodily needs, or as a result of an anafactive operation. What would be wrong is that movement, or the highest speed possible, became a goal in itself of the person concerned. The movement or speed of the body is then the result of a person choosing an unneutral ultimate goal. We all know that bodies, whether in a neutral state or not, do not choose unneutral goals. Similarly, in itself it is neither anafactive nor anti-anafactive to fall in love with somebody, or to be disgusted by somebody, at least if, and insofar as, this attraction or this repulsion are purely given and not the result of anti-anafactive considerations or practises. As a decision-maker a person does not decide to fall in love or to be disgusted; these are things which happen to 'im. Also 'er body does not decide to be attracted or to be repelled. What is, or would be, anti-anafactive for a person as a decision-maker is to choose love or hatred as ultimate ends per se, or to have other people's well-being depend on 'er own partial feelings of liking and disliking. 3.4 WELL-BEING, HAPPINESS AND BENEFICENCE 3.4.1 THE SITUATION OF A HAPPINESS-CATENAL Smart hedonists and eudaimonists of an antineutralist complexion will already have argued that since the happiness-catena is apparently a basic catena, the neutralist, at least the active one, should strive for nanhappiness and the minimization not only of unhappiness but also of happiness. From a neutralist point of view it is indeed obvious that not only unhappiness can never be a perfective end in itself but happiness not either, let alone an ultimate one. So far we can agree with the hedonist and the eudaimonist on neutralism; and so far we must reject the hedonist's and eudaimonist's own doctrines, in which pleasure and happiness are believed to be perfective ends. Yet, those who are even smarter than the hedonist with 'er ultimate pleasure and the eudaimonist with 'er ultimate happiness, realize that from the fact that pleasure and happiness are not ultimate or perfective ends, it cannot be inferred that the neutralist, or even the active neutralist, must strive for nanhappiness. The suggestion that the position of the happiness catena is not different from that of any other basic catena, like the longitude catena, for instance, is a very questionable one. For it is no coincidence that throughout history happiness (but also indifference to pleasure and pain) has been treated as an important value. Or, if not as a value, the reward of all those who lived a virtuous life in terms of the ideological or philosophical system of thought in question. Thus before pronouncing ourselves upon the implications of the norm of neutrality for happiness-catenals, it will be worth our while to first take a closer, nonnormative look at the happiness-catenal and 'er situation. It may be assumed that the factors which determine a sentient being's behavior also determine its happiness-catenary, emotional state. These factors are the totality of internal and external stimuli, and it is these stimuli which constitute a happiness-catenal's situation. This 'situation' must be distinguished, however, from the catenal's 'condition'. (Of course, it is not so much the terms situation and condition themselves which count here.) A condition is a set of predicates (propositional or nonpropositional) at a particular time and place, regardless of whether and how the catenal in question experiences them. A catenal's situation, on the other hand, only consists of those predicates which have an impact on its behavior in a psychological sense, or on its happiness-catenality in a catenical sense. This notion of situation should not be understood too narrowly: it does not only encompass 'objective reality' but all stimuli, whether objective or subjective, measurable or immeasurable, real or imaginary. A situational stimulus may thus be a mere fantasy, while the sentient being concerned has the idea that the stimulus comes from the object fancied. Furthermore, it is of paramount importance that one realizes that the situation of a catenal does not encompass changes in stimuli. Changes in types of stimulus and changes in stimulus intensities must be expressed in concepts like situational change. Every situation will have numerous, if not innumerable, aspects. Here we canconfine ourselves to the catenical aspects of situations. This means that every situation is negative, neutral (or in practise probably perineutral) or positive for each aspect separately, and in its totality. In everyday language, however, people usually only speak of "bad" and "good situations". If not normative, terms like bad and good are at least evaluative. Since we are particularly interested in the relationship between situational catenality and happiness-catenality the question therefore arises if bad does here, perhaps, correspond to unhappy or accompanied by unhappiness and good to happy or accompanied by happiness. A bad situation would, then, be a situation in which the catenal is unhappy, and a good situation one in which it is happy. At first sight this proposition might not look like a bad guess but the underlying presupposition is actually a very implausible one. The presupposition in question is that the relationship between happiness-catenary and situational catenality would be absolute in that one particular happiness-catenary predicate corresponded (albeit for each catenal individually) to one particular situational predicate. This one particular situational predicate would not be a degree of goodness (as goodness and badness are only projected onto each separate, situational catena), but it would be a predicate corresponding to a certain empirical or psychological quantity. On the absolutist view the happiness-catenal would thus have to become happier and happier by increasing that quantity forever. Its happiness would become infinite (or would at least continue to approximate a maximum value) if one could manage to make this quantity infinite; and not only that: its happiness would remain infinite so long as the situation also remained the same. Granted that happiness is a positive predicate, a 'good situation' is on the absolutist view a positive situation (both in the catenical and in an evaluative sense). A 'bad situation' is, then, a negative one; and between these two there is supposed to be some situation which is neither good nor bad, that is, neutral or perineutral. Every original situational catena would thus correspond to both an auxiliary goodness series (an explicit triad with goodness as pseudopositivity) and the happiness catena. Now, if the relationship between happiness-catenary and situational catenality is taken to be relative, happiness does not correspond with some positive or good situation but rather with the improvement of the catenal's situation. (Happiness is then not so much a question of having something worthwhile, but of getting something worthwhile.) Unhappiness is on this relative reckoning a feeling accompanying a worsening of situation; and nanhappiness the indifference when a situation does not change at all. The improvement cannot be an 'improvement' in the sense of maximization tho, for this would mean that however intense an empirical or psychological stimulus were, it would always be an improvement to make it even more intense. If the relative conception is to be more plausible than the absolute one, the improvement must be a situational neutralization at least when solely considering negativity and positivity as improper predicates and not all the individual proper predicates constituting them. (If we took proper negativities and positivities into account, the aspectual value could lie anywhere between 0 and one of the extremes, but our and our opponent's concern is, first of all, whether the aspectual value should be 0 or extreme.) If situational neutralization is improvement, accompanied by happiness, and if one does want to speak of "a good situation", this situation is nothing else than the neutral one. Since there is usually (or always?) no sharp boundary between negative and positive, situational catenality, this means in practise that the perineutral situation is the good one. Bad is, then, any situation which is (not perineutral and) negative or positive in catenical terms. Every original situational catena corresponds on this view to an auxiliary badness series (with badness as pseudo-bipolarity) but not to a happiness catena. It is the neutrality-differentiation or neutrality-differential catena of the original situational catena which corresponds to the happiness catena! But how plausible is it that situational catenas are not goodness but badness catenas with a good situation (or fuzzy situational border) between negatively bad situations on the one hand and positively bad ones on the other? We are not capable here of calculating this plausibility, but the character of the situational catena is definitely badness-catenary instead of goodness-catenary in cases like the following: a. both far-sightedness and near-sightedness are instances of a bad eyesight; as far as this aspect is concerned, having good eyes is the limit case between far-sightedness and near-sightedness; (no sentient being is happy simply because it has good eyes; only being confronted with another being which has bad eyes, or the possibility of having bad eyes, makes it happy, when realizing that it has something more; becoming far- or near-sighted makes it unhappy; being far- or near-sighted makes unhappy when confronted with what it misses or with situational deterioration in other respects as a result of bad eyesight); b. healthy is the human or other sentient being which is neither too light nor too heavy, neither too thin nor too fat, neither too short nor too tall or long; perhaps, it is impossible to say what the right weight, girth and height are supposed to be, but 'everyone' agrees that there is both a minimum below and a maximum above which every weight, girth or height is not indicative of well-being anymore; c. for our comfort we reject a temperature and humidity which are too low, and we reject a temperature and humidity which are too high; when we talk about "nice weather", it is neither too cold nor too hot and neither too dry nor too humid; d. the relationship of the fool (the person with an abnormal lack of intelligence or talents) with 'er surroundings is more difficult than normal, and so is the relationship of the genius (the person with an abnormal intelligence or abnormal talents) with 'er surroundings; the person who is neither a fool nor a genius will have the least difficulty in adjusting to the social milieu of 'er community or society, as far as this aspect is concerned; e. a good public performance is not so much a question of being completely free from tension but of properly regulating one's tension; when a person has too little tension, energy and concentration will be lacking, and 'er performance will be very dull; when 'e has too much tension, 'e is nervous and prone to forgetfulness and black-outs; when 'er level of tension is neither too low nor too high, the performer is capable of showing the right concentration and the right amount of attention for 'er public; physiologically speaking, some arousal is good but only to a certain degree or optimum; both below and above this optimum the quality of a performance will be worse. What favors the relative conception of the relationship between situation and happiness-catenality too is the argument from the possible function of happiness-catenality It is reasonable to believe that sentient beings are happiness-catenal in the first place because happiness and unhappiness are situational signs. It seems hardly to make sense tho that sentient beings should be reminded indefinitely of their having good eyesight, of their having the right weight, girth and height, of their suitable microclimate, and so on and so forth. Instead, it is reasonable to suppose that they should be warned of worsening situations only, and that they should be shown the way to situations which are better only. Unhappiness is then a sign of the deterioration, and happiness of the amelioration of a catenal's situation as experienced. Granted that this view is correct, the happiness catena itself is, as it were, the litmus paper indicator of situational neutrality-differentiation catenality: happiness is litmus paper turned red in situations of improvement, whereas unhappiness is litmus paper turned blue in situations of worsening. But this implies that the happiness catena is in practise not a separate, basic catena, and this implies that an individual's happiness is an inherent indication of the very neutralization of this individual's situation. Now, it is easy to think of many instances in which an individual's condition is not good, nor improving, but in which such an individual is or feels happy nevertheless. Such instances, however, are not counterexamples, because we have solely been speaking about the catenal's situation that is, its condition as experienced or felt by itself. This does not make it impossible that by a general, objective standard the catenal's condition is bad or deteriorating, altho the catenal does not believe or feel so. To emphasize the general standard instead is to emphasize not the catenal's own happiness but something different altogether. This conflict does certainly not exist when the catenal in question is a person who makes that standard 'er own one, and who feels happy when something improves in terms of that standard. Such a person is indeed every doctrine's ideal adherent, if the general standard is the doctrine's too; such a person is happy because 'e experiences each major, known improvement in the light of 'er doctrine's principle as an improvement of 'er own, personal situation. 3.4.2 THE NORM OF WELL-BEING In a strict, direct sense it is impossible to alter the happiness-catenary state of a sentient being, even if one wanted to. One just cannot give it units of happiness, or take units of happiness or happiness-catenality away from it. It is only the condition, and hopefully the situation, of a happiness-catenal that can be changed, and it is such a change in condition that may affect its happiness-catenary feelings. If the catenal's condition is neutral and 'good' in a badness-catenary sense, there is no reason to alter it. The catenal in question is then 'well', that is, healthy or in a desirable state. Some say that a human being in such a healthy state does not feel any separate parts in her or his body, but is aware of this body 'as an integrated whole'. When it is subsequently claimed, however, that this awareness would generate 'a feeling of well-being and happiness', the awareness must either be an occasional one or, if permanent, must generate (a feeling of) well-being and nanhappiness instead. To equate well-being with happiness --as in this example-- could solely be correct on the implausible, absolute view of the relationship between happiness-catenary and situational catenality. Since we cannot change happiness-catenary states but only conditions, the term well-being should even for this reason be applied to a condition, or situational state, and not to a happiness-catenary one. The situation which then represents well-being is the neutral state. According to 'the norm of well-being', a subnorm of the norm of neutrality, it is this state of well-being which is normatively superior. And it is this well-being which may be brought about, and which must be brought about, if anything. (From this it does not follow that when we try to promote a catenal's well-being in one respect, that it could not for contingent, empirical reasons be detrimental to the catenal's well-being in another respect.) Hedonists or eudaimonists might object that even tho one cannot directly offer a catenal happiness, or more happiness, one can manipulate its conditions in such a way that it is made to feel happy. But if happiness is indeed a situational guiding-signal, and unhappiness a situational warning-signal, it is rather odd --to say the least-- to consider it one's goal to have a signal flash as frequently and as long as possible, and to use the thing it conveys information about (the catenal's situation) merely as a means. Hedonists and eudaimonists of the perfective end type must, then, too blithely be turning things upside down. On the argument from the function of happiness-catenality, happiness and unhappiness themselves may only be used as means to attain, or to establish how to attain, a good situation. Happiness is on this account an instrumental (antepenultimate) value, while the good situation itself, or well-being, is the (penultimate) perfective value. Hence, the norm of well-being is compatible with a form of instrumental or nonperfective hedonism or eudaimonism, even tho pleasure and happiness are not neutralities in themselves. Perfective hedonists and eudaimonists might still argue that the happiness catena is a basic catena and that happiness-catenary polarity is not a sign of anything. This, however, would not yet force the neutralist who adheres to the subnorm of well-being to completely reject happiness. If the neutralist said that happiness (like unhappiness) is inferior to nanhappiness this is, or would be, true all other things being equal. But given that there is a special relationship between happiness-catenality and all situation catenas, this ceteris paribus clause never holds. For happiness cannot be combined with every kind of situation or situational change; it can solely be combined with a good situation or situational improvement. Where there would be inferior happiness, there is superior well-being or a change in the direction of superior well-being. Now, as it is only the situation that can be changed, or left the same, we have no reason to alter a state of well-being, or to refrain from changing a situation in the direction of such a state, regardless of whether it is accompanied by a feeling of happiness or not. (Hedonists or eudaimonists cannot argue that the ceteris paribus clause could hold with respect to the situation catenas. For if that were possible, there would not be any relationship between happiness-catenary and situational catenality. But in that case hedonists and eudaimonists themselves would have no means at all anymore to promote pleasure or happiness, the ultimate or perfective values of their own doctrines.) 3.4.3 HAPPINESS AS (A) VALUE OR UNHAPPINESS AS (A) DISVALUE The question whether happiness is 'the highest good or subservient to other goods' is a very old one. We ourselves will not pose such a question, because it does not clearly distinguish between monistic, ultimate, perfective, instrumental, and perhaps corrective, values. Only when happiness is said to be the highest good, may we assume that this means that it is claimed that happiness is an ultimate value. But for an extremist, for instance, for whom universal positivity, or some form of positivity more general than happiness, were the highest good, happiness itself would merely be a perfective value, that is, a nonultimate perfective one. Another question which has occupied theorists is whether happiness, if accepted as a value, would be a dominant (or even the sole) end or not. It would be a monistic end if it were the sole one (as in utilitarianism) and a dominant end if it were a 'single, specific end which has more importance than all other ends'; it would be a nondominant end if it fell into 'an overall life-plan or network of ends'. (The latter kind of end has also deceptively been called "an inclusive end".) It has been pointed out that the controversy between those who see happiness as a dominant end, and those who do not see it that way, is a recurrent issue in philosophy -- and in ideology, it might be added. On the neutralist model it is not happiness which is the dominant end but situational well-being. That is to say, as far as the situational and happiness-catenary aspects are concerned. If the happiness-catenal is a person, this situational well-being comprises 'er overall life-plan, because it depends also on this life-plan how a person experiences changes in 'er conditions. Happiness is acceptable for us as an instrumental value, and as one amongst other values. For utilitarians, however, it is an ultimate value, and the sole one (assuming, that is, that they are truly monistic eudaimonists). Nonetheless, it is a value in both neutralism and utilitarianism, and therefore it is worth our while to examine whether certain objections which have been raised to utilitarianism could be raised to our type of eudaimonism as well. We shall, then, not consider objections with respect to autonomy, justice, truth-telling, promise-keeping and others of this kind. They can in our denominational doctrine either be met with the other values or principles we espouse (inclusive of other subnorms of neutrality), or need not be taken seriously at all, when they but too readily draw on 'moral intuitions' which are not ours. An interesting objection to traditional, positive utilitarianism in the present context is, however, that people (and sentient beings in general) would have to produce as many happy beings as possible, even if there were only a marginal difference between their happiness and a life of nanhappiness. For any additional sentient being, however little happy it were, would increase the sum total of happiness in the world, provided that the population increase did not make the existing sentient beings unhappy, or more unhappy than the new utility bearers would be happy. To bypass the objections against positive utilitarianism, some theorists have proposed negative utilitarianism as the solution to all moral problems. Whereas happiness is the sole, ultimate value in positive utilitarianism, unhappiness is the sole, ultimate disvalue in negative utilitarianism. Negative utilitarianism is not extremistic, and seems to be more in accord with neutralism because unhappiness is, neutralistically speaking, also a perfective disvalue. Yet, the following objection to negative utilitarianism is even more serious than the one to positive utilitarianism: why not painlessly kill every sentient being in order to minimize unhappiness?. Evidently, the negative utilitarian would not have to kill nanhappy and happy catenals, but painlessly killing all unhappy catenals would minimize the total amount of unhappiness in the world. (It must be assumed, then, that the means to do this are there, and that no-one would be 'so irrational' as to be afraid of a painless death.) Why do these objections not apply to happiness-catenary neutralism, altho we, too, do consider unhappiness a disvalue, and altho we, too, may accept happiness as a value? The reason is simple: the ultimate, perfective value is neutrality and the ultimate, corrective value is neutralization and not maximization, minimization, catenalization or decatenalization. One does not neutralize the situation of any catenal by creating another, happy catenal, nor does one in this way neutralize the average situation of all existing catenals. And one does not neutralize the situation or happiness-catenary state of an unhappy catenal by making it into a thing which is not catenal anymore with respect to the situation and happiness catenas. The situation of a catenal is only neutralized by making it neutral, or less unneutral. (That traditional gangsters confuse neutralization and decatenalization is just no reason for traditional theorists to follow suit. Or, are both groups themselves perhaps exponents of the same culture?) Even the average value of situational catenality (which is a hypothetical construct) will not get closer to 0 by adding a catenal in a completely neutral situation, nor will the average value of happiness-catenality by adding a nanhappy catenal. The average value of situational catenality will indeed get closer to 0 by killing a catenal in an unneutral situation, but this will also happen by neutralizing the catenal's situation, and even by adding a catenal in an opposite situation which is equally unneutral. But it does not just follow from the norm of well-being that a neutral, average situation would be superior to an unneutral one. In that case it would suffice to have only unneutral situations in the world as long as the negative situations were balanced by the positive ones. A neutral average is therefore at most the result of a neutralist subnorm, not the goal or essence of it. This is not to say that looking at the average or total value cannot be useful when one and the same action has a neutralizing effect with respect to the one catenal and an unneutralizing effect with respect to another. But it is precisely the fact that the effects on the individual catenals can be different which makes the average or total value a useful instrument. Yet, this still does not make it an ultimate value in itself. The essence of every neutralist subnorm is that each individual value should be 0 if this corresponds to a form of ananormative neutrality. To attain this end, and granting that this is possible, we must neutralize the situation of a catenal, not kill it, nor add another catenal in an opposite kind of situation. Likewise, the average value of happiness-catenality would have to be brought closer to 0 by neutralizing happiness-catenals, not by decatenalizing them, nor by adding happiness-catenals with an opposite happiness-catenary value. This is certainly good news for unhappy happiness-catenals who want to be released from their pains or other feelings of unhappiness without being killed. It looks like bad news for happy happiness-catenals who would have to abstain from all pleasures, unless such abstention were detrimental to their health or to their situation in general. If so, they could do nothing else than to balance happiness-catenary neutralization (fewer pleasures, less happiness) against situational neutralization (as little deterioration of their situation as possible). Should this sound odd, unreasonable or ridiculous, this will in itself be a reason to suppose that nanhappiness is not ananormatively superior to happiness, and that happiness is an 'effect' and sign of situational improvement. In this case happiness is an indication of neutralization and something to be happy about. But even then, happiness must not be pursued as an ultimate end in itself. Until now we have only compared our position with the positions of positive and negative utilitarianism. But, as a matter of fact, any doctrine which recognizes happiness as a perfective value (even if only one among several others) suffers, at least to a certain degree, from the defects of positive utilitarianism; and any doctrine which recognizes average or total unhappiness as a perfective disvalue suffers from the defects of negative utilitarianism. However, besides the neutralist and utilitarian positions there are two other main positions. The first one is the position of normative doctrines which do not say anything about happiness-catenary and situational catenality. According to such doctrines it would not matter at all whether human and other sentient beings are happy, nanhappy or unhappy, nor would it matter whether their situations are good or not (while somehow defining good in nonnormative, situational terms). This is the position of those who do not take any position. Finally, there is the position of ideologies and philosophic theories which do not propagate happiness as a performatory value, or unhappiness as a performatory disvalue, but which promise happiness to those who are virtuous, and which threaten those who are vicious in terms of the doctrinal prescriptions with unhappiness. (Supernaturally, believers who do not receive their reward or punishment before death may on such a construction also receive it after death, 'preferably' either in the form of eternal bliss or of eternal damnation.) The monomaniac inventors and leaders of such promisory-comminatory doctrines only confess implicitly that personal happiness will always remain the sole, ultimate value, and personal unhappiness the sole, ultimate disvalue, if not of the doctrine in question itself, then of its adherents. 3.4.4 THE PRINCIPLE OF BENEFICENCE So far as happiness-catenals and their situations are concerned, a neutralist hatred of pain or unhappiness is an unconditional one, and so is a neutralist love of good, neutral situations; but a neutralist love of pleasure or happiness is a conditional one. It is an intrinsic duty to improve the situations of human or other sentient beings when these situations are not good in a neutral sense. Improving these situations is nanaic, and striving for their improvement anafactive. Where there is pain and suffering, because human or other sentient beings find themselves in a deteriorating or bad situation, it is an intrinsic duty to alleviate or relieve the pain and suffering of these happiness-catenals. Where there is pleasure or contentment, because human or other sentient beings find themselves in a situation which is ameliorating or good in neutral terms, we may be satisfied as well. To promote the well-being of happiness-catenals and to take away their pain and suffering is 'doing or producing good' in traditional terms. In other words, the duty to be anafactive with respect to their bad situations, and with respect to their unhappiness, is a duty to be beneficent. Beneficence is nothing else than intentional anafaction of the situational type. The motivational value corresponding to it is benevolence that is, the disposition to be beneficent. If happiness and situational neutralization are indeed inseparable, beneficence in the sense of situational anafaction need not differ much from utilitarian happiness or utility in practise (except in the marginal cases discussed above). Also other nonutilitarians have often explicitly recognized a (semi-)utilitarian principle of beneficence besides, for example, a nonutilitarian 'principle of just distribution'. In this way it was, and still is, possible to incorporate that part of utilitarianism which is most convincing. One ethical theorist has correctly pointed out that the principle of beneficence is 'the more basic principle' which must underlie the principle of utility. This latter principle (that one should bring about the greatest possible balance of eudaimonist good over eudaimonist evil) emphasizes that one ought to do good and to prevent or avoid harm. Since the ideal to do only good, and not to do any harm, is often impossible in practise, one is in those instances that it is impossible forced to bring about the best possible balance of good over evil -- it is argued. This argument amounts to exactly the same as what has been said above: not the total or average value (utility in this case) is the ultimate one, but each individual value. In this respect individualized forms of consequentialism (which are still identity-independent, however) are much more plausible than an individuality-denying form of consequentialism such as utilitarianism. It has been suggested that it follows from the principle of beneficence, firstly, that 'one ought not to inflict harm'; secondly, that 'one ought to prevent harm'; thirdly, that 'one ought to remove what is bad'; and fourthly, that 'one ought to do or promote good'. On such an account the reason to be beneficent is in neutralist terms that one ought not to worsen any human or other sentient being's situation, or to make it unhappy (the minimum requirement of nonactivating neutralism); that one ought to prevent that this happens; that one ought to improve such a being's situation if it is unhappy and if its situation is not good in a neutral sense; and that one ought to improve such a being's situation if its situation is not good in a neutral sense even when it does not feel unhappy (the severest requirement of activating neutralism). For utilitarians utility, and therefore beneficence, is a duty in all respects (that is, if they use the term duty at all); for many anti-utilitarian deontologists beneficence is only something supererogatory, or if not beneficence in general, at least the normative condition that one ought to do or promote good. The deontological tendency to lift beneficence beyond the call of duty may be a very convenient one, the idea of a supererogatory duty is an artificial device which only blocks or hampers the operation of a doctrinal principle. It is the dire consequence, firstly, of confusing the doctrinal aspect of morality with the metadoctrinal one; and secondly, of neglecting or ignoring the activating interpretation of doctrinal principles. From a metadoctrinal angle every doctrinal or intrinsic duty which requires more than noninterference is, indeed, in a sense 'supererogatory', but the principle of beneficence is a doctrinal principle, and we are not in this context concerned with extrinsic considerations. From a doctrinal angle it does make quite a difference whether the duty connected with the principle of beneficence is activating or nonactivating. But to say that it can be either activating or nonactivating is something else than saying that it must definitely be nonactivating. It is precisely in the latter case that every anafactive (or 'positive') action becomes 'supererogatory' without further ado. In the former case, however, the activating duty always remains, if not in the foreground, at least in the background. Moreover, even where it concerns the activating interpretation of the duty of beneficence, there is no reason to hold that the moral agent's or decision-maker's modal condition would not count anymore. Nor is there a reason to hold that all happiness-catenals would be subject to equally intense feelings of happiness and unhappiness, and that they would all experience the same conditions in the same way. (Here we touch on issues whose treatment, or partial treatment, we will have to postpone until the chapter on life and nonlife.) The principle of utility is not part of the neutralist doctrine, because we do not believe in sum totals which are ultimate, and because we do not believe in happiness as a perfective value. Yet, where we do strive for the minimization of unhappiness, and the improvement of situations (an improvement which probably will be accompanied by happiness), utility can indeed play a role. This role, however, lies only in the way it deals with the practical application of the principle of beneficence where beneficence in one respect is maleficence in another. The fact that one and the same act can do good here and harm there is a contingent, empirical one, and also therefore utility does not belong to a normative doctrine as an ultimate value. But when trying to implement what such a doctrine prescribes, it is evidently a very important factual-modal condition to take into account, and we, too, will have to do this. Thus on the whole only that action may be regarded as nanaic which produces more situational amelioration than deterioration (and which does not cause more unhappiness than happiness). This is a rule which does not only apply to the different situations of different happiness-catenals; it also applies to the situations of one and the same happiness-catenal at different times. Where it is sure or probable that the betterment of a catenal's situation in the short term is substantially greater or smaller than the worsening of its situation in the long term, or vice versa, only that action must be regarded as nanaic which yields more situational betterment than worsening over the whole life-time of the catenal in question. In theory it is the well-being of all happiness-catenals at all times which matters, but in practise the anafactive agent has, of course, limited means and a limited knowledge of what the effects of 'er action will be. This may be a reason to pay special attention to situations 'here and now', yet it can never be a reason to pay no attention to situations far away in other parts of the world or in the future, for it is often the case that one can be quite sure that one's actions will be beneficent, or for that matter maleficent, to foreign peoples or future generations. And where there is insufficient guarantee that the distant effects of one's action will be beneficial ones, it is not seldom possible to first exert one's influence to get such a guarantee, or to make these effects probable. Such action, too, is, if not nanaic, at least anafactive. Utilitarianism (and indirectly also theories of beneficence and well-being) is a much favored instrument of exclusivist sociobiologists and other ideologues of naturalness who would like to get rid of certain groups of human beings, or certain kinds of human phenomena or policies, altogether. (Particularly, the equality of men and women and of hetero- and homosexuals are thorns in their flesh.) Rather than callously appealing to some ancient, sacred book wich commands the extermination and subjugation of certain minorities and (near-)majorities, they prefer a more 'objective' approach to warrant their attitude by arguing that the human beings concerned 'must be' unhappy, or that the phenomena or policies in question cause such unhappiness. (The 'pleasant resemblance' between a religious book of the type concerned and utilitarianism is that neither one recognizes an independent right to personhood.) There may be numerous objections against any assumption that certain groups of human beings would be, or would have to be, unhappy (or more unhappy than other groups), or that certain kinds of human phenomena or policies would on balance cause more unhappiness than happiness (or more than other phenomena or policies), that is, even in a society in which no-one would be discriminated against. This is an 'empirical' issue we cannot deal with here, altho such an assumption betrays more of the human being doing the assuming him- or herself than of the reality talked about. The informative point is, first of all, that beneficence in its activating form requires that the situations of people, or groups of people, who 'are so unlucky to be unhappy' be improved. Secondly, so far as the phenomena themselves are concerned, one must even from a purely utilitarian point of view not only look at people's state of being happy or unhappy, but also at their real or potential contribution to happiness and unhappiness in general. Perhaps, people who are creative, physically less aggressive and more critical of what the majority presumably have always believed to be normal, are on the average also unhappier. But, perhaps, it is also these very same unhappy people who create more beautiful things, who cause less misery to others, and who are more likely to discover what has made human beings unhappy in the past, or to ascertain what will not make them happy anymore in the future. Naturally, to simply take all these things for granted would not be less exclusivistic, and our own prejudgment shall be neither abnegational nor aggrandizemental. What leaves utilitarianism in a sad state here is that it is often in practise not even the principle of utility which counts; what often seems to have the greatest weight instead is a utilitarian's or pseudo-utilitarian's own personal preference for the one empirical presupposition over the other. Altho the principle of utility is preceded by a principle of beneficence, neither utility nor beneficence is a perfective value for us. Beneficence is situational anafaction and therefore a corrective-instrumental value. It is well-being which is the situational perfective value. Hence we speak of "a norm of well-being" and not of some "norm of beneficence". The formulation of such a norm would merely suggest that beneficence itself were an ultimate or perfective value, and this would only support those who have claimed that it is good that there is evil in the world, so that people are able to show their benevolence by means of good deeds. According to the norm of neutrality it is the situations of people or sentient beings which have primary significance, and good deeds are of secondary importance and not ends in themselves. Those who have recognized a principle of beneficence have also argued that beneficence (and certainly utility) is not enough, but that a proper morality also requires some principle of distributive justice or equality. Just as the principle of beneficence is roughly the equivalent of the norm of well-being, so this latter principle of justice or equality is roughly the equivalent of the so-called 'norm of interpersonal equality', another subnorm of the norm of neutrality. We are now going to take a closer look at this equality and at what it is supposed to mean in a social context. 3.5 EQUALITY 3.5.1 FORMS OF CATENATED EQUALITY The neutral predicate of any difference catena is a predicate of equality. If the difference catena is monovariant (and bicatenal), every predicate of the original catena corresponds to one predicate of the difference catena. Given that a catenal has a certain predicate of the original catena, it must then have a certain other predicate of the difference catena. Given that it has a certain predicate of the difference catena, it must have one particular original predicate (if an extremity-difference catena) or one of two original predicates (if a neutrality-difference catena). It does therefore not make sense to consider the normative value of a predicate of a monovariant difference catena. The superiority or inferiority of such a predicate is the superiority or inferiority of the one or more predicates of the original catena to which it corresponds, since we hold that an original catena takes precedence over a derived one. Hence, the value of the equality of a monovariant difference catena would simply be the value of the original predicate or predicates corresponding to it. Bivariant equality can be either monocatenal or bicatenal. Monocatenal equality is equality between component parts of one and the same whole, whereas bicatenal equality is equality between different wholes. The form of catenated equality which is the limit-element of the monocatenal bivariant positivity-difference catena stands for being-neutrally-nondirectional. (The positivity of this catena stands for having-a-positive-direction or being-positivity-directed.) The form of catenated equality which is the limit-element of the monocatenal bivariant neutrality-difference catena is well-known as symmetry. A catenal is of course neutrally nondirectional and symmetrical, regardless of the value it assumes with respect to the original catena. All other things being equal, being neutrally nondirectional and symmetrical are thus states of being which are normatively superior to being directional and asymmetrical. (Those who would like to narrowly confine the notion of normative superiority to ethical matters, should realize that our position is ontologically not different here from that of people claiming that beauty is an ultimate or perfective value, that is, normatively superior to ugliness.) Some may associate being-nondirectional or a 'lack of direction' with indirection or aimlessness. But if aimlessness, that is, a 'lack of aim or purpose', is wrong, it is either wrong, because processes do take place and people do act without any aim or purpose, or because processes do not take place and people do not act, where this would further a good end. Since the principle of neutrality makes neutrality the ultimate aim or purpose of everything and everyone, it does not justify the former kinds of aimless processes or actions, while the relevantist interpretation of this principle can justify a process or action which is neutral-directed and thus 'directional'. In such a case, however, the ceteris paribus clause does not hold. Therefore, the catenary superiority of being-neutrally-non-directional does not warrant the kind of indirection or aimlessness which is wrong. (Note that being-non-directional denotes both the neutral 'being-nan-directional' and the noncatenality of the same aspect.) The difference between mono- and bi-catenal, bivariant equality is not that the one notion of equality is comparative and the other not. Both are comparative in that we compare different catenals, but the catenals concerned belong to a whole which is catenal itself in the former case and do not belong to such a catenal whole in the latter case. Yet, when people speak of "equality" or even of "comparative equality" in traditional terms, they tend --translated into catenical parlance-- to think of the neutralities of bicatenal bivariant difference catenas only. Furthermore, they seem to have always taken it for granted that these difference catenas were positivity-difference catenas. (Extremity-difference catenas amounts to the same here.) One question we will have to ask ourselves later in this division is therefore why equality, even bicatenal bivariant difference-catenary equality, should solely be associated with an extremity- and not with a neutrality-difference catena. Evidently we must then also examine whether it matters whether the one aspectual value is taken for the difference catena or the other. Nature itself provides us with weighty examples of bicatenal bivariant nonextremity catenas namely those derived from the spatial basic catenas. But many people would not notice that the neutrality of this kind of catena is a form of equality. It is the predicate of having-the-same-location. Part of the reason is, perhaps, that different material primary things can never have exactly the same location, however great a role the nanaic force of gravity and the nanaic nuclear force play to bring this about. A more important part of the reason is, probably, that people cannot select the principles of nature, and that people are not physical bodies. They can be ignorant of certain principles, they can adopt principles by hypothesis, and they can call structurelessness "chaos", but this is not the kind of freedom which alters the natural ground-world itself. Whether they like locational equality or not, gravitation is here to stay. Bicatenal bivariant equality did become important for many people when they started thinking of it as a principle in interpersonal, social or distributive affairs. It is especially in this context that we should take a closer look at the temporal aspect of equality. For saying that two catenals are equal in a certain respect is not necessarily saying that these two catenals are different individuals which are equal at the same moment. And if they are, it is only their equality in the future we could bring about (for example, by giving each of them one orange). But we can also bring future equality between two individuals about at different moments in the future (for example, by giving one a banana the one day, and the other a banana the next day). In these two instances in which the equality is a relation in the future, a consequentialist scheme will tell us what to do, provided that the good to bring about is here equality (or bicatenal bivariant equality in interpersonal, distributive affairs). It is a limit-case when one of the catenals is considered at the present moment, while the other is considered at a moment in the future. Can it be called "a consequence of one's action that B will receive the same amount of a certain good as A receives right now"? It will certainly become counterintuitive to speak of "consequences" and of "a consequentialist scheme", when the equality between one catenal in the past and one in the future is considered. To give an example: striving for equality between A and B, we may decide to give an apple to B tomorrow, because A did already get one yesterday. (Here it does not matter from whom or in what way.) The norm of neutrality is 'temporally neutral' in that the normative superiority of neutrality does not depend on the moment or period of neutrality. Hence, equality as a neutral predicate may be equality in the future, in the present, in the past, and between the future and the present, between the future and the past, and between the present and the past. It is only because of the asymmetry of time, or for reasons of causality, that the good of equality cannot be produced in the past. But this is a modal condition and not something which follows from the ananorm, for the ananorm itself is future-, present- and past-regarding. The neutralist doctrine may be labeled "consequentialistic" insofar as it is future-regarding and dealing with causal effects; it is 'antecedentialistic' insofar as it is past-regarding ; and --who knows-- dependent on the definition also 'deontological' insofar as it is present-regarding. What is certain is that it is a past-, present-, and future-regarding teleological doctrine in which nothing else than catenated neutrality in general and catenated equality in particular ought to be chosen as a goal of one's action. The form of bicatenal bivariant equality to be taken into account is, then, not only equality in future relations but also equality in temporal relations which extend from the past to the present or future. When temporal equality concerns one and the same individual we do not speak of "a bicatenal bivariant difference catena" but of "a differentiation" and of "a time-differential catena". Neutralness is then sameness or constancy and when the ability exists to restore a disturbed equilibrium, stability. This sameness, constancy or stability is normatively superior to change and disturbance. But when differentiation and time-differential neutrality merely serve a status quo of inequality, or merely perpetuate polarity in terms of the original catena, such neutralness is not ananormatively superior, and positive, neutral-directed action can then be warranted. Likewise, even where there is bicatenal bivariant equality, we must not lose sight of the original predicate catena. That catena, too, has a neutrality which is ananormatively superior. The main objection against traditional egalitarianism is that it would prefer an equal division of unhappiness or poverty to an unequal division of happiness or wealth. The same ideologues and philosophers who have rejected utilitarianism for neglecting distributive justice, egalitarian or not, have rejected egalitarianism for neglecting well-being, utilitarian or not. 3.5.2 THE TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY Everyone who speaks the present language properly must be in favor of 'justice', and deontologists like to make use of this verbal consensus by appealing to one or more 'principles of justice'. (Some of them even subsume, or used to subsume, everything which is or might be good or right under justice.) Since the principle of utility can definitely in theory lead to a very unequal or 'unjust' distribution of good and evil, anti-utilitarians have correctly argued that a principle of utility could never be the sole, basic standard of right and wrong. However, a methodically adequate normative doctrine must not in its principles assign a normative value to something that is already normative or evaluative in itself. Thou shalt be just dogmas do not add anything to anyone's substantive knowledge or insight. (This is not to say that someone who starts from a so-called 'principle of justice' cannot later formulate what 'e means in descriptive terms.) Unlike 'principles of justice', the traditional so-called 'principle of equality' does make a factual notion into a normative one and is therefore from this point of view methodically adequate. This in itself does evidently not tell us how the principle must be interpreted, nor does this in itself make it into a morally acceptable one. It has thus been argued that egalitarians employ two completely different conceptions of equality: one in which proportions should be kept equal when looking at factors like people's merits or needs, and one in which the people concerned are made equal, as it were, in a certain respect. In the former case it is said to be 'the impartial use of a proper criterion' which counts. Such words implicitly refer to the principle of relevance, which need not surprise us as the principle of relevance is often regarded or treated as a principle of equality. In the latter case equality is said to be a desirable outcome in itself. This is the traditional egalitarian claim which demands our attention in particular here. Quite a few objections raised against the traditional principle of equality do not so much concern equality as a doctrinal value but rather the relationship between a doctrinal value like equality and the kinds of right we have called "rights of personhood". Thus certain theorists have complained that under egalitarian rule people's personal talents, whether inborn or not, would become the property of the whole community. And --it has been added-- why not make transplantable organs into a public good to be distributed in such a way that those who were less fortunate get their equal share? In such criticism two issues are confused, altho the traditional egalitarian is not able to tell them apart either. Firstly, there is the question of what is extrinsically a person's own, that is, what belongs to 'im as a person. The right to one's own body (with its talents) vis-à-vis other people is an extrinsic right of personhood. But secondly, there is the question of what a person should or should not do, with or without 'er body. It is this intrinsic side of morality which tells us that we should declare our solidarity, and act in sympathy with, the less fortunate. We must do so by distributing what no-one extrinsically owns in the best way, and by asking ourselves and other owners of extrinsic property to contribute to a better distribution of goods. The egalitarian ideal has often degenerated into authoritarianism, but it can only degenerate into authoritarianism for those who do not recognize equality as an intrinsic perfective value, a value to be chosen by people who are equal. Even tho we respect people's freedom and the property of their bodies, this does not amount to a status quo ideology, for also our recognition of what are people's extrinsic property rights is founded in normative metadoctrinal, not in factual-modal, considerations. Other objections raised against the principle of equality concern its effect on people's well-being (apart from questions of their rights). In itself this is a problem of any pluralistic doctrine, and of any monistic doctrine in which an action may be beneficent or right in one respect and maleficent or wrong in another. The argument from well-being does only apply to a monistic egalitarianism in which equality is the sole value, or sole intrinsic value. One claim is that equality dissolves the special relationship between the producer and 'er product. Everything a person produces would be for the common good, and the realization of 'er desires, or the satisfaction of 'er needs, would almost entirely depend on the productivity of others. Contrary to this it has been said that it is also a human need to manage the satisfaction of one's own needs on one's own. (Egalitarianism has at once been blamed for treating people as consumers and for forcing them to produce for others.) In this kind of argument the measures which may be necessary to promote equality where inequality exists, are taken to be means in themselves, but the principle of equality does not proscribe the realization of one's own desires or the satisfaction of one's own needs. When it teaches that a situation in which actions, whether individual or collective ones, have led to inequality in outcome is bad, it does not say that the sort of action involved is bad, but the resulting inequality. Equality in itself does not preclude that everyone produces 'imself what 'e needs: a community or society which is individualistic in this respect is neither better nor worse from the standpoint of equality. (Empirically speaking, it might as well be argued that it is in a state of complete socioecenomic equality that most people have the opportunity to be productive and creative on their own, altho no-one will in such a state have so much opportunity as the happy minority in a state of great inequality.) When it is attempted to reach equality by means of collective action, it cannot be required that everyone produce and make use of the same products so long as there are given needs and desires which are different. It would promote inequality, and be exclusivistic, if solely the needs or desires of one particular group (such as the majority) were taken into account, and not those of other groups. To exclusively distribute oranges where only a part of the human beings concerned like or prefer oranges, is to favor those who prefer oranges, and to hurt those who like or prefer other products (let us say, of the same price). Likewise, to have everything produced collectively, where only a part (however great) of the human beings concerned prefers to have everything made for them, is to favor 'consumers' and to hurt those who have pleasure in producing things themselves. What egalitarianism needs is a guideline when equality in one respect is inequality in another respect; yet, such does not mean that equality would not be a value. (Note that we touch on a seeming discrepancy between egalitarianism and inclusivism here. For whereas egalitarianism stresses equality, inclusivism implicitly recognizes and even seems to stress differences between people or other primary things. It might look as if it is exclusivism which furthers unity and equality. But appearances are deceptive: exclusivism draws an irrelevant divide and then ignores or maltreats what is on one side of the divide. Exclusivism's purported 'unity and equality' is therefore always a partial one. Inclusivism, on the other hand, does not assign an exclusive status to the given needs, desires or preferences of any human being or group of human beings in particular and is thus fully compatible with the kind of egalitarianism here propounded.) A favored kind of argument against utilitarianism is that utilitarians would have to prefer a situation in which A and B both had 11 units of happiness and C nothing to one in which all three of them had 7 units. Similarly, a favored kind of argument against egalitarianism is that egalitarians would have to prefer a situation in which A, B and C each had 7 units of happiness (or well-being) to one in which A and B both had 7 units and C 11 units. (The former example of 11, 11 and 0 is then suddenly not used anymore.) But is the fact that someone prefers the division 7-7-11 to the division 7-7-7 an argument against the principle of equality? Of course not; at the most it is an argument against monistic egalitarianism. For any egalitarian doctrine which is not monistic, the distinction between equality and inequality can solely be illustrated in an adequate and sincere manner by varying the difference-catenary quantity and by studying the effect this has on people's preference or opinion, while keeping all other quantities constant. (Physicists could never have discovered the relationship between the temperature and the pressure of a mass of gas if they had not held it at constant volume at the same time.) Taking the necessary methodical precautions, a division like 10-10-10 must be compared with divisions like 9-10-11 and 0-10-20. Anyone who then still maintains that equality does not count at all (that is, other things being equal) does not have 'our normative intuitions'. The principle of equality does only assign a superior value to equality when compared with inequality, and not with any particular level on which the equality is to be maintained. In practise the modal conditions may be such that equality can only be realized at a lower level, but it is then these modal conditions which should be blamed for making it impossible to realize equality at a higher level. Consider, for example, the case that there are three persons, A, B and C, who start with 10 units of happiness or well-being each, and imagine that something would happen to A so that 'e lost, say, 3 units. On the principle of equality alone the division 9-9-9 would then be a better one than the actual division 7-10-10. But anti-egalitarians might us want to consider a situation now in which it were possible to transfer 1 unit from B to A, and another from C to A, while it is not B and C's fault either that A lost 'er 3 units. If it were nevertheless possible to reduce B and C's number of units, altho impossible to increase A's number of units, then --the argument may run-- an egalitarian would have to prefer the division 7-7-7 to 7-10-10. (We are asked to forget about the ceteris paribus clause.) Even if the egalitarian is not of the monistic type, 'e would still have a reason to prefer 7-7-7 to 7-10-10. This may seem odd in a case like this but it is quite reasonable when taking into account that a principle like equality does not apply to one isolated case with exceptional modal conditions but to a great variety of cases. Those who decide from one case that there would not be any reason to prefer 7-7-7 to 7-10-10 (given that there is not any relevant difference between A, B and C, and in addition to the reason to prefer 7-10-10 to 7-7-7 because it yields more units in total), never have such an egalitarian reason. All other things being equal, they will not have any reason either to prefer, for example, 10-10-10 to 1-10-19. If it is no-one's fault that A lost 'er 9 units (even not A's own fault), and if C acquired 'er 9 additional units without stealing anything from A, people should on a nonegalitarian conception of justice be wholly satisfied with such a situation so long as 1 unit is 'just' enough to stay alive, or 'just' too much to die. 3.5.3 THE NORM OF INTERPERSONAL EQUALITY Not all egalitarians are equal. The first distinction to be drawn is that between those egalitarians for whom socioeconomic equality is one value besides others, like well-being or happiness, and those for whom equality would be the sole value. The second distinction to be drawn is that between those egalitarians for whom equality is an intrinsic value subject to extrinsic, right-theoretical considerations and those for whom equality is, if not the sole value, a value which is merely to be balanced against other values of the same (doctrinal) nature. As should have become plain from the anti-egalitarian objections discussed above, egalitarianism of the monistic type, and of the type which does not allow for metadoctrinal considerations, cannot be seriously adhered to. But even the egalitarians now left over, are not all equal. A third distinction must be drawn: that between relevantist egalitarianism and the traditional form of what might be labeled "absolute egalitarianism". Traditional egalitarianism has been attacked because of its absolute priority given to equality as an outcome. Yet, this objection could only be raised after divorcing traditional egalitarianism's principle of equality from that of relevance which often was implicit in it as well. In any adequate egalitarian doctrine this interplay of the principle of equality and the principle of relevance is of paramount importance, however. And it certainly is in the neutralist doctrine with its relevantist interpretation of the principle of neutrality, and thus of the principle of equality. According to the ananorm one should strive for nothing else than neutrality, unless an unneutral end serves a more urgent neutral end. In the present context this means that one should strive for interpersonal equality, unless inequality serves the ananormatively superior neutrality of a different aspect. Such another neutral end may be well-being in a neutral sense but also another form of equality, especially proportional equality. It may be that it is reasonable not to distribute equal shares but shares proportionate to people's merits, needs, and so on. Nonetheless, such proportionality is itself a form of equality again in another respect. For example, if one person has worked 10 hours for someone else or for some collective body, and the other 5 hours, it would be equality in an absolute sense if they were paid the same. To pay the first person twice as much as the second, however, is to pay these people the same hourly wage, starting from the assumption that not the mere fact that someone has worked for someone else or for a collective body is what counts, but the number of hours 'e has worked. This is not to argue, of course, that the number of hours worked could be the only relevant factor. The time worked, for instance, need not be the same as the amount of work done. Given that our equality is not necessarily an absolute equality in outcome, some might suggest that our egalitarianism is nothing else than relevantism without a principle of equality. Those who suggested this, however, would not have understood the basics of the theory of relevancy and the considerations which have led us from the principle of discriminational relevance to the norm of inclusivity. The role of the principle of equality (or the egalitarian interpretation) vis-à-vis the principle of relevance is that it provides a basis of inherent justification. Relevantism in itself does not tell us that we should opt for equality and only deviate from equality if it can be justified; relevantist egalitarianism does. Within the confines of egalitarianism, any distinction made must be relevant with respect to (another) end of equality, that is, some form of proportionality; within the confines of neutralism in general, any distinction made must be relevant with respect to (another) end of neutrality. Neutral, unless neutral is the motto of neutralism, equal, unless equal that of our relevantist egalitarianism. Evidently, unless neutral is short for unless a distinction can be drawn which is relevant to an ananormatively superior neutral end and unless equal for unless a distinction can be drawn which is relevant to an end of equality in the context concerned. How does relevantist egalitarianism relate to the theory that there would be two different sorts of right to equality which people (or citizens as individuals) are supposed to have? Firstly, there would be 'the right of equal treatment', that is, to an equal portion of some benefit or burden; and secondly, there would be 'the right of treatment as an equal', that is, 'to be treated with the same respect and concern as anyone else'. The latter right has even been described as "fundamental" and the former one as "derivative", since the 'right to treatment as an equal' may, but does not always, entail a 'right to equal treatment'. This theory which proposes to cleave the right to equality asunder into two rights, one fundamental and one derivative, is really a muddled way of expressing what is nothing else than the position of relevantist egalitarianism (except that the terminology of the proposal is more poetic than analytic). What it all amounts to is that people should be treated equally unless there is a relevant difference between them. The intrinsic right concerned is simply one right. (Note that it is said that people should be treated with the 'same' respect and concern. But what does same mean in practise if it is not related to equality or proportionality of treatment? If there are three persons who are not different in any relevant respect and the first two are each given one half, and the third one nothing, of a certain product, then all three are still treated as a person, assuming that their rights to personhood are not infringed. That they are not treated 'with the same respect' is because they are not given their equal share. And they are treated with the same respect nevertheless, even when not given an equal share, if there are relevant differences between them and if these differences justify the difference in treatment.) Some theorists have not only distinguished equal treatment from treatment as an equal but also a so-called 'comparative and a 'noncomparative' notion of equality. Thus, if a state tortured a person, it would violate the latter type of equality. This violation would still occur if the state in question tortured every person. The violation would, then, only be multiplied -- it is said. Equality understood in this noncomparative way denotes, of course, nothing else than personhood and the principle connected with it is nothing else than the metadoctrinal principle underlying the right to personhood or the 'right to treatment as a person'. It is someone's right of personhood which is impinged upon when 'e is tortured, regardless of whether other persons are tortured too. Altho this noncomparative form of so-called 'equality' may indeed be termed "constitutional", it is only moral in an extrinsic sense. In the neutralist doctrine, on the other hand, equality is a doctrinal value and the right to equality an intrinsic right not to be confused with the right to personhood. Even when confining oneself to equality between people, that is, interpersonal equality, the recognition of equality in itself is evidently still subject to many different interpretations. The principle of socioeconomic or interpersonal equality is a principle common to widely divergent stripes of egalitarianism, and it can therefore be advisable to underscore our relevantist position by speaking of "the (sub)norm of interpersonal equality". As a subnorm of the norm of neutrality, this interpreted principle of equality also stresses that if people are not treated equally in an absolute sense, the difference in treatment should be relevant to another end of equality, or more generally, another end of neutrality. A very important goal in the social or interpersonal field is, then, people's well-being. Theoretically, the overall situation in a state of absolute, socioeconomic equality might be much worse than in a state in which socioeconomic differences are allowed to exist. If these modal conditions do indeed hold, then socioeconomic differences are allowable if, and insofar as, they are relevant to people's well-being (not merely correlate with it). But well-being is in such a case not the sole intrinsic value; also equality in itself remains an intrinsic value. Total well-being and equality have in such a case to be balanced against each other as the norm of well-being and the norm of interpersonal equality are then contradictory. (In the last chapter we will discuss how to deal with conflicts between the subnorms of neutrality, and between the norm of neutrality and other principles.) Nanapolarity with respect to the norm of interpersonal equality is interpersonal difference-catenary nanapolarity. The corresponding decision-theoretical values are intentional and motivational, interpersonal difference-catenary anafactiveness. When anafactiveness in the field of interpersonal relations is a general phenomenon, the unity of interests and feelings characterized by the genuine concern for each other's well-being can be called "siblinghood" or "solidarity". Siblinghood transcends the brotherhood or (brotherhood and) sisterhood of exclusivist ideologies, while solidarity stresses the unity of the social whole. (Solidum from which it derives, means whole sum and is akin to holos which means whole or safe.) The community of interests and objectives so typical of solidarity does in the case of anafactive motives not issue from the mere fact that people with selfish interests realize that they are mutually interdependent nonetheless. Instead, it issues from a solid adherence to neutral principles, and from a common choice of neutral objectives. Anafactive members of a group, community or society show solidarity of neutral purpose. In interpersonal relations this solidarity consists first of all in interpersonal equality. Where they have to confront anti-egalitarian ideologies or doctrines, the siblings of the ananorm shall not yield to the imposition of any kind of inequality which relevantist egalitarianism cannot justify. Given that they will respect other people's rights of personhood so long as their own rights of personhood will be respected too, they shall not compromise. For there is no compromise between inequality and equality: those who propose a compromise between inequality and equality, propose inequality. 3.6 NANHONORE 3.6.1 MARKS OF HONOR EXISM 3.6.1.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESPECT To have no respect for respect when it means 'honor', and to respect nothing, and to disrespect nothing, is neutrality. To have respect for respect when it means 'concern', and to respect everything, and to disrespect nothing, is inclusivity. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Every denominational doctrine requires respect for what it values, or condemns disrespect with regard to what it values. Thus our own denominational doctrine condemns disrespect with regard to inclusivity, neutrality, truth and all values derived from and associated with these three. Traditional, denominational and other doctrines are not capable, however, of distinguishing the absence of respect and of honor from disrespect and from dishonor. Their lack of catenical discernment makes them equate a concept like lack of respect, in which respect is a positive notion, with the negative notion disrespect (not to speak of rudeness). In the eyes of their adherents dishonorable does not only mean disgraceful or shameful (which is correct) but also having no honor. The underlying, ignorant conception is that there would only be two possibilities: a person either actively shows respect and has honor in some positive sense, or 'e is disrespectful and dishonorable. (When describing this position, it would probably be more appropriate not to speak of "a person and 'er honor" but of "a man and his honor".) Now, on the catenical model disrespect is not simply a negation of respect but its opposite. Similarly, dishonor is not some universal negation, or aspect-negation, of honor but also its opposite. Not showing respect is therefore not necessarily being disrespectful, and not having honor is therefore not necessarily being dishonorable. Only those who still base their conception of truth on the antonymical metaphysics of the dialectical yang-yin brand can seriously maintain this. The doxastic truth they respect is not the truth we respect. Closely related to the concepts of honor and respect is the concept of reputation. Where reputation does not mean anything else than the opinion people in general have about a person, group or institution, there is, from a normative perspective, nothing right in having a so-called 'good' reputation or wrong in having a so-called 'bad' reputation. Being highly esteemed in a certain subculture for one's orthodox, exclusivist attitude and behavior, for instance, is nothing valuable. But when a person, group or institution is judged by the values of a particular normative doctrine, and it has a good reputation then, it means that the person or social entity in question wholly conform to the standards of that doctrine, or at least more than the average person or social entity. In the event that good is used in a badness-auxiliary sense, one must indeed conform entirely; in the event that it is used in a goodness-auxiliary sense, then much more often than on the average. In the latter case it is also possible to 'increase' one's good reputation. As one would expect, adherents of every ideology --also ours-- are in favor of a good reputation in terms of the values of that ideology. It is something else tho, to call such a good reputation "honor" and to say, for example, that one would be protecting, or fighting for, one's honor rather than one's reputation or good reputation. Reputation is etymologically nothing else than a 'reckoning up' or 'thinking over', while good and bad are clearly auxiliary terms. On the other hand, honor(able) and dishonor(able) are not auxiliary terms and have a number of different meanings and connotations which are anti-egalitarian, extremist and exclusivistic in but too blatant a manner. This need not surprise us, for unlike reputation, honor is a positively unneutral concept which completely lacks the basic meaning of concern, thoughtfulness and consideration inherent in respect. A good reputation is open to every person in that no person should and need disregard normative principles. Moreover, every person can be both respectful and respectable. Truistic as these statements may seem for us, the ideal of equality expressed in respect for people has not yet come true in cultures or subcultures where certain people, or groups of people, claim to be the only 'Hono(u)rable' ones. In such x-ist milieus everyone is 'honorable' (deserving respect), but some are judged 'more honorable' than others, for example, because they are of so-called 'high' or 'noble birth', or because they are officials of a certain governmental class. As tho this were not enough, some are not just more honorable than common (honorable?) people but even 'Right Hono(u)rable'. Using expressions like Your Hono(u)r is in these subcultures a way of talking to so-called 'men (or women) of superior standing' like judges or mayors. Even representatives of political parties which claim or purport to be egalitarian, and of parties which claim or purport to respect persons as persons, do not refrain from styling themselves and others "Hono(u)rable Members". They do not seem to have the common sense needed for realizing that where an exclusive minority is 'Hono(u)rable' a majority is not. It could be argued that there is at least a considerable difference between calling certain male or female, human beings "Hono(u)rable" solely on the grounds of their biologic-materialist relationship with other males or females, and calling certain people "Hono(u)rable", or giving them honors, for the work they are doing or have done. There definitely is a difference between these two categories, because being someone's child, or male child, may be a virtue in feudal circles that have not yet been squared with the right present, it is not an anafactive value, whereas the work someone does or has done can be very anafactive indeed. Nonetheless this is no reason to be anti-anafactive ourselves in our attitude towards people's services and good deeds. Even if the assessment of these services and deeds were correct, the function of titles and honor listings is to create absolute differences where there are really gradual ones. What counts in practise is, of course, that the assessment is ideological and must serve the interests, not of high ideals like truth and respect, but of the institution that does the creating and the dubbing. Honor exism has also infiltrated science, a field of human activity which many have claimed or believed to actually be objective, nonideological and even nonnormative. In traditional (pseudo-)scientific phraseology certain academic degrees and courses are called "honors degrees" and "honors courses". Elsewhere people are said 'to have graduated cum laude'. It needs no explanation that some courses are more advanced or difficult than others. It needs no explanation either that the kind of course someone has followed and the talent or diligence 'e has displayed are relevant to particular academic, professional or other goals. Yet, this is, firstly, no reason to speak in terms of honor, and secondly, no reason to suggest that the difference between the one person who is a little bit better qualified and the other who is a little bit less qualified is an absolute one in which the former person needs to be honored or praised, unlike the latter. 3.6.2 THE NORM OF NANHONORE Honor (or honoring) is a positive predicate, dishonor (or dishonoring) a negative predicate, and the concatenate neither-honoring-nor-dishonoring a neutral one. The catena of honor, the neutral limit-element and dishonor is the honor catena, a basic catena. This catena has a duplicate: the catena of the positive being-honored, the neutral neither-being-honored-nor-being-dishonored and the negative being-dishonored, the isorelative of the basic catena. Unlike respect and unlike what is a good reputation from a neutralist standpoint, honor and dishonor do not serve any neutral purpose. They merely contribute to the establishment and maintenance of extremist, or lesser unneutralist, and exclusivist institutions. Therefore honor and dishonor are ananormatively inferior predicates, and the attitudes of honoring and dishonoring ananormatively inferior attitudes. Altho it makes quite a difference with regard to a decision-maker's anafactiveness whether 'e honors or is honored, and whether 'e dishonors or is dishonored, it makes no difference at all in the light of the normativeness of being: honoring and being-honored, or dishonoring and being-dishonored are equally inferior. So, it is not the neutrality of the active, catenical aspect in isolation which is ananormatively superior, but the neutralities of both the active and the passive aspects at once. We shall call the bineutrality which combines the two limit-elements "nanhonore". (Pronounced as nän|höno|ré with ä as in the variants of stance, höno| as in the variants of hono(u)r and é as in we; with stress on the second syllable. The e is to distinguish this term from nanhonor, which denotes the neutrality of the active aspect only.) When applying the ananorm specifically to honor-catenary and isorelative issues, it may be termed "the norm of nanhonore". As a penultimate perfective value nanhonore entails that one should not honor, nor dishonor; and that nothing (personal or not) should be honored or dishonored. As an antepenultimate value honor-catenary anafactiveness entails, first of all, that one should not intentionally and knowingly honor or dishonor. It also entails that one should not have honored or dishonored oneself if one can prevent it, or to the extent that one can prevent it. If it could be proved that a particular, personal or nonpersonal, primary thing were superior according to the ananorm itself, even then positive honoring would not be conducive to less unneutrality, but would only add to it. If it could be proved that a particular, personal or nonpersonal, primary thing were inferior according to the ananorm, even then negative dishonoring would not be conducive to less unneutrality either, but would also then only add to it. Seen from the perspective of the norm of nanhonore, no person or primary thing is in itself honorable, and no person or primary thing is in itself dishonorable. We have clearly distinguished honor and dishonor from respect and disrespect. The question might now arise why the norm of neutrality does not apply to respect and disrespect in the same way as it applies to honor and dishonor. The reason is that respect itself is a conscious conformity with the principles of the doctrine, and disrespect a deliberate violation of these principles. Principles can be applicable to all kinds of ground-world and propositional things but not to conformity with themselves; or, if they are, they can solely legitimize such conformity. It is therefore that our ideology allows respect, and condemns disrespect, for people's right to personhood; allows respect, and condemns disrespect, for the truth; allows respect, and condemns disrespect, for inclusivity; and allows respect, and condemns disrespect, for neutrality itself. Just as there is a valid reason to differentiate respect and honor, so there is a valid reason to differentiate praise and honor, dependent on the definition of praise and on the manner of praising. Where praise has degenerated into glorification, worship and idolatry it is self-evident that it is badly corrupted by strong, polar feelings of the honor-catenary stripe. No doubt, it then offends against the norm of nanhonore. But in its pure form to praise something is to commend, to approve of or to express a favorable judgment of something. Praising involves in this instance not the worship of some doxastic authority but an evaluation of an attitude or actions on the basis of independent norms or principles. 'Praiseworthy' is on such an account --again-- what accords with the principles; and 'blameworthy' what deserves blame, because one has found fault with it, also in terms of these principles. In normative theories praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are terms of ascription, that is, of ascribing praise for having good motives or intentions, and blame for having bad motives or intentions. They apply to people's attitude and behavior with regard to normative principles, and obviously these normative principles cannot be applicable to the kind of praise and blame concerned themselves. Praising someone for living in accordance with the subnorm of nanhonore, the supernorm of neutrality, or any other principle of our ideology is therefore in itself not anti-anafactive. It would become anti-anafactive if one praised the one person and not the other who is equally praiseworthy. It would become anti-anafactive, too, if one lost sight of all proportionality in one's praising, for example, by creating or allowing the existence of absolute differences where the differences in merit (if any) are merely gradual. A typical example of creating absolute differences --still regardless of the principles, or lack of principles, on which it is founded-- is the exclusive naming of objects, such as streets, avenues, buildings, funds, towns, and so on, after particular persons. (If literally every person had an object of the same importance called after 'im, or of an importance proportionate to 'er real praiseworthiness, it would be a different matter altogether.) The tasteless and unimaginative custom of calling objects after particular persons is both anti-egalitarian and in defiance of the norm of nanhonore. Moreover, as an onomastic brand of exclusivity it can be considered an operational manifestation of nonphysical individual, and perhaps also familial, exclusivism. This is but one illustration of how intimately intertwined the norm of neutrality and the norm of inclusivity are. In this instance it is the ideals of onomastic inclusivity and of nanhonore which coincide. Whether it concerns the norm of inclusivity or the norm of nanhonore, in both cases streets, buildings, funds, and so on, should be given substantive names which are, for example, poetical or technical. Names may be used when praising people in an objective and inclusive manner, they should never be used to honor, or for that matter, dishonor people or personified beings. Those who would have liked to, or who would have felt an urge to, call something inter- or non-personal after a person, may call it after the bineutral predicate of nanhonore instead. The way which would otherwise have been prosaically named in honor of one particular specimen will then be the Way of Nanhonore. For nanhonore is the poetic dao in the realm of neutrality, in the realm of inclusivity. [Copyright ©MVVM, 41-69 a(fter)S(econd)W(orld)W(ar) M. Vincent van Mechelen] [TRINPsite, trinp.org; owner Stichting DNI Foundation, reception2@trinp.org]